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Hegel's Philosophical Psychology

Edited by
Susanne Herrmann-Sinai and
Lucia Ziglioli



Hegel's Philosophical Psychology

Hegel's Philosophical Psychology draws attention to a largely overlooked piece of Hegel's philosophy: his substantial and philosophically rich treatment of psychology at the end of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, which itself belongs to his main work, the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. This volume makes the case that Hegel's approach to philosophy of mind as developed within this text can make an important contribution to current discussions about mind and subjectivity and can help clarify the notion of spirit (*Geist*) within Hegel's larger philosophical project. Scholars from different schools of Hegelian thought provide a multifaceted overview of Hegel's *Psychology*. Part I begins with an overview of Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, which outlines both its historical context and its systematic context within Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*. Parts II and III then investigate the individual chapters of the sections on psychology: the theoretical mind and the practical and free mind. The volume concludes by examining the challenges which Hegel's *Psychology* poses for contemporary epistemological debates and the philosophy of psychology. Throughout, the volume brings Hegel's views into dialogue with twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinkers and places the discussion in debates of philosophy of mind and of psychology, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of action.

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Abbreviations

COMPLETE EDITIONS OF HEGEL'S WORKS

- GW *Gesammelte Werke*. Edited by Hartmut Buchner and Otto Pöggeler. Hamburg: Meiner. 1968–.
- W *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl M. Michel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 1969–1971; 1986.

INDIVIDUAL WORKS BY HEGEL

- Briefe I–III *Briefe von und an Hegel*. Edited by Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Meiner. 1952–1954.
- ENZ *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)*. GW 20. Edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Hans-Christian Lucas. 1992.
- Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830). Mit den mündlichen Zusätzen*. W 8–10.
- Cited by section (§) number unless otherwise stated.
- ENZ 17 *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1817)*. GW 13. Edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Klaus Grotzsch. 2000.
- GPR *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*. W 7.
- JS III *Jenaer Systementwürfe III*. GW 8. Edited by Rolf-Peter Horstmann and Johann H. Trede. 1976.
- NG *Nürnberger Gymnasialkurse und Gymnasialreden (1808–1816)*. GW 10.1–2. Edited by Klaus Grotzsch. 2006.
- PdG *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (= Philosophische Bibliothek 114). Edited by Johannes Hoffmeister. Hamburg: Meiner. 1952.
- Phänomenologie des Geistes*. GW 9. Edited by Wolfgang Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede. 1980.
- Phänomenologie des Geistes*. W 3.

viii *Abbreviations*

- VGP *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie I–III.* W 18–20.
- VL *Vorlesungen über die Logik.* Berlin 1831. Transcribed by Karl Hegel, Udo Rameil and Hans-Christian Lucas. Hamburg: Meiner. 2001.
- VPG *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Geistes, Nachschriften zu dem Kolleg des Wintersemesters 1827/28 und sekundäre Überlieferung.* Transcribed by Johann Erdmann and Ferdinand Walter. Edited by Franz Hespe and Burkhard Tuschling. In: *Vorlesungen: ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, vol. 13. Hamburg: Meiner, 1983–2007 (1994).
- VPR *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion I–II.* W 16–17.
- VR1821/22 *Die Philosophie des Rechts. Vorlesungen von 1821/22.* Edited by Hansgeorg Hoppe. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 2005.
- VSG *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes.* GW 25 1–2. Edited by Christoph J. Bauer. 2008–2012.
- WdL, W 5 *Wissenschaft der Logik; 1: Erster Teil: Die objektive Logik, erstes Buch.* W 5.
- WdL, W 6 *Wissenschaft der Logik; 2: Erster Teil: Die objektive Logik, zweites Buch. Zweiter Teil: Die subjektive Logik.* W 6.
- WdL II *Wissenschaft der Logik. Zweiter Band. Die subjektive Logik (1816).* GW 12. Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke. 1981.
- WdL I/1 *Wissenschaft der Logik, zweiter Band. Erster Teil. Die objektive Logik. Erster Band. Die Lehre vom Sein (1832).* GW 21. Edited by Friedrich Hogemann and Walter Jaeschke. 1985.

ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF HEGEL'S WORKS

If more than one translation is available, the translation used by the author will be indicated in an endnote within the chapter.

- E17 *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, and Critical Writings.* Edited by Ernst Behler. Translated by Arnold V. Miller, Steven A. Taubeneck, and Diana Behler. New York: Continuum. 1990.
Cited by section (§) number unless otherwise stated.
- EL *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Basic Outline Part I: Science of Logic.* Translated and edited by Klaus Brinkmann and Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010.

- The Encyclopaedia Logic* (1830), with the *Zusätze: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze*. Translated by Theodore F. Geraets, Wallis A. Suchting, and Henry S. Harris. Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett. 1991.
Cited by section (§) number unless otherwise stated.
- EPM *Philosophy of Mind: Translated from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. Translated by William Wallace. New York: Cosimo Classics. 2008.
Philosophy of Mind. Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), *Together with the Zusätze*. Edited by Michael J. Inwood. Translated by William Wallace and Arnold V. Miller with Revisions and Commentary by Michael J. Inwood. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2007.
Philosophy of Mind: Being Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), *Together with the Zusätze*. Translated by William Wallace and Arnold V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1971.
Cited by section (§) number unless otherwise stated.
- EPN *Philosophy of Nature: Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, 1830. 3 vols. Translated by Michael J. Petry. London: George Allen & Unwin. 1970.
Philosophy of Nature, Being Part Two of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830). Translated by Arnold V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1970.
Cited by section (§) number unless otherwise stated.
- JS *The Jena System, 1804–5: Logic and Metaphysics*. Translated by John W. Burbidge and George di Giovanni. Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1986.
- LPS *Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit* 1827–28. Translated by Robert R. Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2007.
- LPR I–III *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*. 3 vols. Translated by Robert F. Brown, Peter C. Hodgson, and Jon M. Stewart. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1984.
- PD *Philosophical Dissertation on the Orbits of the Planets* (1801); *Preceded by the 12 Theses Defended on August 27, 1801*. Translated by Pierre Adler. *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 12(1–2): 269–309. 1987.
- PR *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right*. Translated by Thomas M. Knox. Revised and edited by Stephen Houlgate. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2008.
Cited by section (§) number unless stated otherwise.
- PS *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by Arnold V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1977.
Cited by paragraph (§§) number unless otherwise stated.

- PSS I–III *Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit: Being §§ 377–482 of Part Three of The Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences (1830) with Zusätze and Including Two Fragments; 'A Fragment on the Philosophy of Spirit (1822/5)' and 'The Phenomenology of Spirit (Summer Term, 1825)'. 3 vols. Translated by Michael J. Petry. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 1978.*
Cited by section (§) number unless stated otherwise.
- SEL *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4). Translated by Henry. S. Harris and Thomas M. Knox. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 1979.*
- SL *Science of Logic. Translated and edited by George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2010.*
Science of Logic. Translated by Arnold V. Miller. Amherst: Humanity Books. 1999.

ABBREVIATIONS OF WORKS BY IMMANUEL KANT

- A *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Translated by Robert B. Loudon. In Anthropology, History, and Education. Edited by Günter Zöllner and Robert B. Loudon, 231–429. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2007.*
- CJ *Critique of the Power of Judgment. Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2000.*
- CPR *Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1998.*
- G *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary J. Gregor. With an introduction by Christine Korsgaard. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 1998.*
- P *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will be Able to Come Forward as Science. Translated by Gary Hatfield. In Theoretical Philosophy after 1781. Edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, 29–169. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2002.*

Preface

This volume is devoted to investigating a comparatively neglected part of Hegel's work: his philosophical *Psychology*, which constitutes the third and concluding part of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*. One of the reasons why Hegel's *Psychology* in particular and his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* in general have so far played only a marginal role in both the scholarly literature and the contemporary debate¹ lies in the complexity of Hegel's notion of *Geist*. An English translation is forced to choose between either 'spirit' or 'mind', and both capture only aspects of the original notion. With his *Psychology*, Hegel in fact provides a 'philosophy of *mind*' *sui generis*, the object of which is the knowing and willing mind as a moment of the broader notion of *Geist*, which forms the subject of the entire *Philosophy of Spirit*.

The *Psychology* constitutes the concluding part of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* and thus represents the highest form of *Geist* in its subjective form. It is the science of the finite mind, which gradually develops a conception of itself as free. Carving out the richness and originality of these passages and illuminating their potential significance for contemporary philosophy is the paramount aim of this volume. It provides the first English collection of essays, all originally written for this volume by scholars from different philosophical schools and traditions, examining Hegel's *philosophical Psychology*.

Hegel attributed such great importance to the *Psychology* that he expressed his intention—though never realised—to provide a separate, enlarged treatment of it.² His definition of *philosophical* psychology as a scientific investigation of spirit marks what he felt was still missing in the panorama of the philosophical sciences of the time. Hegel was indeed highly critical of disciplines like phrenology (associated with Franz Joseph Gall), or physiognomy (as set out by Johann Caspar Lavater), which, according to him, failed to grasp the essence of spirit and its relationship with the natural body. He attributed a similar failure to the empirical and rational psychology of his time. Whereas empirical psychology separated the mind into an aggregation of different and independent faculties, thus failing to acknowledge the 'original unity of mind' (EPM §378 A), rational psychology was

dismissed by Hegel in agreement with Kant as ‘an abstract metaphysic of the intellect’ (EPM §378).

Instead, Hegel places himself in the tradition of Aristotle, praising his investigation of the *psyche* as ‘the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of speculative interest on this topic’ (EPM §378). The living *activity* of spirit, in which its concept is rooted, is the core of a proper philosophical understanding of spirit. Modifying a comparison that Hegel draws elsewhere (PR §4 A), one might claim that activity is a fundamental character of spirit just as weight is of bodies.³ Shifting the perspective in this manner has far-reaching consequences for the methodology of an investigation of spirit. The ways in which spirit is active must not simply be presupposed, but have to be presented and explained *within* this science—a science that proceeds by the very same activity it investigates.

It is worth pointing out that this notion of a *philosophical science* distinguishes Hegel’s approach from the current meaning of the term ‘psychology’, both in terms of its method and its object. Unlike a significant part of modern psychology, Hegel’s investigation of mind is by no means an empirical science, but employs a notion of ‘science’ that is solely justified in the context of a philosophical system. Moreover, the subject of Hegel’s philosophical *Psychology* is neither soul (with its potential illnesses) nor (self-)consciousness, but an intelligent, knowing and willing mind, capable of acquiring rational, conceptually articulated knowledge of itself and of the world around it.

Hegel ultimately defined the nature and methodology of psychology as a specifically philosophical discipline during his time in Nuremberg (1808–1816), while he was also working on the *Science of Logic*. This is not a coincidence. The *Logic* as the science of pure thinking establishes the foundation for the concept of spirit and its science. Hegel’s leading theme within these years was to avoid grounding philosophy in psychological features of the mind, and the task of the *Science of Logic* is to show precisely how thought’s categories do not depend on any givenness but are constituted by nothing else than free self-determination. The concept of spirit ultimately arises from this movement of self-determination of pure thought by emerging from nature and progressively affirming itself in its self-knowledge. Moreover, psychology as the genuine science of spirit constitutes a crucial moment for understanding the intrinsic connection between the *Logic* and later parts of Hegel’s system, the *Realphilosophie*. Hence, the significance of Hegel’s *Psychology* is intimately bound up with the claim of Hegel’s philosophy to constitute a system. By investigating Hegel’s notion of the knowing and willing mind within his *Psychology*, this volume aims to contribute to restoring the systematic framework of Hegel’s notion of spirit.

Putting it in fairly general terms, Hegel describes spirit as reason knowing itself in its other, ‘recogniz[ing] itself in everything in heaven and on earth’ (EPM §377 A). Nature thus is presupposed by spirit as *its* other. Spirit fully affirms itself as self-knowing reason when it comprehends the

unity of its concept and its actuality—in other words, when it understands all aspects of actuality (such as empirical objects, institutions of a state, art, and religion) as particular manifestations of reason's activity (such as acts of knowing and willing, moral and political actions as well as artistic, religious and philosophical activities). Thus, Hegel's notion of spirit as self-knowing reason allows us to understand every step of spirit's progression equally as a different self-conception reason develops of itself.

Furthermore, because spirit progressively re-cognises itself in its other, all activity of spirit also represents its progressive *liberation* from any otherness. This is the central idea characterising Hegel's notion of spirit and his investigation of it: 'The substance of spirit is freedom, i.e. not being dependent on an Other, the relating of itself to itself' (EPM §382 A, trans. altered). Being the first part of the *Philosophy of Spirit*, the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* shows the manner in which the rational individual comes to know and will its own freedom in the reality it presupposes and inhabits.

What is sometimes overlooked but is in fact of great significance is the difference between the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* and the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807). Whereas the *Phenomenology* of 1807 takes into account the progressive development of the relationship between consciousness and its object, thereby preparing the subject for speculative thinking, the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* is instead the proper science of spirit as such (*Geistlehre*). Within the latter, spirit is presented as moment of the philosophical system that already is characterised by speculative thinking.

The *Psychology* in particular shows how spirit—after having emerged from nature and having determined itself as soul (*Anthropology*), and after having overcome any opposition between itself and its given object as (self-) consciousness (*Phenomenology*)—is finally in the position to realise the identity of its concept and of its actuality as rational intelligence. It develops through the subsections of 1) theoretical spirit (intuition, representation—encompassing recollection, imagination, memory—, and thinking), 2) practical spirit (practical feeling, drive, freedom of choice, and happiness), and 3) free spirit. Throughout, the objectivity of spirit is understood as the result of these activities, by means of which spirit determines the known world as *its own*, and becomes able to act in this world in such a way that it realises its freedom *within* it.

Another aspect that deserves to be mentioned is the following. By presenting the constitution of a rational, free will, the *Psychology* lays the foundation for the philosophical treatment of objective spirit, or Hegel's better-known expansion of it, the *Philosophy of Right*. Accordingly, the latter should not be read in isolation from its systematic context in the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Although Hegel reminds the reader in the first paragraphs of the *Philosophy of Right* of the *Psychology*'s results, misunderstandings still exist about the crucial difference between subjective and objective spirit and about how to understand the transition from the former to the latter. The subjective self-determination of the rationally active mind already

introduces a notion of freedom that is further developed in objective spirit and is transformed in respect of the way we understand essential aspects of the life of an intelligent, acting subject: such as the relationship between theory and praxis, or of thought and action. The *Psychology* thus provides the essential link between the self-conscious spirit, which is gradually overcoming misconceptions of itself, on the one hand, and a manifestation of spirit in social practices and the institutions of a just state, on the other. Without taking this link into account, it is not possible to understand how the individual can develop a rational knowledge of itself *and* of the world, and freely realise her rational will within a community that is not only governed by social norms, but by right.

In addition to reconstructing the systematic and methodological implications of Hegel's account of a philosophical psychology, this volume aims to explore the possible implications of Hegel's peculiar approach not only within German Idealism (represented by Immanuel Kant and Johann Gottlieb Fichte) but equally for contemporary debates. This double objective poses the continual challenge of balancing a careful analysis of Hegel's text with contemporary philosophical vocabulary. Ultimately, though, we believe that the benefits are mutual. Throughout, the volume brings Hegel's views into dialogue with twentieth- and twenty-first-century thinkers such as Elizabeth Anscombe, Robert Brandom, Donald Davidson, Sigmund Freud, John McDowell, Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Wollheim, and others—and places the discussion of Hegel's ideas in the context of the philosophy of mind and of psychology, epistemology, the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of action. To bring Hegel's *Psychology* back under the lens of philosophical examination thus proves to be of more than only historical interest but instead reveals the contemporary significance of Hegel's account of the constitution of the knowing and acting subject.

The volume comprises four parts. Part I begins with an overview of Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, which outlines both its historical and its systematic context within Hegel's *Philosophy of Spirit*. Parts II and III then investigate the individual chapters of the sections on *Psychology*: theoretical, practical, and free spirit. The volume concludes by examining the challenges that Hegel's *Psychology* poses for contemporary epistemological debates and the philosophy of psychology (Part IV).

Michael J. Inwood opens the volume with an examination of Hegel's critique of physiognomy—the study of (fixed) features of a person's face—and phrenology—the study of skulls. Inwood analyses Hegel's different arguments against these disciplines as developed in the *Encyclopaedia* and in the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit*. By considering Hegel's objections against these two pseudosciences, Inwood shows that Hegel not only presents phrenology as significantly different from physiognomy, but also as a development out of it. According to Inwood, Hegel's criticisms do not apply to against phrenology's remote descendant, neuropsychology. In addition, he

argues that Hegel's attack on these doctrines is intertwined with his contestable belief that once we know what a person's *actions* are, no further question remains as to his or her *intentions*.

Angelica Nuzzo's contribution examines the role that the *Psychology* plays in the systematic articulation of Hegel's philosophy of spirit—of subjective spirit but also in the entire articulation of the sphere of *Geist*. It is precisely the concept of 'Geist' that marks the first fundamental difference separating Hegel's *Psychology* from the tradition. Indeed, Nuzzo argues that Hegel's *Psychology* is responsible for establishing the modern field of psychology as a discipline dealing with the constitutive structures of subjectivity. Nuzzo traces the fundamental difference between the traditional concept of the soul and Hegelian subjectivity back to the *Science of Logic* and examines the methodological originality of Hegel's dialectical-speculative articulation of spirit. She thereby reconstructs how the concept of spirit can be the 'truth of' the anthropological 'soul' and the phenomenological 'consciousness'. Finally, Nuzzo argues that the *Psychology* remains the underlying basis for spiritual subjectivity in both objective and absolute spirit.

The introductory section of the volume is concluded by Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, who argues that Cartesian approaches to thinking and action fall prey to the illusion of an immediate self-conscious knowledge-in-action. In this way, even post-Wittgensteinian thinkers like Elizabeth Anscombe fail to analyse the real, natural and cultural, conditions of possibility for intelligent performances. Stekeler-Weithofer claims that Hegel is immune to this criticism. According to Stekeler-Weithofer, Hegel understood that any singular act, even an act of self-reflection, is itself an actualisation of a possible form that exists only in the traditions of joint human practices. Logical analysis, thus, turns into a kind of general 'microsociology' of the norms that govern the correct participation in such forms. Ontogeny, according to Stekeler-Weithofer, is the acquisition of body-based habits as preconditions for performing repeatable actions at will.

The volume continues by proceeding into the heart of the analysis of Hegel's *Psychology*. Stephen Houlgate opens the analysis of theoretical spirit by addressing Hegel's conception of perceptual experience. Houlgate thereby continues his discussion with John McDowell, which started in 2006. According to Houlgate's Hegel, sensation takes in the look or shape of things, but consciousness and intuition actively 'posit' what we see and feel as a world of objects. In reply to McDowell's objection that this view commits Hegel to a version of 'subjective idealism', Houlgate responds that Hegel in fact avoids such a position. Pace McDowell, he argues that sensory content does not precede consciousness and conceptualisation according to Hegel, but that sensory content is taken into consciousness, and endowed with objectivity, as it is being received. In his conclusion, Houlgate notes that, while for Hegel sensory content is received into consciousness by being actively taken up into it, for McDowell, experience involves no such activity; rather, conceptual capacities are drawn into operation passively in the deliverances of sensibility.

The role of ‘habit’ in Hegel’s *Psychology* and in the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* more general is explored by **Elisa Magrì**. She aims to demonstrate that the relevance of habit is not restricted to the *Anthropology*. Instead, Magrì argues that Hegel distinguishes between habituality as the second nature of the embodied self and a more sophisticated form of habituality presented in the *Psychology* as ‘memory’. Considering the automatic and impersonal character of habituality, Magrì explores to what extent habit and memory influence the development of theoretical spirit. She asks in particular whether there is any room for a notion of freedom that is independent of habituality.

Richard Dien Winfield continues the volume’s investigation of Hegel’s account of theoretical spirit by discussing Hegel’s notion of language. Even though Hegel does not say very much about the origin and character of language, his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* provides certain key arguments without which the origin of language would remain an enigma. Winfield argues that most modern thinkers presuppose that mind is reducible to consciousness and that consciousness is inherently discursive. These two claims, however, do not answer the question how individuals can create language and learn how to communicate in an already existing language without being consciousness and self-consciousness before obtaining language. Winfield argues that Hegel’s account of intelligence enables us to understand how intelligence can move from intuition to representation and from representation to concept and word. In this way, Winfield can apply Hegel’s contributions to complement and move beyond ideas developed by Chomsky, Davidson, and Vygotsky amongst others.

In the last chapter of this section, **Lucia Ziglioli** investigates the relationship between representation and thought in Hegel’s account of intelligence. She aims to demonstrate that the role Hegel attributes to representation in the cognitive activity is precisely what allows him to avoid an epistemic dualism between data-acquisition and intelligence’s spontaneity, which so commonly characterises many traditional and contemporary accounts of the mind. Ziglioli argues that representation establishes a necessary moment for the development of thought, providing it with a concrete, existent configuration of concepts. Thanks to the relationship between representation and thinking, moreover, Hegel is in a position to acknowledge the social and historical dimension of knowing, without however holding it hostage to the still limited point of view of representation. In order to show how this is possible, the enquiry retraces both acquisitions and limits of the representational activity of intelligence and how thought arises from it.

The third part of the volume, devoted to the sections of *Practical and Free Spirit* within the *Psychology*, is opened by **Susanne Herrmann-Sinai**. She argues that the passages on practical spirit within Hegel’s *Psychology* are able to enrich the picture of Hegel’s account of intentional action by providing us with a genuine discussion of ‘subjective action’. This kind of intentional activity is not yet part of moral or legal philosophy, and it is neutral as

regards the question how an action becomes actually manifest in the world as a 'deed', potentially causing unintended consequences. Instead, subjective action consists in the teleological, end-pursuing action of an agent acting on drives and willfully choosing ends, which are practical as the *causa finalis* of an agent's doing. Thus, the *Psychology* investigates intentional action from the first-personal perspective of the mental activity of the subject. It is legitimately part of subjective rather than objective spirit, and its socially mediated normativity is psychological rather than moral.

The investigation continues with **Dirk Stederoth's** analysis of the different grades of free will. Stederoth begins by underscoring that in comparison to the *Philosophy of Right*, the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* has only received little attention in the scope of the reconstruction of Hegel's account of freedom. He then goes on to show how the section on practical mind contains a stage theory of will in which the various steps and/or degrees of freedom are differentiated. He argues that reading the chapter at hand in this manner is not only interesting in the context of Hegel studies, but provides insight into recent discussions of the freedom of will. In the course of these debates, the term 'degrees of freedom' is increasingly being used while still requiring broad and systematic clarification. According to Stederoth, Hegel's chapter on practical mind provides a paradigmatic model for such systematic consideration of degrees of freedom.

Sebastian Stein closes the analysis of Hegel's *Psychology* with a discussion of the relation established by Hegel between theoretical and practical mind. In opposition to Damion Buterin's recent interpretation, Stein argues that unlike Fichte, Hegel does not claim that praxis trumps theory. The usual meaning attached to this claim is that willing is logically prior to cognition, implying that cognition can be explained in terms of willing. Instead, the *Psychology's* category of free mind is designed to suggest that subject and object are simultaneously identical and different. Stein further shows how this inherently speculative notion is not available to either Kant or Fichte (or Buterin) because they still rely on the method of reflection and its implicit prioritisation requirement.

The volume's final section, *The Challenge of Hegel's Philosophical Psychology*, aims to examine Hegel's significance to contemporary discussions in philosophy of mind and of psychology. **Kenneth R. Westphal** opens this section with a comprehensive discussion of Hegel's systematic epistemology. He examines some neglected yet crucial links between Hegel's *Science of Logic*, his philosophical *Psychology*, and his *Philosophy of Nature*, in order to show how Hegel preserved and critically expanded Kant's cognitive psychology. Westphal emphasises four key features of Hegel's account of *Intelligenz*, namely: human cognition is active; grasping the *Denkbestimmungen* of worldly objects and events requires intelligence rather than consciousness; intelligence obtains genuine objectivity by correctly identifying characteristics of a known object; and the central role played by natural science. All of these features underscore the importance of Hegel's use of the verb

realisieren. According to this use, to ‘realise’ a concept is to demonstrate that an extant object corresponding to it can be located and identified by us.

In the next chapter, **Willem A. deVries** addresses Hegel’s notion of space and time. He begins by situating Hegel’s treatment of space and time in sensation and intuition with respect to his predecessors, Isaac Newton, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Immanuel Kant, and then proceeds to juxtapose Hegel’s and Wilfrid Sellars’s strikingly similar arguments against transcendental idealism. DeVries illuminates Hegel’s complex position on space and time by examining both the presence of space and time in intuition and their presence in sensation.

To what extent Hegel’s philosophical *Psychology* can challenge the contemporary debate about perceptual experience is investigated by **Luca Corti**. He addresses in particular the discussion between conceptualists and non-conceptualists. After referring to Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell to reconstruct how Hegel came to be considered a champion of conceptualism, Corti argues that the question of whether Hegel is a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist depends on how to interpret Hegel’s method in the *Psychology*. Corti outlines two alternative ways of reading Hegel’s argument—which he defines as ‘descriptivist’ and ‘reconstructive’—both of which lead to opposing answers.

Louise E. Braddock’s contribution concludes this section and the volume. Braddock argues that in the literature on psychoanalysis, Hegel’s input is widely acknowledged with regard to the early *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), while the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* and *Psychology* are little considered. Braddock aims to show that a Hegelian conception of the mind’s activity as set out in his *Psychology* is to be found at the core of an influential philosophical reading of Freud’s psychoanalysis by Richard Wollheim. Braddock first argues that a misinterpretation of Hegel’s *Psychology* provokes a rethinking of the claim of psychoanalysis to be an empirical psychology. A second, constructive critical task undertaken by the author is the retrieval of governing ideas which have become occluded and thus unavailable to critique. Braddock argues that reading Wollheim against himself enables a retrieval from within psychoanalysis of elements of Hegelian psychology as a structural commitment that psychoanalysis needs both to own and to understand correctly.

The initial idea behind this collection goes back to a lively reading group and a subsequent workshop at the University of Oxford in Michaelmas 2013. The editors wish to thank the Hegel Society of Great Britain, The Mind Association, Trinity College and the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Oxford for their financial and logistical assistance. The finalisation of the editorial project would not have been possible without support from David C. Merrill, Nicolai Sinai, and Robert Stern, and from three anonymous referees of this volume’s proposal, for which we are very grateful.

Susanne Herrmann-Sinai and Lucia Ziglioli

NOTES

1. There are some important exceptions, though, which should be mentioned. The German philosophical literature has always shown a certain interest in this part of Hegel's system. Some examples are the collections edited by Dieter Henrich (*Hegels philosophische Psychologie*, Bonn: Bouvier 1979), by Lothar Eley (*Hegels Theorie des subjektiven Geistes in der „Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse“*, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 1990), as well as by Franz Hespe and Burkhard Tuschling (*Psychologie und Anthropologie oder Philosophie des Geistes*, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 1991). In Anglophone scholarship, the first monograph entirely devoted to an investigation of theoretical intelligence as part of *Psychology* was authored by Willem A. deVries (*Hegel's Theory of Mental Activity: An Introduction to Theoretical Spirit*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1988). Only very recently has this resulted in a revival of interest around Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. It will be sufficient here to mention two commentaries that have appeared in the 2000s, namely, by Dirk Stederoth (*Hegels Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes: Ein komparatorischer Kommentar*, Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2001) and by Michael J. Inwood (*A Commentary on Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2007). Following deVries, other relevant monographs in English were written by Richard Dien Winfield (*Hegel and Mind: Rethinking Philosophical Psychology*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2010; *The Living Mind: From Psyche to Consciousness*, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2011; and *The Intelligent Mind: On the Genesis and Constitution of Discursive Thought*, Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan 2015). Most recently, a collection of essays edited by David S. Stern draws attention to this part of Hegel's system (*Essays on Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press 2013).
2. Cf. 'Letter to Niethammer, n° 196, October 10, 1811.' In *Briefe I*.
3. The quote reads in the original: 'For freedom is just as fundamental a character of the will as weight is of bodies' (Knox/Houlgate).

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Part I

Philosophy of Subjective Spirit

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1 Hegel's Critique of Physiognomy and Phrenology

Michael J. Inwood

The word 'physiognomy' designates the features of someone's face, especially when they are supposed to indicate the person's character or temperament. It is also used to mean the *study* of facial features in order to discern people's character or temperament. Johann Caspar Lavater, who attempted to systematise physiognomy as a science, and his critic Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, both distinguish physiognomy from what they call '*pathognomy*'. Physiognomy in the strict sense concerns the *fixed* features of people's faces and the attempt to discover their relatively enduring traits from them. Pathognomy, by contrast, is a 'Semiotik' of the *transient* features of someone's face, whether voluntary, such as winks, or involuntary, such as coughs and sneezes. It attempts to infer from these someone's passing mental states or activities, their emotions and intentions, for example (Lichtenberg 1967, 372).¹ However, as Lichtenberg admits, 'physiognomy' is often used to cover pathognomy as well, including both the fixed and the mobile features of faces. (Henceforth I call physiognomy in the narrower sense '*strict* physiognomy'.) Phrenology or craniology was founded by Franz Joseph Gall.² It is the study of the bumps and hollows on skulls in order to discern a person's character. Like strict physiognomy, it deals with fixed features, but it provides no analogue of strict physiognomy's contrast with pathognomy, since skull bumps and hollows are inevitably immobile. Phrenology could not possibly reveal someone's transient states, unless these are necessary consequences of their enduring character.

In the third volume of his *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel distinguishes between strict physiognomy and pathognomy in approximately the same way as Lichtenberg does. He has some interest in and respect for pathognomy as a guide to a person's fleeting mental states and overall character. He has little respect for *strict* physiognomy, except as a way of distinguishing humans from animals and Caucasians from non-Caucasians. He acknowledges that we inevitably make snap fallible judgements of people on the basis of their physiognomy, but scorns Lavater's attempt to make a science of it.³ (His view of phrenology is even lower.) He does, however, suggest a link between pathognomy and strict physiognomy, namely that the frequent expression of an emotion such as anger may leave an indelible mark on a person's

fixed, physiognomic, features. However, he insists that a human being is free and can manipulate and dissemble pathognomic expressions, not only 'voluntary' ones but also those that are primarily 'involuntary', such as tears and laughter; such expressions are therefore a 'contingency for the mind', though this is also true of *strict* physiognomic features, which are not so open to manipulation.⁴ Hegel believes that a person's actions reveal more about him than his physiognomic and pathognomic features. He also has an ambivalent attitude towards speech. On the one hand, speech is, in comparison with physiognomic and pathognomic features, the 'more perfect expression of the mind'. Speech can represent the mind 'in its universality' (EPM §411 R), whereas physiognomic and pathognomic features cannot. A frown may indicate that I am thinking, but only speech can reveal that I am thinking that, say, beauty is truth. A cry may express either pain or surprise; only speech can tell us which. On the other hand, speech or 'language' can be manipulated as easily as pathognomic expressions. It can conceal as well as reveal thoughts.

I examine these considerations not only in *Encyclopaedia* III but also in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

PHYSIOGNOMY AND PATHOGNOMY IN THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA

In *Encyclopaedia* III, Hegel makes several references to physiognomy and pathognomy. In his account of the 'races of mankind' he says that 'in the *Caucasian* race the aforesaid angle [viz. the angle of intersection of the horizontal and vertical lines drawn within the skull—MI] is almost or entirely a right angle. This applies particularly to the Italian, Georgian, and Circassian physiognomy' (EPM §393 A). He also speaks of the distinctive physiognomy of individuals and families (EPM §395). He proposes a science called 'psychical physiology', which would deal with 'the most familiar connections by which tears, and voice in general, namely speech, laughter, sighs, with many other particularisations lying in the direction of pathognomy and physiognomy, are formed from out of the soul' (EPM §401 R). This science would examine 'involuntary embodiments of the mental', that we share, to some extent, with animals (EPM §411 A). Finally he considers specifically human, especially 'voluntary', expressions of the mental. The 'trained' human body 'represents not itself, but the soul, of which it is the *sign*. As this identity of the inner with the outer, the outer being subjugated to the inner, the soul is *actual*; in its bodiliness it has its free shape, in which it feels *itself* and makes *itself* felt, and which, as the soul's work of art, has *human*, pathognomic and physiognomic, expression (EPM §411). Such 'expression includes, e.g., the upright figure in general, the formation especially of the hand, as the absolute tool, of the mouth, laughter, weeping, etc., and the spiritual tone diffused over the whole,' though '[t]his tone is such a slight, indeterminate, and indescribable modification, because the figure in its externality is something immediate and natural, and can therefore be only

an indeterminate and quite imperfect *sign* for the mind, unable to represent it in its *universality* for itself’;

for the mind [the human figure] is only its *first* appearance, and *speech* is straight away its more perfect expression. The figure is indeed the mind’s proximate existence, but in its physiognomic and pathognomic determinacy it is at the same time a *contingency* for the mind. To want to raise physiognomy and especially cranioscopy to the rank of *sciences*, was therefore one of the most vacuous notions. (EPM §411 R)

The Addition expands on this. The body comes into consideration not

with respect to its *organic process*, but only in so far as it is an external-ity posited *ideally* even in its reality [*Dasein*] and in so far as in it the soul, no longer restricted to the *involuntary* embodiment of its inner sensations, makes its appearance with *as much freedom* as it has won *so far* by overcoming what contradicts its ideality. . . . The embodiments occurring with *freedom* . . . impart to the human body a peculiar mental stamp, by which man is distinguished from animals far more than by any mere natural determinacy.

Hegel emphasises our upright posture, our ‘*absolute* gesture’, and the hand, this ‘*tool of tools*’, but particularly the face, since ‘the head is the real seat of the mental’. He considers the symbolic significance of various ‘looks and gestures’: frowning, for example, ‘proclaims *anger*, a concentration of oneself into oneself against an Other’. Some movements reveal character. One’s gait, for example,

must be cultivated; in it the soul must betray its mastery over the physical body. Not merely cultivation and the lack thereof, but also slackness, an affected manner, vanity, hypocrisy, etc., on the one hand, and orderliness, modesty, good sense, candour, etc., on the other, express themselves in the peculiar style of walking; so that it is easy to distinguish people from one another by their gait.

In general, a

cultivated man has a less animated play of looks and gestures than the uncultivated. Just as the former bids the inward storm of his passions to be calm, so he also observes outwardly a calm demeanour and imparts to the voluntary embodiment of his sensations a certain measure of moderation; whereas the uncultivated, lacking power over his interior, believes that he can make himself intelligible only by a luxuriance of looks and gestures. . . . The cultured individual does not need to be lavish with looks and gestures; he possesses in *talk* the worthiest and most suitable means of expressing himself; for *speech* is able immediately to

receive and reproduce every modification of representation . . . / Now just as the *voluntary* embodiments of the mental discussed here become through habit something *mechanical*, something requiring no particular effort of will, so too, conversely, some of the *involuntary* embodiments . . . can also take place with *consciousness* and *freedom*. Above all the human *voice* belongs here; when the voice becomes *speech*, it ceases to be an *involuntary* expression of the soul. Similarly *laughing*, in the form of *laughing at*, becomes something produced with *freedom*. *Sighing*, too, is not so much something uncontrollable as something wilful. Herein lies the justification for discussing the soul-expressions just mentioned in *two* places,—with the *merely sentient* soul and also with the *actual* soul. This is also why we pointed out as far back as § 401 that among the involuntary embodiments of the mental there are many “lying in the direction of pathognomy and physiognomy”. . . The difference between these two determinations is that the *pathognomic* expression relates more to *transient* passions, whereas the *physiognomic* expression concerns the *character*, hence something *permanent*. However, the pathognomic becomes physiognomic when the passions in a man hold sway are not merely temporarily but permanently. The lasting passion of anger, for example, firmly ingrains itself in the face; and so too a sanctimonious nature gradually impresses itself in an indelible way on the face and on the whole bearing of the body. / Everyone has a physiognomic aspect, appears at first sight as a pleasant or unpleasant, strong or weak, personality. According to this semblance one passes, from a certain instinct, a first universal judgement on others. However, it is easy to be mistaken in this, since this exterior, encumbered predominantly with the character of immediacy, does not perfectly correspond to the mind but only in a greater or lesser degree. Consequently, an unfavourable, like a favourable, exterior can have behind it something different from what that exterior initially leads one to suspect. . . and a judgement based on physiognomic expression has accordingly only the value of an *immediate* judgement, which can just as well be untrue as true. For this reason, people have rightly retreated from the exaggerated respect they formerly harboured for physiognomy, when *Lavater* created such a stir about it and when people had high hopes of a massive contribution from it to the highly regarded knowledge of human nature. Man is known much less by his outward appearance than by his *actions*. Even *language* is exposed to the fate of serving just as much to conceal as to reveal human thoughts. (EPM §411 A)

PHYSIOGNOMY AND PHRENOLOGY IN THE *PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT*

In his earlier work, the *Phenomenology of Spirit*,⁵ Hegel had launched a systematic critique of the two pseudosciences. He first considers physiognomy,

but significantly he does not mention *pathognomy* by name and lumps transient pathognomy together with fixed physiognomy. This is clear from such passages as this:

These features and their movement are, according to this concept, the doing held back, remaining in the individual, and in accordance with the individual's relation to the actual doing, they constitute its own supervision [*Beaufsichtigen*] and observation of the doing [*Tuns*], *externalization* [*Äusserung*] as *reflection on* the actual externalization.—The individual is therefore not dumb with regard to and in its external doing, because at the same time it is there reflected into itself, and it externalizes this reflectedness into itself; this theoretical doing, or the individual's speech with itself about its doing, is also perceptible for others, for this speech is itself an externalization. (PS ¶317, 232)⁶

The features that externalise one's supervision of one's doing, one's inner speech about it, must be *transient* pathognomic features.

Hegel knew the distinction between physiognomy and pathognomy, having read Lichtenberg and Lavater. He has, however, several reasons for ignoring it in the *Phenomenology*. A stronger case can be made for physiognomy, if it considers current intentions and self-monitoring, not enduring traits—and, characteristically, Hegel wants to make the strongest possible case even for a doctrine he opposes. It is hard, too, to ignore pathognomic features; they are in part responsible for fixed physiognomic features. Lavater himself compares strict physiognomy to reading a language, a language that provides a better picture of one's soul than does ordinary spoken language. Of the segments into which he divided the silhouettes of faces, he wrote: 'Each individual part of these segments is in itself a letter of an alphabet, often a syllable, or often an entire speech of truth-speaking nature' (Lavater 1878, 193).⁷ In his initial exposition of Lavater's theory Hegel speaks of a person's physiognomy as a 'language' of this type. It is a natural extension of this to suppose that the language is spoken not only by 'nature' but by the person himself in what Lichtenberg called an 'involuntary language of gestures' [*unwillkürliche Gebärdensprache*] (Lichtenberg 1967, 388). It expresses, Hegel adds, the 'individual's speech with itself about its doing'. Finally, the integration of pathognomy into physiognomy enables Hegel to intensify the contrast between physiognomy and phrenology. Neither Lichtenberg nor Lavater could consider the relationship between the two disciplines. But Hegel presents phrenology as developing out of physiognomy. It attempts to repair a defect in physiognomy, its failure to explain why facial structure should infallibly correspond to mental features. If the face is simply a *sign* of the inner, expressing the individual's speech about himself, then the subject is free to override and exploit it. This applies especially to pathognomy, but also to strict physiognomy. Phrenology provides a linking mechanism in a material organ, the brain, *causally* related, somehow, to the structure of the skull. This supposedly supplies the necessary relationship between the spirit

and its outer manifestation that physiognomy lacked. In this respect phrenology seems to be an improvement on physiognomy. In another respect it is a deterioration. The skull is even less likely to be the ‘actuality’ (*Wirklichkeit*) of spirit than the fixed features of the face are, and, being immobile, the bumps and hollows of the skull cannot be quasi-linguistic signs of our inner life. The skull is dead; it does not act and it does not speak.

HEGEL’S CRITICISMS

Because in Hegel’s account phrenology develops out of physiognomy, he considers them separately, but when his criticisms apply to both, I take them together.

Hegel’s first criticism applies only to physiognomy. He notes the *contingency* of the relationship between a facial feature and the character trait it supposedly expresses: it is like ‘a language whose sounds and sound-combinations are not the Thing [*Sache*]⁸ itself, but are linked with it by free wilfulness [*Willkür*] and are contingent for the Thing’ (PS ¶313, 230). It is not always clear what the implications of this are. Hegel’s point that a physiognomical or pathognomical sign has no special affinity to what it signifies also applies to ordinary spoken or written language. The words ‘I intend, or intended, to murder him’ have no special affinity to the intention they express, apart from the meanings assigned to them. The intention could equally well be expressed by words with different acoustic or visual properties. This does not, however, undermine the role of language as an expression of our inner life. So it would not entail that our inner life cannot be adequately expressed by physiognomical and pathognomical features. It does suggest, however, that such features are merely fallible signs of our inner life. They can be manipulated by the individual to give a deceptive appearance of himself. This is true of ordinary language too. Someone can say they intend to murder when they really don’t. It is not true of actions, however. An act of murder is not related to an intention to murder in the way that a sign is related to what it signifies. It fits the intention like a glove. This is one reason why Hegel prefers actions as the expression of our inner life.

The manipulability of physiognomical signs leads to another objection to physiognomy—that it overlooks human freedom:

In this appearance, the inner is no doubt a *visible* invisible, but it is not tied to this appearance; it can take on another appearance, just as well as another inner can take on the same appearance.—Lichtenberg therefore rightly says: ‘*Suppose the physiognomist ever did take the measure of a man, it would only require a gallant resolve for him to make himself incomprehensible again for thousands of years.*’ (PS ¶318, 233)⁹

Hegel has in mind physiognomy in the wide sense, since pathognomic gestures can be feigned more easily than fixed physiognomic features. A thief,

murderer, or confidence trickster can readily assume the mask of innocence. However, a version of Lichtenberg's argument also applies to strict physiognomy. Someone with the supposed physiognomy of an honest man might freely choose to commit murder, thereby defeating the physiognomist. (This would be more appropriately described as a 'gallant resolve' [*braven Entschluss*] than the former case.) If the physiognomist denies that we can dissociate ourselves from our facial features, treating them as contingencies that can be overridden by our free choice, this seems inconsistent with their belief that we can distance ourselves from our speech and actions. However, freedom has limits. If the physiognomist concentrates on moral qualities, such as murder and theft, as Lavater did, the subject is usually free to defeat his prediction, by committing, or abstaining from, murder or theft at will. But if he introduces *intellectual* qualities and predicts that the subject would, say, never write a great book, the prediction may be invincible. Hegel is vulnerable to this objection, since he follows Lavater and Gall in taking these disciplines to be concerned with morality—unlike Schopenhauer, who, though he supported physiognomy, believed that it should deal with intellectual qualities.¹⁰

Hegel stresses the arbitrariness of the physiognomist's and phrenologist's generalisations, quoting Lichtenberg: 'It always rains when we have our annual fair, says the shopkeeper; and every time, too, says the housewife, when I am drying my washing' (PS ¶321, 236).¹¹ The reason for this is not simply the invisibility of spiritual characteristics, also the fluidity and complexity of our inner life, and similarly of our physiognomical structure:

It is not the murderer, the thief, who is supposed to be recognized, but the *capacity to be one*; the fixed abstract determinacy thereby gets lost in the concrete, infinite determinacy of the *single* individual, which now demands more ingenious depictions than those qualifications are. Such ingenious depictions certainly say more than the qualification, murderer, thief, or kind-hearted, unspoiled, and so on, but not nearly enough for their purpose, which is to express the opined Being [*das gemeinte Sein*] or the single individuality; any more than the depictions of the bodily shape which go further than a flat forehead, a long nose, etc. For the single shape, like the single self-consciousness, is, as opined Being, inexpressible. (PS ¶320, 235)

'Murderer' is an 'abstract determinacy'. It gets lost and diluted in the welter of the individual's 'infinite'. Diluting it from a definite prediction to a 'capacity to murder' helps to accommodate freedom. But it reduces physiognomy to vacuity. The phrenologist similarly retreats from predicting a murder to postulating a murderous predisposition (*Anlage*) that may, or may not, be realised. Freedom can be accommodated if he says, not that a man with such and such bump will, in the right circumstances, commit a murder, but that he has various predispositions over which he

has freedom to decide whether and how they develop. This reduces phrenology to vacuity:

Were observations therefore to contradict what it occurs to someone to affirm as a law,—should it happen to be fine weather at the annual fair or on wash-day, then shopkeeper and housewife could say that *really* it *ought* to rain, and that the *disposition* to rain is nevertheless *present*; so too with skull-observing,—that this individual *really ought* to be as, according to the law, his skull proclaims, and he has an *original disposition*, *but* one that has not been developed: this quality is not present, but it *ought* to be *present*. (PS ¶337, 248)

A countervailing tendency is to simplify the spirit to make its features more amenable to correlation with facial or skull features. In fact, not only is a man's spirit infinitely complex; so too is his facial and structure. Physiognomy and phrenology carve up both sides of the equation into simple slices in order obtain their laws. They thereby conceive the mind as something like a face, and correlating skull features with spiritual functions leads to an *ossified* conception of spirit, its functions becoming as distinct and rigid as bumps and hollows on a bone. Hegel concedes that 'there is not supposed to be any materialism' in phrenology, but that is how it ends up: '*the Being of spirit is a bone*' (PS ¶343, 252).

Hegel's specific criticisms of phrenology concern Gall's claims about the brain, namely:

1. The brain is the organ of the mind.
2. The brain is not a homogeneous unity, but an aggregate of mental organs with specific functions.
3. The cerebral organs are topographically localised.
4. Other things being equal, the relative size of any particular mental organ is indicative of the power or strength of that organ.
5. Since the skull ossifies over the brain during infant development, external craniological means could be used to diagnose the internal states of the mental characters.¹²

Phrenology was ultimately more fruitful than physiognomy, since the first three of these doctrines are roughly correct. The brain is the organ of the mind, though not the sort of organ with which we do things as we do things with the hand or the eye. The brain is an aggregate of organs with topographical locations and specific functions, though not, of course, the simple moral functions that Gall assigned to them.¹³ As Hegel says, the capacities located in the brain cannot be as specific as poetry, murder and theft. Since one might commit murder for any of a variety of reasons, it couldn't be explained by any single feature of the brain: 'his murderous disposition can be related to any bump or hollow, and this in turn to any property; for

the murderer is neither merely this abstraction of a murderer, nor does he have only one elevation and one hollow.' (PS ¶335, 246) The 4th and 5th doctrines are false and rightly disputed by Hegel: bumps on the skull have nothing to do with mental functions. But Hegel also disputes the first three claims. He elides the distinction between the brain and the mind or spirit and denies that mental functions are located in different parts of the brain:

it is contradictory to nature for the brain to be such a plurality of internal organs, for nature gives the moments of the concept an embodiment [*Dasein*] of their own, and therefore puts the *fluid simplicity* of organic life *purely on one side*, and its *articulation and division*, equally in its differences, on the *other* side, so that in the way they are to be conceived here, they display themselves as particular anatomical things. (PS ¶330, 242–f.)

He skirts the claim that the brain is the organ of the mind, preferring to collapse it into the absurd claim that the *skull* is the organ of the mind: 'we do *not* murder, steal, write poetry, etc., with the skull, in the way that we see with the eye as an organ.' (PS ¶328, 241) Yet for the phrenologist the skull is a man's *actuality*.

Physiognomy, Hegel insists, regards a man's face as his *Being* or *actuality* and phrenology regards his skull as his actuality. He finds this criticism in another of Lichtenberg's dicta: 'If anyone said: You certainly act like an honest man, but I see from your figure that you are forcing yourself and are a rogue at heart; without a doubt, every gallant fellow to the end of the world will respond to such an address with a box on the ear.' (PS ¶322, 236) This response, Hegel says, is apt, because it refutes the main presupposition of physiognomy—that a man's actuality is his face. It does so by altering the shape of the physiognomist's face and thus showing that the face can be manipulated, without, presumably, altering the character of its possessor. Later he suggests a similar reply to a phrenologist, only in this case you have to smash his skull. This shows that 'for a man, a bone is nothing *in itself*, let alone his true actuality' (PS ¶339, 249).

Why are the physiognomist and phrenologist committed to locating one's actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) in the face and the skull respectively? Why not say that the face or the skull are an 'exterior [from which] we *only infer* the interior . . . , not the inner itself, but only its expression' (PS ¶339, 249)? One is uniquely identified by one's fingerprints, but no one would say that one's identity or actuality *consists* in his fingerprints. We should remember, however, that in ensuring a close fit between spirit and the facial or cranial structure, the physiognomist and phrenologist reduce spirit to something more face-like or skull-like than it is. Hegel also replies that: 'in the relationship of the two to one another the determination of the *actuality thinking itself* and *thought* does fall on the side of the inner, but on the side of the outer falls the determination of *the actuality which is* [*die seiende Wirklichkeit*]'

(PS ¶339, 249). His point is that our inner life remains merely *inner* unless it is actualised, and whatever actualises it is one's Being or actuality. Might we have more than one actuality? It is conceivable that our face and/or skull, our words and our deeds are equally good guides to our character traits. Suppose then that there is a man with the physiognomic and/or phrenological features of a murderer. He has a pathognomic murderous gleam in his eyes. He says that he intends to murder somebody. He then actually murders someone. Here the indications of a murderous disposition are all in agreement. Nevertheless, the murderous deed clearly has a better claim to be this man's *actuality* than the other factors. Whatever his physiognomic and phrenological features, whatever words he utters, his murderous disposition remains *unactualised*, a mere potentiality rather than an actuality, until he actually murders someone. In another sense too, our pseudo-scientists must admit that a man is actualised by his deeds. What evidence could they have for their generalisations except overt behaviour? If no significant proportion of the people they classified as having the tendency to murder ever actually murdered, they would have to abandon or modify their generalisations. What justifies them in saying that someone who has performed no violent action so far nevertheless has a murderous tendency could only be that a significant proportion of the people who share his facial or skull feature do in fact commit murder.¹⁴ So even if the generalisations *were* well supported, they still would not entitle them to locate a man's *actuality* in his face or skull.

HEGEL'S ALTERNATIVE

And so, Hegel declares, a man's actuality is his deed (PS ¶322, 236). A deed actualises a disposition in a way that a face or a skull cannot. A deed is more clear-cut and determinate than the features of a face or skull. We know how to characterise actions, with universal concepts available to all, in a way that we do not know how to describe faces and skulls. There are difficulties, however. Hegel does not mention that someone may act out of character; his deed may reveal his current mental state, but not his overall character. Hegel concedes, however, that actions are open to dissemblance, bungling, and interference. This is the primary motivation for physiognomy:

Speech and work [*Arbeit*] are externalizations in which the individual no longer keeps and possesses himself within himself, but lets the inner go completely outside him, and surrenders it to something else. For this reason we can just as well say that these externalizations express the inner too much, as that they do so too little; *too much*,—because the inner itself breaks out in them, there remains no opposition between them and it; they give not merely an *expression* of the inner, but immediately the inner itself; *too little*,—because in speech and action the

inner turns itself into something else, thus thereby surrenders itself to the element of change, which inverts the spoken word and the accomplished deed, and makes of them something other than they are in and for themselves as actions of this determinate individual. (PS ¶312, 229)

That speech and work express the inner too much is roughly Hegel's own view rather than that of the physiognomist, unless the physiognomist is represented as saying that he wants to know what the inner is *as inner* and not have it converted into something wholly *outer*, that he wants an intermediary between the wholly inner and the wholly outer. The difficulty that the physiognomist exploits is that speech and action express the inner *too little*, owing to possibilities of dissemblance, bungling, or interference. Hegel's responds:

Individuality, which entrusts itself to the objective element when it becomes the work [*zum Werke wird*], does of course thereby risk Being altered and perverted. But what constitutes the character of the deed is just this: whether the deed is an actual Being that endures, or whether it is merely an opined work [*ein gemeintes Werk*], that passes away in intrinsic futility. The objectivity does not alter the deed itself; it only shows *what* it is, i.e. whether it *is* or whether it *is nothing*. (PS ¶322, 237)

A deed is not really altered by bungling, interference, or unfavourable circumstances. It is simply revealed for what it was all along. That is, the agent's intention or purpose is unimportant; what matters is what he does. The physiognomist disagrees:

Of the two sides that the practical consciousness has in it, intending [*Beabsichtigen*] and the deed (the *opinion* [*Meinen*] about its action and the *action* itself), observation selects the former side as the true inner; the true inner is supposed to have its more or less *unessential* externalization in the deed, but its true externalization in its shape. The latter externalization is the immediate sensuous presence of the individual spirit; the inwardness which is supposed to be the true inwardness is the peculiarity of the intention and the singularity of the Being-for-itself; both together the spirit *opined* [*der gemeinte Geist*]. (PS ¶319, 234)

The physiognomist believes that intentions matter, perhaps more than overt actions. One need not be a physiognomist to believe this. Kant believed it too. So too did Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right*: 'In English law it is left to the insight or option of the prosecutor to determine the precise character of the criminal act (e.g. whether it is murder or manslaughter).' (PR §225) Determining this is a tricky business:

In settling the character of an action, the agent's insight and intention . . . is the essential thing; and apart from this [*ohnehin*], the proof depends not

on objects of reason or abstractions of the understanding, but only on single details and circumstances, objects of sensuous intuition and subjective certainty, and therefore does not contain in itself any absolute, objective, probative factor. It follows that judgment on the facts lies in the last resort with subjective conviction and conscience . . . , while the proof, resting as it does on the statements and affidavits of others, receives its final though purely subjective verification from the oath. (PR §227)

Nevertheless, Hegel not only denies that someone's intentions are infallibly reflected in his face, but insists that:

when [someone's] *work* [*Werk*] and his inner *possibility*, capacity or intention are opposed, it is the work alone which is to be regarded as his true actuality, even if he deceives himself on the point, and, turning away from his action into himself, opines to be something other in this inner than in the *deed*. . . . The dismemberment of this Being into intentions and subtleties of that sort, whereby the *actual* man, i.e. his deed, is to be explained by returning to an opined Being, however the individual himself may create for himself particular intentions concerning his actuality, must be consigned to the idleness of opinion. (PS ¶322, 237)

Why did Hegel take this view? His vocabulary pushes him in this direction, though he doubtless chose his vocabulary for his purpose. His use of '*Werk*' instead of '*Tat*' or '*Arbeit*'¹⁵ immediately suggests a connection with '*Wirklichkeit*'. Must not a man's *Wirklichkeit* be his *Werk*? Hegel exploits the ambiguity of '*meinen*', both 'to believe, think, opine' and also 'to mean' in such phrases as 'to mean well' and 'did you really mean it?', in a sense, that is, close to 'intend'. He thereby represents an agent's intention as his *opinion* about his action. A similar effect is achieved by the use of '*Beaufsichtigen*' for the agent's 'supervision' of his doing (PS ¶317, 232) and switching to its close relative '*Beabsichtigen*' ('intending') two paragraphs later, where 'intending' is glossed as 'the opinion [*Meinen*] about its action' (PS ¶319, 234). This equation is wrong. Someone might intend to write a great book and also be of the opinion that he is writing a great book. But his intention is not the same as his opinion of his work. His opinion may be false. But his intention cannot be false, nor can it be true in the way that an opinion can. Generally speaking, we are authoritative concerning our own intentions, but not concerning the merits of our deeds and works.

However, Hegel's relegation of intentions depends on more than linguistic legerdemain. The following case illustrates this: 'When St. Crispin stole leather to make shoes for the poor, his action was both moral and wrong, and hence invalid [or "unacceptable"]' (PR §126 A).¹⁶ St. Crispin did not simply steal leather *and* make shoes for the poor. He stole leather with the *intention*, or for the *purpose*, of making shoes for the poor. Hegel does not

deny that this was his intention or suggest that it was only a story concocted to get off with a light sentence. He agrees that it was a good (moral) intention, but it is trumped by the wrongness of the act. Theft contravenes an objective social order in which theft is forbidden. Crispin's intention is good because it serves the duty of charity. However, the law against theft makes no exception for charitably motivated theft, and could hardly do so without undermining the security of property. In more Kantian terms, the duty not to steal is a perfect duty, unconditionally binding, whereas the duty of charity is an imperfect duty, leaving open how we fulfil it. Hence Crispin is obliged not to steal, but not obliged to provide the poor with shoes. His case is quite different from the distinction between murder and manslaughter. A murderer intends to kill his victim, or at least to inflict such harm as is likely to result in his death; a manslaughterer has no such intention. The distinction between them, and between the penalties they incur, is embodied in the law. Crispin *intended* to steal leather; he did not accidentally walk off with someone else's leather, mistaking it for his own. He stole it intentionally, albeit with the further intention of giving shoes to the poor. Hegel is therefore quite consistent in differentiating the two cases. He does indeed suggest that an action is more clear-cut than intentions, faces and skulls, and perhaps more clear-cut than actions sometimes are.¹⁷ St. Crispin's action can, after all, be described in different ways, as 'stealing leather' and as 'giving shoes to the poor'. But Hegel gives a respectable reason for elevating the first of these descriptions above the other.

That is how it is within a stable, legitimate social order. But how is it when the social order has broken down? A simple case is a typo or a misprint. Quite often an author says 'It is worth nothing that such and such is the case', when what was meant or intended is 'It is worth noting that such and such is the case'. We don't hold the author to what he published. We correct it in view of his presumed intentions. Intentions are not always so manifest. One such case is that of Oskar Schindler, who was in general a bad man: a Nazi agent who made a fortune from slave labour. Then he changed: he began to deplete his fortune in order to save the lives of his Jewish workers. He naturally presented this as a moral decision, even obligatory, his primary intention being to save lives. It is conceivable, however, that his primary purpose was to save his own skin, that he realised that the game was up and he faced prosecution and possibly death unless he could enlist the support of his workers. His action can be described in different ways, as 'saving the lives of his workers' and as 'saving his own skin'. Both descriptions fit his case, whatever his intentions were. Which one we privilege, however, depends on how we view his intentions. But we cannot know what his intentions were. Intentions are sometimes inscrutable, and so too are actions. They are not always as clear-cut as boxing someone's ear.

My second case is fictional, from Kurt Vonnegut's *Mother Night*. Campbell, a politically uncommitted American living in Nazi Germany, is persuaded by the Americans to supply them with information in the prospect of

the coming war. He does this by making Nazi propaganda broadcasts, but with coughs and pauses that convey information. However, his speeches are so vitriolic and convincing that after the war ends, everyone believes that he was a committed Nazi. Vonnegut says: 'Be careful what you pretend to be, for you are what you pretend to be.' Perhaps Hegel would agree. Or perhaps not, because there is still the evidence of the coughs and pauses, though these mean nothing except in the wider context of the code. How could anyone know whether Campbell's primary intention was to transmit information to Nazism's opponents or, alternatively, to propagate Nazism, which he couldn't do unless he obliged the Americans by giving them information on the side? Not from his bumps certainly, nor from his face and facial gestures. Nor from his protestations of innocence, because speech may deceive. We may never discover what his real intentions were.¹⁸

Hegel believes that inner intentions are not only inaccessible to outsiders, but too indeterminate and fluid even for their possessor to be sure what they are until they are manifested in action; they cannot be adequately expressed by faces and skulls, which are too fixed and solid to do justice to their fluidity and indeterminacy. But a deed settles the matter. Now we and the agent know as much about his intentions as there is to be known. But this is not invariably true. The act may be the crucial thing, but we need to know the intention in order to fully characterise the act. The intention isn't always manifest in overt behaviour. This is not especially problematic. The demand for a complete and infallible expression of our inner life is unreasonable. Our thoughts are often inscrutable. How could anyone else know that I am thinking that, say, beauty is truth, unless I express this thought in words, words that leave open the possibility of dissemblance? A behaviourist might say that someone is thinking this thought if, and only if, he *would* utter the words 'Beauty is truth' *if* certain circumstances were fulfilled. But even if this is so, this leaves us none the wiser unless we can formulate and verify this hypothetical conditional. If thoughts can be inscrutable, why not intentions too?

Do inscrutable intentions matter? Hegel believes not. This has other sources than his aversion to our pseudosciences. One is, as his criticism of Crispin suggests, that appealing to intentions threatens the established social order. Moreover, intentions cannot be *invariably* inscrutable. Someone who always, or even mostly, failed to do what he intended or whose intentions were always inaccessible to us, would be quite unintelligible. Inscrutable intentions are necessarily the exception. Again, a morality of intentions fits more comfortably with belief in a God who delves into the deepest recesses of our minds, a God who is our witness and our judge. Hegel acknowledges no such God. The only judgement is on earth. He is therefore inclined against the morality of Kant and more towards that of Sartre: a man is just what he does, what he actually does, and not what he might have done if other conditions had been fulfilled (Sartre 1946). Another factor is this. The passages about manslaughter from the *Philosophy of Right* concern legal

decisions within an established society. But the *Phenomenology* has other concerns. It deals with the grand sweep of history, the development of spirit. In this case, Hegel suggests, we should avoid 'pragmatic history', the sort of history that belittles great historical agents by attributing to them petty personal motives. In his lectures on history Hegel mentions Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon, but in the *Phenomenology* we encounter Antigone, Creon, and French revolutionaries. What matters about these people is the values they represented and the historical effects of their deeds. Their private motives or intentions don't matter. To take a more recent case, George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq was a significant event, even though it seems to have been a failure. But was it a failure? Bush's primary motive was probably to be re-elected as President: he intentionally invaded Iraq, but with the further intention of securing re-election. From that point of view the enterprise was a success. He wanted to be re-elected and was re-elected. However, as Hegel says, the philosophical historian isn't interested in such motives or intentions. We should not focus on them, neglecting the great forces and values that drive big events. Nevertheless, even a philosopher might show some interest in whether little things like Bush's electoral ambitions or Cleopatra's nose make their contribution too.

To sum up: In the *Phenomenology* Hegel conflates strict physiognomy and pathognomy, which he later distinguishes in the *Encyclopaedia*. He neglects this distinction in the *Phenomenology*, because he wants to present phrenology as a development out of physiognomy. He wins hands down against the physiognomy and phrenology of his own day. However, his victory over phrenology's remote descendant, neuropsychology, is less decisive. He is not justified in denying *any* role to capacities localised in the brain. They are not a *sufficient* condition of overt behaviour—for that we need a shared language and way of life, as well as particular opportunities. But they are at least a *necessary* condition, explaining why a man, but not his dog, is capable of participating in this way of life and taking up its opportunities. Intertwined with his critique of physiognomy and phrenology, Hegel has reasons of his own for suspicion of intentions and motives that are not manifest in overt actions and utterances. These reasons are not compelling. One of Hegel's staunchest defenders says that he is 'reconstructing Hegel's intentions' (MacIntyre 2006, 74).

NOTES

1. The essay appeared in 1778 in response to Johann Caspar Lavater's *Physiognomische Fragmente* (1775).
2. The first public announcement of Gall's work on phrenology was a letter published in Christoph Martin Wieland's *Deutscher Mercur* in 1798, but it also became known from his earlier private lectures. See also Gall 1835.
3. Cf. Schopenhauer 1974, 634: 'in ordinary life, we all test the physiognomy of everyone we meet and secretly try to know in advance from his features his moral and intellectual nature. Now all this could not be the case if, as some

foolish people imagine, a man's appearance were of no importance; if, in fact, the soul were one thing and the body another, the body being related to the soul as the coat to the man himself.'

4. Cf. Schopenhauer 1974: 'when we speak to him, or merely hear him speak to others, we disregard his real physiognomy since we ignore it as the substratum, as that which is positively given, and note merely its pathognomical side, the play of his features when he is speaking; but he so arranges this aspect that the good side is always turned outwards' (637) and 'The study of physiognomy . . . is the only thing wherein the arts of dissimulation are not enough; for only mimicry, the pathognomical, lies within their province. . . . in conversation the pathognomical at once slips in, and he then applies all the arts of dissimulation he has learnt by heart.' (638)
5. The word 'spirit' in this title and in my quotations from this work translates the same German word, '*Geist*', as does 'mind' in quotations from the *Encyclopaedia*. The reason for this discrepancy is that in the *Encyclopaedia* the word '*Geist*' is also applied to the individual human mind and not only to what Hegel calls 'objective Geist' (interpersonal social and political structures) and 'absolute Geist' (art, religion and philosophy). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, by contrast, the word '*Geist*' does not apply to the individual mind, but covers only the latter two stages of the *Encyclopaedia*, though Hegel does not specify that they are, respectively, objective and absolute.
6. All my references to the *Phenomenology* give Miller's paragraph number, followed by the page number of Hoffmeister's 1952 edition. I have amended Miller's translation throughout.
7. I have modified Holcroft's translation. See also Zelle 1993 and Moore 2007.
8. I translate '*Sache*' as 'Thing' in contrast to 'Ding', which is a 'thing'. A *Sache*, unlike a *Ding*, is essentially 'an object of theoretical or practical concern, the thing in question' (EL, xxv). It is often translated as '(subject-)matter'.
9. See Lichtenberg 1967, 377.
10. Schopenhauer 1974, 638: 'on the path of physiognomy it is much easier to discover a man's intellectual abilities than his moral character.' And 641: 'if we judge by physiognomy, we can easily guarantee that a man will never produce an immortal work, but not that he will never commit a serious crime.' He takes the opportunity to abuse Hegel: 'I would, therefore, like to advise my discriminating countrymen that, when they again feel inclined to trumpet abroad for thirty years a commonplace head as a great mind, they will not choose for the purpose such a publican's physiognomy as Hegel's, on whose countenance nature had written in her most legible handwriting the words "commonplace fellow", so familiar to her.' (640f.)
11. See Lichtenberg 1967, 398.
12. As summarised by Lyons 2009, 53.
13. Schopenhauer (1974) criticises Gall's phrenology for its moralising: 'Perhaps we shall be able one day to establish a true craniology, couched in quite different terms from that of Gall with its crude and absurd psychological basis and its assumption of brain-organs for *moral* qualities.' (170)
14. It is perhaps significant that Hegel nowhere explicitly mentions the need for observation of *actions* to support the laws proposed by physiognomy and phrenology, not even when he mentions observation of rainfall: 'The *law* and the *ought* are based on observation of actual rainfall, and of the actual sense [Sinnes] in the case of this determinacy of the skull; but if the *actuality* is not present, the *empty possibility* serves equally well.' (PS ¶337, 248)
15. '*Arbeit* is primarily "labour, activity"; *Werk* primarily "result of labour", "finished product".' (Farrell 1977, 385)

16. See also PR §140 and EPM §506.
17. Many actions are clear-cut. Consider the joke in Pinker 1994, 230: Two psychoanalysts meet on the street. One says 'Good morning!' The other thinks 'I wonder what he meant by that?'
18. See also Austin and Anscombe 1956/57 and Anscombe 1957, 1963.

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2 Hegel's *Psychology* and the Systematic Structure of Spirit

Angelica Nuzzo

In the 1830 edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel opens the *Psychology* by introducing its thematic object, namely, 'Geist'. Presented as the result of the preceding movement of subjective spirit, 'Geist' emerges here as that which 'has determined itself as the truth of the soul and consciousness' (ENZ §440).¹ This claim may strike one as puzzling, since 'spirit' has allegedly been at issue at least since the beginning of the *Philosophy of Spirit*. In fact, the notion of *Geist*, whereas ubiquitous in Hegel's philosophy, is a concept that technically and in its most proper and specific validity is thematised for the first time in the *Psychology*. Neither the 'soul' of the *Anthropology* nor 'consciousness' (and 'self-consciousness'), which occupies the *Phenomenology*, is properly 'spirit' yet (it may be said, in a first approximation, to be a stage in its genetic development or a systematic condition for its concept). Unlike the later editions of the *Encyclopaedia*, the 1817 edition divides the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* not according to the three disciplines of *Anthropology*, *Phenomenology*, and *Psychology* but following the distinction of their thematic objects (or, more traditionally, 'faculties'), namely, the 'soul', 'consciousness', and 'spirit'. In 1817 the last sphere of *Subjective Spirit* (C. *Der Geist*) begins by stating, 'Geist has shown itself to be the unity of the soul and consciousness' (ENZ 17 §363). Just as in the later text, spirit is presented as a result first attained by overcoming the movement and the determinations proper to the soul and consciousness. Both the way in which Hegel consistently chooses to open the last division of *Subjective Spirit*, and the change in the titles of this division in the successive editions of the *Encyclopaedia* (i.e., the shift from traditional mental faculties to traditional philosophical disciplines) confirms that the claim that 'Geist' is, specifically, the thematic object of psychology is neither a trivial claim nor a claim that Hegel himself simply takes for granted. After all, 'spirit' in its proper sense is neither the topic of traditional scholastic psychology nor the topic of Kant's critical successor to it; but is also not the topic of Aristotle's highly praised 'books on the soul', which deal precisely with the 'soul' (ENZ §378).

Set right in contrast to this more specific and restricted thematic meaning of *Geist* as the object of *Psychology* is the broadest significance that Hegel attributes to 'spirit' as the sole 'topic' and 'content' of philosophy

and philosophical thinking as such. And this is a non-trivial claim as the one that posits psychology as the philosophical (and speculative) science of spirit. In fact, in the general introduction to the *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel stresses the importance that philosophy finally comes to an understanding that its ‘topic (*Inhalt*) is none other than the basic content (*Gehalt*) that has originally been produced and that produces itself in the realms of the living spirit (*im Gebiete des lebendigen Geistes*), a content (*Gehalt*) made into a world, namely, the outer and inner world of consciousness’. From this he concludes, ‘the topic (*Inhalt*) of philosophy is actuality (*Wirklichkeit*)’ (ENZ §6). The traditional, Aristotelian idea of metaphysics as *philosophia prima* (or of ontology as science of being *qua* being) is thereby transformed into an immanent conception of reality—where reality is the constructed and self-produced actuality of the ‘living spirit’, realised and wholly manifested in the objectivity of a ‘world’, and apprehended in spirit’s self-awareness. Such a world, however, far from being a transcendent (cosmological) object or an antinomic idea set beyond the limits of experience (as for Kant) is constitutively permeated by consciousness—it is spirit’s own, self-produced internal and external reality—and is accordingly always an experienced, ‘spiritual’ world. Accordingly, in its broadest sense, Hegel conceives the task of philosophy as *philosophia prima* to be the task of a *philosophy of spirit*. From the outset, however, Hegel is well aware that such a conception is all but uncontroversial. Philosophy must first be brought to the understanding that its crucial task is the comprehension (and self-comprehension) of the reality and activity of the ‘living spirit’. And this can indeed be seen as one of the programmatic aims of Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia* as a whole.

In the following considerations, I discuss the systematic position that the *Psychology* occupies within Hegel’s *Philosophy of Spirit* framing my analysis as a bridge between the former and the latter text, namely, between the more restricted and thematic meaning of the concept of *Geist* and its broader and ubiquitous validity; between the *Psychology* as culmination of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* and the idea of a speculative *philosophia prima* as philosophy of spirit. I will present an argument in favor of the unique connection that links the concept of spirit to a new psychology developed in the framework of Hegel’s dialectic-speculative philosophy—the connection that marks out Hegel’s psychology in relation to the entire tradition. More broadly, however, I shall bring to light the conceptual constellation that ultimately characterises Hegel’s idea of philosophy itself as a philosophy of spirit. My argument proceeds in the following way. First, I examine the *methodological* difference separating Hegel’s dialectical-speculative psychology from the tradition by looking at the way in which the concept of *Geist* has its root in the *Logic* and, in particular, in the idea of logical subjectivity attained in the *Subjective Logic*. Second, I look at the way in which Hegel presents the ‘Concept of Spirit’ (ENZ §380) as the grounding concept of the *Philosophy of Spirit* as a whole and then obtains its restricted and thematic psychological meaning as the ‘truth of’ (or, as claimed in 1817,

as ‘the unity of’) respectively, the anthropological soul and the phenomenological consciousness. Finally, I briefly look ahead to the further development of the philosophy of spirit, and I argue that the *Psychology* constitutes the underlying basis on which the spiritual subjectivity of both *Objective* and *Absolute Spirit* is structured but also, in a methodological reversal, in its more ‘concrete’ significance is itself the result of the more complex movement of *Objective* and *Absolute Spirit*.

1 THE LOGIC AS THE SYSTEMATIC CONDITION OF HEGEL’S SPECULATIVE PSYCHOLOGY

What sets Hegel’s psychology distinctively apart from the tradition is the dialectic-speculative perspective—or indeed the ‘method’—in which he reframes the discipline in relation to scholastic metaphysical psychology (rational and empirical psychology), to Kant’s critical transformation of psychology into transcendental philosophy, but also in relation to Aristotle’s already somehow ‘speculative’ doctrine of the soul. Accordingly, Hegel presents the *Philosophy of Spirit* as a whole as the dialectic-speculative ‘successor’ of all previous treatments of analogous materials. This is precisely the argument that we find right at the beginning of the last division of the *Encyclopaedia* (ENZ §§377–380). It is significant, in this regard, that the *Psychology* is placed as the culmination or as the last sphere of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*—*Geist* being, as we have seen, the systematic ‘successor’ of the anthropological soul and the phenomenological consciousness. Now, this placement implies that Hegel’s speculative reworking of psychology is connected with an analogous reworking of the disciplines of anthropology and phenomenology. In the tradition, however, these two disciplines have a quite different status than psychology—the anthropology never being itself a part of metaphysics, the phenomenology entailing instead Hegel’s stand towards his own earlier views on the structure of the philosophy of spirit and, more generally, on the function and method of philosophy itself: the encyclopaedic *Phenomenology*, from which ‘spirit’ properly emerges, is this time the ‘successor’ of the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*.

In the 1830 *Encyclopaedia*, Hegel introduces the *Philosophy of Spirit* as a whole with an indirect reflection on the specific ‘method’ required by this division of philosophy on the basis of its topic. In a way that parallels the opening of the *Philosophy of Nature* (ENZ §§245f.), Hegel first presents the shortcomings of common and historical representations of ‘spirit’ as well as different attempts at its cognition found in the philosophical tradition. He argues for the need that all these views be eventually rectified in the dialectic-speculative perspective of his own philosophy of spirit—and hence ‘overcome’ by the latter’s act of dialectical *Aufhebung*. Then he proceeds to discuss the ‘Concept of Spirit’ that constitutes the methodological basis for the development of spiritual reality throughout its three systematic

spheres—*Subjective, Objective, Absolute Spirit*. The knowledge of spirit, Hegel announces at the outset, ‘is the most concrete and hence the most difficult’. He sums up the formula for spirit’s cognition in the Socratic ‘absolute command’ of self-knowledge, ‘know yourself’. The point is relevant: if the *philosophy* of spirit is knowledge of the activity and reality of spirit then such knowledge is necessarily ‘self-knowledge’. And this is the thought that already at this stage announces the very conclusion of the *Encyclopaedia*: spirit comes to its most adequate self-comprehension—and to its most adequate ‘concept’—in (Hegel’s) speculative philosophy (philosophy being the highest form of absolute spirit). But in introducing the topic Hegel warns against taking the Socratic command either in the sense of traditional empirical psychology as a fragmented investigation into the ‘particular (*partikulären*)’ functions, character, and inclinations of the individual or in the sense of traditional anthropology as an inquiry into the alleged ‘essence’ of man. For, in both cases, what is true and ‘substantial’ in the reality of spirit—or the conception of ‘the essence itself as spirit’—remains properly unthematized and fundamentally unknown (ENZ §377). This, by contrast, should be the topic of a true, i.e., speculative philosophy of spirit.

In the history of philosophy, Hegel considers the traditional metaphysical account of the soul offered by rational psychology or ‘pneumatology’ to have been rightly overcome by Kant’s criticism but already reduced to irrelevance by a confrontation with Aristotle’s *De anima*. Against the abstract account that the *Verstandesmetaphysik* offers of the soul, Aristotle’s remains for Hegel ‘the only work of speculative interest on the topic’ so that, after Aristotle, the only aim of a philosophy of spirit can be ‘to reintroduce’ the speculative concept in the knowledge of spirit (ENZ §378). Against the traditional ways of thematising the reality of spirit that dissolve it into a manifold of separate and abstract ‘faculties, forces, and . . . activities’, Hegel draws to the center the ‘living unity’ of *Geist*. But he also rejects the traditional dichotomies that constitute philosophy’s usual way of posing the question of spirit, namely, the antinomy of freedom and determinism, the opposition of mind/spirit and body (ENZ §379). Thus, the task is to offer a new speculative reconceptualisation (*‘speculative Betrachtung’*) of the living unity of spirit’s manifold reality and activity capable of encompassing all the problems previously addressed bringing their antinomic contradictions to a true solution (ENZ §379; Nuzzo 2013a; Wolff 1992). Thereby Hegel indicates the broad program of an *Aufhebung* of both modern metaphysical psychology and of its Kantian transformation into transcendental philosophy that rather goes back to Aristotle’s speculative standpoint renewing it in light of those later developments. It is, however, only the very last step of this program that is carried out by the speculative philosophy of spirit. Its systematic basis and its first step have been laid out in the *Logic*. It is to the *Logic* then that we have to turn in order to appreciate the novelty of Hegel’s idea of a *speculative* philosophy of spirit and to understand the position that the *Psychology* occupies within it.

Starting in 1827, the *Encyclopaedia Logic* is famously introduced by a ‘*Vorbegriff*’—a ‘pre-concept’ or preliminary concept—in which Hegel sums up the historical antecedents of his own dialectic-speculative logic by systematically framing them in terms of distinct ‘positions of thought toward objectivity’ (Denker and Sell 2010). Significantly, in 1817 such *Vorbegriff* serves as an introduction to *all* of the three successive systematic spheres—to the *Logic* as well as to the *Philosophy of Nature* and *Spirit*. In 1827 instead, whereas the *Logic* is preceded by a ‘*Vorbegriff*’, the spheres of nature and spirit require the discussion of an introductory ‘*Begriff*’ (of nature and spirit respectively). However, since both traditional metaphysics and Kant’s transcendental philosophy belong in the logical ‘pre-concept’ (along with the position of ‘immediate knowing’), and since scholastic ‘psychology’ and its critical transformation are central to Hegel’s appraisal of the historical development at issue, it is not difficult to understand why the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia* could consider the argument of this introductory section as valid for the *entire* encyclopaedic partition as such. Again, what we have here is the oscillation suggested above whereby ‘spirit’ is, at once, a specific concept as well as a systematically all-encompassing one, the part and the whole. My suggestion is that the issue of the *speculative* transformation of psychology sums up, for Hegel, the *methodological* problem of his new dialectic-speculative philosophy as a whole. This is how central the problem posed by the discipline of psychology—by its methodological transformation and by its systematic placing within the whole—is for Hegel’s philosophy. To put the point in a way that confirms the intentions of ENZ §6, this is the central issue of a philosophy of spirit conceived, this time, as *philosophia prima* (i.e., as the whole of philosophy itself).

In the *Science of Logic*, Hegel offers a more articulated argument in regard, this time, to the relation of his logic to both Kant’s transcendental logic and to traditional metaphysics. Referring to the first division of the *Logic*, Hegel suggests that the *Objective Logic* ‘would in part correspond to what for Kant is transcendental logic’ (WdL, W 5, 59). This, however, is a qualified ‘correspondence’ (it corresponds only ‘in part’). Hegel’s reservation concerns the *transcendental* character of Kant’s logic, which he fundamentally criticises and then rejects. On his view, Kant has dwelled exclusively on the relation—and, properly, the derivation—of the logical forms from consciousness with the consequence that the categories of his logic remain merely and insuperably ‘subjective’, limited to and by the structure of the transcendental ‘I think’, and trapped in its constitutive ‘opposition’ to the object (ibid.). In other words, Kant’s transcendental logic endorses, mistakenly, the standpoint of psychology or, alternatively, of phenomenology. This, however, yields two crucial interconnected shortcomings. On the one hand, the logic remains a mere phenomenology or, at best, a sort of ‘transcendental’ psychology. On the other hand, on this basis neither the discipline of phenomenology nor psychology can be developed in a way that brings to light the truth of the spiritual reality in its complete extension and in its

‘living unity’. In point of fact, Hegel’s appraisal of Kant’s logic repeatedly converges with his evaluation of the relation between the *Phenomenology* and his own speculative logic. Hegel aligns Kant with the phenomenological standpoint of consciousness and its stubborn yet unavoidable ‘separation’ and ‘opposition’ of certainty and truth, subject and object (WdL, W 5, 36; ENZ §41; confirmed in ENZ §467 A). And this is precisely the standpoint that needs to be overcome in the speculative conception of logical thinking (i.e., in order for the *Logic* to properly begin). The point I want to presently underscore is that the act of overcoming the standpoint of consciousness—the standpoint endorsed both by Kant’s transcendentalism and by Hegel’s own 1807 *Phenomenology*—is necessary not only for the *Logic* to begin (which is the point generally made by interpreters in this connection) but is necessary also, and most importantly for my present argument, if a philosophy of spirit should be developed in a *speculative* way. In other words, if the standpoint and the constitution of subjectivity are limited from the outset to phenomenological consciousness or to the (psychological-transcendental) ‘I think’,² the development of the concept of spiritual subjectivity—or of *Geist* in its truly speculative meaning—becomes impossible. It becomes impossible to think of subjectivity as being ‘spirit’ in the specific sense that Hegel’s *Psychology* attributes to it, i.e., as that which ‘has determined itself as the truth of the soul and consciousness’ (ENZ §440), realises itself in the objective world of social, political, and historical institutions, and finally expresses itself in spirit’s highest, ‘absolute’ manifestations. After all, one of the most important programmatic tenets of Hegel’s 1807 work, namely, in short, the aim of transforming ‘substance’ into ‘subject’ (PdG, W 3, 23, 28) is precisely what yields, in its conclusion, the transition to the ‘standpoint of science’, i.e., to the logic.

It is then clear that for Hegel a lot is at stake, systematically, in getting the position (and the qualification) of logical thinking right. Logical thinking must be distanced both from psychological thinking and from phenomenological consciousness. In fact, Hegel insistently characterises it as ‘objective thinking’ (ENZ §§24f.; WdL, W 5, 40, 43; Jaeschke 1979). It is only under the condition of freeing logic from psychological and phenomenological subjectivity that spiritual subjectivity can become the topic of a speculative account of *Geist*. This suggestion finds its confirmation at the end of the development of ‘Theoretical Spirit’ in the *Psychology* where at stake, coherently this time, is the account of psychological ‘thinking’ or the thinking that is proper to finite subjective intelligence (ENZ §465). At this level, the ‘formality’ of thinking is a function of the subject’s cognitive attitude toward the world (ENZ §466), and expresses a fundamentally different standpoint than the one presented in the logic. And this is an important point, which Hegel takes good care to explicitly make at this juncture (ENZ §467 A).

Hegel’s second claim in sketching out the connection between his own dialectic-speculative logic and the tradition is that ‘the critical philosophy did in fact already reduce *metaphysics* to *logic*’ (WdL, W 5, 45). Hegel

recognises that transcendental logic is Kant's critical transformation and overcoming of scholastic metaphysics. This concession, however, is a qualified one as well: 'the critical philosophy did in fact already reduce *metaphysics* to *logic*, *but*' in fact fell short of its more radical, truly speculative transformation. Again, what limits the achievement of transcendental logic is Kant's commitment to the subjectivist limitation implied in transcendental idealism or, in another Hegelian formulation, the 'fear' of the object (or the 'tenderness for worldly things' ENZ §48 A; Bodei 1981) that keeps the material content outside of the activity of the understanding and ultimately renders the logical categories merely subjective, in need of an additional 'transcendental deduction', and unable to apply to the 'thing in itself' (or the absolute). In effect, as Hegel suggests, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* brings the entire field of traditional metaphysics under the title of 'transcendental logic': the principles of ontology (*metaphysica generalis*) are reconstructed in the *Transcendental Analytic*, those of rational psychology, cosmology, and theology (*metaphysica specialis*) in the *Transcendental Dialectic*. In a sense, however, since the entire structure of Kant's logic is considered as having a psychological foundation in the 'I think' (ENZ §41), it is a psychological thread that ultimately guides, for Hegel, this transformation.

Now, following the first proposition (the objective logic corresponds in part to Kant's transcendental logic), the second claim (Kant's logic has already reduced metaphysics to logic) leads Hegel to conclude that 'the objective logic replaces . . . traditional metaphysics', and in particular ontology (WdL, W 5, 61). But how does this connection—speculative philosophy to metaphysics through transcendental logic—play out in the second main division of Hegel's work, the *Subjective Logic*? It is here, I suggest, that Hegel advances the program of a new speculative foundation of the philosophy of spirit—or of a speculative transformation of psychology—a step further. For it is at this level that the transcendental figure of subjectivity represented by Kant's unity of apperception or 'I think' is properly overcome in the speculative 'subjectivity' of the *Begriff* and of its realisation in the Idea yielding the logical antecedent of the concept of *Geist* to which the *Philosophy of Spirit* and the *Psychology* in particular are dedicated. It is only at this level that traditional psychology in all its successive incarnations is finally left behind once and for all,³ that substance is truly and completely transformed into subject, and the possibility of a dialectic-speculative psychology is first disclosed. The logical 'concept'—the 'genesis' of which lies in the logic of substance (WdL, W 6, 256)—displays the vestigial freedom and subjectivity (WdL, W 6, 251) as well as the modality of manifestation and actualisation—which is both *Entwicklung* and *Offenbarung* (WdL, W 6, 260; ENZ §380)—proper to spirit. On this logical basis the task of the speculative philosophy of spirit is to bring the purely logical structure of the concept to bear on the concrete reality of spirit or on the specific 'concept of spirit'. Accordingly, it is with the exposition of the 'Concept of Spirit' that Hegel opens the last main division of the *Encyclopaedia*. But before turning

to this text, we should look first at how the concept of spirit (or, more properly, 'the concept as spirit') and its systematic division emerges already in the conclusion of the *Logic*.

2 HEGEL'S SPECULATIVE PSYCHOLOGY: FROM SPIRIT AS THE CONCEPT TO THE 'CONCEPT OF SPIRIT'—ENZ §380, ENZ §440

The third division of the *Subjective Logic* presents the development of the Idea in the three moments of 'life', the 'idea of the true and the good, as cognition and willing', and the 'absolute idea' (WdL, W 6, 468f.). It is here that Hegel first explicitly introduces the notion of *Geist*, and presents structures that become crucial for the development of the philosophy of spirit as a whole. Whereas in life the idea in its objectivity displays the form of immediacy, and has individuality as mode of existence, in the structures of finite knowing and willing we are explicitly presented with the antecedent of 'subjective spirit', and of *psychological* spirit more specifically. It is 'subjective spirit that makes to itself the presupposition of an objective world'—the world in which it knows and acts as finite spirit. Since logically the movement of 'subjective spirit' is 'to overcome that presupposition and to turn it into a posited', i.e., to disclose the 'ideality' of the objective world, spirit finally reaches the true identity of self-knowledge in the 'absolute idea', in which 'spirit knows the idea as its absolute truth' (WdL, W 6, 469). In this movement of *logical* spirit—or in the purely logical movement in which spirit is caught at this point as engaging—Hegel presents the template for the development of spirit first in its coming out from nature (life), and then in its immanent articulation in subjective, objective, and absolute spirit (respectively, the idea of the true and good, and the absolute idea).⁴ At stake herein are the purely logical presuppositions that guide 'subjective spirit' in its activity; those purely logical presuppositions that are also, systematically, the necessary conditions for subjective spirit's concrete or actual development in the later philosophy of spirit (ENZ §387 referring back to ENZ §223).

Hegel is well aware that the gesture of including *in the logic* the idea conceived in such 'concrete' and 'real' forms—the idea as 'spirit' but also as 'life'—runs counter to what has traditionally been considered the possible content of the logic, and even seems to 'cross the boundaries of the realm of the logic' (WdL, W 6, 469). In fact, this inclusion is the last consequence of the speculative transformation of both metaphysics and Kant's psychological transcendentalism on which Hegel has been working since the beginning of the logic. It is only because logical thinking begins its determination process independently of any connection with a psychological, phenomenological or transcendental subject—it is only on the ground of this fundamental premise that (subjective) 'spirit' can emerge at the end of the logical process where the purely logical structure of its specifically *spiritual* movement is at

issue. This is the structure on the basis of which the concrete reality of spirit will develop. And in a stronger sense, it is the structure that spirit needs *in order to develop*. To be sure, the traditional conception of an ‘applied logic’ which is to follow ‘the so-called pure logic’ allows for a logic of ‘concrete cognition’ that differs, in turn, from the account of thinking and cognition offered by ‘psychology’ and ‘anthropology’. The difference lies in the fact that the ‘psychological and anthropological side of cognition is concerned with the form in which cognition appears when the concept does not as yet have an objectivity equal to it, that is, when it does not have itself as its object’ (WdL, W 6, 469). Hegel, however, rejects this traditional distinction, which only betrays the non-speculative position of the *Verstandes-metaphysik*. For, speculatively, the psychological and anthropological sides of cognition are themselves modes of spirit’s self-knowledge, which need to be thematised accordingly not in the logic (even in an allegedly ‘applied’ logic) but in a philosophy of spirit. Thus, Hegel frames the chapter on the Idea of Cognition in terms of a speculative transformation of the ‘metaphysics of spirit or, as was more commonly said in the past, of the soul’ (WdL, W 6, 487f.; ENZ §387). And he underscores the importance of dwelling on the placement of this chapter of the logic in the aftermath of ‘the traditional *metaphysics of the soul* and in particular also of the *critique* to which this has been subject’ by Kant (WdL, W 6, 489). However, neither of them is sufficient to disclose the standpoint of Hegel’s own speculative philosophy of spirit—the standpoint that is attained for the first time by his *Logic of the Concept*. Whereas the ‘metaphysics of the soul’ has presented only the ‘abstract essence of the soul’ according to determinations of the *Logic of Essence*, hence has proved unable to bring to light the *speculative* dimension of spirit, Kant’s critique has proceeded ‘without any dialectic’, remaining stuck in the still stand of unsolvable contradictions and ultimately has not gone past the metaphysics of his time, ignoring ‘the truly *speculative* ideas of more ancient philosophers on the concept of spirit’ (WdL, W 6, 489f.). These considerations constitute the logical parallel to the reflections with which Hegel opens the *Philosophy of Spirit* in the 1827/31 *Encyclopaedia* (ENZ §§377–379). At this juncture we have the logical antecedent of the speculative *Psychology* of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*.

To sum up, Hegel’s dialectic-speculative philosophy of spirit—and the psychology as its centerpiece—can begin only once the *Logic* has established the *speculative* foundation of the concept of thinking in two steps. First, the *Logic* has eliminated all reference to metaphysical and empirical psychology (in the *Objective Logic*), and then has generated the pure structures of logical subjectivity—or ‘subjective spirit’—by considering the processes of life and cognition again independently of psychological or transcendental considerations (in the *Subjective Logic*). At this point, in ENZ §380, Hegel completes the foundation of his speculative philosophy of spirit by presenting the specific methodological requirements that the ‘Concept of Spirit’ imposes, this time, on the logical structure of ‘spirit as the concept’

presented in the second division of the *Logic*. It is only on this systematic basis that the *Psychology* can be developed as the culmination of the movement of *Subjective Spirit*.

Hegel remarks that methodologically, the ‘concrete nature of spirit’ offers a ‘peculiar difficulty’ in contrast to nature. Nature does not properly ‘evolve’ as a unitary whole since its different forms remain independent and separated from one another, held back in ‘particular forms of existence’. It is only in the sphere of spirit that we encounter what is properly the ‘*Entwicklung des Begriffs*’—the immanent and unitary development of the concept. As the movement of *logical Entwicklung* is specified into the movement of *spiritual Entwicklung*, Hegel claims that ‘the particular levels and determinations of the *Entwicklung* of its [spirit’s] concept are not held back at the same time as particular existences’ as it is the case in the sphere of ‘external nature’. Within the reality of *Geist*, ‘the determinations and levels of spirit in contrast [to nature] are essentially only moments, states, determinations within the higher levels of development’. This means that lower, more abstract determinations already contain in themselves all higher determinations—albeit only in empirical, inadequate form—and can be considered somehow ‘anticipations’ of those higher forms (ENZ §380). At the same time, however, in order to fully understand the meaning of those lower forms a reference to the higher, full-fledged reality of spirit has to be made. As example of this methodological relation Hegel presents the case of ‘sensation’, topic of the *Psychology*, in which one can recognise in abstract form the ‘root’ of more developed contents that belong to religious or ethical consciousness (ibid.). But the case systematically most relevant is the sequence of the psychological forms of theoretical intelligence—intuition, representation, thought—which becomes the paradigm for the articulation of the forms of absolute spirit, namely, art, religion, philosophy.

The complexity of this two-directional intersecting relation distinctively proper to the spiritual modality of *Entwicklung* should be kept in mind when discussing the role played by the *Psychology* within the overall systematic structure of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Spirit*. The *Psychology* is set, systematically, at the center of the *Philosophy of Spirit*. It is the bridge that connecting spirit’s subjectivity—in both its theoretical and practical activity—to its objective and inter-subjective world ultimately, reversing this time the relation, reveals how the individual’s psychological life is grounded in and presupposes social and political institutions. For, these objective institutions fill the individuality of the subject’s memories, representations, volitions, feelings, etc. with the concreteness of higher and more complex social and historical meanings. In other words, whereas psychological subjectivity comes *first* in the exposition (*Darstellung*) of the successive spheres of spirit according to the order leading from more abstract forms to their increasing complexity, the psychological subject is, in fact, constituted *last* on the basis of the objective world within which it is an agent—as family member, economic actor, citizen, world-historical individual, etc. Finally, Hegel

brings the convergence of spirit's subjectivity and objectivity to bear on the articulation of the forms of spirit's 'absoluteness'. Art, religion, and philosophy are modes of production and expression proper to spirit's individuality within the social-political world. Developed on the basis of the psychological articulation of intuition, representation, thought, they give voice to both spirit's individuality and to its collective and historical life although they also and necessarily exceed these confines being at once historical and eternal forms, being always more than merely individual or communal expressions of spirit's life. In the last section of this essay I shall discuss one example of this systematic relation. But before getting to this, let me add another condition necessary to frame the systematic position of the *Psychology* in the overall development of spirit's reality.

Within the encyclopaedic division (or, as Hegel puts it, 'for us') the 'concept of spirit' has nature as its 'presupposition'. Given the general meaning of Hegel's systematic transitions, spirit is now presented as the 'truth' of nature, and as its 'absolute first'. Herein we find, for the first time, the twofold relation discussed above: spirit is the result of the movement of the sphere of nature (and in particular of the last development of organic, living nature). And yet, inverting the relation, spirit is also declared an 'absolute first' with regard to nature. Indeed, in the transition to spirit, nature 'has disappeared' in the unity of subjectivity and objectivity that is spirit in its concept. Systematically, spirit is the movement of 'coming back from nature' (ENZ §381). Nature, however, despite such 'disappearance' remains the underlying basis as spirit's necessary presupposition. Thereby, it becomes a different nature, i.e., nature this time in the process of its spiritual transfiguration and mediation (or idealisation). Nature accompanies spirit's development from the natural embodied subjectivity of the anthropological soul and the givenness of the world progressively appropriated by psychological spirit, through the social transformation of natural relations into family bonds, on to the geographical basis of world-history, up to the different modes of the artwork's poietic relation to natural materials and forms. Freedom constitutes spirit's most proper essence. Formally or negatively, this means that spirit can make abstraction from all exteriority—even from its own existence—and this constitutes spirit's proper form of universality (ENZ §382)—the freedom and universality that nature (and the natural individual) can never achieve. Concretely or positively, however, freedom is the movement of self-realisation whereby spirit's universality becomes particular and concretely individual in the manifold of its actual manifestations (ENZ §383). Ultimately, the movement of actualisation of spirit's freedom is the movement of 'revealing' or *Offenbaren*, i.e., the process through which spirit posits and (re-) creates nature as its own 'world' (ENZ §384)—a world that is both the reality of spirit's subjectivity and finitude and the sign of its true absoluteness.

Whereas 'spirit' in the most general sense offered by its 'concept' is obtained as a result (is '*geworden*' ENZ §388) from nature, hence is

presented as ‘the truth of nature’, and is the thematic concept progressively determined throughout the *Philosophy of Spirit*, *Geist* begins to be and to act as *Geist* in the proper sense only in the *Psychology*. Accordingly, the *Psychology* offers the *terminus ad quem* driving the movement of subjective spirit as a whole. On the other hand, however, by developing the structures of ‘practical spirit’ up to the ‘free spirit’ (ENZ §§469–481) the *Psychology* sets the conditions for spirit’s further actualisation in its social, political, and historical forms—it is, accordingly, the *terminus a quo* for the presentation of ‘objective spirit’ (ENZ §482), and from here on of absolute spirit. In the broader sense that Hegel makes clear in addressing the methodology dictated by the concept of spirit (and sanctioning the difference between the ‘concept of spirit’ and ‘spirit as the concept’ at stake instead in the *Logic*), all the lower determinations of finite spirit presented in the *Anthropology* and *Phenomenology* are abstract forms that first reach their true meaning in the end, i.e., in the higher and more complex structures of psychological spirit. In fact, this is precisely what it means for ‘spirit’ to be posited as the ‘truth of’ the soul and consciousness (ENZ §440). It is only in the higher psychological structures of *Geist* that the ‘truth’ of the preceding, still inadequate, and one-sided forms comes to light. As their truth is established, however, we no longer have the soul or consciousness but the different, indeed higher reality in which they are dialectically *aufgehoben*. And this is ‘spirit’ in the proper sense, the topic of the *Psychology*.

In order to appreciate the systematic presuppositions of the overall movement of the sphere of *Psychology*, it is necessary to understand the central characters of the two incarnations of spirit *before* ‘spirit’ proper, namely, the soul and consciousness the ‘truth’ of which is attained at the beginning of the *Psychology*. The ‘soul’ that is the topic of the *Anthropology* is ‘not yet spirit’ (ENZ §388). As it comes out of nature in its immediacy the soul is still almost closer to nature than to spirit proper: it is ‘*Naturgeist*’ (ENZ §387). For one thing, the soul is not subject but is rather ‘substance’, and as such is ‘the absolute basis of all particularization and individualization of spirit’ (ENZ §389). The movement of the anthropological soul is its coming to itself, its becoming ‘for itself’, its first becoming ‘subject’ in an individualised natural body which is its own (ENZ §411). Finally, in the figure of the ‘actual soul’, by overcoming the opposition to its body the soul overcomes the immediacy characterising its anthropological determination. Again, the traditional problem rational psychology, namely, the mind-body dualism is not an issue of Hegel’s psychology. It is, instead, the problem that the *Anthropology* speculatively solves once and for all even before the psychological subject is attained (ENZ §§379, 412). In its conclusive anthropological figure, the soul ‘anticipates’ the determinations that the *Psychology* will present in the concrete subjectivity of spirit proper: ‘In the habit of *sensation* and of its concrete feeling of itself the actual soul is in itself the ideality of its determinations that is for itself; it is *recollected* in itself in its exteriority, and is infinite relation to itself’ (ENZ §412;

my emphasis). Thereby the soul ‘wakes’ to the first vestigial determination of the subject, the ‘*P*’ that in order to be ‘*P*’ opposes itself to a ‘world’ (ibid.). At the same time the fundamental structure of ‘consciousness’ and its subject-object opposition is attained—the topic of the *Phenomenology*. Whereas the *Anthropology* is dominated by the determination of ‘immediacy’ in which the soul is immersed and from which it has to liberate itself, the *Phenomenology* is the sphere of the subject’s ‘reflection’ with the relationality and duplicity that reflection necessarily implies (ENZ §413). The overcoming of reflection is the position of ‘reason’ (ENZ §438), and this is the properly *speculative* standpoint (in contrast to ‘consciousness’ and ‘understanding’) from which the *Psychology* first begins. At stake in the movement of the *Phenomenology* is the constitution of the unity and identity of the subject in its self-certainty against the world of objects. But this is also the process whereby mere subjective certainty yields to the ‘truth’ proper of ‘spirit’ (ENZ §417). In fact, *Geist* emerges above and beyond the soul and consciousness only once the ‘subject’ is constituted in its unity and identity, hence in its (subjective) ‘truth’—in the unity of body and soul, in the identity of certainty and truth. The psychological subject as ‘spirit’ is the subject that conscious of truth as her own truth can ascribe a story—and thereby an individual identity—to herself and can tell for the first time such story as her own. As Hegel puts it, spirit begins only from itself and deals throughout only with its own determinations.

We are now in the position of better understanding the implications of Hegel’s claim at the beginning of the *Psychology*, ‘*Geist* has determined itself as the truth of the soul and consciousness’. In this sphere, ‘spirit begins only with its own being and relates only to its own determinations’ (ENZ §440). The topic of the psychology, Hegel maintains, are ‘the faculties and the modes of activity of *spirit as such* (*des Geistes als solchen*)’ (ENZ §440 A). Whereas in this account Hegel seems to repeat traditional descriptions of the discipline, if we take into consideration the movement from which ‘spirit’ properly issues as the ‘truth of the soul and consciousness’ (or as their ‘unity’ ENZ 17 §363) it becomes clear that we have reached a turning point in the development of the philosophy of spirit. It is only at this point that *Geist as such* (not spirit as soul, *Naturgeist*, consciousness, self-consciousness, understanding or even reason) comes to properly know itself in and by what it is and what it does. Accordingly, the standpoint of the *Psychology* is also, for the first time, the standpoint in which spirit—and the philosophy of spirit—*speculatively* relates to itself in an act of self-knowledge thereby beginning to fulfill the Delphic *dictum* that Hegel places in the opening of the *Philosophy of Spirit* as a whole (ENZ §377). It is only at this point that the *method* of the philosophy of spirit is adequate to its *content* and is the true self-thematisation of the content. This is properly *Geist*: spirit is that which can thematise, know, and realise itself *as spirit*. To this extent spirit *is* freedom as a process of self-realisation. That was the case neither in the *Anthropology* nor in the *Phenomenology*. In these spheres

it is, alternatively, the immediacy or the reflected character of the relation between the proto-spiritual forms of subjectivity and the world that progressively drives on the attempts at a conciliation of the two sides.

3 HEGEL'S *PSYCHOLOGY* AND 'SPIRIT'—SUBJECTIVE, OBJECTIVE, ABSOLUTE

It is first in the *Psychology* that 'nature' and the 'world' more generally gain a new meaning. They are now 'ideal' in the sense of being truly appropriated and spiritualised through the theoretical and practical functions and activities of *Geist*. In this regard, the *Psychology* 'anticipates' the development of objective spirit and is somehow closer to the movement of spirit's self-actualisation at stake herein than it is to the process of overcoming the opposition to objectivity (to the natural body and the object more generally; cf. ENZ §441) characterising the soul and consciousness. In fact, the spirit that first emerges in the *Psychology* is no longer 'limited' or confined by the subjective and objective totality still facing the soul and consciousness. Despite its finitude, psychological spirit is now 'infinite form' (ENZ §440). Thus, as the culmination and completion of the sphere of subjective spirit, the *Psychology* fundamentally 'anticipates' the actualisation of objective spirit thereby laying the foundation for the further development of the forms of absolute spirit. But at this point, taking up again the methodological considerations of ENZ §380, I want to sum up the systematic role that the *Psychology* plays this time with regard to the further development of spirit in its objective and absolute manifestations. I shall do so by discussing a paradigmatic example.

The case in point is provided by the role that 'dialectical memory' plays first within the development of the sphere of *Psychology*—in the specific functions of *Erinnerung* and *Gedächtnis*—and then in the successive articulation of objective and absolute spirit. According to this line of argument, psychological memory is the foundation of a movement in which *Erinnerung* becomes, respectively and successively, the 'collective' and 'historical' memory of a community and the 'absolute memory' crystallised in works of art, religious practices, and philosophical works. These are both the result of individual, subjective creativity, the expression of the ethical world in which they have been produced, and something exceeding them (Nuzzo 2012). However, this systematic line of development, which follows the encyclopaedic succession of the three spheres of spirit, is accompanied by a second methodological progression, which is the order of their foundation and runs, this time, in the opposite direction. In this latter perspective, the subjective, psychological forms of memory come last, and are presented as concretely fulfilled and adequately realised only in the forms of spirit's social and historical actualisation and in the highest self-cognition produced at the level of absolute spirit. Psychological subjectivity is now revealed as socially

constituted and as the active, creative center of spirit's absoluteness. Let me now, by way of conclusion, look briefly at the most significant stations of this twofold methodological development.

The case of *Erinnerung* is particularly significant because 'dialectical memory' is a process that, taking place already in the logic, is pervasive of Hegel's entire philosophy of spirit. Dialectical memory is a movement that does not presuppose a subject but rather constitutes, for the first time, the 'subject' who recollects by the way in which it recollects. The subjectivity, objectivity, absoluteness of spirit in its three successive encyclopaedic spheres is determined precisely by the type of 'subject' that memory respectively institutes. And yet, encountering again the double systematic validity of the *Psychology* remarked at the beginning of this essay (to be whole and part of the system of philosophy), thematically, or 'in its most proper sense' (ENZ §454) *Erinnerung* is the chief function of *Geist* explored by the *Psychology*. At this level Hegel presents the process of memory—the very activity of remembering and recollecting—when the 'subject' who remembers is not presupposed as the condition of such activity but is seen instead as the very result of such activity. The *Psychology* shows that the individual in her subjective identity is the result and the product of spiritual recollection (ENZ §§452–454; Nuzzo 2012, ch. 3). The process of *Erinnerung* first makes us who we are; it is not who we are that determines the type of memories we have. Memory is the process that progressively and immanently weaves together the story that, once it is remembered or re-collected as a 'story' first institutes the subject who can then claim the story as her own. Now, conceiving of memory in this dialectical way, i.e., free from its inhering on a presupposed subject but also still in a somehow 'abstract' way until the subject is specified, has long-standing systematic consequences. For, it opens up the possibility of conceiving of different types of 'subjects' that are first constituted and determined by such activity—the individual, to be sure, but also the collective, social subject, political institutions, history itself, and works of art.

In the *Psychology*, *Erinnerung* and *Gedächtnis* play a crucial role in the liberation process that freeing 'theoretical intelligence' from the dependence on the givenness of the world, leads it to the incipient, still subjective freedom of 'practical spirit'. Memory articulates the conscious dimension of spirit. But it also discloses the existence of spirit's *unconscious* depths. Dialectically, memory *finds as past* a content that seems given and found in the unconscious dimensions of the subject but is, truly, first *posited as past* and *found* by the very movement of memory. *Erinnerung* recalls something that was not there before and in doing so it first *posits* a content as given and past. Memory never simply re-produces (or re-cognises) given contents. For, it is memory that originally *produces* those contents *as reproduced and recognised*, i.e., as past. Memory precedes thinking—it is thinking's own past (is *Denken* as *Ge-dächtnis*). In the sphere of subjective spirit, it is an act of memory that institutes thinking for the first time. The 'given' is always

posited *as given*. The act of recollecting something that was not there before is the act that first puts it into existence. This is the meaning of spirit's freedom. While the activity of 'practical spirit', which the positing and poietic activity of memory already 'anticipates', prepares the systematic transition to the sphere of 'objective spirit', the finitude of spirit's unconscious subjectivity will be overcome—but also maintained in its transformed 'absolute' figures—in and by the development of absolute spirit.

At the more advanced level of objective spirit, *Geist* is actualised and manifested in the social and political institutions that ultimately constitute its *collective* identity in the nation state. On Hegel's view, this is the distinctive 'subject' and the main actor of world history. Within the collective structures of objective spirit, Hegel now shows that individual, psychological memory is properly grounded in—and is the true result of—the 'collective memory' of the social and political community. Psychological individuality is not an original first but is a product and a result. It is the product of the collective self-realisation process, which displays objective existence and life in the forms of ethical life. As I have argued elsewhere, this central claim, which anticipates Maurice Halbwachs' anti-individualistic and anti-psychologistic idea of 'collective memory', can be found both in the *Phenomenology* and in the later *Philosophy of Right* (Halbwachs 1950; Nuzzo 2012, chs. 1, 4; Nuzzo 2013b). Presently, I only want to underscore the importance of the dialectical inversion that sees the still abstract psychological subject gaining a concrete objective meaning by the act of sharing the collective memory of the people and state of which she is part. *Psychology* is thereby repositioned at the higher level of spirit's collective, intersubjective reality.⁵ The individual is a true subject, i.e., not merely abstract psychological individuality but a free acting subject whose action is efficacious in the objective world, only when her psychological individuality is recognised and appropriated as grounded in the broader, collective universality of the ethical whole. Accordingly, psychology becomes a truly speculative and concrete discipline only once it is reread or reenacted in its actual foundation within objective spirit; or, once it is understood that the movement of psychological spirit does not properly end with the end of the *Psychology* but continues on in the realisation of spirit's ethical life. This is, in effect, a concrete instantiation of the methodological requirement proper to the 'concept of spirit' which Hegel acknowledges in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Spirit* (ENZ §380).

Properly, however, the 'concretisation' of psychological subjectivity continues on even beyond the limits of objective spirit. Beyond world history, yet still always on the basis of world history, Hegel introduces the concluding forms of 'absolute spirit': art, religion, and philosophy. These spiritual productions are systematically positioned *beyond* world history, and yet, in actuality, they are always and necessarily placed *within* history, within the collective reality of objective spirit. The work of art is the product of individual subjectivity and gives expression to her psychological (conscious and unconscious) life once such subjectivity has gained universal expression and recognition

in the ethical world. And yet, in the work of art, psychological individuality is raised even beyond its limited historical universality as it gains an eternal, infinite value. Subjectivity is now a form of realisation and self-thematisation of *absolute* spirit. As mentioned above, the articulation of absolute spirit is a repetition, at the level, this time, of the infinite dimension of *Geist*, of the sequence of the forms of theoretical spirit: intuition, representation, thought. Accordingly, as *Erinnerung* plays a fundamental role in guiding the dialectical movement of the *Psychology*, it is also central within absolute spirit. What Hegel presents, at this level, is the ‘absolute memory’ of spirit (Nuzzo 2012, ch. 5). Such is indeed the content crystallised in the work of art, in religious representations and practices, and in the work of philosophical thinking.

NOTES

1. All translations are mine. In what follow, I use the capitalised and italicised form *Psychology* (just like *Anthropology* and *Phenomenology*) to indicate the encyclopaedic section with this title; I use instead ‘psychology’ to indicate more broadly the discipline or the topic under discussion.
2. See ENZ §41 for Hegel’s reference to Kant’s ‘psychological-historical’ derivation of the categories.
3. WdL, W 6, 261: Kant’s ‘psychological idealism’ is its final incarnation.
4. It is significant, however, that in this logical context Hegel explicitly and specifically mentions only ‘subjective spirit’.
5. And this can indeed be considered Hegel’s own critique of the abstractness of psychology as an isolated discipline: when psychology is treated speculatively, it necessarily leads on to the collective reenactment of its structures.

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3 From Satisfaction of Desire to Fulfilment of Intentions

Hegel on the Bodily Basis of Higher Intelligence

Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer

1 PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY INFORMED BY KANT, PLATO, AND ARISTOTLE

Hegel's philosophical psychology, as he presents it in the third part of his *Encyclopaedia*, is, altogether, a *logical geography* (Ryle 1949, 1) of our talk and knowledge about the human spirit (*Geist*), and not a theory of mind or a science of the soul. Just as I will be doing in this paper, Hegel does not develop 'arguments' that somehow force the reader to agree, but demonstrates how a real understanding of at first sight plausible ways of talking presupposes many other things. And just as I will be using quotation marks to mark some distance to a formulation and inverted commas for verbal citations, we should be aware of corresponding signals in Hegel's sometimes ironic phrases and, of course, take his self-commentaries very seriously. He declares, for example, with regard to his project in ENZ §378, that he intends to reconstruct the content of Aristotle's books on the soul. However, he does this in a way that is informed by Kant's transcendental, i.e., presuppositional, analysis of object-related forms of speech, as it applies, in due adaptation, to any 'entity' we can meaningfully talk about.

Hegel starts (in ENZ §381) with a very condensed definition of 'spirit':¹ nature is its precondition (for us), but *knowledge* about nature presupposes spirit, i.e., our cognitive faculties. It is an altogether basic fact that reason and thinking about oneself (hopefully) plays a major role in human life. In the extremely dense paragraph, Hegel says, moreover, that spirit turns out as *the idea* in its *being for itself* (*Fürsichsein*). This obscure remark can be understood only if we understand, firstly, that the adjectival or adverbial expression 'for itself' is a translation for the Latin *pro se* and, secondly, that it marks a *relation to itself*, and thirdly, that it refers to *actualised realities* that present or represent the 'entity', or rather, the 'subject' or 'object' we are talking about. Moreover, Hegel's word *idea* is not derived from the English, Lockean sense but instead more likely from Plato's *idea to agathou*, the form of the good, which includes the true and the beautiful and which is, in its ideal form, as perfect as our image of God. More precisely, Hegel's nominal expression 'the idea' is a label for our *real human life form* as expressed

in modes of good cooperation and communication between persons. The norms of the good, true, and beautiful are grounded in this joint life or 'practice' (*prāxis*). In contrast to *eidos*, Plato uses the word *idea* very rarely. Its prominent, even prototypical application refers to the *good form* of leading a *sapient life*—as I propose to read the seventh book of the *Republic*. Just as Plato's word '*politeia*' stands for the *constitution of a society* as well as of *the soul*, i.e., of *personhood*, Hegel will also analyse the inner relations of a reflecting and planning person in some analogy to a dialectical dialogue. Accordingly, I propose to read the simile of a master that gives a servant orders as an analogical allegory for what it means to fulfil conceptual norms correctly, namely, in performing forms that determine the very idea of a human life in a good way, in contrast to mere animal behaviour driven by animal appetite (*Begierde*) and animal awareness.

Hegel's dark and dense definition includes, moreover, the difficult remark that 'spirit is the absolute', which I propose to identify with *our performance of our life*. The word 'absolute' just marks the contrast to the word 'relative'. In performing an illocutionary speech act, *saying so makes it so*, as we might have learned from John R. Searle's commentaries on John L. Austin's observations: under certain further preconditions, I really give a promise just *by saying* that I promise it (Searle 1969, 54–61). Even when asserting things, as I do here like any writer who uses the indicative, what I *do* is *absolute*, even though the content of my assertions may prove wrong. This is because my action is free, i.e., spontaneous in Kant's sense. The contents of my claims are true only *relatively*, depending on how my sentences are to be understood differentially and inferentially *and* how the world is. It is quite easy to see with Hegel that speech acts are only a special case. They represent a most general feature or 'moment' of any spontaneous and conscious action.

Moreover, Hegel uses the expression 'the concept' as a generic label for a given system of conceptual norms. Strife for perfection in actualising forms of life is already a real enterprise of all living beings. But only we humans try or should try to fulfil the norms of 'the concept' as it defines our sapience and reason. The central insight consists in a differentiation between merely verbal *ideals* as we use them in reflecting on the directedness and infinite direction of all kinds of possible perfections and the real forms or norms that are quite robust in their non-sophistic applications. Hegel's radical criticism of all kinds of beliefs in transcendent and metaphysical utopias rests on these distinctions.

In every active attempt to perform our life in the world, we find indeed an 'absolute' standpoint in the true 'intellectual intuition' (*intellektuelle Anschauung*) of our performances, which we can happily identify with Martin Heidegger's *being*. To see what this means, we have to remember that the defining characteristic property of 'intellectual intuition' in the terminology of the time is that merely thinking or saying either proves or even creates the existence of what was said. Kant thinks it is safe to claim that only God

can have such a property or faculty. However, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel have seen that Kant overlooked the following fact: it was Descartes who first hit upon the form of argument that Kant calls 'transcendental' when he showed that, in every case of doubting or claiming, there is a thinker, and I *am* this thinker if I start to ask who I am. Such thinking about myself *establishes* not only that I am a thinking *person* but also *ipso facto* the actualisation of the elements and moments of my thought—granted that my silent or overt symbolic actions are meaningful. But this already gives us a central paradigm of what Kant calls 'intellectual intuition'. To be sure, we still do not adequately know what my self or a thinking person is in content and reality. But we should not doubt the argument in its most general form, which would even include the famous case of *ambulo ergo sum* if we could read it thus: I know that I exist because I consciously walk around. For Descartes, too, the central middle term in his 'argument' (not 'proof') is indeed the *con-scientia* that accompanies the process of thinking—such that Georg Christoph Lichtenberg's famous counterexample of 'it thinks' (in my head) and all other cases of unconscious mental occurrences below the level of full spontaneity do not apply. A further point is this: in any real case of thinking, but not in all cases of walking, some knowledge of what I do is presupposed, as Descartes himself pointed out against his critics. This leads to the further insight that thinking is, by definition, reflexive. Being conscious always already contains some forms of self-consciousness, for I must be in a position to line out symbolically, perhaps in words, *what* I do if you ask me or if I ask myself—otherwise my doing is or was no action. This holds for speech acts as well. The apparent regress always stops at some level, namely, when we are content with a *performance* and do not need any further *commentaries* or *verbal titles*, not to speak of whole propositional descriptions of the act.

All transcendental arguments in favour of some version of 'intellectual intuition' have the form of proving the cake by making it. In fact, there is no way of showing the faculty of thinking or free action other than by performing the corresponding scheme of action at will. I can, for example, at will ride my bike or think of the streets of Paris—or stop doing it. It does not make any sense to doubt this, if we read 'reasonable doubt' in accordance with Hegel's sober Suebian, pragmatic spirit, which was fundamentally opposed to the subtleties of all forms of sophistic scepticism. In fact, Hegel believes that all formalist arguments turn a philosopher into his own caricature. In the German tradition, there is a well-known figure of *Till Eulenspiegel*, a drastic but popular 'mirror' of the 'owl', ridiculing a 'literal' understanding of words as sophistic and attacking by this the 'clarity' of scholastic philosophers.

A logically difficult point lies in the fact that our nominalised forms of talking about the thinking self, consciousness, free will, the soul etc. suggest a mystic dualism between the material world and a merely intelligible world of things that lie outside it. The result is a more or less unclear belief in an

eternal, e.g., Christian or Cartesian soul, or even some God. The opposing belief is that only the empirical world, i.e., what is more or less directly accessible to the senses, can be said to exist really. But this contradicts what we do and say in the sciences. In the sciences we declare that some underlying ‘real reality’ (*Wirklichkeit*) explains the sensible phenomena causally as mere appearances, and that only our theories provide us access to these ‘physical causes’. Therefore, Hegel can say, somewhat maliciously, that only our thinking has access to such a real reality (of ‘material causes’).

2 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

The task is to understand the conditions of possibility of human sapience as a development *in* the world and *out* of nature. Nature is, Hegel says (with at least a part of his tongue in cheek), as such ‘spiritual’—insofar as we identify it with the inner, internal, theoretical object(s) of natural science. For it is undeniable that science is a real human institution. As such, it is an enterprise of ‘spirit’. It exists (absolutely) only in our real and actual competitive co-operations, in which we develop ‘the concept’, i.e., the conceptual framework of material norms and rules for a good understanding, not only of scientific language but also of general vocabularies and general and particular knowledge, made explicit in corresponding speech acts. In other words, science is not a collection of empirical information. Such collections are always anecdotic in their indexical reference to the perspective of the narrators, even if we get statistical evidence of historical relative frequencies. *Scientia* and *theoria* stand in opposition to *empeiria* and *historia*. If we do not forget this, we might join Hegel in understanding science as an institutionally organised joint enterprise to develop ‘the concept’ in the sense of situation-transcendent generic knowledge about default inferences or rational expectations, conditioned by more or less jointly controlled differences. Any correct understanding of a theory should see it, accordingly, as a proposal of a set of material but conceptual rules of differentially conditioned a priori inferences. In other words, the application of a theory is governed by a practice of making differences, a practice of calculating generic consequences in the theory and drawing practical conclusions in the form of some default expectations or predictions in and for the situations of application.

Whereas philosophy since Plato and Aristotle traditionally encloses all theoretical knowledge of the sciences, the genuine task and method of philosophy has narrowed, at the latest after Kant. Now most general categorical and logical maps of the different domains of human knowledge and practice are at issue, addressed by transcendental logical analysis and the corresponding dialectics, which we can depict as a fitting continuation of Plato’s *dialektikē technē* and the logical and methodological writings of Aristotle, including the *Metaphysics* and *On the Soul*. This explains why and how Hegel returns to Plato and Aristotle. He sees that they had already

understood the soul (*psychē*) and reason (*nous*) as respective forms (*eidē*) of organic, animal, and human life.

The main difficulty in reading Hegel consists, of course, in his extensive use of generic expressions. But he needs them in his logical geography in order to make general contrasts in our talk about the soul, mind, and spirit explicit, especially features concerning understanding as rule-following and reason as taking part in setting norms and rules. Speakers of English do not tolerate with similar ease as do German speakers, or speakers of Ancient Greek, the use of nominalised expressions like *das Sein* (*to einai*) in order to reflect generically on all cases of application of the verb 'to be'. It is important not to read the noun-phrase as naming an object or a set of objects. This holds especially for an expression like 'the *I*'. It stands, in its reflective reading, for any generic case of a proper use of the indexical (even 'demonstrative') personal pronoun '*I*', together with 'me' and the possessive pronoun 'my'.

The preference for a narrative style wrongly suggests that we talk about 'entities' and their 'properties' and have to 'prove' our 'claims', instead of making implicit forms explicit in generic reflections. The (Wittgensteinian) advice to stick to examples and to philosophise through parables is not helpful either. We can see this if we understand that a mere paradigm relates to an explicit commentary on a verbally represented form just as a metaphor relates to an analogy. A metaphor leaves it open to the reader how to draw the analogical lines of equivalence that turn the simile into a structural explication. In other words, examples and metaphors *only show* forms implicitly, and they do this only for persons who are able to 'see' the forms. They see the forms by knowing something about form-equivalence. Nominal titles and speculative, i.e., high-level commentaries *say* explicitly to which formal features or moments we should pay attention. However, the logical elucidations of such speculative sentences in the sense of Hegel's high-order categorical analysis are not to be confused with empirical assertions or scientific explanations. In empirical narrations we *presuppose* that individual objects and subjects exist, have this and that as real properties, and are involved in this or that actual process. In speculative reflections on the status of conceptual and generic statements, we instead *point* to practically already well-known forms. And we *comment* on our use of generic names and adjectives. Generic entities are, at least in a first approach, *abstract* objects like numbers or states or institutions. But in good and true sentences about them, we express *essential moments* in the being and behaviour of a whole genus of things. If we say that only the individuals and their doings *really exist*, we once again contradict the fact that we also always appeal to some generic explanations of mere appearances, such that again a 'real reality' (*Wirklichkeit*) is distinguished from the contingent phenomena of mere actuality (Hegel's *Realität*). No purely empiricist abstraction theory can understand what we do in the sciences and in philosophy, where we *have* to talk about generic forms, and always already do so.

3 FINITUDE AND IMMANENCE OF THE HUMAN SPIRIT

Hegel presents his logical reflection 1) on the mind, consciousness and self-consciousness (*mens, conscientia, soul*), 2) on reason (*ratio, intellectus*), and 3) on spirit (*spiritus*) under the three titles ‘subjective spirit’ (1), ‘objective spirit’ (2), and ‘absolute spirit’ (3). Subjective and objective spirit are finite in the following sense: The mind or individual soul of an animal or a (human) person exists as such only from birth to death. Its existence is therefore limited to the time of that person’s life. Objective spirit exists as the constitutive forms of human cooperation and institutions defining our personal life. It is finite in the sense that the corresponding forms and norms of a ‘good’ practice must be understood in relation to a corresponding limited epoch or ‘bracketed time’, just as a genus or species of animals and their particular life-forms are well-defined only if we keep a corresponding epoch fixed. If we do not restrict our attention to such a limited epoch, there is no taxonomical system of well-defined genera or species for animals and plants.

It is not only a pun but a deep generic truth that has conceptual, i.e., a priori status that ‘in the long run we are all dead’, as John Maynard Keynes famously said (Keynes 1923, 83). In the same sense, it should be accepted as a conceptual truism and methodological principle, and not just as an empirical claim, that all organisms are related by common ancestors if we look far enough into the past. This means that the very notion of genus and species in natural history is *finite*, epoch-related, similar to the notion of human life on the generic or the individual level.

Some readers may argue that Hegel really follows Johann Gottfried Herder here in his *Ideas to a Philosophical History of Human Kind* and its developmental thinking. However, we miss his deepest thought if we fail to grasp his insight into the finitude of any historical development. In fact, the achievement of Hegel’s logic consists in his insight into the historicity of all categorical and conceptual forms and his recognition that particular developments, including the institutional developments of state and law, religion and art, philosophy and science, need to be reconstructed as instantiations of general developmental forms. The task is to identify and explicate state, law, and justice (*polis, dike* and *dikaiosyne* resp. *res publica, ius* and *justitia*) not just as presently given static relational structures but as dynamic, teleological, and effective forms governing real processes.

It is important to understand Hegel’s discussion of political institutions as paradigms for the collective forms of ‘objective spirit’, just because it should now be clear that the subject matter of objective spirit is totally different from what we address as the *soul* or *mind* of a particular human person. The notion ‘spirit’ in the domain of objective spirit corresponds more closely to Montesquieu’s famous title ‘Spirit of Law’ (*Esprit des Lois*) than to the topics of contemporary philosophy of mind as a secularised philosophy of the soul and a *theory of mind* as a neurophysiological and psychological theory of inner processes and outer behaviour of individuals. ‘Objective spirit’ is to

be taken in the sense of human institutions like language, knowledge, science, and their forms. Hegel's central insight is that the developed sapience of individual humans totally depends on their participation in institutional practices, i.e., in 'objective spirit'. Science is then indeed the arbiter of true general knowledge, as long as we avoid reducing *scientia* to only one of its provinces like physics, chemistry, biology, and physiology and forget all the social sciences and *Geisteswissenschaften*.

Just as we cannot understand the life of individual social animals like ants and termites if we do not take the life of the whole stock into view, namely, as a collective super-organism, we also do not understand personal competence if we abstract it from its holistic context. A human person and her 'rationality' and 'reason' essentially consist in her being a member of a system of relations between possible roles and statuses in our institutional network of families, communities, and states, and in the active participation in the cultural project of humankind. Nations play only a partial role in this project—as Hegel and Herder, interestingly, would agree.

4 ABSOLUTE SPIRIT AS RECONCILIATION OF THE LIMITED AND DELIMITED

Before we acquire a clearer picture of Hegel's philosophical psychology, we should at least give a preliminary answer to the question concerning the meaning of Hegel's 'ominous' talk about *absolute spirit*. This is not difficult. Objective spirit exists in the institutions that make personal competence possible. As such, it exists through the compliance and acknowledgement of the individual subjects, or rather, of enough persons who are needed to keep the institutions intact, to continue institutional traditions and to teach and learn the proper ways of partaking.

We can now understand the three 'super-institutions'—religion, art and philosophy—as the 'generic subjects' of a cooperative development of making our place in the natural and the social world explicit in a most general way. Their common topic is our practical self-relations or *attitudes* to nature and to the cultural world of objective spirit. The task is a kind of *reconciliation* of our finitude as individual personal subjects with a *delimited* joint project of developing sapience. In other words, the task of the three institutions of absolute spirit is to develop the self-consciousness of *noēsis noēseōs*, which I read as our knowledge of what makes us human persons and what are reasonable attitudes to the institutions that make it possible to lead a life as a person. In any religious or philosophical morality, the life-form of a mere *homo oeconomicus rationalis* appears, for example, as that of a *free rider*—which is the 'character mask' of merely self-interested rationality (Karl Marx). This means that the corresponding persons use and abuse all kinds of techniques only for their *own finite ends* by maximising their *profits*. In contrast, art and philosophy represent the fact that in a

good life, persons must view themselves as a part of a *joint* cultural enterprise of developing humankind. This is a relation to our genus (*Gattung*), not merely to our limited nation or state. However, in some distance to Kant's or Fichte's overestimation of the duty of a citizen to the community or nation-state, Hegel defends the central position of the individual person and concedes to the national project of state formation only a limited role for securing personal freedom, justice, and welfare.

Ultimately the topic of the institution of absolute spirit is the reconciliation of particular interests of individual persons with the impositions of objective spirit, the norms of institutions, the central power of the state, even its threats and other means to enforce compliance and, of course, the informal duties of ethical life and morality.

5 ANTHROPOLOGY, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN A PHILOSOPHY OF THE MENTAL

Hegel now divides his reflection on subjective spirit into three parts: *Anthropology*, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and *Psychology* (ENZ §387). The topic of *Anthropology* is the human soul or 'natural spirit', i.e., the mind as the 'system of the mental' (*mens*) in the sense of natural faculties (*dynamis*) to develop higher personal competences (the *energeia* of already embodied faculties of free rational judgement and action). In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, the central topic is the disambiguating differentiation of mere (self-)awareness in immediate feelings of certainty from full-blown (self-)consciousness. Under the title *Psychology*, the topics are the central properties and faculties of a self-developing personal subject in formation (education) and self-formation (*Bildung*). The terminology is unusual because the topics of psychology today stand under the heading 'anthropology'. The domain of the constitution of a full person—the highest translation of the Greek word *psychē*—has been 'outsourced' by twentieth-century psychology, which has divided this domain into *physiological* (after Gustav Theodor Fechner), *behaviorist* (for example in the work of Burrhus Frederic Skinner), *medical* (as in Sigmund Freud's 'therapeutic theories' of unconscious, mainly sexual, desires and drives) and, finally, *neurological*. Hegel's plan of reflecting on the motley of things traditionally addressed by a word like *psychē* corresponds, instead, to Aristotle's distinction between the organic and animal soul and the human person endowed with knowledge and self-knowledge (*psychē noētikē*). It thus develops the relation between the subjectivity of different forms of immediate (self-)awareness and the objectivity of (self-)consciousness, where the latter presupposes our whole culture of objective spirit. Personal (self-)development is therefore a development of habit and intellect, if we understand the contrasting *and* cooperative relations between desire and intention, between all kinds of 'bodily drives' and conceptually informed and therefore 'intellectual' will.

As I have said in the beginning, the most difficult and most important logical category in Hegel's meta-language is 'being-for-itself'. This category stands for a system of 'real beings', together with corresponding relations and processes that define the very self or identity of what we talk about, just as (representations of) ratios together with some equivalence relation define the identity of rational numbers (of course only in human practice). A most important paradigm is the system of all the 'internal' processes in a living body that define the relations of being-for-itself of an animal or a human being in its life. Hegel's deepest logical insight here is that the very notion of 'self' and 'the self' depend on a pre-selected notion of being-for-itself, i.e., on the relevant contrast with 'other selves' and the relevant equivalences between different moments of one and the same self. We should read Hegel as a kind of logical master of abstraction-theory who sees that the real fact of the matter in our talk about an individual personal self—sometimes called the soul, the mind, the person, or the *I*—consists in the *real* representations of what is identified by counting *as* representing 'the same' soul, mind, or person. And he sees that we are simply reflecting here on the different, and complicated, usages of the system of personal pronouns.

The question concerning why the soul is immaterial for itself (ENZ §389) can now be answered without subscribing to any mystical 'ontic dualism' of matter and mind or *res extensa* and the Christian soul or the Cartesian *res cogitans*. The soul is, as the self of an animal or person, an abstract object of our talk. At the same time, we refer to some real existence, namely to the real generic *form* of life as it is actualised in the life of the individual.

All 'forms of nature' are, as such, immaterial. For this reason, nature as the object of our (scientific) knowledge is, by its very concept, also immaterial. This sounds odd only if we view nature as a *heap of matter*. But real matter is only one moment in the always holistic form of natural processes. What this means in detail still needs to be elucidated, but this would lead us away from our main topic.

The soul as determined by nature is only the *actual* soul as the form of the individual being (ENZ §390). The basic self-relations of an animal or a human being have the form of *sensitivity*, beginning with 'vigilance' in opposition to sleep or coma, leading to some higher forms of (self-)awareness and (self-)attention, where the highest form is (self-)consciousness (cf. ENZ §§448 and 453), supported by recollection (of matters, ENZ §§452ff.) and memory (of words, ENZ §§461ff.). They are results of personal (self-)formation, the topic of philosophical psychology. The five senses and the 'sixth sense' of proprioception (including the sensation of pain, which some humans lack with terrible consequences) mediate our reference to the surrounding world and to myself at presence. All these relations and processes are, of course, *embodied*, such that the concrete soul is the living and sensing body (*Leib*) itself—in contrast to a *mere* body, which is the corpse immediately after the person dies. The mere body is also the 'object' of our medical treatments.

Hegel analyses the conceptual relations among the following phenomena: 1) (bodily) *sensations*—the ‘consciousness’ of Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers, so to speak; 2) general moods (ENZ §392), as they are mostly bodily mediated in ‘dampened’ depressions; 3) object-focused attentive perceptions; 4) ‘higher’ feelings that are already *intentional* in the sense of Franz Brentano—because they refer at least in the first place to *merely possible* objects; and 5) explicit thoughts. The modal relations in human intentionality presuppose conceptual representations and are in some sense always already propositional (notwithstanding the fact that the notion of a proposition is vague and ‘conceptual’ already stands in the context of symbolic actions). If I feared a dangerous animal around the corner, for example, the fear would immediately subside once I learned that there is no such animal. In contrast, we cannot immediately change *moods* like Heidegger’s *Angst*.

Sensation (*Empfindung*) in its pure form is still dull and vague (*dumpf*, ENZ §399) and embodied (*verleiblicht*, ENZ §401). Attentive perception is, instead, object-directed and, as such, in the human case, already an example of an intentional, hence conceptually mediated, relation of the ‘feeling soul’ (ENZ §403). However, a merely emotional life (of sensations and feeling) is, from the perspective of a (self-)conscious and intellectually developed person, still a defect. It is a ‘psychological disease’ (ENZ §406). This does not mean that animals who cannot ever surpass emotional life (or, for that matter, the animal capacities of enactive perception as sensitive beings) are, as such, sick or defective. Rather, it means simply that *we* can understand their way of life only by *negative abstractions*, i.e., by somehow bracketing our ‘higher’ forms of consciousness.

Psychological madness in humans can be (the result of) an illness of the body as well as of the mind (ENZ §408). Necessary functions of sensitive self-control can fail. The most developed level of the ‘feeling soul’ is given by habit (*hexis, assuetudo, consuetudo*) (ENZ §409); like memory, it is difficult to understand in its bodily reality and actualisation (ENZ §410). In fact, to explain these things is not the topic of philosophy but of the sciences of physiology and cognitive psychology—which should, however, always remain conscious of the special problems and limited place of their respective enterprise in a holistic logical geography of topics and themes, methods of investigation and discussion, and of presenting the results in generic terms.

The important point of *embodiment* consists in its role in *liberating* the individual by *schematising* the performance of complex actions. *Habitualisation* relieves the individual of having to check too many differences and make too many decisions in the course of ‘running the programme’ of an acquired generic action; it opens up the horizon for focusing on more general points (ENZ §410). This deep insight reappears in any decent philosophical anthropology and goes back, of course, to Aristotle.

The real soul is the thoroughly formed bodily subject (ENZ §411). The physical nature and corporeality of the soul (*Leiblichkeit*) is, however, only

the outer form or outward appearance (*Äußerlichkeit*), whereas the subject herself *relates* to herself *in actually performing* her own ‘inner’ forms of life. This already happens, for example, in an *enactive perception* of an animal, whose self-movements are informed by what it perceives.² It also happens in *empractical actions*³ of persons that actualise certain action-schemes⁴ or forms of ‘behaviour’ (more or less ‘at will’ and with some ‘conscious self-control’). In other words, we can more or less deliberately start or stop an acquired form of action. This is the central feature of free choice and will (ENZ §§473ff.)—in some contrast to the triggering of programmes of behavioural responses in the case of animals as we traditionally describe and explain it under the heading of animal instincts. The generic actions of some typical kind,⁵ which a person can perform at will, are already the result of education and *Bildung* in the sense of an active self-formation of the person.

6 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE THEME OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT

The topic of a phenomenology of spirit is the reality and actual appearance of consciousness and self-consciousness in the sense of knowing something about the world and oneself. The problem is to grasp self-consciousness in its full sense, i.e., not inferentially weakened or reduced to sensitive cognition, awareness, attention, or vigilance, which we share with animals. In contrast, (human) consciousness presupposes a certain level of (self-)reflection (ENZ §413).

The usual talk about ‘the *I*’, from Kant or Fichte to modern philosophy in the twenty-first century, is formal insofar as no particular identity conditions are defined (ENZ §415). In fact, the word ‘*I*’ allows for many different identifications, as it is made well known by examples like the following: I can find out that I myself spilled the milk, which I find on the floor of a supermarket, even though I was not aware of this and I certainly did not do it intentionally. I can also find out that I am the person on an old photograph. When I refer to me as the author of a book or as being responsible for some decision, I am not just referring to my present or past body just in its living identity. But I am also not referring to any formal *res cogitans* or *soul*, even though I also say that I am the ‘subject’ of my thinking and my judging. But I may also say that I am my body, even though it would be odd to say that I am my brain. I may say, for example, ‘you have stepped on me’, meaning, perhaps, my foot.

Logical complications arise from the fact that mental, psychological, cognitive, and intentional predicates (or ‘events’) and physical properties (or ‘processes’) are as categorically different from each other as are the predicates that apply to *ciphers* and the properties that apply to abstract *numbers*. Any literal use of sentences like ‘the brain thinks’ or ‘the brain produces a self-model’ is logically confused, namely, in the same way as the

suggestion that the rational number $5/4$ has a greater denominator than the number $3/2$.

The word '*P*' is a 'plastic word' especially because we use it in totally different predicative contexts, as the examples above show. There is no well-defined and unique 'entity', to which the indexical word '*P*' refers in *all* my uses—even though any contextually defined relation of the identity when using the word '*P*' somehow hangs together with the unity of my living body. But the use of the word '*P*' is often enlarged even to my *property* or *family* or *nation* and so on, such that I can happily say that you have insulted *me* if you have insulted *my daughter* or even *some flag* representing my allegiance (to a club or nation).

In a sense, a phenomenology of spirit is a logical analysis of the general form of what we call the (self-)conscious self or the *psychē noētikē*. After the basic methodological insights of Cartesian and Kantian transcendental reflection, we can and must develop the notion of (self-)consciousness in steps like the following (ENZ §417): a) consciousness of objects; b) self-consciousness with the I or self as its object; c) the unity of consciousness and self-consciousness in actualising forms of reasonable judgements, as they preexist as possibilities in the domain of objective spirit, namely on the ground of language and general knowledge.

Kant and Fichte reflect only on a formal or abstract subject or self without telling us anything about the realisations of the presupposed mental and intellectual conditions of the possibility of (self-)consciousness. If we do not want to stay on the abstract level of talking generically about what consciousness is or should be merely *an sich*, i.e., in principle, we need some concrete knowledge about the typical socio-historical conditions for a human individual becoming a person as a member of a community of persons with corresponding properties. The chapter on 'psychology' deals, therefore, with the *constitution of a real person* with real self-consciousness in the natural and social world (ENZ §415). We need to understand the underlying subjective and trans-subjective realities, starting with some self-certainties (ENZ §416). Cartesian reflections on the role of self-consciousness in thinking and acting remain too abstract, focussing not on mental (self-)awareness (e.g. of so called qualia as pseudo-objects of inner sensations), but on *conscientia* as participation in joint knowledge as we need it when we refer to actual objects in conceptually informed perception or to relevant possibilities in thinking. The constitution of subjective spirit thus presupposes the historical developments of objective spirit, i.e., the system of institutions and forms of social practices that lie at the ground of any conceptual condition and fulfilment as we need it in any form of knowledge, science, and free action.

7 DESIRE AND SATISFACTION IN IMMEDIATE (SELF-)AWARENESS

The leading problem of the chapter on self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is, in fact, the *unity of the self* together with an appropriate

disambiguation of our quite broad talk about being (self-)conscious. Hegel's surprising answer is the following: the unity of the real subject is desire in general (*Begierde überhaupt*) (PS ¶167).⁶ This seems to highlight a deep connection between *desire* and (self-)awareness in life (cf. also ENZ §426).

Sensuous consciousness alone is merely awareness (ENZ §418), as it is governing the movement of the animal being in an 'immediate' way. In the human case, *conceptual* judgements *intervene* and *mediate* between perception and action in a way distinctly different from immediate reactions to outer objects and inner drive (from ENZ §419 onward). Vision and audience are, in the human case, always already intentional in the sense of Brentano; and this means that human perception is always already *modal* and *generic*; it is mediated by general understanding (*Verstand*) as the competence to follow generic rules. A special case is the mastery of causal explanations, or of looking for forces, given certain effects, but also of giving ethical reasons or reflecting on moral evaluations with their special interests in the cooperative value of an action (ENZ §§422ff.).

'The truth of consciousness is self-consciousness.' This sentence (ENZ §424) expresses the reflexive concept of Cartesian *conscientia*, as explained above, and it says that when we know something about objective things, for example, via perception, we should be able to make the general form of this knowledge explicit. If you ask me, for example, what I have just said, I should be able to repeat it or to comment on it. A short title may suffice, e.g., when I say that it was a question or a joke.

The general categorical form of such self-commentaries was expressed tentatively in Fichte's formula '*I=I*'. The formula stands for something like 'I say that this or that holds about me and the world', which, in turn, expresses the abstract 'freedom of judgement' (and action) (ENZ §424). This abstract or formal structure of self-consciousness denies the immediacy of merely reactive consciousness (in a 'first step'). It corresponds to the drive to realise what I am as such (*an sich, per se*, as a mere exemplar of some genus) in the sense of making (self-)statements true by acting.

Desire is animal appetite. As dissatisfaction, it contains a kind of negation and is nevertheless 'immediately' given as a natural form of subjective self-awareness in feelings of hunger, thirst, or sexual desire. Eating, for example, results in a bodily feeling of satisfaction. The desire is satisfied exactly at that point when it ceases to exist (ENZ §§428–429). Satisfaction is a kind of 'sublating' of the separation (*Diremption*) between subject and object. The term 'subject' stands here for what 'I am', the term 'object' stands for the topic (subject-matter) of my judgements. Acknowledgement is a *performative attitude* to judgements (about other things as well as about myself). As an immediate feeling it can still fall short of proper fulfilment (ENZ §429). If we *judge* about the real fulfilment of a condition, we already presuppose some *conceptual determination* of correct fulfilments, which leads to the difference between (self-)certainty and (self-)consciousness. Merely holding something to be true does not make it true. Therefore, we better consider the tensions between

merely acknowledging a judgement (about the world as well as about myself) and the ‘truth’ of such an acknowledgement (ENZ §430). Again we have to consider the two moments in self-consciousness—the subjective or performing side of feeling satisfied and the objective side—which leads us to ask how the condition of fulfilments are constituted such that we can talk of some ‘real’ fulfilment in contrast to mere certainty (ENZ §430).

In any self-reflection or self-observation, the performing *I* is absolute: if I *feel* content or satisfied, then I *am* satisfied. However, there are possibilities of *errors* of such feelings of satisfaction with respect to the *content* of propositions, perhaps even with respect to the quality of what I have eaten.

‘With self-consciousness, then, we have therefore entered the native realm of truth’, writes Hegel in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (PS ¶167). It is a kind of knowledge of itself in contradistinction to knowledge of other things. In the first sentence of the paragraph, Hegel had outlined the plan of his thought: ‘In the previous modes of certainty, that what is true for consciousness is something other than itself. But this notion of truth [I prefer this translation to ‘the Notion of this truth’—PSW] vanishes in the experience of it’ (PS ¶166). And further Hegel writes: ‘What the object immediately was *in itself*—mere being in sense-certainty, the concrete thing of perception, and for the Understanding, a Force—proves to be in truth, not this at all’ (PS ¶166), because we now realise the gap between sensing or feeling and what it is that we assume to perceive, which is clearly not just a bundle of sense-data.

If we talk about the object ‘as such’, as we usually like to do, we have to be warned of some traditional uses of such phrases. It is, for example, semantic nonsense to assume that a Kantian *Ding an sich* could *produce* any sensation *causally*—just as it would be nonsensical to say that a numerical truth could produce an arithmetical thought causally. A phrase like ‘(in and) by itself’ or *an sich* is only an index for a merely *generic* way of referring to formal contrasts that exist ‘only for another’, as Hegel says, and in relation to us.

8 THE PROCESS OF RECOGNITION IN ACKNOWLEDGING THE NORMATIVITY OF TRUTH AND REASON

The process of recognition in acknowledging the difference between subjective feelings of satisfaction and real fulfilments now becomes the focus of Hegel’s analysis, after he had started with mere certainty and run through doubts about ‘truth’—in order to be reconciled in some higher evaluation of (self-)knowledge (ENZ §430). The tension between self-feelings of certainty and real fulfilments is represented by a kind of fight between two positions. The first position concerns my self-certainty. I cannot know about myself or about the world other than via my actual feelings of (self-)certainty. Any other perspective would not be mine, and any knowledge of *somebody* else

still needs my recognition if it should become mine. Furthermore, in my immediate self-certainty, I am disposed to 'negate' all merely subjective or 'immediate' self-certainties of other persons, at least if they contradict mine. However, the situation is obviously symmetrical, for my certainty cannot be recognised just in its immediacy (as true). Instead I must give up the immediacy of feeling certain. Only by doing so can I give my freedom of judgement and the will its reality, namely, by distinguishing between real intentional action and mere desire-driven behaviour according to some natural drive.

The second position takes shape as external control, for any fulfilment of a normative condition for being true or correct with respect to a judgement or action needs some 'external' control to determine whether the relevant conceptual conditions really are fulfilled beyond our mere feelings of satisfaction. Yet, as far as my judgements and deeds are concerned, my *embodied* (self-)consciousness, which I have given the label '(self-)awareness', always has the last word (ENZ §431). This is an obvious 'contradiction' or tension in any self-evaluation.⁷

The result of the tension is Hegel's famous 'struggle for recognition' or 'process of acknowledgement'. It is a question of life and death, namely, with respect to the 'truth' of my immediate self-feeling or the 'truth' of a contradicting judgement. This holds for claims about the world as well as about myself. In the tension of (self-)certainty and (self-)knowledge, the internal and the external perspectives are two moments of any (self-)consciousness. The one puts the truth of the other into doubt. As long as this refers only to some self-reflection, in which I myself control my immediate opinions, or to some dialogue between two persons, no real life is in danger. Rather, it is in danger only when each of the two moments of self-consciousness—that of self-certainty and that of critical self-evaluation—strives to hold its position as the real presence of my free judgement.

But here there is no real symmetry. The bodily self-feeling of immediate self-certainty must turn in a next step into the 'servant' of a 'master'. The master is the thinking subject who claims to work with 'objective truth conditions' (ENZ §432). However, we never can give up the perspective of self-certainty either. Ultimately every judgement rests on it. This is why the simile of a struggle of power between two persons becomes helpful for understanding the struggle between our intellect and feelings. If we were to simply resolve this contradiction dogmatically by letting one of the two 'self-certainties' win, we would immediately fall back to the original problem of recognition: my intellect as the master tells me in the end also only what I feel certain about. In other words, we do not get rid of subjective certainty, however high the level of reflective evaluation is. The problem on the first level was that my feeling should recognise the superiority of the intellect (or reason); my certainty should acknowledge the superiority of knowledge. Moreover, my immediate 'animal drives' should not only give in to the more far-reaching intentional plans in a rational life, but even support them, just as a servant supports his master by his work (ENZ §432).

Life is essentially performance. Therefore, the struggle always ends in a one-sided negation of the other perspective. But this means that one side (say my feeling of certainty) gives up its stubborn position, and gives in to ‘reason’. However, as already mentioned, this second side of ‘rational judgement’ is also just a version of ‘higher certainty’, and its claim to deeper understanding and true knowledge can in turn, and often must be, put into question.

In this reading, it may at first seem quite unclear why my bodily feelings of certainty should really fear any danger in the struggle with some conceptually higher knowledge, which wants to be my master. But the very way I have put the problem already contains the answer. Feelings of certainty can be erroneous, such that my interest in self-preservation alone might convince me to give up the guidance of mere feelings and succumb to the guidance of the conceptually informed intellect or rational thought. In this reading, Hegel’s expression ‘this other life’ in the *Phenomenology* (PS ¶173) refers to an intellectual life, ‘for which the genus as such exists’, since thinking refers to eidetic forms and norms, i.e. it refers to a self-consciousness that does some self-evaluation and self-control, and by doing so surpasses self-awareness by far.

If Hegel talks about two persons here that fight for power, he does so in the same mode as Plato talks about constitution. His word *politeia* refers at the same time to the *polis* and the *psychē*. In the case of two persons, the one gives in because ‘life’ or some practical goal is deemed more important than ‘winning the argument’—and works for the master, who, in turn, cares for the good survival of the servant. In the analogy, bodily drives are used to do the work and the intellect enjoys the results, but not without giving the bodily desires some share. In other words, we can act according to some long-term plans only if we are able to govern our own bodily based desires: we let them do the work by channelling our drives into the direction where we want to go. Merely talking wisely or wishing to be rational will never accomplish anything. This is the handicap of Stoicism. Nonetheless, the doubts about the importance of knowledge and higher reasons mislead a merely ‘pragmatic’ sceptic to arbitrary judgements and contingent beliefs, in the end to a gross overestimation of striving for a pain-free Epicurean life, with or without some widening of the utilitarian perspective to a group of friends, a nation or even humankind. Only if we keep the whole dialectic in mind, these insights become visible, along with the reasons why thinking and comprehending, intention and action are possible only in a ‘*we*-mode’ and only by relying heavily on our cultural heritage. If Hegel already talks at this point in the analysis about *us*, and not about *me* as controlling myself—or rather, about my higher (self-)consciousness controlling my more immediate (self-)awareness—it is because he wants to be sure we do not lose sight of this goal.

Acting according to a plan (*Arbeit*) has the form of an ‘upheld desire’: the conceptual content of the intended end and the knowledge about possible means governs the action in the pursuit of fulfilling the intention. In this reading, the process of acknowledgement in the passages on lordship and bondage is not yet a ‘theory’ of social relations between (two) persons,

even though the important point is made that political and economic power presupposes at least some recognition of the lords and their functions by the subjects, for example, by the labourers.

9 THE TOPICS OF PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY IN A PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT

There are three topics of a philosophical analysis of the human soul. They result from a formal distinction between 1) anthropology, in which we reflect on the general concept of ‘the soul as such’ (*in itself, an sich*) in various contrasts to merely bodily properties or processes, 2) phenomenology, in which we make the forms of (active) self-relations explicit that constitute the (practical) identity of a personal subject, its *being for itself* in all forms of self-consciousness and, finally, 3) psychology. Its domain is the concrete constitution of the finite soul, the empirical personal subject *in-and-for-itself* (ENZ §441), by an appropriate educational development and self-forming process (ENZ §445), by which general ‘spirit’ is actualised and made manifest (ENZ §442).

A subtopic of philosophical psychology is the need to balance our various drives and plans, values and ideals in pursue of what Hegel calls ‘happiness’ (ENZ §§479–480). In a certain sense, individual and collective freedom of will and fulfilments by one’s own actions are highest values (ENZ §§469, 480–482), and justice as such is evaluated higher than prosperity as such (ENZ §§471–472, 486ff.); sometimes, however, we opt for the satisfaction of other interests (ENZ §475) like basic needs for life, but also immediate desires, safety and wealth. Like a serf we may do this by giving up personal independence. However, for applying generic concepts and values with ease, we always need *practical habit, supported by well-formed moral sentiment* (i.e., *praktisches Gefühl*, ENZ §§447, 471ff.), but also good judgement and inference (ENZ §467), i.e., practical intelligence (*prudentia*), by which we determine the relevant content or reflect on the relevant form (ENZ §§469ff.), quite in the sense of Kant’s *Critique of Judgement*. The need of adjusting one’s judgements to particular cases answers to the fact that the highest values do not stand in all contexts and situations in the same alphabetic order. Truthfulness is required in general, but in particular cases, a questioner does not deserve a true answer at all. Liberty can be the higher value in principle, but security or sheer survival might be more important in particular situations. Therefore, there is no ‘final’ solution to the ‘master-slave struggle’.

NOTES

1. For an interpretation of Hegel’s *Phenomenology of Spirit*, see Stekeler-Weithofer 2014.
2. Cf. Noë 2004.
3. Cf. Bühler 1934.
4. Cf. Kamlah and Lorenzen 1967.

5. Cf. von Wright 1971; 1963, 114ff.
6. The citations of the PS are according to Miller's translation (1977).
7. John McDowell does not make this point in McDowell 2009.

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Part II

Theoretical Spirit

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4 Hegel, McDowell, and Perceptual Experience

A Response to McDowell

Stephen Houlgate

Some years ago, I published an essay that set out what I took to be the principal similarities and differences between G. W. F. Hegel and John McDowell concerning perceptual experience (see Houlgate 2006). McDowell replied with some appreciative but also critical remarks (see McDowell 2008), and I would like to take this occasion to respond, belatedly, to his criticisms. To do so, however, I need once more to explain Hegel's conception of perceptual experience. My account is again based on Hegel's *Encyclopaedia Philosophy of Spirit* and accompanying lectures, though some of the lectures I draw on here were published after my original essay (see VSG vols. 1–2).

HEGEL ON SENSATION

Like Kant, Hegel recognises that mature human perception does not just entail opening one's eyes and letting the world in, but involves what McDowell calls 'conceptual capacities' (McDowell 1996, 24). As Hegel puts it, 'seeing, and so on, is the concrete habit which *immediately* unites in one simple act the many determinations of sensation, consciousness, intuition, intellect [*Verstand*], etc.' (EPM¹ §410 R). Note that sensation (*Empfindung*) is just one component of this concrete 'seeing' and in mature human beings does not occur by itself without the other components. In babies and animals, however, sensation does occur without those other components;² and Hegel thinks that, even in the case of mature human perception, one can identify the distinctive contribution made to perception by sensation. We will look first, therefore, at what Hegel says about sensation—or, more precisely, about *external* sensation, since it is this that forms part of our perceptual experience of the external world (see VSG 1, 52).

External sensations, for Hegel, are, from one point of view, ways in which parts of the body—its sensory organs—are affected by other things (and by other parts of the body). Yet they are not just modifications of the body, but rather such modifications as they are felt or sensed by what Hegel calls the 'soul' (*Seele*). Sensations are thus forms of feeling or sensory awareness.³

These sensations, in Hegel's view, have specific characteristics. First, they are how the soul finds *itself* to be determined, or modifications of our own subjectivity (EPM §400 R). Second, they are how the soul *finds* itself to be determined and are not produced by the subject itself (or at least not primarily) (EPM §399 A). This is because, as just noted, they arise through the body's being *affected* by things. The consciousness of being affected by something is not, however, itself part of the sensation, but the latter is simply an 'immediate determination' (*unmittelbares Bestimmtheit*) of the soul (VSG 1, 289; see also EPM §401).

Immediacy constitutes the form of each sensation, but different kinds of sensation have different kinds of content. Visual sensation, Hegel states, is the awareness of a 'plane of colours' (*Fläche von Farbigen*) (VSG 1, 250; see also EPM §401 A). Such colours are in turn—for the philosopher, though not for the soul itself—the way things in the world manifest themselves. Under the right conditions, therefore, vision takes in the 'manifestness' (*Manifestiertsein*) or *look* of things themselves (though colours are also partly 'conjured up by the eye') (LPS 117/VPG 77; EPN⁴ §§317 A, 320 A).⁵

In Hegel's view, however, vision does not see any depth to things or locate them at a distance from us (see EPM §401 A; VSG 1, 54). Yet this does not mean that *space* is wholly absent from visual sensation, for we see space in seeing a two-dimensional *plane* of colours. In this respect, Hegel's conception of sensation differs from that of Kant. For Kant, there is nothing of space or time in sensations themselves, since the latter are a posteriori, whereas space and time are the *a priori* forms of sensibility (see CPR B34–36). For Hegel, by contrast, 'the determinacies of time and space' belong to sensation itself (VSG 1, 283, 440). We see space, however, only in the 'physical' form of light or an expanse of colour (EPM §401 A; VSG 2, 656–657).

Touch differs from vision by sensing '*shape* in its three dimensions' (EPM §401 A).⁶ Hegel argues, however, that we come to 'see' three-dimensional shape, and to 'see' depth and distance, by comparing and combining visual and tactile sensations (such as those of a shadow and a receding shape). So, for example, 'when we notice that to the depth perceived by feeling there corresponds something dark, a *shadow*, . . . we come to believe that where a shadow becomes visible to us we see a depth'; and similarly, we come to associate a visible reduction in size with felt distance (EPM §401 A).⁷ Note that this ability to 'see' in three dimensions must be *acquired* and in that sense the child must 'learn to see' (*sehen lernen*) (VSG 1, 250). Vision in this more concrete sense, therefore, is not purely passive and receptive, but involves an operation on the part of the subject. Yet the comparing and combining of sensations is not freely and actively initiated by us; nor does it require thought or concepts, since it is something of which animals, as well as humans, must be capable (and, for Hegel, animals cannot think).⁸ What enables us to see depth and distance is simply our 'habit' (*Gewohnheit*) of associating visual and tactile sensations with one another (LPS 117/VPG 77).

HEGEL ON CONSCIOUSNESS

Hegel argues, however, that mature human perception is more than just sensation, but also involves thought, the initial form of which is ‘consciousness’ (*Bewußtsein*). Concrete vision sees coloured shapes stretching away from us, but it does not take what we see to be an object distinct from the subject; consciousness, by contrast, does precisely that.

Consciousness, for Hegel, does not add to the content of our awareness, since ‘*everything is in sensation*’ (EPM §400 R). It rather confers on what we see a form that is absent from sensation itself: the form of *being* there, and of being *something*, over against the knowing subject. The content of sensation already has the form of ‘immediacy’, insofar as it is simply given to, and found by, the soul; consciousness, however, takes what we see to be something standing apart from us—to be ‘*a being, a something, an existing thing, an individual, and so on*’ (EPM §418 R). As Hegel puts it, therefore, the sensation of ‘red’ is a ‘determination of the soul’, ‘but that the red is something red [*etwas Rotes*] is the objectivity of consciousness’ (LPS 168/ VPG 141–142).⁹

Hegel insists that there are no distinct objects for sensation as such, but just colours, sounds and felt shapes; ‘for the animal’, therefore, ‘there is no something, no thing’ (LPS 176/VPG 153).¹⁰ There are things and objects only for a conscious ‘*I*’ (*Ich*). The *I*, however, is conscious of itself as an *I* (see VSG 1, 101). Consequently, ‘only when I come to apprehend myself as *I*, does the other become an object to me, confront me’ (EPM §413 A). This means in turn, not just that ‘the *I think* must *be able* to accompany all my representations’, as Kant states (CPR B131–132), but that there is no consciousness of objects without actual self-consciousness (at least to some degree) (see VSG 1, 435). Consciousness is thus conscious of objects *and* conscious of itself as conscious of them.

Consciousness, for Hegel, is a form of thought and as such (unlike the habit of seeing depth) is free and active—though it can itself become habitual (see VSG 1, 430; EPM §410 R). More precisely, consciousness actively ‘separates’ from itself, and ‘expels’ (*hinauswirft*), the content of sensation and thereby sets it outside itself as an object: ‘The reflection of the soul into itself, *I*, separates this material from itself, and gives it initially the determination of *being*’ (EPM §418 R; VSG 1, 428). In so doing, Hegel claims, consciousness engages in a twofold act of judgement (*Urteilen*). Distinguishing an object from itself is itself an act of ‘original division’ or *Urteilen*, and that act in turn involves identifying the object—at least tacitly—as such and such and judging it to be, for example, a red rose (see VSG 1, 102–103, 418, 428).

Yet despite the fact that it is active, consciousness, for Hegel, is not aware that it is. ‘To consciousness’, therefore, ‘the object appears not as an object *posited* by the *I*, but as an *immediate, given* object that just *is*’; and consciousness takes itself simply to be the subject, or *I*, for which objects are

present (EPM §414 A).¹¹ Consciousness thus has an ‘unconscious side’ to it, and does not share the understanding that philosophy has of it (VSG 1, 430).

So, to recapitulate: vision, considered by itself, simply finds itself aware of a plane of colours, though it also learns to see depth; in mature human beings, however, vision never occurs by itself, but is always a moment of the consciousness of objects; such consciousness, equally, just finds itself in the presence of objects, but is in fact the unconscious *activity* of setting what we see over against us *as* a sphere of objects.

Hegel identifies three forms of such consciousness, the first of which is ‘sensuous consciousness’ that just takes what it sees to be an immediately given thing subject to change (EPM §418; VSG 1, 106, 445). The second is ‘perception’, which takes a thing, not just to be there, but to be a ‘manifold’ of ‘relations’ and ‘universalities’, that is, to be a thing with multiple properties; and the third is ‘understanding’ (*Verstand*), which takes things to be governed by laws (EPM §§419–423). All three forms are integral to our consciousness of things, in Hegel’s view, but only with perception and understanding does consciousness become perceptual ‘experience’ (*Erfahrung*) of the world (LPS 178/VPG 155–156).

Note that each form of consciousness goes beyond sensation and employs concepts and categories to think of what we see as *objective* (and thereby to set it over against us), concepts such as ‘being’, ‘something’, ‘property’, and ‘law’. These concepts constitute what Hegel calls the ‘metaphysics’ that informs, and makes possible, perceptual experience of the world (VSG 1, 106; EPN §246 A). Nonetheless, in each of its forms the focus of consciousness is on the object before it, rather than itself: its concepts enable it to comprehend what we see *as an object*, or, in Kantian terms, as a ‘synthetic unity’ (CPR A105). Consciousness is conscious of itself as an *I*, and as perception and understanding it knows that it employs concepts; yet it takes itself to do no more than disclose what the *object* is, ‘the object in its *truth*’ (EPM §420). Consciousness is not aware that it actively *posits* or ‘constructs’ the object it encounters.¹²

In a remarkable statement in his 1825 lectures Hegel admits that his conception of consciousness as ‘positing’ its objects coincides with that of ‘subjective idealism’, the position he otherwise attributes to Kant and subjects to criticism (VSG 1, 431; EL¹³ §42 A3). Hegel insists, however, that ‘this subjective idealism is only one side of philosophy, of true idealism’. We do, indeed, cast sensory content outside us through ‘our activity’, but the objects we thereby encounter are not merely the products of our activity; to say that, Hegel states, would be as ‘irrational’ as maintaining that things are just given to us and we are quite ‘inactive’. The truth is that thought as consciousness is ‘the unity of subjectivity and objectivity’: in its activity of ‘positing’, it thinks things to be what they *are* (VSG 1, 431).

There are in fact two senses in which consciousness, for Hegel, does not confine us within a merely *subjective* idealism. Consider, first (and briefly),

sensation, which provides the content for consciousness. As we have seen, visual sensation—though not for the soul itself—is the awareness of the way external things *manifest themselves*. Sensation is thus already more than just subjective and brings to mind features of the world out there (whereas, for Kant, sensation acquaints us with ‘nothing except our way of perceiving [objects], which is peculiar to us’ [CPR B 59]).

Consider, second, consciousness itself (though what we say about this will need to be more extensive than what we have just said about sensation). Although, for Hegel, consciousness actively (if unconsciously) posits sensory content as objective, the categories through which it does so are not the arbitrary products of thought, but are inherent in and made necessary by thought. They constitute the necessary determinations of free thought and so lay down how objects *must* be thought by every consciousness (in which the categories have, as it were, ‘dawned’) (VSG 2, 770; LPS 178/VPG 155).¹⁴ This, then, appears to be the second sense in which consciousness does not confine us within a subjective idealism: its categories lay down what objectivity *must* be understood to be.

Yet Kant, of course, could say the same thing, since for him, too, categories are necessary, a priori forms that determine how objects must be thought: they are the conditions under which ‘every intuition must stand *in order to become an object for me*’ (and for any other discursive intellect) (CPR B138). Indeed, Hegel gives Kant explicit credit for equating objectivity with what categories require us to think: ‘it is in this sense’, Hegel states, ‘that Kant called what conforms to thought [*das Gedankenmäßige*] (the universal and the necessary) “objective”; and he was certainly quite right to do this’ (EL §41 A2; translation altered). Hegel criticises Kant, however, for reducing such objectivity to subjective objectivity (and thereby defending a subjective idealism). Kant does so, in Hegel’s view, because he draws a sharp distinction between thought and the ‘thing in itself’, which Hegel equates with what the thing truly *is* (EL §41 and A2). For Hegel, then, we do not avoid subjective idealism just by identifying what thought makes necessary with objectivity; we do so, only when we also recognise (as Kant does not) that through thought we bring to mind *being itself*.

Now, as I have just indicated, in criticising Kant Hegel takes the latter’s concept of the ‘thing in itself’ to refer to what things *really are* in themselves; that is, he conflates the thing in itself with *being*. This, however, is a subtle misunderstanding on Hegel’s part. Kant’s concept does not refer to some *being* just out of reach, but is produced *by thought* as the correlate of the idea that objects of experience are ‘appearances’. As Kant puts it, ‘the understanding, when it calls an object in a relation mere phenomenon, simultaneously makes for itself [*sich . . . macht*], beyond this relation, another representation of an *object in itself*’ (CPR B306).

Yet Kant puts being, or existence, itself beyond thought in his critique of the ontological argument. In his view, thought judges things to exist or to be such and such, but it cannot do so on the basis of concepts alone: ‘whatever

and however much our concept of an object may contain, we have to go out beyond it in order to provide it with existence' (CPR B629; see also EL §51 and R). (This is why the mere concept of God cannot prove the existence of God.) So, even though Hegel mistakenly conflates Kant's 'thing in itself' with *being*, he is right to insist that thought alone, for Kant, cannot bring being or existence to mind. Thought could do so, in Kant's view, only if it were a form of 'intellectual' intuition (CPR B72); but it is not such intuition, and so, as Kant puts it in the third *Critique* (CJ), concepts 'pertain merely to the *possibility* of an object' and do not by themselves bring to mind what objects *are* (CJ §76; emphasis added). An object can thus be judged to exist and to *be* such and such, only when it is, or can be, given in *sensible* intuition (see CPR B33, 272–273, 629). Such intuition, however, has subjective (though, for humans, universal) conditions, namely, the pure forms of intuition: space and time. The objects we can judge to exist and to be such and such are, therefore, no more than 'appearances' (see CPR B34, 42).

In contrast to Kant, Hegel thinks that space and time belong to things themselves, and that in sensation we see space and hear time that have 'become physical' as colour and sound (EPM §§401 A, 448 A). Hegel also contends that thought is, indeed, the intuition of being—being that is irreducible to its being thought by us.¹⁵ For Hegel, thought is not radically distinct from being, but knows being since it is itself being; thought, after all, *is* (see EPM §465 A; VSG 2, 877; Houlgate 2006, 249f.). More specifically, thought knows that the categories inherent in it are also inherent in being, and so 'it knows that what is *thought*, *is*' (EPM §465). This does not mean that thought knows a priori everything there is to know; but it knows from within itself *that* there are beings or things in the world, and through its categories it knows those things *in their being*. To put it simply, thought knows a priori *that* there is and, in its basic structure, *what* there is.

It remains the case that thought, as consciousness, actively sets its sensory content over against it as an independent object. Yet, when such content allows itself to be thought in this way (and we are thus not misconceiving what we see), consciousness thinks what it sees to be the object *it is*. The activity of consciousness presents us with the object itself.

Two things, however, need to be emphasised here. First, our thinking of what we see as being an object is not founded on and justified by what we see, because the content of sensation itself contains no element of 'being an object'.¹⁶ Our conceiving of what we see as an object, and as an object that *is there*, is justified by *thought's* knowing that there are objects (and how such objects are structured). Sensory content must certainly allow itself to be conceived as an object, and if it does not do so we must understand it differently: if part of this tree suddenly tweets and takes flight, then it is not in fact part of this tree. Sensuous consciousness of things is thus always open to the possibility of revision. Nonetheless, thought answers to itself, not just to sensation, in understanding and knowing there to be an object before it (see Houlgate 2006, 249f.).

Second, thought, as consciousness, does not somehow ‘take in’ a thing’s being, thinghood or objectivity in the way the soul takes in the colours and shapes of things. Thought actively *sets* what we see over against us *as* a being and a thing. Yet, in so doing, as we have said, thought thinks what we see to be the object *it is*; in Hegel’s words, ‘our activity is one side, but equally the other side is that the object also is [*daß der Gegenstand auch ist*]’ (VSG 1, 432). This is why, for Hegel, the activity of consciousness in positing a world of objects does not confine us within subjective idealism.

HEGEL ON INTUITION

Sensation and consciousness are both required for perceptual experience, but they do not exhaust the latter. Hegel argues that theoretical spirit or ‘intelligence’ is also needed. Indeed, intelligence is the whole within which both sensation and consciousness are moments.

Intelligence, in Hegel’s view, is more explicitly self-conscious than either the soul or consciousness. It is thus aware, as consciousness is not—or at least it can become aware—of its own *activity* (see VSG 1, 120–122; VSG 2, 806). The first form of such activity, which Hegel calls *attention* (*Aufmerksamkeit*), is that of ‘directing’ oneself towards the content of sensation,¹⁷ and it has two sides to it. On the one hand, attending to what we see entails distinguishing the latter from us, or moving it away (*Wegrücken*), as an ‘*independent* being’ (EPM §448 A; VSG 1, 125–126; VSG 2, 815). In this sense, it is an act of ‘judgement’ (VSG 2, 821). On the other hand, it entails bringing what we see within the space of our own awareness and thereby ‘filling oneself with a content’ (EPM §448 A). As we attend to things, therefore, we ourselves become absorbed in them; and such absorbed awareness of things Hegel calls ‘intuition’ (*Anschauung*).

Note that attention, for Hegel, is not just a habit or an unconscious act of mind, but depends on my ‘wilfulness’ (*Willkür*), on my deliberate effort: ‘I am attentive’, he states, ‘only when I *will* to be so’, just as ‘a man stands only in so far as he wills to stand’ (EPM §§396 A, 448 A). Yet Hegel also includes intuition, and thus attention, in what he calls the ‘concrete habit’ of seeing (EPM §410 R). A child, therefore, must develop not only the will to attend to what is before him, but also the *habit* of so willing, just as he must develop ‘the habit of the will to stand’ (*die Gewohnheit des Willens zum Stehen*) (EPM §396 A). Attention, however, remains something we can suspend, if we want to. If you open your eyes, you cannot fail to see what is visible, but you can let your eyes go out of focus and thereby lose a clear sense of depth.

Whereas consciousness merely takes what it sees to be a distinct object or ‘thing with properties’, intelligence, as attention and intuition, ‘casts’ the content of sensation ‘out *into space and time*’ (EPM §448). We have seen that the soul is already aware of space and time in a ‘physical’ form, namely as the plane of colours (and the visible depth we must ‘learn to see’) and as

the occurring of sound, so space and time in that sense must be present for consciousness too. Intuition, however, sets things in a space and time that is a continuity or ‘universality’ *in its own right*. Such universality, Hegel states, is ‘*formal*’ and ‘*contentless*’ and as such is distinct from sensory content (EPM §448 A; VSG 2, 816). Intuition is thus aware, not just of extended colours and disappearing sounds, but of things *in* space and time (LPS 209/ VPG 191). Furthermore, intuition posits both space and time as a ‘totality’. Space, therefore, does not just belong to things that stand ‘over against me’ (*gegen mich*), but it is a space that surrounds us and within which things are located (VSG 2, 816; LPS 210/VPG 192).¹⁸ To intuit something as being here or occurring now is thus to set it in a space or time that continues beyond whatever is directly present to us (see VSG 2, 818–819).

Hegel states unequivocally that intelligence in the form of intuition is an *activity* of spirit. ‘The content of intuition’, he says, ‘is at first a felt content. . . . But intelligence is active in it [*ist in ihr Aktion*]’, for intelligence ‘has shaped [*formiert*] this content, and this formation is the spatial and the temporal’ (LPS 210/VPG 191; see also VSG 2, 816).¹⁹ Yet, like consciousness, intuition posits things to be what they *are* in themselves: for, as we know from the philosophy of nature, things are ‘*themselves* spatial and temporal’ (EPM §448 A). Furthermore, intuition itself takes things themselves to be spatio-temporal. As Hegel puts it, therefore, ‘things are spatial and temporal because they are posited as external by spirit. . . . Spirit does this to things [*der Geist tut dies den Dingen an*]; and this is no subjective activity of spirit, as in Fichte, but it is the nature of things themselves’ (VSG 1, 126–127).

Hegel’s conception of space, time and intuition thus differs in two respects from that of Kant (even though he agrees that space and time, as we intuit them, are ‘a priori’). First, space and time, for Kant, are forms of our receptivity and not the result of our subjective activity: they are simply the forms in which objects are *given* to us (CPR B33–36, 74–75). Second, since space and time are a priori, they cannot, in Kant’s view, belong to things themselves and so must be purely subjective (though universal among human beings) (CPR B42–44, 49–53). As Kant puts it, no ‘determinations’ can be intuited by the subject ‘prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain’ (CPR B42); what we do intuit prior to things thus cannot belong to the latter and so must belong solely to the subject. Implicit in this claim is the further one, endorsed by empiricists, that we can know something of things themselves only *from* those things ‘a posteriori’—a claim that Kant makes explicitly in the *Prolegomena*.²⁰ For Hegel, by contrast, there is nothing unintelligible in the idea that the subject can confer a priori on what it sees the very form that belongs to things themselves.

FROM INTUITION TO THOUGHT

Perceptual experience, as Hegel conceives it, requires a given sensory content, the unconscious activity of consciousness, and the more deliberate

act of attention that opens a whole space of things and that has become habitual. In his 1825 lectures, however, Hegel indicates that further acts of intelligence are required. In an ‘act of seeing’, he states, there are ‘many representations’ that are ‘first acquired through a great amount of reflections’ (VSG 1, 250). Moreover, he notes, a child who is ‘learning to see’ is also learning language. Hegel thus suggests that the ‘concrete habit’ of seeing—as opposed to mere vision as such—requires, beyond intuition, the ability to form general representations, to speak and also to reflect and think. This suggestion is confirmed, he thinks, by the fact that the ‘educated person’ (*der Gebildete*) sees more, or discerns more in what he sees, than the uneducated person (VSG 1, 125, 501).²¹

In Hegel’s view, then, the activity of thinking and judging in language works with consciousness and intuition to render what we see intelligible.²² This is not to deny that there is a difference, for Hegel, between the conceptually structured *seeing* of the tree and the *thoughts* we have, and *judgements* we make, about the tree; this difference is implicit in his claim that intelligence wants ‘its intuitions, representations *to become* thoughts’ (LPS 238/VPG 226; my emphasis). Yet, according to Hegel, we would not be capable of such structured seeing, or at least not much beyond the level of a child, if we did not also engage in linguistic thought and judgement (judgement that is, of course, often a matter of habit and often tacit).

In this respect Hegel is close to Kant. For Kant, there is a difference between understanding the manifold of *intuition* to be a synthetic unity (through a category) and subsuming representations under concepts in *judgements*. Nonetheless, the ‘function’ that gives unity to the synthesis of representations in an intuition is ‘the same function’ as that which ‘gives unity to the different representations *in a judgement*’ (CPR B104–105). This is because ‘*categories* are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given intuition is determined with regard to them’ (CPR B143). Moreover, the understanding can conceive of intuitions as a synthetic unity, and thus as an *object*, only insofar as, at the same time, it judges the object to be this or that. *Pace* McDowell, it is not just that ‘the ability to enjoy intuitions is inseparable from the *ability* to make judgments’ (McDowell 2008, 228), but enjoying synthesised intuitions requires actually making judgements: the distinct activities of categorising and judging must occur together. This is because categories, as well as being thoughts of synthetic unity, are also *concepts* and thus ‘predicates of possible judgments’ and so must be employed in judgements (CPR B94). For Kant, therefore, as for Hegel, not only can judgements be based on our categorised intuitions, but they are also conditions of the latter: for it is *in* judging what we see to be such and such that we also unite what we see into the intuition of an object.²³ Indeed, in Kant’s view, not only is judgement required for perceptual experience of objects, but so, too, is reason: for, without the latter’s transcendental principle of ‘homogeneity’ or ‘genera’, ‘no empirical concepts and hence no experience would be possible’ (CPR B682).

Hegel and Kant have different views about space and time and about the relation between thought and being. Nonetheless, they agree that thought in its different forms plays an indispensable role in making perceptual experience possible. Moreover, they agree in a further respect: both take us to be passive and 'receptive' insofar as we are sensory beings, and insist that sensory receptivity as such does not involve the spontaneity or activity of thought.²⁴ Equally, however, they insist that in mature human beings sensation is inseparable from the consciousness of objects (in a broad sense that includes what Hegel calls 'intelligence'), and that sensory content cannot enter consciousness without the activity of thought—activity that is itself partly unconscious and partly conscious.²⁵ So, for Hegel and Kant, perceivers are engaged in the activity of conceiving *as* they receive sensations, if not *in* sensory receptivity itself.

Now in my original essay, I wrote that 'understanding is irreducibly operative in receptivity' (Houlgate 2006, 252). This does not mean, however, that understanding is required for us to see colours or feel shapes at all; rather, 'conceptual capacities are drawn into operation in receptivity in the sense that nothing is received *into the conscious mind* without their operation' (Houlgate 2006, 252f.; my emphasis). In mature human beings, however, no sensory content is received *without* being received, or rather taken up, into consciousness (except, of course, that which remains unconscious and plays no direct role in perceptual experience).²⁶ Conceptual capacities are thus operative (with the exception just noted) whenever we receive sensations and so in that sense are operative 'in' receptivity. Yet their 'operation' consists in actively conferring objectivity *on* sensory content that otherwise lacks it. It is precisely this idea, however, that McDowell rejects, even though he shares the Kantian-Hegelian view that experience involves conceiving as well as seeing.

A RESPONSE TO MCDOWELL

In response to my original essay McDowell notes that in *Mind and World* he did not deny, as I took him to, that there is a 'notional distinction between sensibility and understanding'. As he puts it, 'sensory responsiveness on its own does not enable its possessors to think; the capacity for thought on its own does not provide for sensory responsiveness to features of the environment' (McDowell 2008, 225). McDowell describes this distinction as 'Kantian', and I am happy to accept that he draws it. The distinction is also drawn by Hegel. For Hegel, however, the fact that sensibility does not enable its possessors to think means that it does not provide any thought or consciousness of 'objects' and that the latter is provided only by thought or consciousness itself. In sensory experience, therefore, in which sensibility and thought cooperate, thought gives sensory content a form that that content does *not* itself have, namely that of being an 'object'. Yet McDowell

rejects this last claim. In his view, ‘experience is not to be understood in terms of the idea that sensibility provides something without the form characteristic of thought, on which understanding proceeds to impose that form’ (McDowell 2008, 226).

This statement is at first sight puzzling: for if sensibility does not enable its possessor to think, and so does not provide what thought provides, it must surely contribute to experience ‘something without the form characteristic of thought’. Our puzzlement disappears, however, when we consider the following line of reasoning. Mature human experience involves the indissoluble cooperation of sensibility and understanding. This in turn means that in such experience sensory content is always ‘conceptually informed’ (McDowell 2008, 227f.). If that is the case, however, sensibility cannot provide a content without conceptual form ‘on which understanding proceeds to impose that form’.

For McDowell, then, the notional distinction between sensibility and understanding does not require the latter to give conceptual form to the content yielded by the former, because in mature human experience sensory content is never unconceptualised. The Hegel I present in my original essay thus has only a ‘shaky’ grip on the insight that matters. On the one hand, he recognises, like Kant and McDowell, that our conceptual capacities are operative in *all* mature sensory experience; but, on the other hand, he loses sight of this insight by claiming that ‘sensibility does after all yield items without the form characteristic of thought’, and that ‘our intellectual capacities proceed to work up those deliverances of sensibility into something that has that form’ (McDowell 2008, 226f.). Furthermore, my Hegel does not appear to notice that these two ideas are at odds with one another.

McDowell insists, against my Hegel, that thought in experience does not *actively* confer the form of objectivity on sensory content that lacks such form, but that ‘conceptual capacities are already operative in the deliverances of sensibility themselves’ (McDowell 1996, 39). Such capacities, for McDowell, find their ‘characteristic expression’ in ‘intellectual activity’; but this is not to say, ‘unless we are saying it only as a *façon de parler*, that experience acquires its objective purport through intellectual activity on our part’ (McDowell 2008, 230).

In my view, however, Hegel’s talk of intellectual activity—both unconscious and conscious—in the constitution of experience is not just a *façon de parler*. He means what he says: consciousness actively posits what we see as an object, and intelligence is active in intuition (*ist in ihr Aktion*) in casting what we see out into space and time (VSG 1, 429f.; LPS 210/VPG 191). Moreover, McDowell resists such formulations (in part at least) because he misunderstands what they imply.

McDowell rejects the idea of ‘intellectual activity conferring objectivity on sensory content’, because he thinks it imports ‘irresistibly’ the idea of sensory content ‘as it was before objectivity was conferred on it’—content that can be found ‘only in an antechamber of the mind’ (McDowell 2008,

228f.). Taking Hegel's talk of intellectual activity literally thus 'threatens the insight he shares with Kant': namely, 'that we do not first have bare sensations and then work them into conceptual shape' (McDowell 2008, 230). McDowell's concern, however, is unfounded, because that shared insight is not threatened by the idea that intellectual activity confers objectivity on sensory content. This idea certainly implies that such content could be enjoyed by animals and babies without any consciousness of objectivity; but it does not imply that mature human beings first admit sensory content to an antechamber of the mind and then grant it full admittance to consciousness at the cost of being 'conceptualised'. For, on the view I attribute to Hegel, the sensory content that is a component of mature perceptual experience is taken up into consciousness (and intelligence), and endowed with objectivity, *as* it is first being received (see Houlgate 2006, 244).

Note that there is only one stage to the process envisaged by my Hegel, not two, as McDowell thinks.²⁷ Similarly, if we see white light through blue glass and the glass turns the light blue, there is just one event as far as we are concerned—seeing blue light—even though two different things make contributions to it. Of course, the glass is not active, as thought is on the Hegelian picture of conscious experience. Nonetheless, it still gives the light a colour that the light itself does *not* have, and thereby lets us see only blue light—just as consciousness gives sensory content a form that it does *not* have and in so doing ensures that we experience only conceptualised sensory content.

Leaving blue glass to one side, the point, for Hegel, is that we act on sensory content *as* we receive it. There are, indeed, two different things going on—the receiving of that content (through sensibility) and the acting on it (by thought)—but these two occur together *at the same time*. Sensory content is thus not just received (as it is in the animal), but it is received *into consciousness* by being *actively* taken up into it: our passivity and activity coincide. In McDowell's story, by contrast, experience involves no activity on the part of the mind (whether conscious or unconscious); rather, conceptual capacities are drawn into operation 'passively' in the deliverances of sensibility itself (McDowell 1996, 30).

For Hegel, no thought is involved in sensibility as such; but intellectual activity is, and must be, involved in concrete perceptual experience, because sensory content alone does not enable us to think of it as *objective*. So, not only is sensory content 'conceptually informed' as soon as it is received into a human mind—as McDowell puts it (2008, 227)—but it is formed conceptually *by* thought *as* it is received.

McDowell is right that both Hegel and he deny that 'we first have bare sensations and then bring our powers of thought to bear on them' (McDowell 2008, 227). Nonetheless, there is a subtle difference between them: for Hegel highlights the role of intellectual *activity* and *freedom* in the constitution of perceptual experience, whereas McDowell stresses the passive 'operation' of our conceptual capacities in such experience—capacities that

also find expression in the activity of making judgements. Assuming that Hegel's talk of intellectual 'activity' in experience is not just a *façon de parler*, this is a subtle but significant difference between Hegel and McDowell (and one that can, perhaps, be partly explained by McDowell's ignoring the proximity of Hegel to Fichte).

This difference in turn means that McDowell and Hegel conceive of experience itself in different ways. For McDowell, experience involves the 'cooperation' of sensibility and understanding; yet the distinction between the latter is merely *notional*, since sensibility does not make an 'isolable contribution' that understanding actively works up *into* experience (McDowell 2008, 225f.). (This 'notional' distinction is set out at the start of this section.) Experiences, therefore, are not the result of two distinct contributions by sensibility and understanding, but rather just the 'conceptually structured operations of receptivity' or sensibility *itself* (McDowell 1996, 26).

For Hegel, by contrast, experience is the cooperation of sensibility and thought in which both do make 'isolable' contributions. It is thus not just the operation of conceptually informed *sensibility*, but the product of a sensibility or receptivity from which all thought is absent *and* a thought that acts on that sensibility, transforming its deliverances into perceptual experience. Experience combines sensory receptivity (or passivity) with conceptual activity. McDowell's critique of this Hegelian picture of experience misses its target, however, since thought acts on sensory content *as* (not *after*) we receive it.

McDowell also appears to misunderstand why I invoked the idea of unconscious sensations in my essay. The claim made by my Hegel is not, as McDowell appears to think, that all sensations are first unconscious and subsequently admitted to consciousness (see McDowell 2008, 228f.). As I have stressed repeatedly, the sensory component of mature perceptual experience is taken into consciousness and intelligence *as* it is received, and so is not first admitted in an unconscious form into an antechamber of the mind. Nonetheless, for Hegel, intelligence in particular is not only activity, but also a 'nocturnal pit' in which is stored an infinity of representations 'without being in consciousness' (EPM §453 R); and Kant, too, talks (in the *Anthropology*) of 'representations that we have without being conscious of them' (A §5) and (in the first *Critique*) of intuitions that are 'nothing for us' if not taken up into consciousness (CPR A116). Both Hegel and Kant recognise, therefore, that some of our representations are unconscious. For neither, however, do such unconscious representations enter directly into perceptual experience (though they can become conscious).

A further difference between Hegel and McDowell is that, for Hegel, sensory experience does not 'take in' objects and facts, whereas, for McDowell, it does. For McDowell, conceptual capacities are operative in our passive sensibility and so enable us to take in 'the layout of phenomenal reality' in just the way 'common sense has it' (McDowell 2008, 234). For Hegel, by

contrast, experience cannot ‘take in’ objects because objects (in McDowell’s words) are the ‘products of an intellectual construction on our part’: our thought posits what we see *as* an object (McDowell 2008, 231; see also VSG 1, 436). Yet Hegel’s position, as I present it, is not one of subjective idealism, as McDowell claims (2008, 231, 234): for in giving the form of objectivity to sensory content, thought understands what we see to be the object *it is*. It does so, as I explained above, because it knows a priori that what it thinks *is*.

McDowell contends that experience, as described by my Hegel, cannot yield knowledge of how things are (McDowell 2008, 234). Yet this charge holds only if such knowledge must be based on *taking in* objects and facts in experience. My Hegel, however, does not accept this view of experience or experiential knowledge. Experience, for him, involves *actively* thinking things to be thus and so, *and therein* understanding and judging them to be what they *are* (see EPM §465; VSG 1, 432).

To conclude this paper, let me cite one further remark of McDowell’s that highlights the difference between his position and Hegel’s. McDowell writes as follows:

Houlgate attributes to Hegel the idea that ‘our visual and tactile sensations take in directly the look and shape of things’. But that cannot be right. It is inconsistent with the basic insight that Hegel shares with Kant. Anything we take in in experience is available to us to be taken in only because our conceptual capacities are operative in the constitution of experience (McDowell 2008, 232).

These lines make it clear that, for McDowell, in mature human beings conceptual capacities are at work in, and the conditions of, *sensibility itself* (the operations of which McDowell equates with ‘experience’) (see also McDowell 1996, 24f., 39). Since this is the case, what we take in in experience can never be anything less than conceptualised sensory content. For Hegel, by contrast, conceptual capacities are *not* conditions of sensibility for us or for any other animals. In mature human beings, however, the activity of understanding what we see occurs *at the same time* as the process of seeing and in that sense is inseparable from it: they join together to form one ‘concrete habit’ of seeing (EPM §410 R).

There is, then, a subtle, but significant difference between Hegel and McDowell, even though both agree that mature perceptual experience, mediated by thought, is always of conceptualised sensory content, or visible *objects*. McDowell tries to remove this difference by reducing Hegel’s talk of intellectual activity in experience to a mere *façon de parler*. In my view, however, this does not do justice to what Hegel says in his texts and lectures; and it interprets away Hegel’s core idea that spirit is *active* in the experience that common sense takes to be merely receptive and passive.

NOTES

1. The EPM is quoted according to Inwood's edition (2007).
2. Hegel states that 'sensation as such, without a content belonging to spirit, is animal' (VSG 1, 51) and that 'initially the child has only a sensation of light by which things are manifest to it' (EPM §396 A). See also Houlgate 2006, 248. (Note that all the additions to EPM can also be found in VSG 2, 919–1117.)
3. See EPM §401 and A; VSG 1, 52–53, 288; VSG 2, 655: 'The bodily determinacy is at the same time in feeling a sensation' (*die leibliche Bestimmtheit ist zugleich im Gefühl ein Empfinden*). (See also McDowell 2009, 117: 'Sensibility provides an animal with representations—awarenesses in some sense—of features of its environment'.) Hegel does not, however, deny that what we are aware of, including sensations, can be sub- or unconscious (see EPM §453 R).
4. The EPN is quoted according to Miller's translation (1970).
5. Translation of '*Manifestiertsein*' altered. See also VSG 1, 289; VSG 2, 657.
6. Touch also feels 'resistance' (*Widerstand*) (or what is often known as 'impenetrability') and so, unlike the other senses, is not just aware of immediately given determinations but registers the presence of something *other* than the soul and its body (EPM §401 A; VSG 1, 55). Yet touch registers the presence of an other only through direct contact with the latter; it does not, therefore, take that other to be an *object* quite distinct from the subject.
7. See also Berkeley 1975, 20–23, 51; Houlgate 1993, 99–109.
8. Hegel says at one point that we learn to see through 'inference' (*Schließen*), but he then immediately associates this with 'comparing' (*Vergleich*) (rather than explicitly rational inference) (VSG 1, 54).
9. Consciousness not only separates what we see from the subject, but it also separates visible objects from one another by bringing 'various sensations together into a point' (VSG 1, 442). In other words, it performs a function similar to Kantian 'synthesis' by uniting the 'manifold' of sensation into discrete things.
10. See also EPM §400 A: 'the soul, in so far as it *only* senses, does not yet apprehend itself as a subjective confronting an objective'.
11. See also VSG 2, 766: 'the activity of the I is not for our consciousness'.
12. See VSG 1, 436: 'the construction [*Konstruktion*] of the object by thought'.
13. The EL is quoted according to the Geraets/Suchting/Harris edition (1991).
14. This is not to deny that children must acquire these categories as they learn to think, or that our way of understanding the categories changed in history before they came to be properly understood. On the development of children, see EPM §396 A, and on categorial change in history, see EPN §246 A: 'All revolutions, in the sciences no less than in world history, originate solely from the fact that spirit, in order to understand and comprehend itself with a view to possessing itself, has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly, more deeply, more intimately, and more in unity with itself'.
15. For this reason, I think, Hegel writes at the start of the *Science of Logic* that 'nothing' is 'the same empty intuition or thought [*Anschauen oder Denken*] as pure being' (SL 82/W 5, 83). See also SL 77/W 5, 78. The SL is quoted according to Miller's translation (1999).
16. See deVries 1988, 68: 'no sensory episode plays a foundational epistemological role'. See also VSG 1, 118: 'sensation is the imperfect objectless [*gegenstandslose*] form'.
17. See EPM §448: 'the abstract *identical* direction [*identische Richtung*] of the mind'. See also VSG 1, 500; VSG 2, 814f.

18. Williams translates '*gegen mich*' as 'in relation to me'.
19. Williams has 'active in this felt content' (whereas Hegel has in mind 'active in intuition'). If Williams' version were to be correct, however, the German would have to be 'ist in *ihm* Aktion', rather than 'ist in *ihr* Aktion'.
20. 'If our intuition had to be of the kind that represented things *as they are in themselves*, then absolutely no intuition *a priori* would take place, but it would always be empirical. For I can only know what may be contained in the object in itself if the object is present and given to me' (P §9).
21. Hegel's claim that the uneducated or 'wild' person is 'attentive to nothing' (*auf nichts aufmerksam*) suggests that the 'educated' include not simply those who have enjoyed a formal education, but those who have learned, or been trained, to pay close attention to things (VSG 1, 125).
22. As we have noted above, consciousness and intuition are themselves also activities of judgement, but they do not yet involve the linguistic judgement that is at issue here.
23. The subtle difference between the two philosophers, however, is that, for Hegel though not for Kant, the activity of uniting what we see into an 'object'—the activity that Hegel assigns to consciousness—is itself that of (prelinguistic) judgement.
24. Kant distinguishes sharply between the 'receptivity' of sensibility and the 'spontaneity' of understanding (CPR B75, 129–130), and Hegel states that 'only *soul* is *passive*, the free mind is essentially *active, productive*' (EPM §444 A) (though he also thinks that the child, who is initially little more than soul, has to 'learn to see' depth and distance [VSG 1, 250]). Unlike Hegel, however, Kant does not think that sensation takes in the look of things themselves, but rather that it is simply the way we are affected by things (see CPR B34).
25. See VSG 1, 430 on 'the unconscious side' to consciousness, and VSG 2, 806 on the self-conscious activity of intelligence: 'Theoretical spirit certainly seems to be passive, but it *is* not; it is immediately active . . .; it is itself the drive—and is this *for itself*—to make the other into its own'. See also CPR B130: 'all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not'.
26. For Hegel on unconscious representations, see EPM §453 R, and for Kant on the same topic, see A §5. For both philosophers, unconscious representations remain *representations*, and thus forms of (albeit obscure or dim) awareness, rather than mere bodily states.
27. See McDowell's phrase 'a *successor* to that separable contribution' (McDowell 2008, 228; my emphasis).

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5 The Place of Habit in Hegel's *Psychology*

Elisa Magri¹

How quickly the consciousness ceases to collaborate with our habits, leaving them to develop on their own account without further concerning itself with them.

Marcel Proust, *Time Regained*

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

I would like to introduce this paper by reminding you of a famous work of art, *The Red Model* (1937) by René Magritte. The painting shows a pair of old looking boots that have merged into a pair of feet at the bottom. As the feet are not part of a body or of anything living, the spectator has an overall feeling of discomfort and uneasiness. The technique utilised by the artist is called hybridisation, which blends the characteristics of different things to yield something new and unexpected. According to Magritte, 'the problem of shoes demonstrates how the most barbaric things pass as acceptable through the force of habit. One feels, thanks to *The Red Model*, that the union of a human foot and a leather shoe arises in reality from a monstrous custom' (Gablik 1988, 111). A 'monstrous custom' one obtains when getting used to habits that corrupt one's own nature, leading to depravation and degradation. It happens, then, that habit can lead one to perform actions both against human nature and human interests.

Such a statement echoes Hegel's warning against the risk of 'dying from habit', which happens when one comes 'to feel completely at home in life, when he has become spiritually and physically dull, and when the opposition between subjective consciousness and spiritual activity has disappeared; for the human being is active only in so far as he has not attained his end and wants to produce and assert himself in the effort to attain it' (PR §151 A). By addressing the risk of being totally assimilated into one's own life, Hegel notices that habit is a potentially dangerous attitude, such that a strong self-discipline is required in order to avoid the annihilation of the self. The major problem posited by habit is the lack of awareness, for habitual activities do away with our conscious agency. Indeed, the *habitus* makes the problem of

agency superfluous, for it is automatic and impersonal. As put by Bourdieu, 'the habitus is a spontaneity without consciousness or will' (Bourdieu 1990, 56). It is precisely in virtue of its automatic character that Hegel regards habit to be fundamentally ambiguous. On the one hand, habit enables us to acquire certain skills, thereby broadening the spectrum of our dispositions and abilities; on the other hand we can be enslaved by the passive character of habituality, which makes us blind towards further possibilities.

Hegel is one of the philosophers who have devoted the most critical attention to habit and its relation to intellectual faculties. In his view, 'habit is a form that embraces all kinds and stages of spirit's activity' (EPM² §410 R). Indeed, not only does he feature habit as one of the most prominent functions of theoretic spirit, but he also acknowledges the connection between habit and ethical life.³ Recently, the problem of habit in the context of Hegel's thought has awakened new interest in the debate on naturalism.⁴ However, there is still more to say about the psychological nature of habit and its influence over subjectivity. As Christoph Menke (2013) has observed, habit is a critical concept that denotes the possibility of spirit self-contradiction. Once habits have been acquired, how do we liberate ourselves from them? How is it possible to correct a behaviour that has been incorporated and sedimented in our own style? Are we doomed to the passive force of habituality, which commits us to acquire a new habit in order to replace another one, or does Hegel offer us an alternative?

To be sure, habit plays a significant role in Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, not only in the *Anthropology*, but also within the *Psychology*. Hegel distinguishes between habituality as the second nature of the embodied self and a more sophisticated form of habituality that is active as memory. Like Hume in *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*, Hegel conceives of habit as a propensity to renew the same act or operation without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding (Hume 1999, 121). Nevertheless, contrary to Hume, he does not admit any distinction between habit and memory that depends on the constant conjunction of past instances in the mind. For Hume, habit arises from the frequent conjunction of objects, thereby grounding the knowledge of every matter of fact. The exercise of memory consists of preserving the order and position of former impressions. In contrast to Hume, Hegel holds that habit is a refinement of the natural self, which establishes the basic and originary self-reference of subjectivity. In this regard, habit encompasses a variety of shapes that mark different stages of the *Bildung* of subjectivity, including memory itself. Whereas habit is the *gestural* power that establishes a style over the undetermined multiplicity of sensations and feelings, memory is the *intellectual* power that transforms intuitions into linguistic signs, thereby enabling thinking. More precisely, as I shall argue, habit explains how a 'praxis of ontological transformation' (Menke 2013, 36) is acquired by the living body, whereas memory also includes apprehension and learning.

Yet, habit and memory, although specifically different, rely on the same process. To be sure, they share a fundamental feature, i.e., the capacity to incorporate gestures and meanings. From a Hegelian perspective, habit and memory explain why adaptation and learning do not rely on an entirely passive mechanism, but rather entail a fundamental self-acquaintance that is reactivated and empowered by means of habituality. In fact, it is in virtue of habitual processes that subjectivity effectively develops the capacity to think and to set itself free as a thinking subject. Thus, to acknowledge the role of habit in Hegel's *Psychology* leads us to question the limit and the relevance of habituality in relation to the overall structure of theoretical spirit. Does habituality commit the subject to the automatic acquisition of bodily habits through somatic sedimentation? In what sense are habit and memory not entirely passive? I believe that an understanding of Hegel's conception of habituality may provide an original insight that sets specific limits to the extent and influence of habit in relation to subjectivity. What is remarkable in Hegel's account is that neither habit nor memory can replace conscious agency and choice. Hegel's argument implies that habituality may be viewed as a schematic function enabling the self to give herself a style as well as to think. Yet, habit is not responsible for the practical endorsement of beliefs and practices, for these imply the moral capacity to choose as conscious agents. Hence, the explorations of habit and memory lead to the appraisal of thought for the realisation of a specific sort of freedom, i.e., the freedom of thought *as such*, which is subjected to the manifold of experience as well as to physical constraints.

HABIT AS SECOND NATURE

Hegel was highly concerned with philosophical anthropology and psychology dating back to his early studies in Tübingen (Hoffmeister 1936). Yet, until the 1817 *Encyclopaedia* Hegel did not develop a philosophical anthropology, as he occupied himself mainly with phenomenology and psychology. When the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia* was published, anthropology was identified with the investigation of the soul. Even by the Jena lectures on logic and metaphysics, the soul was already defined as 'neither genuine substance, nor genuine subject' (JS 147) due to its lack of determinateness. Indeed, the soul is conceived of as an undifferentiated unity whose dialectics with the world displays the coming to be of the genus.

'The soul'—Hegel writes—'is the whole circle, and its peripheral movement, which is at one and the same time connected with the soul as middle point, and extended indefinitely as a straight line—extended indefinitely because, to the extent that the soul is the middle point, to that extent the periphery is opposed to it and on its own account' (JS 147). The opposition between the circle and straight line reflects the contrast between the genus and the individual. The whole circle represents the soul's efforts to

reproduce itself as genus, thereby reminding the reader of the Platonic conception of the soul.⁵ At the same time, the Hegelian soul is a principle that is embodied in every animate being. The peripheral movement of the circle, which is extended indefinitely as a straight line, stands for the infinite progression of individual life generated through a continuous and indefinite movement forward. Hence, the analogy between soul and circle allows for a twofold perspective on the soul, which is conceived both as genus and as the particularising of individual existence.

In the sections of the *Encyclopaedia* dealing with *Anthropology* Hegel provides a substantial revision of the originary notion of the soul. From the very beginning, the soul is conceived of as being immersed in nature. A threefold development (natural, feeling, and actual soul) marks the transition from natural immediacy towards consciousness. The division into *Anthropology*, *Phenomenology*, and *Psychology* is notably a Hegelian thematic partition, which provides the overall and complex development of the concept of spirit (*Geist*), emerging from nature towards the practical determination of freedom. As such, the threefold division should not be taken an implication of a separation among the different determinations of subjectivity, nor should the progression from *Anthropology* to *Psychology* be considered as a ladder. On the contrary, Hegel warns against the risk of tracing superficial separations, for 'what is higher already shows itself to be empirically present in a lower and more abstract determination' (EPM §380). In addition, 'the procedure gives rise to the anticipation of a content which only presents itself later in the development' (EPM §380). From this point of view, the very treatment of *Anthropology* represents the basis of the entire philosophy of subjective spirit, i.e., it is not something that should be left aside once the shift to the following step has occurred, but as the permanent ground wherein the subsequent development of spirit takes place.

Hegel describes the soul as an entirely natural entity, which gradually develops the distinction between inward and outward. Hegel's analysis may be said to be genetic, since he carefully acknowledges the different layers that compound the specific intentionality of the soul.⁶ Sensation marks the first relevant step in this process in a quite Aristotelian fashion. As scholars have widely and attentively recognised, Hegel's analysis of sensation is strongly influenced by Aristotle's *De Anima* (Ferrarin 2001, 262ff.; Wolff 1992). Sensitivity stands for a naturally sense-informed receptivity, which passes through an alteration when affected by something external. Sensations are, properly speaking, forms of being affected (*De Anima* II 11, 423b 29), which in turn represent, for Hegel, 'alterations in the substantiality of the soul' (EPM §402). On the one hand, sensation implies the internalisation of the physical modifications of the sense organs; on the other hand, such modifications are experienced as the sedimentation of information provided by sense contents.⁷ At the same time, it is worth noticing that Hegel conceives of sensation in light of a process of embodiment or *Verleiblichung* (EPM §401 A). By embodiment, Hegel seems to suggest an intertwining

between emotions and bodiliness such that each sensation is perceived as affecting not simply the physical body (*Körper*), but rather the totality of the lived body (*Leib*).⁸

Embodiment includes expressive phenomena such as voice, laughing, weeping, but it also refers to the overall experience of the lived body. As Pinkard (2012) has noticed, Hegel's *Anthropology* involves a prior form of self-acquaintance that shares significant similarities with Merleau-Ponty's view. The embodied soul is not conceived of as an object of empirical observation, standing in external interaction with the outer world, but rather from the inside of the subjective and animal awareness (Pinkard 2012, 26). This aspect can be further elucidated by looking at the difference between sensation (*Empfindung*) and emotional feeling (*Gefühl*). As Hegel notices (EPM §402 R), in our ordinary experience, we have sensations without being aware of them. To be aware of sensations means to *feel* them. Although our eyes meet the sun's daylight, we are not aware of the sensation of the light that meets our retina. What Hegel outlines through the analysis of sensation and feeling is an account of self-awareness that precedes the very distinction between subject and object. For this reason, the feeling soul should not be taken as identical to self-consciousness. On the contrary, sensation and feeling represent different layers of a unitary process underlying originary self-acquaintance.⁹

Importantly, Hegel holds that being aware of one's own feelings is something that can be trained. Not by chance, feeling is the place where Hegel discusses different forms of derangement. The problem here is that, as long as the self remains engrossed in a particular feeling, it is subject to disease, as it happens when someone takes her subjective states to be objective (EPM §408 A). For Hegel, derangement does not consist in a loss of reason, either in respect of intelligence or of the will, but in a 'contradiction of reason' (EPM §408 R).¹⁰ Sanity is not necessarily opposed to madness, but rather calls for a proper cultivation of mind.

What strikes the reader is precisely the relevance Hegel assigns to rational training. Since *Anthropology* describes an embodiment process, the natural development of the self is a process of continuous adaptation to externality in accordance to one's own rules. To be sure, habit is the 'determinacy of feeling' and the 'mechanism of self-feeling' (EPM §410 R). To put it differently, habit enables the embodied soul to learn a practice that makes its natural mode of existence a routine. Examples of habit include standing upright, walking, and writing, i.e., all activities that entail learning single practices and then forgetting how they have been unified and memorised. Such engendering of habit is a practice (*Übung*), for it consists in the repetition of gestures and activities that gradually reduce the apparent externality of feelings and desires, turning them into something that is unconsciously posited by the soul. Yet, all the achievements provided by habit are involuntary, as they do not stem from any conscious deliberation. How, then, is it possible for the soul to detach from feelings without employing any conscious will?

Hegel describes acquired habits as dispositions that broaden the spectrum of subjective capacities.¹¹ Once the soul learns to master all these functions, it 'infects them with its universality' [*sie so sehr mit seiner Allgemeinheit angesteckt*], so that 'they are no longer before us as singularities, and we are aware only of their universal aspect' (EPM §410 R). We do not need to recall how we have learnt to play the violin in order to play the instrument. By means of habit we regularly perform a set of skills that are embedded in our body.¹² Consider, for instance, the case of writing, addressed by Hegel himself (EPM §410 R). When we learn to write, we must pay attention to every single detail, including how to hold the pen in our hands and how to draw signs on the paper. But, once the habit of writing has been ingrained in ourselves, we no longer concentrate on these details, since they have become abilities. The habit to write refines and transforms itself into a rule the particularities inherent in the learning process, such as our tension or uncertainty in holding the pen or in drawing a sign. Still, it is by gradually incorporating many different abilities that we improve in the practice of learning other related skills, e.g., reading. In this sense, we acquire a mastery over the manifold of bodily capacities without being conscious at each stage of the rule that we are following. This is the reason why Hegel stresses that in habit we are interested in the matter-in-hand and yet we are indifferent to it.

In the Berlin lectures 1827–28 Hegel draws attention to the fact that 'habit is a universality of reflection, i.e., generality, a universality, since it includes many particulars in itself, a universal related to the many (the higher universality, the species, is not a universal of reflection, it is rather simple relation to itself)' (LPS 153/VP 125). The difference between the universality of reflection and the higher universality of the species is a difficult passage that can be properly discussed only in light of the *Science of Logic*. However, for the purpose of this paper, it is important to notice that reflection is not the cogitation of mind. Hegel conceives of reflection as the one-sided operation that establishes relations among particulars according to external features, i.e. features that are independent from the essence of the relation itself. Hegel regards, for instance, the judgement 'Man is mortal' as a judgement of reflection. This is because the predicate does not express the essential connection between 'being human' and 'being mortal', but only the immediate act of positing a property through abstraction. Thus, such universality obtains between extrinsic determinations. Likewise, the universality of habit falls under the category of reflection, for it implies that a general rule is established by abstracting from the involvement of the self. In order to acquire a habit, we do not reflect upon it, but we passively absorb it. A wide range of bodily activities, gestures and expressions become habitual not in virtue of the conscious effort of the self to give oneself a style, but only as result of the passive repetition. More precisely, Hegel stresses the ambivalent function of habit, which, on the one hand, trains our bodily dispositions and transforms them into self-positing and self-driven

activities. On the other hand, by following habits, the soul falls prey to mindless mechanisms that do not require any active awareness. From this point of view, the ambiguous character of habit stems from the fact that the relation between universality and particularity is obtained by means of abstraction.

As long as the soul is constrained by its particular feelings, habit is the only means that provides a reference to the soul for the unitary centre of all physiological movements and affections. A common way to put this is to say that habit is located at the boundary between nature and spirit. According to John McCumber (1990, 159), Hegelian habit is a relatively simple disposition to repeat an activity without the awareness of doing so, thereby determining the kind of self one is. In this sense, ‘habituation clearly belongs to spirit rather than to nature’, because lower functions are understood in terms of higher spiritual activity. By contrast, Simon Lumsden (2013, 134) has argued that ‘habit does not mark the ascent into an exclusively spiritual domain, but it is the way in which human beings can be at home with nature’. For Lumsden habit is not a break with nature, for it enables the self to have a world and to experience it. As such, habit cannot be identified with either spontaneity or sheer receptivity.

Following Lumsden, one can say that habit overcomes the dualism between spontaneity and receptivity. The structure of habituation is intrinsic to the embodiment process. As such, habit is only indirectly committed to the transition (*Übergang*) from nature to spirit, since it provides the primitive actualisation of the concept of *Geist*, i.e. the concept (*Begriff*) that is for itself and that has itself as its object (EPM §382 A). For Hegel, habit is not the passive sedimentation of the unconscious operations of the body, but rather a sort of *schema* that enables spirit to distance itself, while establishing a fundamental and basic form of unconscious self-reference. In this regard, there is no dualism between nature and spirit from the very outset of *Anthropology*. Hegel’s issue is that soul is constrained not by its bodiliness, but rather by the fact that it does not know itself, i.e., it has not developed the capacity to take itself as object. In other words, Hegel is not so much concerned in the *Anthropology* with the ontological transition from nature to spirit as with the processes that develop spirit’s self-knowledge.

Importantly, if one takes habit to be a schema, it follows that even the dichotomy between sensibility and spontaneity does no longer subsist. As David Forman has noticed *contra* John McDowell, ‘Hegel’s account of habit and the emergence of the actual soul suggest that a subjectivity that is engaged in the natural world that it can cognize is a subjectivity that preserves within it a receptivity that is not itself conceptually informed’ (Forman 2010, 151). Hegel’s reflection on habit provides the model for the integration of skills into bodily functions, but it is not a *transition* from being merely natural to being cognitively accountable. Embodiment accounts for the training of feeling, thereby providing a kind of knowing-how that is crucially different from the knowing-that and knowing-why offered, for

instance, by logical thinking. In this sense, there is a difference between the subjective embodiment of rationality, as presented in the *Anthropology*, and the capacity to provide an account of it, as entailed by logic. It is precisely because the integration of skills and bodily capacities is assigned to habit, i.e., to an operation not reducible to the conscious observing of any rules, that the embodiment process replaces the opposition between spontaneity and receptivity.

Within the *Anthropology*, Hegel is primarily interested in exploring how subjectivity attains its basic form of self-reference. As such, the liberation from sensations that habit yields (EPM §410 R) is not to be understood as underlying an *opposition* between sensory apprehension and spontaneity, but rather a *tension* that is intrinsic to the very nature of *habitus*.¹³ The 'liberation from the sensations' refers to the gradual constitution of a pattern or modular activity, i.e., a body-memory, by means of which a set of abilities is incorporated into an individual. Accordingly, habit concerns how beliefs *belong* to the self, not the endorsement of belief as such. In this sense, habit schematises bodily intentionality in a way that is analogous to that of work and memory within the *Phenomenology* and *Psychology* respectively.

As is well known, the *Phenomenology* transforms the original entanglement between soul and world into an opposition. Conceived in terms of consciousness, the self is driven by desire and stands in opposition to the sensed object. Yet, a refined version of habit marks the liberation of consciousness from the clash with the other. In fact, a habitual pattern enables the activity of work in the master-slave relationship. Here, the discipline acquired by the slave through labour is of the utmost importance. Hegel emphasises that without having experienced the breaking of his own will through discipline, 'no one will be free, rational and able to command' (EPM §435 A). To be sure, the discipline of the servant represents only the beginning of freedom, for this cannot rely on passive obedience. However, the role of work is precisely that of governing desire and making consciousness used to the interaction with the outer world. One can say that habit, far from being reduced to the motility of the nerve system, has become a learned process for voluntary actions in the *Phenomenology*. Hence, habit is not simply a set of mindless repetitions, but a mechanism that enables the *Bildung* of the self. In order to elucidate how habit influences the development of thought, one must enter the field of the *Psychology*, which comprises the unity of soul and consciousness. More specifically, I will now address the relation between habit and memory, which is crucial for understanding the empowerment of habit throughout the *Psychology*.

HABIT AND MEMORY

Within the *Anthropology* Hegel remarks that habit is quite similar to memory (EPM §410 R) and that they both represent hard points in the

organisation of spirit. At the same time, he points out that memory belongs to a higher level, for it is very close to thinking (EPM §464). Indeed, in order to think, we need language and memory plays a crucial role in the production of linguistic meanings. However, the striking affinity between habit and memory deserves closer attention, as I will attempt to clarify in the following. Memory is presented in the last section of *Theoretical Spirit* within the *Psychology*, as one of the divisions of representation (*Vorstellung*) right before thought (*Denken*).

It is noteworthy that the *Psychology* differs from the *Anthropology* in that the former is no longer tied to specific physiological phenomena, but rather to the *content* of the bodily acts of cognition originally laid out in the *Anthropology*. Yet, psychological functions presuppose the embodied structure outlined in the *Anthropology*. *Psychology* is ideal in the sense that physiologically different organs can embody different activities. For instance, sheer sensibility differs from intuition in so far as the former accounts for the immediate sensory grasping of the external world, whereas the latter is the ideal content of sensation that underlies the constitution of a spatiotemporal framework. Unlike Kant, Hegel maintains that intuition refers to the apprehension of the content of sensation, i.e. it is intuition *of objects* located in space and time (EPM §450). Likewise, the treatment of language in *Psychology* represents the ideal treatment of the voice, which was explored in the anthropology as a physical phenomenon. As Hegel says, the soul represents a potentiality (EPM §389); therefore, psychology can be viewed as the actualisation of those faculties that intelligence develops in the field of cognition as its own activities—i.e., they are no longer given by nature. Accordingly, one can notice a parallel between anthropological capacities and psychological activities. In the case of habit, memory is certainly the activity that parallels habit.

This can be further clarified, if one takes into closer account memory (*Gedächtnis*), which is closely related to language.¹⁴ Hegel distinguishes three stages of memory: a) name-retaining memory, b) reproductive memory, c) mechanical memory. a) The name-retaining memory is based on intuition, for it implies that intelligence recollects the sound of the spoken word together with its representation. In this way, intelligence produces a connection such that, by hearing the word, it is capable of generating a meaningful representation. Hence, retention, according to Hegel, is not merely passive: By the very act of hearing a word, we acquire the capacity to connect it simultaneously to a specific meaning (*Bedeutung*). Hegel seems to suggest that meaning is not simply the reference of the word, but rather the stable connection between word, object, and representation. The function of recollection in retention is precisely that of filling the gap between word and meaning through a spontaneous associative process in order to produce a universal representation. Yet, the forming of representation is grounded on comprehension. The user of a new language must possess the meaning in order to be able to speak and write the word (EPM §461 A). Hegel seems to maintain that it does not

mean that the reverse is true, i.e., that production may precede comprehension, for he claims that we learn to speak and write a language later than we understand it (EPM §461 A). Thus, for Hegel, it would be impossible to learn a foreign word without associating it with the standard meaning that the speaker already knows in his or her own language.¹⁵

b) The reproductive memory is the ability that connects sign and signified without the aid of representation. While speaking or hearing, we do not take into account the difference between word and representation, because the word sounds already significant to us. At this level, intelligence understands the word 'lion' as a meaningful sign, because it recollects only the name as embedded with meaning.¹⁶ Reproduction allows us to abstract from the conscious presentation of representations, since these have been deeply internalised by meaning. However, at this level, the order and the structure of discourse are still contingent and depending on circumstances. It is only when intelligence memorises series of words as c) mechanical memory that the *transition* from memory to thinking is obtained. The relation between mechanical memory and thinking is certainly one of the most difficult in the *Psychology*. Although thinking 'requires habit and familiarity' (EPM §410 A), mechanical memory is not identical to thinking, but rather it is the enabling mechanism of thought. As deVries has pointed out (1988, 163), mechanical memory 'is not a separable faculty of mind, nor a distinct stage in the growth of a thinker, but a form of activity that can be isolated within, but not separated from, the complex activities of a thinking being'. What Hegel seems to suggest is that, by routinely recollecting words as meanings, we get used to them to the point that we forget *how* we unified meaningful *series* of words. As a result, sentences and phrases are triggered independently of any synthesis of form and content. The 'senseless words' are the syntagmatic relationships of words employed by spirit immediately, without having any representation in mind. However, as long as language relies on a habitual act of memorisation, what we produce through linguistic expression appears to us as something given, 'as something that is found' (EPM §463 R).

Thinking arises once we have internalised the rules to connect words in a *meaningful* way. Thanks to the work of mechanical memory, we do not need to recall or to keep in mind the rules of a particular language. Memory dispenses us with the particularity of language, just like habit frees us from the particularity of bodily capacities. In this sense, memory provides intelligence with its own space wherein it develops beyond the constraints posited by external and contingent factors, including the language one uses. It is not that the entire thinking activity is assimilated to language, since the use of signs and words become a matter of indifference, once intelligence is involved in thinking (EPM §464 A). What marks the capacity to think is not simply the use of language, but the ability to employ a route established by language without losing the fundamental character of self-reference. To this end, the most important feature that intelligence acquires by means of memory is the capacity to be self-acquainted without being self-aware *that*

it is following a rule. This is compatible with *not* representing the minded item or thinking of it in any expressed form.

The entire mnemonic process can be viewed as the *schematism* that gradually enables thought to generate meaning without having to rely upon intuition or representation. In the Kantian framework, the problem of the schematism concerns how pure concepts can be applied to intuitions. Through the work of memory Hegel offers a model to explain the relation between intuitions and thinking without employing any *a priori* forms. From a Hegelian perspective, we can do away with the *a priori* in so far as we are confronted only with a system of habitual capacities that function without awareness or necessity of conscious monitoring. However, since this process is partly the result of a habitual development, memory shares significant characteristics with habituality.

Apparently, Hegel's account of habit and memory is quite similar to Bergson's view, according to which habit differs from memory in so far as the former is a mechanism of the body that lives in an ever renewed present, whereas the latter is coextensive with consciousness and truly moves in the past (Bergson 2005, 151). For Bergson, habit consists of a series of mechanisms that are subjected to a growing number of possible solicitations, whereas memory retains from the past only the intelligently coordinated movements that serve the purpose of action. As a result, Bergson argues that memory can supply habit and even be mistaken for it, but it is nonetheless different from habit. In fact, memory does not involve any sensible mediation between the self and meaning. Memory is lived and acted; it is not simply repeated like habit, but intelligently performed.

However, for Hegel, habit, far from being reduced to motor awareness, entails an outward projection of the self. The body cannot be separated from the spiritual activity that enables its movements and activity. Instead of introducing a temporal opposition between habit and memory, Hegel suggests a unified theoretical development. Whereas habit abstracts from the content of bodily feelings in order to generate styles and skills, memory abstracts from the content of representations in order to constitute imageless meanings. Throughout the *Psychology*, Hegel arguably proposes a theory of body memory and mnemonic activity that are grounded on the capacity of spirit to be self-present without being self-aware of the process it unfolds. Therefore, the dualism outlined by Bergson with regard to temporality does not apply to Hegel's *Psychology*. Habit and memory are not reciprocally opposed, because they highlight two layers of self-reference depending on spirit's theoretical *Bildung*.

HEGEL AND MAGRITTE

But in what sense can spirit set itself free? An important aspect of the process of actualisation is that thinking has the potential to have thoughts as objects

and to transform its experience into thought.¹⁷ Importantly, the capacity to reflect upon our thoughts implies that we have the power to question our habits and eventually to subordinate them to others upon which we can reflect in language (Lewis 2007, 27). Yet, one may wonder whether a form of mechanisation is unavoidable throughout the entire development of theoretic spirit. If so, should one say that subjectivity is governed by habitual mechanisms, such that there is no possibility to escape a habit without shifting to a different one?

In order to provide an answer, let us take again into account the relation between memory and thought. For Hegel, the exercise of memory implies that inwardness is levelled into pure space. Subjectivity feels at home only within memory, for here there is no opposition between inwardness, immediacy and givenness: the differences in the world are differences in thought and intelligence freely moves within such space. As Hegel reminds us in EPM §465 A, we are thinkers in all circumstances, whether we are aware of it or not.¹⁸ As long as thought depends on language for its expression, it can be said that the very activity of thinking relies on the set of skills that are required to master a language, such as speaking and writing. In this sense, we *can* be conditioned by a given language and thereby avoid the effort to reflect upon the meanings we use, i.e., to think as conscious agents.

Yet, such a risk does not depend on habit, but rather on our choice. The relation between memory and thinking suggests that habituality is more a form of self-presence than a constraint. Habituality does not rely on the content of our beliefs or attitudes, but rather on the structure that unifies our overall sense of existence. We are not compelled to take on a new habit in order to replace another one, since habitualities belong to us not simply as routines, but rather as dispositions that structure the layers of spirit's self-relation. Habitual schemata are more like centres of orientation than constraints, for they represent self-given rules that broaden spiritual capacities and dispositions. Hence, we cannot escape from habituality, just as we cannot escape from our own skin.

However, if habituality is essential to determine genetically the development of thinking, the latter preserves the capacity to determine itself freely not independently from habituality, but precisely in virtue of the *loss* experienced through habituality (Houlgate 1996; Menke 2013). The issue implicit in habituation has to do with the problem of abstraction: by committing ourselves to an automatic procedure, we necessarily abstract from accidental aspects (e.g., our bodily complexion in learning a practice, the rules of the language we speak) to the point of *forgetting* them as such. To put it differently, since we cannot be self-conscious of all particularities inherent in our activity, we let our unconscious routines be the rules of our movements and discourses. According to Hegel, this kind of universality (e.g., universality of reflection) is part of our embodied existence as well as of the determination of concrete universality. Our own complexion prevents us from being conscious of all affections and modifications we go through

in our daily life. Yet, concrete universality can be attained through speculative thought by dialectically reconstructing both the meaning of universality and the logical processes in which it is involved. It is by engaging in logical thought that intelligence learns to stand in a free relationship to the object (EPM §467 A). Thus, what we lose in the universality of reflection embodied by habituality is not our freedom to choose, but the *consciousness* of our entanglement in particularity. Such a loss can be explicated in terms of logical determinations, as it is showed by the *Logic*. This latter offers the ground to understand conceptually the different determinations of the process that generates concrete universality. In this sense, intelligence is recognitive (*wiedererkennend*, EPM §465).

At the same time, this self-determining capacity of thinking, which is explicated at the fullest by the *Logic*, lies at the core of will (EPM §468). It is not that we have to acquire knowledge of the logic in order to be agents. On the contrary, what Hegel suggests is that our faculty to choose is grounded on the *capacity* to take our thought as an object, i.e., to question the meaning of the universality that guides our thinking. In this sense, to be an agent presupposes the logical capacity of self-determination. Thus, the loss of particularity experienced through habituality allows subjectivity to confront itself with universality.

Having such points in view, we can now turn our attention to the problem presented by Magritte's painting. The portrait hints at the risk of assimilating habit to beliefs and attitudes that ultimately lead to pervert one's own nature. As long as we regularly perform actions that do not require our conscious effort, we can fall prey to mindless mechanisms that corrupt our sense of humanity. However, the analysis of habit and memory in Hegel's thought shows that habituality is more like a schematism than a passive automatism. Habituality as such is not responsible for the content of those beliefs or attitudes we incorporate due to culture and education. Such risks can be challenged, according to Hegel, only by means of rational choice. Echoing Aristotle's notion of moral virtues, Hegel holds that moral consciousness and education can prevent mankind from falling prey to self-alienation.

Accordingly, an account of habit as bond of social customs cannot be found in the process of theoretical spirit, but only in the *Philosophy of Objective Spirit*. In this latter, habituality is not conceived as the schema that enables thinking, but rather in relation to the actualisation of practical will. Whereas theoretical spirit is engaged in the actualisation of its bodily and cognitive capacities, objective spirit seeks the realisation of its action in the world (Winfield 2013). Thus, in order to avoid the risk evoked by Magritte's painting, it is essential to keep in mind the difference between the necessity of habit as psychological schema and its relevance as social practice once beliefs and values get embedded in it. Such a difference is not supposed to introduce any hiatus between subjective and objective spirit. On the contrary, it aims to highlight that habituality cannot be *immediately*

apply to social practices, for moral choice is required. Ultimately, this is what Hegel implicitly suggests, which is essential to eluding the risk portrayed by Magritte.

NOTES

1. I wish to thank Michael Sellis, Lucia Ziglioli, Susanne Herrmann-Sinai, Willem deVries, Brian O'Connor, and Alfredo Ferrarin for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper. Without their questions and thoughtful remarks, this paper would have been flawed in many respects. Of course, all remaining errors are mine.
2. I am quoting the Inwood translation (2007) throughout this paper.
3. According to the *Philosophy of Right*, ethical life is shaped by the set of habits and customs that accompany the historical development of society. See also Cesa 2013. In this sense, Hegel would have probably agreed on many aspects of Husserl and Bourdieu's analysis of *habit*.
4. See Forman 2010, Pinkard 2012, and Testa 2013.
5. Compare with Plato's *Phaedo* 72 b: 'For if generation did not proceed from opposite to opposite and back again, going round, as it were in a circle, but always went forward in a straight line without turning back or curving, then, you know, in the end all things would have the same form and be acted upon in the same way and stop being generated at all'. See also Chiereghin 1991.
6. For a critical contextualisation of Hegel's *Anthropology*, see also Fulda 2001, Sandkaulen 2010, and Nuzzo 2012.
7. For both Hegel and Aristotle no passivity is involved in sensation. For a discussion, see Wolff 1992 and Ferrarin 2001, 268–278.
8. Hegel does not have a univocal concept for embodiment, for he clearly distinguishes between several notions, such as: *Verleiblichung*, *Verkörperung*, *Inkarnation*. He uses *Verleiblichung* in the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (more specifically in the *Anthropology*), *Verkörperung* and *Inkarnation* in the *Lectures on Aesthetics* and *Religion* respectively. The difference among these notions is grounded on the Fichtean distinction between *Körper* and *Leib*. For a further analysis of embodiment in Hegel's philosophy, see: Inwood 2010, 354–355 and Russon 2009.
9. See EPM §402 A: 'At this standpoint, what I sense, I *am*, and what *am*, I sense. I am here immediately present [*gegenwärtig*] in the content, which only subsequently, when I become objective consciousness, appears to me as a self-dependent world confronting me.'
10. On Hegel's notion of madness, see: Gamm 1981, Berthold-Bond 1995, and Wenning 2013.
11. This point can be further analysed in light of the Aristotelian distinction between sensation and learning. For Aristotle, in the case of sensations the *hexis* (habit) does not have to be acquired, but it is born with us. Instead, learning grammar is a formation of our disposition that presupposes a proper training. According to Ferrarin (2001, 277), Hegel ignores the Aristotelian difference between sensation and learning, since he emphasises man's pre-intentional and later explicit will. See also Forman 2010.
12. Such self-reflexive reversal has been recently investigated in light of Varela's biological theory of auto-poiesis. See Michelini 2008.
13. Such a structure has been interpreted as a case of *hypotyposis* (Malabou 2005, 26). For Malabou, 'habit, a process whereby the psychic and the somatic are translated into one another, is a genuine plasticity. It fashions the human by an

incorporation (*Verleiblichung*) or rather an incarnation of the spiritual similar to an *hypotyposis*. The “exemplary individuality” which is man “sculpted” by habit discloses, as if in a Greek statue, the unity of essence and accident’. At the same time, Malabou also identifies habit as the middle term of the syllogism joining particularity (‘particularity of feeling’) and universality (those same particulars having become the ‘forms’ in which spirit is active), whereby soul comes to enjoy a position between abstraction and rigidity (Malabou 2005, 37). However, Malabou’s reading emphasises habit as the idealised form of the body to the point of reproducing, instead of overcoming, the hiatus between ideal and corporeal. By interpreting habit as plasticity in virtue of its ‘penetrating’ or ‘forming’ the body through spirit, the dichotomy between ideal and corporeal is not overcome. To be sure, Hegel’s treatment of habit evokes a plastic model, but this seems closer to James’ view on plasticity than to Greek sculptures. According to James (1983, 110), ‘plasticity, in the wide sense of the word, means the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits’. For James, the forming of habit is due to the plastic nature of the physiology of the nervous system. As such, habit is said to diminish the movements required to achieve a given result, as well as the conscious attention with which our acts are performed. Drawing on experimental and applied researches, James holds that habit depends on the way a course of sensations gets embedded in the structure of the nervous system. Thus, James raises an issue that is fundamental also in Hegel’s account of habit: the training of sensitivity does not entail that the body is imbued with a form, but that the sphere of sensitivity develops independently from higher-order faculties. This is the reason why Hegel encourages a psychic physiology (EPM §401 R) and shows interest in the investigations concerning the embodiment of sensations. However, James assigns to habit an unlimited power such that it governs the fixity of our characters and routines (Weiss 2008, 227). Instead, for Hegel physiology cannot be determinant, for habit highlights a self-referential pattern that is essential for soul to acquire consciousness. For a discussion on the relevance of physiology in Hegel’s *Anthropology*, see Howard 2013.

14. See Fulda 1991, Ferrarin 2007, and Ziglioli 2014.
15. As noticed by Inwood (2007, 506), Hegel is here trying to explain how language emerges in a single individual from more basic capacities. Another possibility suggested by Inwood is that ‘both the understanding of a word encountered and the production of a word fall under the heading of reproductive memory, while retentive memory simply keeps the signs in readiness for use’.
16. On this, see also deVries (1988, 154): ‘Note that Hegel is not saying here that, on hearing a word, an image of something to which the word applies comes into our heads, but rather that at this stage knowing the meaning of a word does mean that one has the ability to generate such images; the word signifies the ability, not the images.’
17. See VPG 226f./LPS 237f.: ‘The intelligence wants to think; it exists as the drive to think, so that thinking is its end. . . . The absolute inner end of intelligence is to exist as thinking. The end is the concept; the concept should be actualised and come to existence, and this very concept has been actualised in the intelligence. Insofar as it is for itself as the act of thinking, the intelligence is conscious of its own vocation and end. . . . That the intelligence knows this as thought, that it transforms its experience into thought, means here that the intelligence transforms the given into something free.’
18. However, to think is not the same as to be self-conscious of one’s own thinking. Although each of us is a thinker, not everyone seeks the philosophical or—in

Hegel's sense—speculative knowledge of reason. According to Hegel, speculative thought is the unfolding of the Idea whose subjective existence is, in turn, developed within the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. In other words, to attain to the level of speculative thought means to gain a form of knowledge that is no longer grounded on the self-acquaintance of spirit, but rather on the self-acquaintance of the Idea.

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6 Hegel and the Origin of Language

Richard Dien Winfield

THE PUZZLE OF THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE

The origin of language presents a daunting puzzle due to two key features of discursive intelligence that have won widespread recognition.

First, language and thought are necessarily ingredient in one another. There can be no thinking that does not employ language any more than there can be linguistic activity that does not involve thought. Individuals may think without communicating, but any thought unexpressed to others is still realised in interior monologue, using words. Conversely, any partaking in language employs meanings that transcend the particularity of imagery and engage thinking. Discourse always has some conceptual content, even if linguistic expression is restricted to individual commands or designation by proper nouns. Every command expresses something that can be performed by others in different circumstances, just as every proper noun refers to something with a reidentifiable selfhood extending beyond a point in space and a moment in time. Universality always enters into language, requiring more than images for its expression.

Second, although individuals may think in solitary monologue, no one can discourse inwardly or outwardly unless the meanings invoked have been established in actual interaction with others. Any intelligent individual may create a sign by associating some intuited content with a general representation, abstracted from multiple intuitions and images. Yet even when an individual recollects such an association, that semiotic connection cannot be assured any commonly apprehended significance unless individuals recognise one another making that association. The same proviso applies to any further modification of the content of signs or of their relationships in expressions. Without any intersubjective validation of the bearers and ordering of linguistic meaning, words and propositions cannot attain their own universal, communicable significance, rendering thinking impossible.

Together, the unity of language and thought and the intersubjectivity of meaning seem to leave the origination of language an unfathomable mystery. After all, how can individuals engender discourse if all they have to rely

upon are pre-linguistic, pre-conceptual resources, such as intuition, recollection, and imagination? How can they possibly institute, let alone recognise, intersubjectively valid meanings and syntactic rules?

Any attempt to evade the looming difficulty through divine intervention only begs the question. No monotheistic god can gift language to humanity, for how could such a deity think or communicate without first acquiring thought and language in engagement with others? Alternately, no plurality of deities could circumvent the challenge to mortals, for any immortals would face the same conjuncture of thought and language and the intersubjectivity of linguistic usage. The gods would already have had to solve the same problem that we mortals confront at the origin of our discursive humanity.

The same would apply to any extraterrestrial intervention, whose eliciting monoliths might teach able humanoids to speak, but would still leave in mystery how its makers generated their own language.

Any appeal to the blind chance of natural evolution provides no more illumination. All this does is acknowledge the contingent emergence of a species being whose biological endowment enables it to converse. Admittedly, the first intelligent animals to engage in linguistic interaction must have been born with the requisite biology enabling them to generate the rudiments of language, as well as learn preexisting language once there is a linguistic community within which to be raised. Further, that this occurs through natural selection is hard to deny given species reproduction, mutation, and a struggle for existence. Nonetheless, that evolution engenders the enabling biological conditions for discursive individuals does not itself determine what psychological process necessarily enters into the origination of language and then into learning as well as into the collective alteration of the discursive practice in which individuals find themselves. An animal species may evolve with a biological 'language faculty' giving its members the cognitive and sensorimotor potential to discourse, and with it, the potential to generate and communicate new words and an infinity of discursive expressions.¹ What, however, must take place for those animals to progress from having the potentiality to think and speak to the actual enacting of discourse? How do those living minds which are sufficiently endowed ever first establish a particular language without being raised in a preexisting linguistic community?

The common experience of childhood language learning perennially surmounts the different challenge of acquiring language and thought from exposure to individuals who already converse. The very unfolding of that process casts in doubt that individuals can just be born as interlocutors, ready to speak without further ado. Rather, the originators of discourse must somehow put their maturing psychological endowment to work and thereby take the first step to founding language. Yet, how can this possibly occur? How do the founders of language, who have not yet begun to converse, move from imagery and dumb signaling to thought and verbalisation?

The task of linguistic origination would be hopelessly demanding if it required speechless individuals to institute collectively from scratch the vocabulary and grammar of a real language. Grammatical rules are too complex to be known or consciously followed by any but a professional linguist. For just this reason, the natural learning of language by children in a linguistic community does and must occur without need of any conscious knowledge of grammatical structure. That structure can hardly be an object for collective invention by individuals who have yet to converse as well as think in inner monologue.

What removes this forbidding difficulty is similar to what overcomes the implausibility of random mutations generating anything as hugely complex as a multicellular organism, let alone a rational animal. If evolution required generating a new animal species through blind contingency building upon nothing but the most minimal life form, evolution would stall before the same infinitesimal probability of a monkey banging out *Finnegan's Wake* at a typewriter. Whereas the proverbial monkey always begins typing on a new blank page, evolution proceeds from an emergent organism, already embodying the cumulative results of prior mutations and natural selection.² Each step along the evolutionary path can involve just one minute alteration, which builds, however, on all that went before. What is produced from every engagement of blind chance mutation thereby has a feasibly reduced scope. The same is true of whatever accident may precipitate the transition from inorganic process to life. The origination of life need only consist in the emergence of the simplest autopoietic entity.³ All that need emerge is the most elemental prokaryote cell, containing chemicals whose reactions, regulated by an enclosing cellular membrane, result in the renewal of those same reactions while reproducing the selectively permeable boundary enabling them to continue without being dispersed or interrupted by extraneous chemical processes.

Analogously, the origination of language need not and cannot consist in the invention of a full-fledged grammar and vocabulary from no prior linguistic materials. Instead, the genesis of language can feasibly proceed with the collective institution of the most basic linguistic factor. Then, further development can proceed upon the acquisition of that primary linguistic heritage by individuals who are raised in a community that uses that factor, wielding with it the generative power it possesses for freely producing new expressions. These individuals can then supplement and modify that minimal language element, once more doing so in rudimentary ways that are acquired by each subsequent generation through the natural learning process made possible by their common genetic endowment. That inherited so-called 'language faculty' allows maturing individuals to acquire the prevailing linguistic competence as well as to enrich further its verbal repertoire and syntax without any formal study of vocabulary or grammar. Not until a linguistic science has emerged may any member of the emergent linguistic community have conscious knowledge of the grammatical complexity of their shared language.

THE THREE DOGMAS BARRING COMPREHENSION OF THE ORIGATION OF LANGUAGE

Although this incremental process promises to engender an initial genuine language, the very first step along the way remains blocked by three dogmas dominating much contemporary philosophy of mind. These are the dogmas of mind-body dualism, of the identity of mind and consciousness, and of the discursive character of all consciousness.

The dogma of mind-body dualism, which sets mental reality apart from physical reality, renders inscrutable any theoretical and practical interaction of the two domains it demarcates from one another. This is equally true of the offshoots of dualism, the monisms of idealism and materialism, which retain the incompatibility of mental and physical realms, but deny the existence of one while affirming the solitary actuality of the other. On either account, the incommensurability of the mental and the physical leaves inexplicable how individual minds can exist for one another and engage in any communication, let alone express any mental content in an intuitable sign. Without minds having individual bodily realisations with which to express mental activity, the very possibility of linguistic interaction is removed. To the extent that thought and language go together, Descartes' 'notion' of a solitary immaterial thinking thing is something of which it is impossible to be certain.

The common identification of mind with consciousness equally precludes any genesis, let alone any actuality of language. This is not just due to consciousness being the form of mind that opposes itself to a world from which the conscious ego is extricated, operating with a subject-object opposition where every mental determination is treated as being of something independently confronting conscious awareness. When that dualism is made the exclusive shape of mind, both the preconscious psyche and intelligence are precluded. The preconscious psyche relates to its mental contents as modifications of its own embodied subjectivity, feeling its own feelings. Through the repeated act of its own self-feeling, the psyche modifies its own subjectivity, forming habits, building universal modes of motility and sensitivity in which the opposition of consciousness is not yet at hand. This permits mind to engage in unconscious activities while its conscious attention is focused elsewhere (EPM §410). Without such unconscious habituation and the trove of internalised feelings it embodies, no individual could possess the memory and habits of linguistic practice, without which vocabulary and syntax could neither be learned nor repeatedly employed in the solitude of inner discourse or in the motor skill of outer communication.

On the other hand, language is unrealisable without intelligence, which supplements the psyche and consciousness by apprehending its mental modifications as being both mind's own subjective determining and the determinations of objectivity. The most elemental realisation of linguistic activity requires individuals to be aware of intuitable signs and intuitable relations of signs, apprehending them as both products of discursive subjects and

determinations of intersubjective and objective meaning. The oppositional cognition of consciousness cannot grasp both subjective and objective sides that must be associated together for language and thought to operate. Consciousness just confronts objects, without apprehending the subjective mental acts by which it does so (EPM §415). Only the subjective/objective awareness of intelligence can wield the discursive facility to comprehend its linguistic expressions to be products of mind that no less are about something else.

Further, if all consciousness were discursive, then no individuals could be conscious, let alone self-conscious, without already employing concepts and judgements, which equally involve language. Kant and his followers uphold this dogma, presuming that unless representations are connected by concepts rooted in the forms of judgement, representations cannot convey anything objective, nor fit within the unity of self-consciousness.⁴ The identification of consciousness with discursive rationality bars the possibility not only of consciousness and self-consciousness for dumb animals and pre-discursive children, but of both the origination and the learning of language. Individuals who lack consciousness and self-consciousness cannot be aware of the communications of others, let alone of their own expressions. How then could anyone emerge from a pre-linguistic condition to linguistic and conceptual competence?

Among historical figures, Hegel stands out for repudiating the three dogmas that obstruct the path to any understanding of the origin as well as of the learning of language. He recognises that mind is a living reality of an embodied animal self⁵ and that mind is not just conscious, but involves a preconscious psyche and intelligence.⁶ Moreover, Hegel recognises, contrary to Kant and his followers, that consciousness has a non-discursive actuality that both phylogenetically and ontogenetically precedes linguistic intelligence. Dumb animals, young children, and adult individuals who could inaugurate language can all be conscious and self-conscious. They can be conscious because what suffices to engender the opposition of consciousness is habit formation and the expression of feeling. These psychological developments together detach the feeling self from the domain of its sensations, which the disengaged mind now registers as a unitary objectivity it confronts.⁷ No apprehension of concepts is required, which would incoherently presuppose linguistic interaction. The same can be said of the constitution of self-consciousness in the interaction of desiring conscious selves. As Hegel delineates in his mislabeled 'master-slave dialectic', they encounter a recognition of their own desiring selfhood in the expressed desire of the individual with whom they interrelate, without having to speak or think.⁸

THE ORIGIN OF THE BASIC ELEMENT OF LANGUAGE

For language to originate, a plurality of individuals who lack words and concepts must somehow employ their pre-discursive physiological and mental

endowments to establish the minimal threshold of discourse, at one blow creating the most basic actuality of thought and speech. As pre-rational animals, the prospective members of the first linguistic community can be granted a psyche that feels its own feelings and, through repeated feeling, acquires habituated sensations and motor skills, a consciousness that perceives things with properties and understands dynamic relations without yet conceiving laws or universals, and an intelligence that has intuitions, represents them in recollected images, produces new imagery from its recollections, and associates all these mental contents in the inner world of its imagination.

Hegel sketches the first psychological development that paves the way for the transition to thought and language. This consists in the process of semiotic imagination, whereby an intelligent individual generates a sign (see EPM §§457–460). The mental construction of the sign consists in an act of intelligence that operates without any intrinsic relation to the mental activity of others. Indeed, without this solitary psychological production, the intersubjective engagement in language would not be possible.

Sign production must be distinguished from symbolisation.⁹ In producing a symbol, an intelligent individual associates an image with a general representation, where some aspect of the former's content is intended to convey some aspect of the content of the general representation. The symbol symbolises a general rather than unique representation because only a generalised content can be repeatedly invoked as the same. A symbol, like a sign, has this repeatable reference, which is what allows for its communicability, since others can only apprehend the same mental content if that content is a 'token' of a multiply instantiated representation. The general representation itself consists in an association of an image with a plurality of images that share the content of that image (see EPM §456 A). To have a general representation, an individual must employ imagination to keep in mind the plurality of recollected images that intelligence associates to a single image that is apprehended to present something they have in common. That common content is not a concept proper, but a pictorial image. Consequently, the production of a general representation can precede discursive rationality, for which it provides an indispensable mental prerequisite.

Since both, the symbol and the general representation it symbolises, are images, they each contain a manifold pictorial content, which leaves ambiguous what the symbol is conveying. The ambiguity is not total, because what the symbol symbolises is a content contained in both the symbol and the general representation with which it is associated. Accordingly, when the individual produces a symbol, that individual must also choose which aspect of the symbol's imagery as well as which aspect of the general representation to associate. That selection, however, is not itself present in the symbol or in the general representation it conveys.

Sign production goes one crucial step beyond symbolisation. Semiotic imagination associates an intuitable content with some general representation where, unlike symbolisation, the association is completely independent

of any shared imagery. The intuitable content figures as a sign because it connotes a general representation with which it is associated solely by the act of intelligence, with complete indifference to how the sign's imagery may otherwise be related to what it means. The sign is an image which intelligence apprehends to signify a general representation with no constitutive pictorial relation to it. As such, intelligence knows the image to be a sign only insofar as it is equally aware of the association it makes between that sign and what it signifies. Although semiotic imagination still employs imagery, it is completely free in how it associates an intuitable sign with some general representation. No inspection of the given content of a sign can disclose its meaning, for that meaning is a creation of intelligence and can only be perceived by simultaneously apprehending the act of semiotic imagination. Here for the first time, intelligence expresses a meaning that is completely independent of the given imagery of its vehicle of expression. The meaning may still be linked to a general representation that presents a shared pictorial content, but the sign provides mind with a tool for freely rising beyond the given confines of received intuitions.

This freedom reaches its negative acme in what Hegel describes as mechanical semiotic or verbal memory, where the mind autonomously recalls signs in an order indifferent to the meanings they convey (EPM §463). Mechanical verbal memory operates on the basis of the mind's recollection of individual signs, whose association of an intuited content and a general representation is internalised and made available for recall. Once this internalisation is at hand, intelligence can then recall signs at will and associate them with one another. Of course, once signs are associated by mind, that association itself can be internalised and recollected. The recollection of associated signs takes the form of a rote, purely mechanical memory insofar as the recollected ordering of signs is completely external to their own image content, as well as to that of the general representation they otherwise signify. Mechanical semiotic memory is duly celebrated by Hegel as a liberation of intelligence from representation, bringing mind to the threshold of thought and language (EPM §464). Even though such recollection may appear to be utterly meaningless and seemingly mindless, it completes the negative emancipation from representation by setting the recollected signs free from their last remaining connection to imagery—that of the general representations they signify when they are first baptised as signs. To move from the negative freedom of mechanical semiotic memory to the positive freedom of discursive rationality, intelligence must proceed to associate signs in such a way as to give them determinate meaning.

Hegel is ready to identify signs as names without, however, immediately connecting them with linguistic interaction or conceptualisation (EPM §462).¹⁰ The individual intelligent mind can baptise names of its own simply through its own activity of associating an intuitable image with some general representation irrespective of any pictorial tie. These names are produced subjectively and as such they have no intersubjective validity or any intrinsic conceptual character.

Their lack of intersubjective validity is evident in how the association of sign and signified remains confined to the apprehension by the individual name producer of the mental association that individual makes between that name and the general representation to which it refers. That connection cannot be grasped by others by inspecting the content of the sign or of any general representation, which only becomes perceivable by others after having been externalised in some intuitable factor. So long as the semiotic connection remains an individual, subjective act, communicable intelligibility is lacking. Even for the individual who makes that subjective semiotic association, nothing in that individual act or its repeated recollection can insure that the connected terms have any non-arbitrary tie that can distinguish 'proper' from 'improper' use and insure that that connection be upheld from one moment to another. This is why there can be no 'private' language, for no individual subjective semiotic association can have an abiding unequivocal meaning for others or for the individual who independently produces signs.¹¹

Moreover, the production of names by the individual intelligence does not yet have any genuine conceptual content since what they signify are general representations, which remain shared imagery rather than imageless thought. General representations lack conceptual universality precisely because they consist in common image contents, which as such, are indefinable. At most they comprise the family resemblances with which Empiricism confuses thought by reducing concepts to shared imagined contents that have been abstracted from experience.

On both counts, semiotic imagination's production of names does not constitute the emergence of language and it would be a mistake to condemn Hegel for here reducing language to the ostensive reference of naming.

Instead, what Hegel here provides is the elemental semiotic factor which individuals can and must possess *before* acquiring thought and language. Once individuals have given themselves this psychological product they are in a position to interact in terms of the commonly intuitable expressions they give to their signs in face of commonly perceivable objects. Only by having produced signs beforehand do they have something to 'triangulate' in the intersubjective process of baptising a communicably intelligible name, where individuals recognise one another, associating the same name with the same sort of object, and sustain that practice.

Of course, such 'triangulation' can by itself only provide a naming of empirically given resemblances represented by general representations rather than concepts.¹² Interacting individuals can mutually signify similar objects with similar signs, but these intersubjective associations apply only to contingent collections of shared observations.

Nonetheless, words that begin their linguistic career as signifiers of empirically abstracted commonalities can eventually come to signify conceptually determinate factors, exhibiting the logical connections of universality, particularity, and individuality with which judgement and syllogism can operate. Vygotsky describes this transformation as a key part of the

language learning process of children, who begin by using words to describe contingent groups of things devoid of logical relations, but later come to employ the same words to signify definable meanings subject to conceptual relationships. What allows children to move from a pre-conceptual to a conceptual use of names is exposure to the discourse of adults who use the same names to refer to logically determinate groups, under which fall some, if not all, of the same things with which children originally associated those names (see Vygotsky 1986, 92, 110–124).

The original move from words to language and concepts obviously cannot rely upon such exposure. Instead, it depends upon individuals supplementing their original ‘triangulation’ of communicable names with the further steps that engender the grammatical being of language, without which thought is impossible. Hegel has little to say about these moves, but his analyses of semiotic imagination and mechanical verbal memory provide the psychological processes that must be enlisted.

THE MOVE FROM NAMES TO DISCOURSE

The grammatical being of language adds to names two fundamental modifications that make discourse possible. These are the intersubjectively recognised ways in which new meanings are determined through specific types of syntax, that is, relations of words and of modifications of words within these relations. Crucial to how these grammatical processes enable thought is that both involve a freedom of intelligence where the relations and modifications of words are open to infinite realisations. With such limitless procreative potential, these grammatical structurings in no way limit what words can be employed and what meanings can be expressed. They instead imply general forms of declensions and syntactical orderings to which every possible word is subject, no matter what it may be.

Hegel’s account of the subjective production of signs already exhibits how intelligence is able to make any intuitable content a sign and to make any putative sign signify any general representation. Since general representations are themselves freely abstracted from intuitions and images, they are themselves indefinitely multiple. Further, mechanical verbal memory exhibits how intelligence can repeatedly relate signs in any connection it pleases, without being bound by the given determinations of their intuitable content. On top of this, intelligence can produce new signs to signify any of the infinitely possible relations of signs that semiotic imagination can form.

Consequently, grammatical alterations and relations of words cannot restrict what intelligence can signify. Given this open generative character of grammar, language cannot in any way undercut the freedom of thought that must employ verbalisations for its inner or outer expression.

Any such restriction is epistemologically incoherent. If language were to condition what can be known, there would be no way to know unconditionally of language’s alleged privileged foundational role or of anything else for that

matter. The supposed conditioning character of language would render all knowledge claims relative to that particular linguistic framework, including knowledge of what that framework is itself.

Nonetheless, even though grammar cannot juridically determine knowledge and thought, the employment of grammatical process makes it possible for words to have a significance based solely on their relation to one another. This feature is what lets intelligence wield the positive freedom to establish meanings independently of received intuitions.

Propositions provide a basic linguistic relation in which the relation of words signifies a specific meaning of its own. The words in a proposition do not just figure as symbols or signs of one another. Rather, their propositional connection comprises a new meaning irreducible to that which they already contain. As Hegel observes in his discussion of judgement in the *Science of Logic*, propositions, as a grammatical form, do not necessarily involve any conceptual determinations. They can connect words on the basis of empirical contingencies that are singular in nature, such as that, 'Aristotle died at the age of 73, in the fourth year of the 115th Olympiad' (SL 626).¹³ Propositions, however, can be judgements, in which words convey conceptually determinate connections, where individuals and particulars are determined by universals. Significantly, individuals who first employ propositions devoid of conceptual relationships can construct judgements without need of employing words and grammatical forms that they have not already mastered. The same words and syntax can be used to make the objective conceptual specification of judgement.

The situation is no different in the construction of the linguistic expression of syllogisms. Although propositions that are not judgements can be linked together without drawing any inference, the same words and grammatical forms can be used to form a syllogistic series of judgements that determine individuals by a universal through their particularity. Moreover, the same words and syntax that are used in mere propositions or formal syllogistic inference can be used to group judgements into systematic philosophical argument, such as Hegel pioneers, which overcomes dependency upon given premises and forms of inference by thinking through conceptual self-development.

These moves are indicative of how word production and syntax offer enabling conditions for the engagement of autonomous reason.

How, then, can individuals, who have come to name things in an inter-subjectively recognised way, develop the declensions and syntactical relations of words with which propositions, and then judgements, syllogisms, and systematic philosophical argument can be stated and thought?

The process of language development is necessarily incremental.¹⁴ The addition of each new word requires its own recognition process by a plurality of interlocutors. So, too, does the introduction of every word that involves modifications and relations of words, such as adjectives, verbs, adverbs, pronouns, and quantitative expressions. All these can be employed

only on the basis of the established usage of the words to which they relate. The accumulated succession of ‘triangulations’, where individuals together perceive how expressions are commonly employed with respect to commonly observed phenomena, can secure further linguistic development only provided it is internalised and habitually renewed by each generation of the persisting linguistic community. The whole process may be gigantic in scope and complexity, but its incremental character permits each advance to be a minimal addition that can be built upon by individuals who learn whatever linguistic practices have so far emerged by growing up within the community that uses them. This allows for a gradual cumulative development, where additions to vocabulary, including words that signify relations of words, provide an ever-widening resource for employment in syntactical usages that themselves are very gradually invented, recollected, and learned. The inherited endowment of intelligence with the capability for semiotic imagination provides all that is biologically and psychologically necessary for the process to unfold and build upon itself. Since each incremental change is a matter of convention, whose transformations take place in historical time, the rise of language can far outpace any biological evolution.

Although the process of language development is endless, the rise of thought that accompanies it reaches a stage at which full conceptual competence is achieved. Once grammar has provided the syntax for the conceptual determinations of judgement, syllogism, and systematic argument, autonomous reason has all it needs to express itself. New conceptual content can always be added, but thought, now enabled to be self-determined, is no longer limited by any external factors.

Even though language cannot juridically determine thought, the different stages of linguistic development can still affect how far thinking can progress. This is possible, however, only at the most primitive levels where word forms and syntax have not yet provided the grammatical tools for full-fledged conceptual determination. Once a language has developed the grammar for propositions, its participants can take the leap from general representation to thought. At that point, language leaves thought free to set its own limitations, that is, its own self-determinations. It no longer matters whether one speaks German, Greek, Hindi, Swahili, Chinese, or Navajo. So long as language has developed into propositional discourse, its users can think without conditions. In principle, they will be able to share those thoughts with those of the users of any comparable language, be it terrestrial or extraterrestrial. Translatability is guaranteed, for, unlike poetry, thought cannot be tied down to any particular verbal expression.

NOTES

1. Chomsky frequently invokes such an infinitely generative biological ‘language faculty’, most recently in his 2013 Dewey Lectures. See Chomsky 2013, 647, 651, 672.

2. Hans Jonas points this out in *The Phenomenon of Life* (Jonas 2001, 42–44).
3. See Thompson 2007, 91–118, for an account of the minimal structure of the autopoiesis of life.
4. This, of course, is the whole point of Kant's 'Transcendental Deduction of the Categories'.
5. Hegel establishes this in his account of animal life in his *Philosophy of Nature*. See EPN §§350–441.
6. This is exhibited in how Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* proceeds from an account of the preconscious psyche in Subsection A: 'Anthropology' to an account of consciousness in Subsection B: 'Phenomenology of Mind' to a concluding account of intelligence in Subsection C: 'Psychology. Mind'.
7. For further discussion of this point, see Winfield 2011, 125–141.
8. How this is so is analysed at length in Winfield 2011, 191–221. See also Winfield 2010, 59–77.
9. Hegel draws this distinction in his *Philosophy of Mind*, EPM §458.
10. As Hegel notes, 'Language here comes under discussion only in the aspect of a product of intelligence for manifesting its ideas in an external medium' (EPM §459—quoted according to the Wallace/Miller translation).
11. For the classic statement of the argument against private language, see Wittgenstein 1958, §§259–274, 92e–95e.
12. For this reason, Davidson's claim that 'triangulation' insures that conceptual determination, intersubjectivity, and objectivity go together would only apply when the meanings at stake are concepts, not just general representations, and the objectivity in question is not just commonly observed appearance, but an intrinsically determined totality (see Davidson 2001, 129–130). Significantly, Davidson acknowledges 'a prelinguistic, precognitive situation which seems to me to constitute a necessary condition for thought and language' and first describes triangulation in terms that he explicitly applies to dumb animals, writing, 'it is the result of a threefold interaction' where 'each creature learns to correlate the reactions of other creatures with changes or objects in the world to which it also reacts. One sees this in its simplest form in a school of fish, where each fish reacts almost instantaneously to the motions of others. This is apparently a reaction that is wired in. A learned reaction can be observed in certain monkeys which make three distinguishable sounds depending on whether they see a snake, an eagle, or a lion approaching.' (Davidson 2001, 128)
13. See also SL 410. The SL is quoted according to Miller's translation.
14. Davidson, who asserts the holistic character of mind, denies any gradual emergence of thought and language (see Davidson 2001, 124, 126–127). What he fails to recognise is that even if beliefs and conceptual meanings are holistically interconnected, they can arise in different stages, acquiring newly modified significance as the context of which they are part itself alters in the course of psychological and historical development.

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7 World of Representation and Thought

Hegel on Subjective Knowing

Lucia Ziglioli

1 AN UNCONVENTIONAL MODEL OF COGNITION

According to a well-established paradigm, the cognitive activity of mind is mainly divided into two moments: sensation, usually described as the receptive component of cognition, and thought, mainly defined as mind's ability to intervene on the perceived content through its experience-independent categories. This two-pronged conception of mind goes back at least to Aristotle; it characterises the modern debate between rationalists and empiricists, as well as Kant's transcendental idealism, and it still serves as the background of many contemporary theories in philosophy of mind. In approaching Hegel's *philosophical Psychology*, the reader is immediately aware of the innovative nature of Hegel's account of cognition. Hegel articulates the cognitive activity of intelligence in three stages, placing *representation* (*Vorstellung*) between sensorial intuition and thought. Representation is, according to Hegel, the middle term, the *medium* (*Mitte*) between 'intelligence's immediate finding-itself-determinate and intelligence in its freedom, thinking' (EPM¹ §451). It is only in the light of this mediation that we are able to understand the necessary link between sensorial intuition and thought, a mediation—as it will be shown—that allows Hegel to overcome the opposition between a naïve realism, on the one hand, and a subjective idealism, on the other hand.

Despite the relevance of such a theoretical move, the scholarly literature does not often draw due attention to representation, generally favouring the reset of the cognitive issue around the binomial sensation²/rational-thought, or simply rapidly dismissing the role of representation based on the argument that it still stands for a finite and untrue form of knowledge. I instead believe that representation plays a key role in undermining the opposition between sensorial givenness and rational conceptuality. Moreover, as I hope to show, representation is not simply an earlier stage of knowledge which, once the mind has developed true thought, may be dismissed. Hegel's notion of knowing entails the idea that thought, instead of being one faculty next to others, accounts for the entire development of cognition, thereby including sensorial intuition and representation as essential parts of it.

This study is devoted to the elucidation of the cognitive function played by representation as an intermediary stage between intuition and thought. The overall aim is thereby to show in what sense representation is essential for the entire cognitive process and necessary for the development of thought itself. The relevant consequences of the so conceived representation/thought relation within Hegel's account of cognition shall also be outlined. In particular, I shall argue that, based on such an original account of the relation between representation and thinking, Hegel is able to avoid the risks of bad subjectivism and scepticism. Both are possible traps of representationalism, as of any account of cognition that separates mental representations from the world outside and therefore cannot possibly anchor the known truth to the things as they are in themselves. I will also show how the relationship between representation and thinking within subjective mind allows Hegel to integrate social and historical aspects of human knowledge as well, thereby justifying a non-formalistic notion of thought.

In order to avoid possible misunderstandings, a couple of methodical remarks are due. While defining the specific contribution of representation to the development of knowledge and what distinguishes it from intuition and thought, every measure should be taken to prevent the risk of reading Hegel's philosophical *Psychology* as a *description* of a series of different faculties, operating more or less independently one *beside* one another—intuition, *and also* imagination, *and also* memory, and so on. Hegel strongly rejects this kind of approach (NG, GW 10.2, 785; EPM §445 R), which irons out the complexity of cognition into a *modular* notion of the mind. According to Hegel, on the contrary, there is only one unique activity of subjective spirit: the activity of knowing. Similarly, a genuine philosophical approach to mind does not take into account the '*natural* emergence' or '*genesis*' of the single faculties according to their temporal, empirical appearance (EPM §442 R). It rather considers the *spiritual* development of mind: all forms or configurations of mind are different stages through which spirit gradually develops a fully rational comprehension of itself and its object, that is to say, a process moved by the immanent drive of reason to 'recognize itself in everything in heaven and on earth' (EPM §377).

This is the highest truth the subjective spirit will ever know: i.e., that everything that is, is a finite manifestation of reason and thus there is no proper otherness to spirit. Yet, this truth is not immediately available to the subject, who initially lives in the contradiction of believing to know an object that is taken as other than the subject itself. In his *Lectures*, Hegel makes reference to an *impulse* or *drive* (*Trieb*) of the subject to overcome this contradiction, and to make the object of its knowledge something of its own (*Seinige*) (VPG 167–168, 175). There is no extrinsic necessity that drives the knowing subject in the development of its cognition, it is rather the rationality of the subject that immanently and necessarily prompts it to progressively overcome all the inadequate forms of cognition, until it has recognised reason as the true substance and content of its knowing. Only

at this point will the spirit release itself from the opposition with something apparently other, and affirm itself as properly rational and thinking. In Hegel's view, this is the only true task of a philosophical investigation of mind: to retrace in its actuality the *spiritual* development of the embodied mind, through which reason progressively gains its own self-affirmation.

The object of a *philosophical psychology* in particular is the activity of cognitive spirit as such, abstracting from the anthropological features of the subject as well as from the contingent content of knowledge. Within the philosophical presentation (*Darstellung*) of the activity of spirit, every stage of knowledge should therefore be taken as a different way for the subject to relate to its object, starting from the most immediate and undetermined up to the most sophisticated and rational way. What the cognitive subject gains in the elevation from one form of cognition to the other is not a new object—the content of knowledge ‘remains *one and the same*, whether it be felt, intuited, represented, or willed’ (EL³ §3)—but, rather, a better understanding of the nature of this content. Cognition, therefore, far from being the sum of different, independent powers of mind, is for Hegel a unique process, whose *ultimate purpose* (*Endzweck*) is the comprehension of the rationality of the object. This explains why any search for the specific ‘*utility*’ of one single faculty in isolation from the others and from the ultimate purpose of spirit would rest on the misunderstanding of their real function (EPM §442 R, VPG 170).

It is only in light of these remarks about the nature of mind and its operations that the originality of Hegel's account of cognition may be fully appreciated.

2 ENCOUNTERING THE MATERIAL OF KNOWLEDGE

Based on all the previous remarks, it is impossible to properly grasp the function of representation if not by starting from that first form of knowledge from which representation arises, that is, intuition. In intuition, intelligence receives the content of its knowledge and a first, still inadequate, stage of cognition is established, which representation will later sublate (*aufheben*).

Intuition is the form taken by intelligence in its first encounter with the material of its knowledge: within the realm of feeling, the intelligence simply ‘finds itself determined’ (EPM §446). Intelligence's intuition is to be distinguished from soul's and consciousness's sensation. As the subjective spirit progressively develops an appropriate awareness of itself, its relationship with the externality gradually changes and, accordingly, its comprehension of given data evolves. The anthropological soul, for instance, is fully immersed in the contingency and particularity of sensation, without being able yet to differentiate itself from the sensed material: ‘what I sense, I am, and what I am, I sense’ (EPM §402 A). Differently, as far as consciousness is concerned, the content of sensation acquires the determinate features of

an independent individuality other than myself, i.e., ‘a unit that is, both in its existence and in its constitution, a given for me’ (EPM §418 A). Only as intelligence, the subject becomes aware of its playing an active role in the determination of the object. What changes in this progression from sensation to intuition, therefore, is not the given content, but rather how the subject relates and understands it.⁴ By preferring the German term *Gefühl* (feeling) for intelligence’s finding of data, rather than *Empfindung* (sensuous sensation), Hegel formulates the following distinction:

Sensation (*Empfindung*) emphasizes more the aspect of passivity, of *finding*, i.e. the immediacy of the determinacy in feeling, whereas feeling (*Fühlen*) looks more to the selfishness involved in it. (EPM §402 R)⁵

Hence, whereas the soul is concerned with sensorial affection passively felt as a determination of its bodiliness, and consciousness takes it as an external givenness, intelligence knows that the material of feeling is rather ‘immanent in the mind’ (EPM §447 R).

The distinction between the subject and the object of knowledge—which has simply been taken for granted for consciousness—is now understood by intelligence as something posited by the self, something that it introduces as soon as it attends to an immediate affection of its feeling. By attending to its feeling, intelligence separates its own subjectivity from the content it is attending to, and thereby becomes aware of its role in the determination of the given. This is the truth that intelligence reaches about its intuiting. There is no proper content *for* the mind unless the mind actively intervenes to distinguish this content from itself and attends to it: I am the master of my intuition; I can—at least under certain limits—direct my attention to an object instead of another, thereby determining the content of my intuition as something that I do not passively find, but that I *actively* contribute to receive.⁶

Hegel understands the first encounter of consciousness with the material data as already characterised by the rational spontaneity of the knowing subject. Hegel’s investigation of ‘attention’ as an activity of the psychological intelligence does not necessarily entail that consciousness does not *attend* to its object, but rather that it is not properly aware of this activity, and therefore is not aware of the power exerted in determining the content of its perception. Furthermore, intelligence does not take the given content as something independent from itself, but ‘determines the content of sensation as a *being* that is *outside itself*, casts it out *into space and time*’ (EPM §448). It is this *determining* the object as being, rather than simply considering it as given, that properly distinguishes the intelligent intuition from sensory consciousness. This will mark an important acquisition for the development of representation.

However, Hegel does not compensate the dismissal of the subject-object dualism through some form of subjective idealism. This is a point of the

greatest importance and with respect to which serious misunderstandings of Hegel's theory of intuition may arise. Space and time, the forms of intuition, are not understood *à la* Kant as only *subjective* forms of our experience; they are the necessary determinations of any externality, the 'objective determinations' (EPN §258 A) of natural being. In order to properly explain why this is the case for Hegel, a detailed discussion of the *Science of Logic* and of the *Philosophy of Nature* would be required—for which I refer the reader to other enquiries.⁷ But it should be nevertheless clear that, by positing the content as spatially and temporally determined, intelligence is not imposing a subjective form on the given material. According to Hegel, 'things are in truth *themselves* spatial and temporal' (EPM §448 A), and intuition is precisely intelligence's capacity to comprehend this objective determination of the thing. Both soul and consciousness could perceive a sensation at a specific moment, and *then* no longer, or perceive such and such externality *here*, and such and such externality *there*, but they are not aware—as intelligence is—of the spatial-temporal continuum as a necessary feature of the external beings.

These remarks describe all too briefly the essential functions exerted by intuition. By shedding light on the subject's active role in assimilating any content, intuition allows intelligence to abandon what, in Sellars's words, may be defined as the *myth of the given* that is still valid to the perspective of consciousness. Furthermore, it also enables intelligence to refer to the object as an existent individuality, with its own objective determinations. Both of these functions provide an essential contribution to the acquisition of proper knowledge, and yet they are not sufficient.

According to Hegel, proper knowledge of the object is not conceivable without the involvement of cognitive judgements, which provide intelligence with the comprehension of the universal features of the object. At the level of intuition, the mind is instead still fully immersed in attending to the contingent presence of the found material and completely bound to it. This is the reason why Hegel claims that 'intuition is not yet cognitive knowledge', which does not mean that intuition is set outside the activity of knowing, but rather that it is 'only the *beginning* of cognition' (EPM §449 A). Despite the fact that intelligence's intuition represents an improvement with respect to the soul's and consciousness's understanding of sensation, it still stands for a poor and inadequate stage of cognition. In Hegel's view, a subject who should remain at this level of cognition couldn't possibly develop a fully rational comprehension of the thing.

3 THE WORLD OF REPRESENTATION

Representation is, notably, the moment in which a proper object with universal features arises *for* the intelligence. Intelligence radically changes how it relates to its object: although the content is still the same as in intuition, with representation the intelligence reaches a different understanding of it.

Representation is the stage of cognition in which intelligence works to overcome the opposition between objectivity and subjectivity, between externality and inwardness (EPM §451). Such a process develops in three moments: recollection or internalisation (*Erinnerung*), imagination (*Einbildungskraft*), and memory (*Gedächtnis*). While investigating the cognitive contribution of each stage—Hegel insists—‘the organic development of intelligence occurring in them’ (EPM §451 A) should be made fully clear.

This organic development proceeds through three important phases of the cognitive process that I respectively individuate in the *spiritualisation*, *universalisation*, and *objectification* of the content of knowledge. Particular attention shall be devoted to the question of how the intelligence makes its content into a proper object of knowledge by interiorising, judging, and communicating it. Only through the analytical investigation of these functions exerted by representation it is possible to understand how the world acquires its shape for the subjective mind. By means of this investigation, it will also be possible to fully appreciate the importance of this moment of knowledge and its necessity for the development of thought. My aim is to show, how representation provides an essential contribution for intelligence’s affirmation of its autonomy from any givenness working on both sides of the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity. I shall argue that within representation, intelligence operates to liberate itself from the apparent dependence on an external object and, simultaneously, operates to free its knowledge from the wilfulness of its individual subjectivity.

3.1 The ‘Spiritualisation’ of the Data: *Erinnerung*

The first activity of representation is the *recollection* of the intuited data. According to the ‘peculiar sense (*eigentümlicher Sinn*) of the word’ (EPM §451 A), recollection is the movement of *making* the intuited material *internal* (*er-innern*) by producing an image of it. In its broader and speculative meaning, *Erinnerung* is the activity through which the spirit appropriates its otherness or, in other words, unifies the reality with its own knowledge of it.

By producing an image of the intuited content, the external being is made into something that intelligence owns in its interiority. The recollected object becomes *my* object; it is posited as something that is *for* me and to which I am attentively directed. Moreover, by recalling an image—something I have produced—I call upon myself, I make myself into my object. Recollection thus allows the subject to become aware of its own activity.⁸

Remarkably, Hegel’s notion of *Erinnerung*, in comparison with other psychological theories of the time, stands for much more than the capacity of storing and preserving content: it is the movement of *spiritualisation* of the material of intuition, that is to say, it performs the speculative function of raising the external being to the ideality of thought. Recollection allows the subject to appropriate the otherness found in feeling and to recognise itself in this otherness. By means of recollection intelligence acquires a first

degree of freedom from its dependence on the external reality, for reality is now no longer external. This is the speculative signification of the function of recollection that a philosophical approach to the activity of the mind—unlike the empirical approach—is able to appropriately grasp. It is according to this speculative meaning that the movement of *Erinnerung* acquires its greater importance for the development of thought, either subjective (*Psychology*) or purely logical (*Science of Logic*), and appears repeatedly in Hegel's system.⁹

From the point of view of the subjective spirit, the activity exerted by *Erinnerung* allows the cognitive process to overcome the apparent externality and otherness of data. It is a movement that concerns not only the actual production of an internal copy of the given, but, more importantly, the subject's awareness of being in control of its content, which it conceives now as something of its own.

It might be worth remarking, once more, that Hegel is not describing a temporal process, as if one *first* immediately intuits something and *then* recollection brings the *I* into the scene. The order of the different activities is based on the cognitive improvement they represent, not on their presumed chronological appearance to the mind. The production of an internal image is always implied in the process of intuition, as it is also true that intuition is already a 'formal' self-determination of intelligence (EPM §448). But *Erinnerung* is the specific activity of making the external being into something *mine*, something spiritual, and in this regard it marks a cognitive improvement of the simple feeling of intuition. Moreover, the produced image is devoid of all the particular determinations provided by intuition, in particular of the specific spatial and temporal determinations every intuition comes with. The image of the rose I have here and now intuited will be recalled every time I intuit this rose or evoke it. The image, therefore, presents a first level of generality: the space and time of the image is the space and time proper to intelligence (EPM §452).

Thus recollection provides intelligence with a first unification of subjectivity and objectivity, so that intelligence is no longer bound to the immediate finding-itself-determinate of feeling and can make this acknowledged determination the object of its free reflection.

3.2 The 'Universalisation' of the Image: Imagination

Hegel is now able to explain how it is possible for intelligence to develop the knowledge of a world of universal objects, starting from the multitude of singular intuitions. Through the recollection of intuition, intelligence is now aware of its capacity to freely intervene on its own content. This is the moment of cognition in which intelligence—overcoming the dependency from the sensorial givenness—subsumes the singular intuited data under universal representations and relates the single representations one to the other. Herein lies the core of Hegel's theory of representation: a long

process, already started with the production of an internal image by the *Erinnerung* and further developed by 'imagination'. It is a complex set of intelligence's operations that Hegel distinguishes in at least three moments: *reproductive* imagination, *associative* imagination, and *symbolising* or *sign-making* fantasy.

The simplest activity of imagination as 'reproductive' is essentially the reproduction of images independently of the presence of the external intuition. Unlike recollection, however, the reproduction of an image by imagination is *voluntary* (EPM §455 A): the subject has acquired power over its own inwardness and exerts it freely by linking the different images together and raising them to universal representations. 'Associative imagination', prompts a step further, enabling the subject to make abstraction from the many sensorial determinations of the intuited content, and thereby to raise the resulted image to an universal representation.

The recollected image, for instance, of a particular rose I have once intuited is reproduced and confirmed every time I intuit that rose or a very similar one (first degree of generality acquired by recollection). The universal representation of the rose, instead, counts for all roses in general, independently of the numbers of leaves, or petals, and even of the particular colour they might have (second degree of universalisation). Through progressive universalisation, I can then form the universal representations of the flower and then of the plant in general (third degree of universalisation).

Hegel stresses that the production of a universal representation is not obtained by the addition or aggregation of different images, but is the result of the *dissolution* of various empirical determinations of different objects and of the isolation of a *common* element between all of them (EPM §456 A). Thus, for instance, intelligence recognises—by dissolving other determinations of the objects—the red colour as a common element between different images, such as the image of a rose and of the sunset. It raises this individuated common element to a universal representation, the redness or the red colour, under which intelligence can then subsume all the images sharing this element.

One should not believe that the mind was tied down to the singularity of the sensorial content before the associative and subsuming activity of representation occurred. Already at the level of consciousness, categories and predicates are employed, and universal laws are formulated, by means of which consciousness attempts to understand the reality it perceives. Yet, consciousness is not able to properly grasp the origin of these universalities, as the object of its knowledge remains something given to it, something it believes to know by simply turning its attention to the world outside. Despite the fact that consciousness is already active in determining the object, it is not aware of its activity. As Stephen Houlgate puts it, 'consciousness believes that it simply opens its eyes and sees the tree, without further ado' (Houlgate 2006, 244). Intelligence, on the other hand, recognises that knowing something means to subsume it under a universal, and that the

only active force in this process of subsumption is reason itself, that is to say the intelligence. No difficulty, then, prevents Hegel from differentiating the specificity of intelligence's representation from consciousness's understanding:¹⁰ representation is a higher level of knowledge as it is clear that intelligence is now able to reappropriate what is found, in both its singular manifested *being* and its *universality* (EPM §455 R).

Hegel presents this process, as he often does, starting from the polemical criticism of a rival theory, the theory of 'the so-called *laws of the association of Ideas*' (EPM §455 R).¹¹ This theory was mainly maintained by the long-standing tradition of English empiricism (Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, David Hartley and James Mill), and was also developed in Germany by Johann Friedrich Herbart in his *Psychologie als Wissenschaft* (1824).¹² Hegel's criticism of this doctrine is based upon two main claims: first, associations take place not among *Ideas* but among singular images—consistently with the specific meaning Hegel gives to the notion of 'idea'; secondly, the several modes through which images are related do not constitute any *law* for the intelligence. The production of universal representations is operated by the intelligence *spontaneously*. The universals are not simply *found* in the externality of nature; nor is it the case that things impose some kind of *force of attraction* guiding the subject in the elaboration of universal representations. Even the representation of the red colour is the result of the active, free reflection of intelligence upon the thing:

Of course, the particular element belonging to the image is something given; but the analysis of the concrete individuality of the image and the resulting form of universality come, as remarked, from myself. (EPM §456 A)

Moreover, intelligence is free to adopt different criteria for the association of images, without being subjected to some external, imposed order. Imagination might be guided in its activity by thought, or by the sensorial affinity between images, or again even by the 'emotional moods' the subject happens to feel in occasion of the representation of some images (EPM §456). Depending on the criteria adopted by intelligence, the world of representation can be populated by different objects, and it can be more or less adequate to a rational comprehension of reality.

The so described process allows Hegel to uphold the autonomy of reason against the correspondence to an external world, which provides Hegel with a crucial argument against the empirical tradition. Hegel maintains that representation is not the mirror of an external, independent world, but it is rather the result of the intelligent determination by the subject of the content of its cognition. Moreover, Hegel shows himself to be fully aware that, by reducing the representational process to the internal reproduction of an external pre-ordered world, it would not be possible to explain how different cultures, and even singular individuals, produce different worlds of representation (EPM

§455 A). As I shall argue in detail later on, Hegel's acknowledgement of the relevance of the historical, cultural factors of social praxis in the development of cognition allows him to avoid a formalistic notion of thought.

Before Hegel, a similar understanding of the elaboration of universals—as resulting from the free process of comparison of images, from the abstraction from their differences, and from the elaboration of a *rappresentatio communis*—is to be found in a well-established tradition that, starting with Christian Wolff, continues with Alexander Baumgarten and Georg Friedrich Meiner and reaches also Kant. Hegel, however, significantly differs from this tradition, for he distinguishes between universalities as 'abstract representations' and proper 'concepts', thereby marking an important distinction between the universality of representation and the universality of thought.

Indeed, the different kinds of universalities intelligence deals with account for one of the most important aspects of the evolution of the cognitive process between intuition, representation and thought. At the level of representation, intelligence still deals with something given, the sensorial content of the images, and the universalities it produces are inevitably conditioned by a certain degree of contingency, and may vary depending on the material each time given to our intuition. This also explains why the production of such universalities is always open, as the progress of natural sciences shows: as our sensorial experience changes, or becomes more accurate by means of new instrumentations, new representations and empirical notions of the world are acquired. Such a process is given great importance by Hegel, yet it never reaches the rational comprehension proper to the concept of the thing. Representation still entails a distinction between empirical givenness and subjective determinations of the mind, a distinction that only speculative or philosophical thought is able to sublate.

3.3 The 'Objectification' of Representation: Language and *Gedächtnis*

By means of the processes of *spiritualisation* and *universalisation* of the given, intelligence liberates itself from its dependence on externality. Yet, its knowledge is something exclusively subjective that intelligence retains closed in its inwardness. At this point, it becomes necessary for the intelligence to manifest its own knowledge. It has to make of it something that has its value independently from the single individuality that has produced it. This is the point where language comes onto the scene.

Despite what the empiricist tradition thinks, language is not only an *instrument* for communicating an already-formed knowledge of the thing. On the contrary, Hegel remarkably conceives language as performing a necessary task for the subjective development of thought.¹³

Language is the product of the last activity of imagination, the *self-externalising, intuition-producing, sign-making fantasy* (*Phantasie*), which operates together with memory (*Gedächtnis*).¹⁴ It consists in a semiotic

activity of intelligence, thanks to which an exterior sign is assigned to the internal representation. Two are the immediate results of this operation: First, through the creation of signs, intelligence makes its own content into something also externally intuitive and both inner and outer; universality and being are thus ‘completely welded into one’ (EPM §457 R). The being of the sign (e.g., the name ‘lion’) has value for the intelligence as something of its own already, as the universal representation of the object (the representation of the lion). Secondly, by linking the representation to an external sign, intelligence no longer needs to internally reproduce the image of the thing. By referring to an object through a name, the subject does not utter the immediate existence of the thing, it rather refers to the universal representation of it: ‘Given the name lion, we need neither the intuition of such animal, nor even its image; the name, when we *understand* it, is the simple image-less representation’ (EPM §462 R).¹⁵

This latter result is one of language’s important achievements and marks a significant evolution with respect to the cognitive capacity of mind. By dealing with language in his *Psychology*, Hegel is by no means concerned with the historical or anthropological ‘origin’ of language. He rather aims at showing language as a constitutive element of knowledge. So, when Hegel distinguishes between two kinds of semiotic production, the symbol and the proper sign, he has no interest in the empirical evolution of the linguistic sign, as naturalism in philosophy of language would instead have.¹⁶ Hegel acknowledges that the symbol still maintains a pictorial similarity with the content it symbolises (the eagle as symbol of strength for instance), whereas the sign (such as a flag or a pyramid) ‘represents a wholly different content from the content that it has for itself’ (EPM §458 R); but the meaning of this evolution is for Hegel essentially spiritual. The arbitrariness of signs constitutes ‘a great accomplishment’ for the spiritual progress of intelligence, since it emancipates the subject from the domination of the image, from the dependence on the sensorial nature of the thing. Cultures that adopt an alphabetic language represent a higher level of spiritual development than those who employ hieroglyphics, which still feel the need for a pictorial representation of the thing (EPM §459 R).

Against the traditional claim that we think in images, which goes back at least to Aristotle,¹⁷ Hegel thus argues that ‘it is in names that we *think*’ (EPM §462 R). His polemical target is the naïve realism and its general assumption that the content of our knowledge can be fully derived by sensations and intuitions. An adequate comprehension of the process of knowing, however, refutes this reductionism. As this inquiry should have shown, Hegel does not deny that the starting point of our knowledge is the sensorial encounter with the data, but he also shows how this is only the first and, therefore, the simplest and poorest form through which intelligence determines what it finds. In other words, objectivity cannot find its ultimate foundation in the sensorial givenness but only in the activity through which the mind comprehends and reveals the rationality of the being.

Although the ultimate justification of this activity is to be found in its accomplishment, when intelligence rises to thought, memory and language arguably have an essential role in this process. Not only do they allow intelligence to overcome even the last bonds of intelligence with the sensorial givenness (the image), but they also enable intelligence to overcome its own particular subjectivity. This is a further function exerted by language and memory that I shall now briefly account for.

By steadily establishing the sign within the realm of a consolidated convention, memory transforms the arbitrary and transient product of the intelligence into something universal that endures in time and has value for other subjects as well.

For the first time with memory, the inventive will [*erfindende Willkür*] of intelligence disappears; the *I* has come into being. The name is a consolidated sign; a stable relation, an universal relation. The *I* has delivered its will to its being, has set itself as universal. (JS III, GW 8, 193; my translation)

This point is made especially clear in the exercise of the highest form of memory, the *mechanical* memory: the capacity of retaining entire lists of names without referring to their meaning, that is without referring to their being a product of the intelligence. Mechanical memory, in other words, allows the intelligence to separate its content from its own subjective will, thereby making the former into an object that has value also independently from the individual subject that has created it. The content of memory is thus together subjective and objective.

By means of *Gedächtnis* and language, intelligence therefore accomplishes what *Erinnerung* started, that is to say the sublation of any opposition between the inwardness of intelligence and the externality of the existent being—for this reason, as Hegel claims, *Gedächtnis* may be read as the supreme form of *Erinnerung* (EPM §463).¹⁸ This sublation, as previously stated, is the result of a twofold process: the appropriation of the given by the intelligence, and the *thing-making* (*Versachlichung*) or objectification of the inwardness of the subject.

As Hans Fulda (1991) has successfully argued, memory plays an essential role in the development of thought. The same, one may say, applies to language. The linguistic creation does not *follow* cognition; it is not the manifestation of an already-formed knowledge that is unaffected by its being communicated. Language, on the contrary, performs an essential task in the very process of acquisition of knowledge: it enables intelligence to sublimate both the externality of the existent being and its own private subjectivity, thereby accomplishing the restoration of the unity of subjectivity and objectivity that consciousness breaks apart.

Moreover, language is arguably the highest moment of the process of progressive *objectification* of the inwardness, which, starting from the

anthropological embodiment (*Verleiblichung*), accompanies the whole development of subjective spirit. By means of this process of self-manifestation and self-objectification only, intelligence can become fully aware of its thinking:

We are only aware of our thoughts, only have determinate, actual thought, when we give them the form of *objectivity*, of *being distinct* from our *inwardness*, and thus the shape of *externality*, and of an externality, too, that at the same time bears the stamp of the highest *inwardness*. (EPM §462 A)

Far from being exclusively a means of communication, according to Hegel, language is an essential moment of the cognitive process, necessary to the development of rational thought itself.¹⁹

In brief, according to the results of our investigation, the power of the representing *I* over the content of its knowledge is exerted by means of three main functions.

- I) It reduces its distance from the external data by making it something of its own and raises the existent being to the ideality of thought.
- II) It *freely* subsumes the singularity of intuition under categories, schemes, and judgements, thereby allowing the subject to represent the object as a universal with multiple manifestations that the subject self has individuated (e.g., the red colour, the plant, God, etc.).
- III) It manifests the so produced content of knowledge—this is the most original element of Hegel's notion of representation—positing it as an existent being, and redefining it as something objective and subjective at the same time.

All these functions of representation contribute to the restoration of the unity between subjectivity and objectivity and allow intelligence to rise to proper thinking.

4 THE OVERCOMING OF REPRESENTATION IN THOUGHT

As Richard Winfield has remarked, the tripartite structure of intelligence raises the question of 'why thought involves more than representation' (Winfield 2010, 84). Indeed, representation already enables the subject to think different kinds of universalities and to find in the manifested representation (the name) a restored unity of subjectivity and objectivity. Why is it then necessary for intelligence to overcome this stage of knowledge and to elevate itself to a higher comprehension of reality? The following section is devoted to answering this question.

The entire activity of subjective spirit aims at overcoming the distance between itself and its object, and representation provides an invaluable contribution to this goal. As soon as intelligence comprehends the necessity of the identity between the thing and its knowledge of it, it reaches the last and highest stage of its development and becomes properly speaking *thinking*. Like the other stages of cognition, thought also develops through different degrees of complexity; Hegel distinguishes three: formally identical intellect, judgement, and inference or syllogism.²⁰

The first two forms of thinking still take the object as given, with respect to which thought-determinations appear as something external that entirely depend on the thinking activity of the judging subject. 'Only at the third stage of pure thinking is the *concept* recognised *as such*. . . . Here the universal is recognized as particularizing its own self, and gathering itself together out of particularization into individuality' (EPM §467 A). This is the stage of thinking as *inference* or syllogising (*Schließender*); it is thought risen to proper reason.

The radical change entailed by intelligence risen to the level of thought, and by this highest form of thought in particular, concerns how intelligence understands the form-content relationship and the notion of the universal. From the point of view of reason, the universal is not an a priori form, independent from its particular instantiations and extrinsically attributed to things, but it is rather a self-developing universality, 'the self-developing concept of the thing'. This universality of the concept, defined by Hegel as a *concrete* or *active* universal, determines and actualises itself *through* its content, through its own particular and singular manifestations in reality (EL §163).

In the *Preliminary Concept* of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, Hegel provides an explanation of the necessary relation between the universal concept and its singular manifestations. For instance, concerning the notion of 'animal', it is clear that the 'animal as such' does not exist in nature; only single, existing animals, such as this particular dog here and now before me, are experienced. However, 'to be animal' is supposedly the 'determinate essentiality' of the dog, its substance. 'If we were to deprive a dog of its animality we could not say what it is' (EL §24 A1). The thing, therefore, exists as a singularity that comes to be and passes away, but its essentiality is the universal that thinking is able to grasp, the concept that finds in the thing its particularisation and its own actualisation. The existent being and its concept are now understood to be two moments of the same truth, one having no value without the other. Within thinking there is no longer opposition between form and content, between being and thought, but only the self-developing unity of the concept with the particularity of the thing.

Only at this point does knowledge become truly *objective*, where by 'to be objective' Hegel does not mean 'what is externally present, as distinct from what is only subjective'; nor does he mean *à la* Kant 'what is universal

and necessary as distinct from the contingent, particular and subjective we find in our sensation'. In fact, 'the true objectivity of thinking consists in this: that thoughts are not merely our thoughts, but at the same time the *In-itself* of things' (EL §41 A2).

Hegel firmly believes that solving the issue of the objectivity of knowledge should be the purpose of every philosophy, and certainly this is the aim of the whole activity of the subjective spirit. The objectivity of thought is grounded on the ontological truth that everything that is, is a manifestation of the self-actualisation of the Idea or reason.²¹ It is the task of the *Science of Logic* to provide this ontological foundation. The *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, instead, presents the epistemic process through which the finite subject comes to know this truth, and after going through different stages of knowledge, it *finally* knows that it 'has no other content than itself, than its own determinations, which constitute the immanent content of the form; in the object, it seeks and finds only itself' (EPM §467 A).²² In this way, as I am going to discuss in the next paragraph, the thinking subject is able to acknowledge the moments of intuition and representation as necessary stages for the development of its rational and true knowledge. Those different, still inadequate epistemic points of views are, in other words, explained and even justified in Hegel's notion of *thinking* as the always open process through which reason progressively re-cognises itself in its other.

As to answer our initial question—why intelligence needs more than representation—it may now be maintained that only objective thought provides the cognitive subject with the justification of its knowledge. By understanding that 'what is *thought*, *is*; and that what *is*, only *is* in so far as it is a thought' (EPM §465), the subject comprehends the object as a (determined) manifestation of the universal concept and ultimately of reason itself. There is no longer any otherness to confront the spirit, as thinking is now '*for itself intrinsically* cognitive; *intrinsically* the *universal*; its product, the *thought*, is the thing; simple identity of the subjective and objective' (EPM §465).

The epistemological consequences of Hegel's conception of objective thought are highly significant. Together with the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity, two very dangerous risks are also avoided: the risks of subjectivism and scepticism. Both find their origin in the missed conciliation between subjectivity and objectivity. As Willem de Vries²³ has rightly pointed out, Hegel addresses these risks within the framework of a *representationalist* theory of knowledge, which would still maintain the distinction between the object and the subject and thereby prevent the knowledge of what truly *is*, i.e., the concept. Conversely, thought, far from being a merely subjective activity, must be regarded in its objective meaning, as the ancients used to call it, *nous* or *logos*, as the universal structure of all things.²⁴

Moreover, by comprehending the necessary relation between the concepts and their existent manifestation in the object, intelligence can develop a consistent and systematic knowledge of the world. Intelligence, in other words, is ultimately able to organise its knowledge in a scientific system, in which

every single aspect of reality finds its appropriate collocation as part of the whole. A weak empiricist representationalism, according to which everything we know derives from the perception of external, sensorial determinations, would instead be condemned to some kind of knowledge fragmented into singular empirical concepts. The common and still today very popular understanding of thought as the simple combination of independent representations, mental symbols, or signs is, according to Hegel, unable to prove any intrinsic and necessary connection between its objects, and is therefore drastically limited as to its cognitive ambitions. Hegel does not deny that thought operates with representations and signs—‘it is in names that we *think*’ (EPM §462 R)—but he strongly rejects any reduction of thought, typical instead of a certain modern philosophy of thought, to the extrinsic combination of independent mental signs, i.e., the reduction of thought to re-presentation.

For all these reasons, the point of view of representation must be sublated. A subject whose understanding remains at the level of representation is perfectly able to move and act in the world, to be part of a linguistic community and share a common historically and culturally determined comprehension of this world. But this subject will never understand the rationality of its being and acting nor that of the world around him/her.

5 CONCLUSIONS: THE NECESSITY OF REPRESENTATION FOR THOUGHT

Based on the fact that the operations of the cognitive mind follow a progressive course, one might be tempted to maintain that, once intelligence fulfils its ultimate purpose in thought and achieves the only true comprehension of itself and of the reality around, it is free to dismiss intuition and representation as inadequate stages of knowledge. This is certainly true as far as the way is concerned by which the mind understands its relation to the object respectively through intuition and representation. However, the previously provided investigation of Hegel’s *Psychology* should have shown that the relation between intuition, representation, and thought is far more complex.

Thought is not the last step of a long gallery of mind’s activities, but, being the activity through which reason re-cognises itself in its other, it is rather the totality of the entire development of intelligence itself. Thought is the result fed and powered by every stage of cognition, a result that explains each passage as a (necessary) moment of its development.

This is a very significant aspect of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* that should not be underestimated. Hegel does not conceive of thought as an a priori set of categories, concepts, and truths. The ontological priority of the universal forms of pure thought presented in the *Science of Logic* does not translate into an *epistemic apriority* of those forms with respect to the experience of the subject. The subject does not have pre-formed truths

at its disposal which it can apply to a given material, but it is guided by the always active impulse of reason to discover itself *within* this material. Only by following this impulse and bearing the full length of the cognitive process can the finite subject know the rationality of the thing.

The challenge Hegel faces in his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* is exactly to show how the finite subject gets to comprehend the rational nature of reality passing through the investigation of its own experience. From the point of view of the finite subject, every truth of its knowing is always and only the result of the process of reflection upon the thing. And subjective thinking—unlike pure logical thought—is the ever lively activity of revealing the concept within the material immediately provided by intuition and firstly categorised by representation: ‘Thinking is what is universal in all representations, recollections, and in every spiritual activity whatsoever, in all willing, wishing, etc. These are all of them just further specializations of thinking’ (EL §24 A). In this sense, not only is every stage of the cognitive process already a moment of thinking, but there is also no thinking outside or beyond this process.

The task of rational thought is to work on the abstract universalities provided by the language of representations, in order to bring to light the immanent, necessary connections between the concept and the thing. As Hegel notoriously claims, ‘Philosophy does nothing but transform our representation into thoughts (EL §20 R; see also LPR I 397). Thus, there is no thinking without representation (Fulda 1991, 347), for representation provides thinking with the particular content the concrete universal needs to realise itself. This last point is, furthermore, confirmed at the very end of the system, where *absolute spirit* represents in art, religion, and philosophy the intuition-representation-thought articulation.

The overall purpose of this study was to show that representation is a necessary moment of thought, as the activity providing a concrete, existent configuration of the concept.²⁵ Hegel’s claim that representation constitutes the middle term between intelligence’s immediate finding of the material of knowledge and thought’s freedom within this material has been proved. As previously argued, the acknowledgement of the mediating role of representation between the sensorial singularity and the concept allows Hegel to avoid a formalistic notion of thought. Moreover, by understanding thought as a process that emerges from (rather than is added to) the actual experience of the subject, Hegel acknowledges the role played by culture, education, and language in the development of knowledge.

It has been pointed out that the world of representation, and the linguistic expression of it, is inevitably culturally and historically determined. Yet, Hegel conceives of the social-historical account of knowledge as consistent with the development of a true, universal knowledge, rather than in contradiction with it (cf. Westphal 2003). Thanks to the power of thought to reflect over and sublimate the determinations and the false distinctions that necessarily characterise the representation, the truth is never left hostage of

the boundaries imposed by the historical and cultural determinations any singular mind is embedded with.²⁶

The triadic articulation of the cognitive process in intuition, representation, and thought, therefore, finally shows its necessity by demonstrating the capacity of the finite subject for acquiring an *objectivity* of its knowledge that is neither experience-dependent nor *a priori*-determined, but that is fulfilled by the dialectics between the immediacy of being and the activity of thought.

NOTES

1. The EPM is quoted according to Inwood's edition (2007).
2. I am using here 'sensation' in a very broad sense to refer to the sphere of sensitivity in general. However, concerning Hegel this term is too vague, as he distinguishes in his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* at least three main levels of sensation: 1) soul's sensation, or the simplest affection caused by an immediate determination that souls simply finds (EPM §§399–402); 2) sensory consciousness, which gains the determination that 'the manifold particular content of sensations concentrates itself into a unit that is outside me' (EPM §418 A); 3) intelligence's intuition, according to which the found content is now recognized as 'both *subjective* and *objective*' (EPM §446 A). The progression from one form to the other is conceived by Hegel as the progressive acquisition by mind of the true comprehension of what 'sensation' really is. So, intuition is not a form of sensation next to the others, rather it constitutes the truth of what soul and consciousness initially assumed. It is to this most adequate notion of sensation as intuition that we will henceforth refer for Hegel.
3. The EL is quoted according to the Geraets/Suchting/Harris edition (1991).
4. On this essential point of Hegel's treatment of sensation along the entire *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* has drawn the reader's attention also Houlgate 2006.
5. It is starting only from the Berlin editions that Hegel tries to avoid possible semantic ambiguities between *Empfindung* and *Gefühl*, although the distinction is never sharply drawn. This terminological issue and its philosophical implications have drawn the attention of Peperzak 1979.
6. See EPM §448 A, where Hegel lingers on the role played by attention and defines it 'the beginning of education' for spirit.
7. See EPN §§250–261. For a discussion of Hegel's theory of space and time, see Ziglioli 2016.
8. See also the Jena manuscripts, where 'recollection' clearly marks the passage from the unconscious operating of consciousness to the wakefulness of spirit (JS III, GW 8, 188). Regarding the double function of the *Erinnerung*—as appropriation of an external data and as the rise of the Self-awareness—see Verra 2007.
9. See the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), or the *Essence* chapter of the *Science of Logic*. An investigation of the various systematic implications of the notion of *Erinnerung* has been provided by Nuzzo 2006 and 2008.
10. Such a difficulty has been underlined by Inwood, who more generally judges the integration of the *Phenomenology* into the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* as problematic (Inwood 2007, 489; 470; 478).
11. Such a criticism is of the greatest importance for Hegel, as the arguments are formulated in Jena (JS III, GW 8, 187) and later reiterated in the many versions of his philosophy of subjective spirit (NG, GW 10.1, 346) as well as in lectures (VPG 507–511).

12. See Inwood 2007, 487.
13. I elsewhere argued in detail that language exerts an 'objectifying' function for the development of thought. See Ziglioli 2014.
14. Imagination is the activity of subjective spirit that Hegel re-elaborates over the course of years. Whereas in Jena, imagination has exclusively a reproductive function, between Nuremberg and Heidelberg it carries out also a synthetic-associative function. Finally, in Berlin, Hegel introduces the figure of *sign-making fantasy*, assigning thereby to imagination a semiotic functions and linking it to the activity of memory. Concerning Hegel's theory of imagination and its gradual development over the years, see Düsing 1991. On the specific moment of sign-making fantasy, see Simon 1996.
15. Hegel notoriously argues in the chapter of 'sense certainty' at the beginning of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) (PS 58–66 [Miller's translation]/GW 3, 63–70) that language always expresses the universal of the object, its representation, and not its immediate, singular being. A similar argument was developed by Hegel only a few months earlier in one of his first version of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (JS III, GW 8, 189).
16. Hegel does not deny the plausibility of historical reconstructions of the evolution of sign (NG, GW 10.1, 349; GW 10.2, 787), but such reconstructions would only have an empirical value.
17. Aristotle, *De Anima* III 7, 431 b 2; 8, 432 a 10; I, 1, 403 a 8; III 7, 413 a 16f. See also Aristotle, *De memoria* 450 a 1. Concerning Hegel's criticism of the claim that thinking operates with images, and his reference to Aristotle, see Ferrarin 2001, 287–308.
18. On mechanical memory, see Houlgate 1996. On the importance of the *Gedächtnis* for the development of thought has drawn the attention Fulda 1991. For a broader consideration of memory and of its systematic implications, see Nuzzo 2012.
19. By acknowledging the essential role of language in the development of a rational thought. Hegel is not binding the logical connections of thought to the grammatical structure of language. He is, on the contrary, very clear on this point: the grammar is the product of the intellect (*Verstand*), 'which impresses its categories on language' (EPM §459 A). But the development of the intellect does not necessarily correspond to the spiritual development of a community. The speculative thinking does not let itself bridle by the fixed, cultural determined grammatical structures of a language, but it is rather able to work on them in order to develop a plastic use of language able to bring to expression the speculative content of thought. See Ziglioli 2014.
20. This triad recalls the logical development of the doctrine of the Concept in the *Science of Logic*, with the important difference, however, that the object of the *Science of Logic* is pure thinking in its logical development, whereas here the object is thinking as the actual activity of an individual mind.
21. For a systematic account of Hegel's notion of objective thought and its implications between logic, metaphysic and real philosophy, see Jaeschke 1979.
22. See also: 'Thus, *thinking* as an *activity* is the *active* universal, and indeed the *self-actuating* universal, since the act, or what is brought forth, is precisely the universal' (EL §20).
23. DeVries 1988, 170–171 and 1987, 127.
24. As Inwood has explained: 'Hegelian philosophy of Mind, is not simply knowledge of man's reality. It is also knowledge of 'genuine reality' in and for itself—of the 'essence as mind': mind or spirit is the 'essence' of reality as a whole, not simply of the human species' (Inwood 2007, 280).
25. A similar aim, I believe, motivates Nuzzo 1990, who reconstructs the representation-concept relation with special focus on the *Philosophy of Right*.

26. This point cannot be further developed here. However, I refer the reader to, for instance, the second preface of the *Science of Logic*, where Hegel famously explains that, although 'the forms of thought are in the first instance [*zunächst*] displayed and stored in human language,' is the job of reflexion to overcome any boundaries of natural language and to be 'plastic' about its use (SL 31/WdL I/1 10).

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Part III

Practical and Free Spirit

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8 Subjective Action

Susanne Herrmann-Sinai

1 INTRODUCTION

The best-known discussion of Hegel's notion of 'intentional action' is located in the section called 'Morality' in his *Elements of a Philosophy of Right*. Within that section, action is an expression of the moral agent's free will and essential for understanding the various objective manifestations of right. Thus, the notion of action is discussed in its relation to terms such as 'responsibility', 'imputability', 'right of subjective will', 'rational universal justification', 'intention (*Absicht*)', and 'outer deed'. At stake here is the understanding that intentional action is inseparably part of a philosophical investigation into moral and legal relations.

This intrinsic dependence has sometimes been explicitly repudiated (Quante 2004) in order to engage Hegel in the post-Davidsonian discourse of modern action theory.¹ Modern action theory typically investigates descriptions in which my doing can be understood as caused by an intention (Davidson 2001) but nevertheless takes place in a world of causality and natural laws. By contrast, moral and legal philosophy asks what makes actions right or wrong, just or unjust, and introduces a different notion of 'law'. Interpretations of Hegel that emphasise this moral aspect of his notion of intentional action usually understand its morality as constituted by a 'social context' (Brandom 2013; Pippin 2008; Wood 1990). Such readings see Hegel as proposing an intrinsic social character for human reason in general. This social character is manifest in a particular understanding of the norms of intentional action as being constituted by a social practice. Although an agent's action primarily expresses her intention, this expression can be put under scrutiny as to whether or not it is an adequate realisation of a norm, once her intention became public. Thus, the opposition between causalist (Quante) and expressivist philosophies of action², famously coined by Charles Taylor (1983), still prefigures large parts of the debate around Hegel's notion of action today.

This chapter intends to challenge this opposition, not so much by engaging with the internal problems of each interpretation, but by contrasting commonly cited passages in the *Philosophy of Right* with the lesser known

discussion of intentional practical activity as ‘practical spirit’ in Hegel’s *Psychology*. The *Psychology* immediately precedes ‘objective spirit’, the section that is coextensive with the *Philosophy of Right*.³ The kind of intentional activity discussed in ‘practical spirit’ is not yet part of moral or legal philosophy and is neutral as regards the question how my action actually becomes manifest in the world as a ‘deed’, potentially causing unintended consequences. It is intentional action, viewed first and foremost from the perspective of the mental activity of the subject, the first-person perspective indicative of what wanting, or ‘*trying to get*’ (Anscombe)⁴ means and presupposes. Hence, it is legitimately part of ‘subjective spirit’ rather than ‘objective spirit’, and I argue that its topic should best be understood as *subjective action*.

The activity of practical spirit is subjective *action* insofar as it constitutes a teleological self-determination as an agent’s representation of ends. The subjective intentionality of practical spirit is the practical representation of ends that serve as the *causa finalis* of its activity. As Hegel writes in his *Lectures*:

The will [in practical spirit] means nothing else but the end that is active. End and reason are immediately connected; what is rational is an end. (LPS §469, 248)

It is *subjective action*, because this volitional, end-pursuing activity is not yet the expression of a fully fledged intention (*Absicht*) manifested as a deed that bears the universality of a law in the specific sense of objective spirit. Yet before we can possibly come to understand the moral context of action in objective spirit with its intrinsic relation to the ‘*will of others*’ (PR §112) and its causality, or the efficacy of our thoughts (Korsgaard 2009)⁵ towards the world as ‘other’ (PR §7 A), we first of all have to understand the causality of our thoughts towards *ourselves*. This kind of self-determination is already an expression of spirit’s freedom and it constitutes the topic of the *Psychology* (subdivided into ‘practical feeling’, ‘drives and *Willkür*’ and ‘happiness’). A discussion of these passages will reveal crucial concepts and distinctions for any reconstruction of Hegel’s account of intentional action that can be summarised as follows.

- i) *Practical appropriation*: Hegel’s investigation of practical, teleological intentionality proceeds methodologically by means of a practical appropriation of the theoretical forms of the intellect (intuition, representation, and thought). Practical appropriation is an attempt to identify the *form of the end* with the *form of the practical activity* by which this end is pursued. Only when this is the case, can we say that the end determines and structures the activity as a *causa finalis*—as an ‘end that is active’. The failure to provide such an identity moves the three different stages of practical spirit forward.

- ii) *Finitude of subjective spirit*: All these three forms reflect *inner* processes of a subject, according to its methodological context, subjective spirit. Here, objectivity or rather *externality*, is a mere *Grenzbegriff* (limit concept). The self-determining subject does not yet determine externality, but only the its own activity. Hence, practical ‘intelligence’ (*Intelligenz*—the subject of *Psychology*) does not have any capacities to understand itself as altering the externality providing adequate means. Because subjective spirit is constrained by some ‘given’ externality, it is ‘finite’. It can understand itself only as being surrounded by finite things, and thus mostly aims at *pursuing finite ends*.
- iii) *Reasons as ends and reasons as law*: Hegel differentiates between at least two kinds of reasons and their normativity. I take reasons in general (*Gründe*) to constitute various forms of the ultimate ground (*erster Grund*) of spirit’s self-determination. Whereas the *Psychology* discusses the normativity of reasons as ends, objective spirit introduces reasons as laws and only the latter provides the context for Hegel’s notion of *Absicht*.
- iv) *Desires and drives*: The encyclopaedic section titled *Phenomenology*, preceding the *Psychology*, discusses the limitations of reasons as based on desire. Contrasting the ‘desires’ of self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology* with the ‘drives’ of practical spirit in the *Psychology* allows us to discuss the importance of language for teleological action. Language is crucial for understanding types of action as repeatable forms of my and our activity. According Davidson’s suggestion the pair ‘desire and belief’ forms the intention (in the sense of being a mental state the onset of which is an event causing the event that is the action) that triggers me to act. This idea and his contention that a true description of an event as intentional adequately captures this intentional form both face similar difficulties to those of the desire based, self-conscious activity that Hegel discusses and criticises within the *Phenomenology*.
- v) *Social norms and moral law*: Alongside with this distinction we will find that already the normativity of ends in subjective action can be understood as a social one, insofar as the ends I pursue are given to me by the social context in which I find myself. But this social context and its normativity are to be distinguished from the socio-moral context of objective spirit.
- vi) *Psychology and Logic*: Hegel himself suggests a connection between the *Psychology* and the *Logic* in a particular understanding of ‘universality’ as ‘allness’. We shall see how this link provides the ground for the internal development of the argument within the *Psychology* as well as for establishing a difference between the normativity of subjective spirit and the normativity of objective spirit.

As a result of this analysis we will establish a more differentiated view of Hegel's philosophy of action, as well as being able to contrast Hegel's position more carefully against some standard assumptions in the contemporary philosophy of action.

2 PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT

The *Psychology* is placed within the third part of Hegel's encyclopaedic system, which constitutes the *Philosophy of Spirit*. Spirit is fundamentally different from nature—which Hegel investigates in the second part of his system—insofar as nature is determined by (mechanical, chemical, and teleological) causes, whereas spirit determines *itself* according to reasons. We do not apprehend ourselves only as *heteronomously* determined in a world that follows its own laws, as we in fact do with corpses that are subject to mechanical and chemical processes, or as we in fact do when we apprehend ourselves as subject to the metabolic and reproductive cycles of organisms *in the same way* as animals are (cf. Houlgate 1995, 864). Instead, all forms of spirit (rational soul as in the *Anthropology*, consciousness and self-consciousness as in the *Phenomenology*, intelligence as in the *Psychology*, persons, moral and ethical subjects as in the *Philosophy of Right*, etc.) can only be understood as self-determining, which entails philosophically apprehending the various grounds of this self-determination. This is the topic of the entire philosophy of spirit.

This kind of investigation is not an observation from an outside perspective to which an additional judgement is required as to whether the investigation is appropriate to what is being investigated. Instead, Hegel names his method a 'presentation' (*Darstellung*—EPM⁶ §474),⁷ by which he captures the thought that the identity between what we do when we think about our (practical) activity as rational beings and what we do when we act as the finite beings we are must not be accidental. It expresses the methodological insight that *by thinking* about rational human activity in all its variations, we cannot and must not abstract from the fact that this is *our* activity we are thinking about. Self-determination must be shown to take place *by investigating* spirit's self-determining activity—something that merely natural organisms are incapable of. It is inherently practical insofar as the philosophical apprehension of spirit is part of what defines spirit's activity.

To put it in the form of a question guiding our investigation: How can we understand our rational (practical) activity solely *by being engaged* in that activity? When have we achieved a 'presentation' of the activity in its most general form that initially is 'rational organic life', such that this form is *essentially* ours? This is equally a methodological question⁸ because it constantly forces us to revise the conceptual framework by which we are trying to approach our rational activity. We shall retrace some of these revisions.

Subjective spirit attempts to provide a first answer to the above-mentioned guiding question. It solely conceives of activity as regards its source, its ends,

and its products as subjective and *inner*. Thus, the finitude that spirit ought to come to terms with is a finitude which is constrained by some ‘given’ externality. Subjective spirit can understand itself only as surrounded by finite things and aims at *pursuing finite ends*. It does not think of itself as surrounded by property, by a family, by an economy and its civilians, nor by a just state and its citizens. Rather, it thinks of itself as surrounded by food, by houses, and by other finite minds.

The finitude of subjective spirit equally confines our way of apprehending rational human activity itself. Accordingly, the mental activity of subjects either rests on presuppositions or produces results that it cannot yet fully grasp as being constituted *by* the kind of inner activity that at this point it understands itself to be. Subjective spirit is the general form of an activity in which the *sources* of the activity and its *products* are—in Hegel’s terminology—only ‘immediately’ identical. The subject does not yet understand itself as constituting the means for its activity or—put differently—to mediate between its wanting and the final result of its action. It cannot conceive of itself as mediating because of the way it conceives its own activities (intuiting, representing, and subjective thinking, as well as wanting, choosing, and pursuing ends), all of which are inner activities and do not rationally alter externality. As part of this immediate self-relation, the subject of subjective spirit is not (yet) able to fully understand the *source* of its ‘wanting a house’, for example, as a *legitimate* need (*Bedürfnis*). A need (PR §§189ff.) is partly constituted by, and partly only accomplishable in, the context of an existing economic market situation that shapes objectivity to the extent that it provides the opportunities and means for house building (such as an industry of producing and selling bricks)—which is introduced only much later in the context of ‘ethical life’ (cf. Merrill 2014). Subjective spirit is equally not capable of fully understanding the constitution of the *product* of its own activity—the ready-made house as a manifestation of freedom in the form of a person’s ‘property’. Hence, Hegel labels this self-relation of subjective spirit an ‘ideal [*ideell*] totality’ (EPM §385). ‘Practical spirit’ in the *Psychology* investigates this immediate self-determination of spirit as the willful determination of a practically intelligent subject according to ends.

3 PRACTICAL SPIRIT IN CONTEXT

He or she who has practical intelligence in the everyday sense shows his or her intelligence *by doing* this and that or *by being* thus and so, rather than through rationally deliberating within the inferential relations of theoretical thoughts. Practical intelligence is ‘directly exercised’ intelligence (Ryle 1945/46, 2), knowledge *in actu* or ‘knowing how’. In practical intelligence, subjective thinking proves to be immediately efficacious insofar as it can effectuate *the subject’s own* activity. In order to prove its efficacy, thinking has to be shown to be the source *and* the activity of practical self-determination.⁹ According to Hegel, to understand thinking as both source and activity is

to understand it as ‘drive’ (*Trieb*) because a drive constitutes both the motivating source of my activity as well as the particular end that endows my activity with its inner form (EPM §443 A). My drive for shelter explains both *that* I *want* to build a house as well as *what* I am actually *doing* in arranging the means according to the normativity of the end (that the house will actually provide me with shelter, i.e., has a proper roof etc.). A drive thus explains *that* and *how*. We shall investigate the single steps by which subjective spirit comes to apprehend itself as ‘drive’ and hence as efficacious *towards itself*.

It is essential for understanding spirit as ‘drive’ to distinguish it from the previous and the following forms of spirit in the general line of argumentation within Hegel’s *Philosophy of Spirit*.

Looking ahead to objective spirit it is most crucial that within subjective spirit we are still lacking the conceptual means to talk about a realised end as ‘deed’. Hegel insists that the products of ‘practical spirit [are] (not yet deed and action,¹⁰ but) *enjoyment* [*Genuss*’] (EPM §444; cf. Peperzak 1991, 362). So the measure for a successful doing in practical spirit is not the public deed, to which other agents might refer to in their judgements. Instead, it is my subjective grasp on the end I pursue as well as my judgement whether it is met by what I *am doing*. This judgement might be implicit only as a feeling of enjoyment or content after my doing. It is not a judgement, however, about what I *have* done. Therefore, the intentionality of pursuing an end is considered solely insofar as the end determines *my activity* of pursuing it. We shall later return to a more detailed analysis of the differences between subjective and objective action (6).

Looking backwards—to the *Phenomenology* immediately preceding the *Psychology*—we are able to better understand why Hegel distinguishes between desires and drives and why language plays a key role for the teleological self-determination of practical spirit.

Intentionality based on desires poses a particular problem for our understanding of our practical activity. Although a merely phenomenological perspective allows us to understand *that* subjective spirit is capable of practically determining itself (for example to be conscious of the fact that eating an apple satisfies my desire for one), we cannot understand *how* it is doing so. The difficulty springs from the fact that perceiving consciousness (EPM §§420–421) and desiring self-consciousness (EPM §§426ff.)¹¹ both carry a moment of passivity (EPM §415). Here, spirit apprehends itself only as ‘appearance’ and it can refer to inner or outer phenomena only as ‘given’, regardless of their source (EPM §414 A; deVries 1988, 52; Inwood 2007, 465). It is this lack of understanding their source and spirit’s concomitant reference to itself as an appearance that makes desires ‘transitory’ and ‘destructive’ (EPM §428) attempts at a ‘momentary satisfaction’ (EPM §473 A), which even if satisfied, constantly engenders new desires.

If we understand our intentionality as dependent on such a notion of desire, we face a particular problem, which Hegel figuratively expresses

as a struggle for recognition between two (conceptions of) selves (EPM §§430ff.). On the one hand, a desire for *X* and its satisfaction is an appearance *of* self-consciousness. On the other hand, it is an appearance *for* self-consciousness as a certainty of itself (*Gewissheit*—EPM §439). Yet both perspectives employ a very different notion of self-consciousness: the former as the appearance-*originating* source, the latter as the appearance-*processing* capacity. Each perspective is a manifestation of self-consciousness in its own right—which is why Hegel speaks of *two* selves that engage in a struggle for recognition. At least in *this* context this figurative struggle serves as an analogy for the argumentative struggle we end up with if we understand our practical self-determination solely in terms of satisfying desire. Because the notion of self-consciousness that is the source of the desire is not the same as the notion of self-consciousness that expresses its satisfaction, the model of desire-satisfaction cannot serve as the final conceptual framework for our understanding of rational practical *self*-determination.

There are two crucial consequences of this interpretation of the *Phenomenology*—one of intersubjective and the other of intrasubjective relevance. From an intersubjective perspective, we still lack the conceptual means to express the thought of you and me doing something *of the same kind* in order to satisfy a desire for *X*. A merely phenomenological point of view leaves us lacking the conceptual means of something like ‘action types’ as the shared form of your and my activity. All we can do without reference to a shared form is to compare my singular activity that connects an individual desire with its momentary satisfaction to a second, phenomenologically distinct activity that connects someone else’s desire with its satisfaction—a ‘distinction which is no distinction’ (EPM §437). From an intrasubjective perspective, we are equally lacking a notion of the *kind* of activity I am engaged in while I am satisfying a desire. Therefore, the subject lacks an understanding of *what* it is doing. Phenomenologically speaking, we understand only *that* we are satisfying desires. Yet we do not understand *what* we are doing, that is, *how* satisfaction is achieved (cf. Ikäheimo 2004, 84), an understanding which requires the normativity of action types that could explain the order of which my activity to satisfy a concrete desire is an example. Hence, if we understand our practical rational activity only by means of having desires, we are not able to apprehend ourselves as ‘practical’ or as having ‘efficacious’ thoughts.¹²

A similar point has been stressed by some neo-Aristotelian approaches that criticise Davidson’s account of intentions as a compound of belief and desire. If one understood ‘wanting *X*’ as based on ‘having a desire for *X*’, it remains a mystery how my desire is brought into connection with my linguistically shaped judgement or belief, which employs a description or type of action (Lavin 2012; Rödl 2007).¹³ The transitory character of desires challenges every evaluation to form a belief at every possible moment and thus creates an infinite series of intentions, none of which covers the *entire* process of satisfying a desire. Any attempt to directly translate changeable

desires into practical judgements leads to an infinite regress, because what defines the ground for my belief about what to do—desires as the way spirit appears to itself—is liable to change and provide another appearance according to which I form another belief about what to do—involving a different action type. Hence, if I understand my practical activity as based on desires, I am not able to apprehend myself as being rationally practical at all.

According to our guiding question, that is, how we can understand our rational activity solely *by* being engaged in that activity, we now see the limitations of apprehending ourselves as desiring. Desire does not explain how my activity to satisfy it can be a rationally ordered activity and thus does not explain how I can determine myself by thinking at all. Hence, we have to change the conceptual framework whereby we understand the human rational activity that is constitutively ours. We need to understand practical self-determination as something other than desire-satisfaction and replace ‘acting on desire’ by ‘acting on a drive’ or ‘pursuing an end’. ‘Drives’ overcome the limitation of desires, because they are part and parcel of an intelligent mind that has practical as well as theoretical capacities. Reasons as ends are capable of explaining *what* I am doing, as they bear a linguistic form that desires lack. The end of my activity teleologically structures my way of getting there as *causa finalis*. Hegel frames this distinction as the difference between ‘consciousness’ (the subject of *Phenomenology*) and ‘intelligence’ (the subject of *Psychology*). Whereas the former retains the moments of passivity, only the latter can actually be said to be active (EPM §§443 A and 473 A). Only intelligence first and foremost establishes a proper self-relation because it conceives of the subject-object distinction as a relation within *its own activity*—the ground of spirit’s activity itself already is spirit (Inwood 2007, 414). Therefore it conceives of the objective end pursued in a way that is constituted *by* its own subjective activity and not by simply processing given appearances in the guise of another, given self-consciousness.

By analysing the interplay between theoretical and practical intelligence, we shall now see how Hegel gradually develops a notion of spirit that is practical through teleological self-determination.

4 THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL INTELLIGENCE

Practical intelligence and theoretical intelligence are two sides of the same coin (EPM §445 R) which have—to use a distinction provided by Elizabeth Anscombe—a distinct ‘direction of fit’.¹⁴ On the one hand, ‘theoretical intelligence’ is the general name for a variety of capacities (*Vermögen*—EPM §440 R) to process the form of objects or what is given (*das Gefundene*) as theoretical intelligence’s own content or more generally as something of one’s own (*das Seinige*—EPM §443). ‘Practical intelligence’, on the other hand, is the general name for a variety of capacities to posit one’s own

content as the form of one's activity (EPM §468).¹⁵ And we shall now focus on the question of how far practical intelligence already rests on the capacities of theoretical intelligence.

Theoretical spirit is a drive for knowledge (EPM §443 A). It appropriates objectivity for subjectivity by establishing the identity of the *form* of the former with the *content* of its subjective activity. Theoretical spirit re-cognises (*wiedererkennen* EPM §465) the form of what is external to itself by comparing it to its own (theoretical) activity. For example, the truth of intuitions is the (limited) universality they share with the form of spirit's activity while it is *intuiting* (EPM §454). At this stage intelligence re-cognises its own activity through intuitions. The truth of representations is the kind of universality they share with the activity of theoretical spirit while *representing* (EPM §462). Intelligence now re-cognises its own activity through representations. And theoretical intelligence re-cognises itself in thinking insofar as it re-cognises itself as *having* thoughts both as its content and as the form of objects (EPM §465).¹⁶

Practical spirit proceeds in the reverse 'direction of fit'—it appropriates subjectivity for objectivity by establishing the identity of the former with the latter. Practical spirit thus is the practical appropriation (*Aneignung*) of the knowledge of theoretical spirit.

The most central aspect of theoretical intelligence is the acquisition of language in its different stages of intuition, representation, and thinking. In contrast to consciousness and desires in their non-conceptual form, practical intelligence is able to master language such that there is a change in the way it relates to itself. Hence, the kind of *practical* self-determination intelligence is capable of must be a self-determination whose linguistic form is not a merely accidental ingredient. Instead, the practical self-determination of the *Psychology's* subject is an efficacy of conceptually formed thoughts towards its own activity. In this respect, reasons as ends differ in their conceptual form from desires. My conceptual representation anticipates the end I am pursuing while I am pursuing it. Practical intelligence is a practical representation of this end, or, what is the same, the subjective embodiment of language.

We can now specify guiding questions for reconstructing practical spirit: Does spirit apprehend itself as self-determining if it apprehends itself as end-pursuing? How is the normativity of ends to be understood? Does the form of the end at the same time constitute the form of the practical activity by which this end is pursued? Hegel discusses three ways of answering these questions and three different kinds of wanting or of 'trying to get':

- i) In 'practical feeling' externality is *intuited*, thus practical intelligence can immediately compare itself only with an *intuition*.
- ii) In 'drives and *Willkür*' externality is *represented*, thus practical intelligence can pursue only an end that it *represents* and compare its practical activity to this *representation*.

- iii) In 'happiness' (*Glückseligkeit*) externality is *thought* as a totality, thus practical intelligence can pursue only an end which it can *think* as a totality and compare its practical activity to that sort of thinking.

While progressing from i) to iii) we are amplifying the focus of the end pursued and thereby the aim of the subject's practical self-determination or its 'trying to get':

- i) A *singular* feeling of pleasure and displeasure ('this').
- ii) A *series* of fulfilments for a drive ('some').
- iii) The *totality* of drives ('all').

The universality present in the schema of the development of these three types of practical ends (this, some, all) is 'allness'. In order to explain its relevance in this context, we need to take into consideration some of Hegel's remarks considering a link between the *Psychology* and reflective judgements in the *Logic*.¹⁷ Among the four types of universality (cf. EL §171) that Hegel associates with the four classes of judgement, reflective judgements bear the universality of 'allness'. The universality of 'allness' is the mark of judgements that judge the predicate to have some semantic relationship to the subject as in inductive and analogous reasoning (cf. EL §190) which, however, is not yet made fully explicit in the judgement itself. Examples are '*This* plant is curative', '*Some* planets have inhabitants', or '*All* men are mortal'—whereas there is no such semantic relationship between 'the car' or 'the jumper' and their colour 'red' in 'My car/jumper is red', because they could have any other colour without being less of a 'car' or a 'jumper'. Hence, allness is a higher developed form of universality than mere formal universality (the universality of distributive predicates, like colours), but it is not yet the universality of a genus differentiated into species (such as the generic singular in '*Men* are mortal').¹⁸ Allness-universality will be constitutive for the normativity of subjective spirit. We shall discuss it in the context of 'happiness' and also compare it to the genus/species universality when we discuss the contrast between subjective and objective action.

The overview of linking the forms of theoretical intelligence with the ends of practical intelligence provides us with the key for reconstructing this part of Hegel's philosophy of action as an investigation into the normativity of reasons as ends. These three levels permit a distinction between three kinds of subjective intentionality and three types of subjective action; they mark three ways of 'trying to get'. However, they are not part of a descriptive map of the mind that Hegel draws, but are claimed to necessarily follow from each other. The higher level resolves the contradictions of the practical appropriation of the former, which can be overcome only if the type of end intelligence pursues changes its form, i.e., its universality. Subsequently the way spirit apprehends its own activity will change as will the way we think about our activity (Winfield 2010, 119).

5 PRACTICAL SPIRIT IN DETAIL

5.1 Practical Feeling

The most basic level of intentionality in practical intelligence is practical feeling.¹⁹ I take the term to refer both to the practical activity of a subject as well as to the product (the feelings of pleasure and displeasure) brought about by this activity (Inwood 2007, 530). In practical feeling, subjective spirit compares its own determination in some sort of inner intuition with the way it finds itself to be determined. My singular inclination for an apple results in pleasure if it is met by an existing apple and displeasure in the absence of one. Practical feeling judges a match or mismatch between my single inclination here and now and whether it is met here and now.²⁰

'Practical feeling' is distinguished from mere 'desire' insofar as desire did not include the comparison between itself and what it desires (Winfield 2013). 'Desire' as laid out in the *Phenomenology* is not even implicitly a judgement. However, this most basic level of practical spirit is immediate and thus only contingently actualised:

In practical feeling, it is a contingent matter whether the immediate affection agrees with the inner determinacy of the will or not. This *contingency*, this *dependence* on an *external* objectivity, contradicts the will that knows itself to be determined-in-and-for-itself, that is aware of the objectivity contained in its subjectivity. (EPM §473 A)

The practically feeling subject reappropriates the form of intuitions by its self-determining activity of feeling or emotion. The externality of the practically feeling subject is already minimally structured as far as one can draw general distinctions such as between edible and non-edible things—similarly as intuition cannot distinguish between what falls under the concepts of 'tables' and 'chairs', but minimally discriminate between things to sit on and things to write on or things here and there.

A contradiction occurs because by reappropriating, the subject does not appropriate its own activity but instead finds itself completely dependent on an externality which it cannot understand as being determined by its own activity. Consider my 'wanting an apple', for example. I could not want an apple if there were no such things as apples, and if I was not able to intuit a red, sweet fruit as that at which I aim. My getting the apple or not getting it produces pleasure or displeasure. However, both, my trying to get and the result of getting, i.e., pleasure or displeasure do not determine what an apple is. Hence, the identity between 'wanting' and 'getting'—between the *form of my activity* and the *form of the end*—is only immediate as it fully depends on something that it cannot possibly understand *by* its activity. It depends on the apple or the availability of food here and now. This is the contradiction of practical feeling. If practical spirit was only active as a practical feeling, it could indeed conceive of itself as efficacious with respect to its

own activity—but only with the help of something that is not determinable through this kind of activity (the concrete apple).

5.2 Drives and *Willkür*

The drives within the *Psychology* are of a rational mind that understands its rationality through having drives.²¹ Practical intelligence is at this stage a reappropriation of representations. According to Hegel, representations differ from intuitions in that intuitions are singular and immediate, whereas a representation always already refers to a remembered *series* of intuitions (EPM §§448–449).²² To pursue ends that are representations rather than intuitions means to pursue something of greater universality. But it also means to represent externality so that it can provide ends of greater universality for intelligence's practical activity. In understanding itself as acting on drives, practical spirit is surrounded by an externality differentiated into edible and non-edible things here and now or there and then, but also by an externality to which the representations 'apple', 'fruits', 'house', and 'shelter' apply. Thus, on the one hand, 'drive' argumentatively follows from the contradiction of practical feeling:

The will cannot, therefore, rest content with *comparing* its immanent determinacy with something external and just *finding* the agreement of these two sides; it must go on to *posit* objectivity as a *moment* of its self-determination, and therefore to *produce* this agreement, its satisfaction, itself. Volitional intelligence thereby develops into the *drive*. (EPM §473 A)

On the other hand, 'drive' also argumentatively precedes happiness—which will be the most generic or universal form of end a subject is able to pursue within subjective spirit. A drive is for something particular and it manifests itself in a 'series of satisfactions':

The *drive* . . ., since it is a form of *volitional intelligence*, starts from the sublated opposition of the subjective and the objective, and involves a *series* of satisfactions, and so is something *whole, universal*. At the same time, however, the drive . . . is still something *particular*. (EPM §473 A)

Compared to desire, which did not allow us to comprehend *how* to bridge the gap between subjectivity and objectivity, drive is a generic activity of trying to come to terms with this transition in general *and* as manifest in several concrete instances. Thus, acting on desire and getting a momentary satisfaction is logically different from acting on a drive. Only drives bear a universality that allows for *repeated* instantiations and thus for saying that I am doing something 'of the same kind' today as I did yesterday (or as you did). Subjective action that is an acting on a generic drive—such as my drive for fruits—is manifest in my having an apple yesterday, my having banana

today as well as my having grapes tomorrow, etc. Understanding what representations of 'fruits' are involves my understanding that this is what I had yesterday, am having today, and will have tomorrow. Now we are in a position to express what we were not able to express at the level of the *Phenomenology*, namely the normativity of *repeatable* action types that bear a linguistic form which teleologically structures my activity and ultimately allows us to express that you and I are doing something of the same kind.

It is, in particular, this intrinsic link to language that is constitutive of the wanting that characterises volitional intelligence in the *Psychology*. And it ought to be clearly distinguished from 'feeling' (soul) and 'desire' (consciousness). A desire does not have a conceptual form and remains alien to judgements because of its transitory character. Practical activity as acting on drives, on the other hand, essentially involves the anticipation of the end that is pursued, because the object of my wanting must be intuited, represented, or thought by me, and it cannot be thought without entertaining *some* conceptual content.

Still, Hegel claims that acting on a drive is only particular and not yet universal, which is why it turns out to be unfree. The contradiction springs from the fact that drives always come in a multiplicity from which I have to choose. To balance them requires a faculty distinct from drives, the faculty of choice or *Willkür*. A conflict between the various drives is inevitable not because we lack the faculty of reason in the form of laws that should instruct us which drives to follow (this is sometimes claimed to be the Kantian solution).²³ Rather, there is a conflict because drives themselves do not contain their own criterion by which to measure their realisation (PR §17), but, instead, they depend on our choice. *Willkür*, on the other hand, depends on drives to be given to it in order to be active at all (EPM §478).

When we measure 'acting on drives' against our guiding questions, as to how far the *form of practical activity* differs from the *form of the ends* themselves, we shall be able to see the contradiction more clearly. The form of practical activity is the form of a series of voluntary acts. Choice always is a choice of something singular. In order to give in to my drive for fruits, I will have to choose eating a singular banana, an apple, or a plum, *all* of which taken together as a series can be said to correspond to my drive. Any of these series is just a group of several singularities. Thus, the universality of a drive does not actualise *as* universal but only as a quantitative series of singularities. Hence, the *form of practical activity* differs from the *form of the ends*. Furthermore, every singular voluntary act still depends on there being apples, plums, and grapes, i.e., on the fact that the externality is structured in such a way as to provide me with what I am choosing. The conditions of choice cannot be brought about by practical spirit's own activity.

This is the contradiction of the section on drive and *Willkür* in which spirit is not yet self-determining. Because of this contradiction, spirit must be more than the realisation of a drive. Happiness partly resolves it because happiness is the actualisation of the *totality* of drives.²⁴

5.3 Happiness

With the transition to happiness, the externality that provides practical spirit with options as to what ends to pursue takes on the form of a totality that can only be grasped by thinking and not by the representation of particulars. This change in universality goes hand in hand with a change in intentionality and in the kind of ‘trying to get’. The end of ‘happiness’ is of a more general kind than wanting something edible (practical feeling) or generally wanting fruits (drive). It is the background principle from which particular choices are made and certain drives preferred over others in this or that situation or within a lifespan. But happiness itself could not possibly be the object of my choice, for if it were, there would be alternatives and we would need another principle to balance happiness against its alternatives—which would lead into an infinite regress.²⁵

In order to strive for happiness as a long-term pursuit, thinking has to conceive of the totality of drives so as to be able to ponder which drives are to be acted upon at a given point in time.

But the truth of *particular* satisfactions is the *universal* satisfaction, which the thinking will makes its purpose as *happiness*. (EPM §478)

[A]nd they [the drives] are supposed to be sacrificed, both sacrificed one to another for the sake of that purpose, and sacrificed to that purpose directly, in whole or in part. (EPM §479)

For example, I will have to sleep in order to rest, to eat when I am hungry, and to read in order to educate myself—each happening at a particular time. But these ends can generate a conflict, which I might solve by postponing reading to give in to my appetite or tiredness while I am studying for a scheduled exam. Happiness requires not only the competence to anticipate the end I pursue as a representation. It requires imagining the consequences of my potentially pursuing that end rather than another, hence my answering questions such as ‘What would the consequences be if I followed *that* drive *now*?’ (cf. PR §20). Thus, by striving for happiness, practical intelligence is reflectively balancing all drives and is giving each of them some right but at the same time avoiding letting one drive dominate all the others. Happiness is the generic actualisation of drives—or ‘universal satisfaction’ (EPM §479).

As one cannot choose happiness as an end—although I can choose this course of action rather than another for the sake of my happiness—happiness is not the kind of finite end mediated in its realisation by *Willkür*. Instead, we can specify happiness by a term that has been introduced by more Aristotelian approaches to action theory. According to Jonathan Ackrill (Ackrill 1980) for example, *eudaimonia* is not the highest good understood as the last element of a chain of ‘in order to’ explanations.²⁶ Rather, it is an ‘inclusive end’ that includes all other finite ends under it. Sebastian Rödl uses the

term of an ‘infinite’ end (Rödl 2007)—an end that is not just actualised when it has been achieved at a certain (finite) point in time but instead already is being actualised *while* I am after it, *while* I am choosing the right means and am about to accomplish them. ‘Infinite ends’ in this sense constitute an infinite number of finite realisations (my exam will end, my hunger or need for sleep will be satisfied at a certain point in time, while my pursuit of happiness continues in other activities to follow). However, infinity comes in various guises according to Hegel, which must not be conflated.

The *Psychology* and the *Philosophy of Right* both approach the question of normativity of reasons from different angles. It is, therefore, crucial to carefully understand the difference that is constituted by their systematic context: subjective spirit (*Psychology*) and objective spirit (*Philosophy of Right*) respectively. A summary of the main arguments in the *Psychology* that Hegel provides us with at the very beginning of the *Philosophy of Right* can retrospectively help us to understand happiness.²⁷ In this context, Hegel introduces the ‘*truly infinite*’ will (PR §22) in distinction to a will of merely formal universality (PR §§13R; 21). This distinction marks the step from the *Psychology* to the *Philosophy of Right* or from subjective to objective action. It applies to happiness as an infinite but still formal end, because here infinity only serves as the negative notion to finite ends (cf. PR §22 R) and the finitude of subjective spirit in general. Within the constraints of the *Psychology*, however, infinity only is an infinity of content (happiness), not of form. We are not yet able to understand the inner dynamic of our acting on infinite ends as the infinite self-determination of spirit. This would require us once more to change the conceptual framework by which we are trying to apprehend our rational human activity—it requires us to develop the notion of ‘right’.

Developing the notion of right requires another distinction which Hegel introduces in early paragraphs of the *Philosophy of Right*. Here he claims that true universality and infinity lies in the ‘system of all drives’ (PR §17 A).²⁸ The totality of drives constitutes a *system* of drives when we understand the free will as its principle—as in the context of right.²⁹

The truth . . . is that the drives should become the rational system of the will’s determination; to grasp them thus in terms of the concept is the content of the science of right. (PR §19)

Subjective spirit is not able to fully grasp the systematicity of drives *as* a system; it remains a mere aggregation of their multitude. The logical distinction between an aggregate and a system is reflected in the distinction between ‘allness’ and ‘genus/species’ universality. Allness judgements like ‘*All* human beings are mammals with earlobes’ (cf. EL §175 A)—which is only accidentally true but does not express the differentiating mark of human beings—do not express a full genus/species distinction that constitutes a system. And

we are not able to conceive of externality as manifesting such a systematic structure. This is the logical structure of happiness, which is the *subjective* conception of such a system of drives that remains a mere aggregation of accidental unity. The externality of an agent striving for happiness is accessible only in the form of allness-universal judgements ('This is how *we* do it / how *everybody* does it'). Pursuing finite and formal infinite ends, therefore, alludes to social norms underlying the logic of 'allness' in the sense described. Accomplishing this conformity to existing social norms through practical self-determination according to reasons as ends might be sufficient for a subject to achieve happiness in its practical community. Yet, according to Hegel, these social norms are not moral or legal laws which follow the logic of a genus differentiated into a system of species (as in objective spirit).

In happiness, activity and end are identical only from my subjective perspective, which thus still contains a moment of contingency or sheer 'luck' (*Belieben* EPM §479).³⁰ Beyond the scope of this subjective perspective is the precondition of being a member of the *right sort* of social practice, a practice that already is structured by the right sort of social norms that enable me balancing the relevant drives and provides the relevant means. The drive to have a fulfilling professional live and the drive to care for loved ones, for example, might be given to me by my social community with which I identify. Freedom to choose from either of these options might constitute a happy life for someone, whereas the balance of both might constitute a happy life for someone else. But whether or not the balance of both is possible at all within my social practice remains a matter of luck.³¹ To judge its possibility goes beyond the subjective mental capacities developed so far and beyond an understanding of social norms as norms of allness. *If* the social practice allows this balance, it appears to be a *rational* social practice in which available drives form a system of right and being a member of that practice enables me to manifest freedom. But 'right' requires spirit to become objective, something that cannot be adequately expressed within the psychological-normative perspective on action that we have encountered so far.

In conclusion: striving for happiness is the *immediate* identity of activity and its source since both are thought. The striving activity essentially involves thinking as the reflective comparison of drives and their imagined actualisation while at the same time the totality of a lifespan only is apprehensible as a thought. This identity is the ground of the notion of 'free spirit' as briefly touched upon at the end of the *Psychology* (EPM §§481–482) as it provides the key to the transition from a formal infinite will to the will that is infinite in its content and form (PR §21).

6 SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE ACTION

In the previous sections, we identified Hegel's *Psychology* as the basis for reconstructing Hegel's philosophy of action. Subjective, end-pursuing

intentionality is a form of self-determination as the practical representation of ends and hence an expression of spirit's subjective freedom. In this section, we shall enquire into some of the consequences for both expressivist and causalist readings of Hegel's theory of action. By doing so, we shall not only point out some fundamental differences between modern terminology and Hegel's own, but also see more clearly the *various* ways in which spirit has a social character.

The first important point to emphasise is that the intentionality in 'subjective action' must be contrasted with the intentionality of 'objective action' within the framework of objective spirit. There, the realisation of my purpose (*Vorsatz*) is mediated by laws and takes place within an objectivity that already is shaped by these (EPM §474 R). The extent to which 'right' underlies a different normativity than the normativity of ends is expressed in the following quotes:

The absolute determination or . . . the absolute drive, of the free spirit . . . is to make its freedom into its object [*Gegenstand*]*—to make it objective both in the sense that it becomes the rational system of the spirit itself, and in the sense that this system becomes immediate actuality. . . . The abstract concept of the Idea of the will is in general the free will which wills the free will.* (PR §27)

Right is any *existence* [*Dasein*] in general which is the *existence of the free will.* (PR §29)

When the reason for self-determination is freedom itself, this reason is no longer a finite end. Freedom is a different kind of reason than the finite ends of building houses, having fruits, and buying tickets and also different from the subjectively infinite end of 'happiness'. The freedom of objective spirit is not an end of my activity but *a manifestation of right*. If freedom constitutes the reason of my action, I determine myself according to laws. 'Right' in objective spirit is supposed to govern my subjective purpose (*Vorsatz*) as well as the objectivity in which I am performing the action as a *realisation* of my purpose—a realisation which thereby becomes part of that objectivity. The very same form governs the subject's interests, needs, and intentions, as well as the objectivity in which the subject acts. Both are united in what Hegel names 'deed'—the result of a '*truly infinite*' will. Hence, now I am able to—and so are others—to refer to what I *have done*. But to be able to do so rests on the fact that I already understand *my doing* in different terms than in subjective spirit. The subject of the *Philosophy of Right* 'wills property' as a manifestation of right and does not simply 'want to build a house' in order to satisfy her drive for shelter. Right requires the objectivity of spirit and not just the teleological structure of subjective wanting.³² Moving from understanding reasons as (subjective) 'ends' towards reasons as (subjective and objective) 'right' provides us with the conceptual means for understanding the extent to which we are not only efficacious towards

ourselves but also efficacious in the world. Thus, by moving from ‘ends’ to ‘right’ the notion of subjectivity changes as well.

The change to the normativity that characterises right explains why only the performed action, which has become part of objectivity by altering it, will contain the full intention (*Absicht*). It also explains why other subjects are able to judge the outcome of this alteration in terms of this intention.³³ Only the context of ‘right’ addresses the social practice in which I act as a *rational* practice that is governed by a system of laws such that these laws can constitute the universal content of my free action. Intentions, in Hegel’s *technical sense*, are manifestations of *rational* social norms—contrary to the widespread modern use of the term ‘intention’. They are rational because they reflect the system of right and not just *any* social norms or action types—a rationality that the psychological subject could not conceive (Inwood 2007, 525).³⁴ Accordingly, Hegel reserves the notion of ‘action’ exclusively for the rational activity that is already a manifestation of right. His vocabulary makes this clear: examples for intentional action are now ‘murder’, ‘arson’ and ‘healing or killing with a knife’—all of which are manifestations or infringements of right and they manifest a kind of freedom, that is not merely subjective. When practical intelligence determines itself to build a house (or to raise the arm, to flip a switch, to cross the street, to go skiing, or to buy a ticket to Venice etc.), it does not yet fully *act* in Hegel’s sense.

The second emphasis has to be laid on the fact that according to Hegel, there are at least two ways in which spirit is inherently social: firstly as social norms manifest in individual ends and secondly as ‘right’ ethically understood. All subjective capacities that Hegel discusses within subjective spirit—starting from ‘habit’ (EPM §§409ff.) up until the acquisition of language (EPM §§457ff.)—could not possibly be understood without a social practice and the norm-governed initiation of an individual into that practice (cf. Ikäheimo 2004, 88f.). Likewise, the ends practical spirit pursues are constituted by a social community and express norms that are shared with other end-pursuers. Their normativity rests on the relevant social practice I am part of insofar as this practice serves as a condition of possibility that pre-structures certain ends for me as pursuable at all. My drive for shelter is met by ‘building a house’ according to *my* practice rather than by ‘building an igloo’. Thus, a certain degree of intersubjectivity already is present in subjective spirit as one of its not yet fully understood preconditions. One should therefore hesitate to read Hegel’s subjective spirit as being only concerned with an individual, isolated *I*.³⁵

Yet this social practice is not considered in its inner dynamic and rationality—which indeed is the theme of the later passages in objective spirit—but only from the perspective of a subject who is trying to come to terms with its own rationality in this ‘given’ social practice. Thus, any encounter with the notion of ‘ethical life’ (*Sittlichkeit*) in the *Philosophy of Right* must not simply equate it with the notion of social community implicit in subjective

spirit. Both are different expressions of the social dimension of spirit and allow for different forms of self-determination. What marks the difference between subjective and objective spirit is the understanding of the active role of spirit in the constitution of these social practices. But to introduce ‘social practice’ as a *condition of possibility* for my ends of choice (*Psychology*) does not yet entail the claim that my intentions can be determined *only* by that social practice. Understanding ‘ethical life’ requires a richer notion of social practice than that would merely be understood as a necessary condition.

Both points combined—the terminological distinction between Hegel’s notion of *Absicht* and the modern notion of ‘intention’ as well as different ways of apprehending the social character of spirit—have crucial consequences for the expressivist readings of Hegel. Within the expressivist lines of interpretation, intentional action underlies an inherently social normativity, because the constitution of the ‘deed’ (what I have done) depends on what other members of my social practice judge this deed to be (Brandom 2013, 79ff; Pippin 2008, ch. 6). The main problem here is that the acting subject loses her authority to determine herself according to her intentions. Any subjective self-determination is put under scrutiny as soon as the action is performed and becomes part of objective reality. Thus, we run into the danger of losing what seems to be essential for understanding intentional action at all: a first personal authority of self-determination.³⁶ But according to our distinction between subjective intentionality in the *Psychology* and the fully fledged *Absicht* of objective spirit, we should be careful in attributing to Hegel a notion of intentional action that commits him to a position in which *only* the outcome of my doing something—the deed—counts as decisive for what I intended. This claim overlooks that there is no ‘deed’ for the subjective intentional activity and hence no socially correcting interpretations that are constitutive for understanding my wanting. Nevertheless, subjective, teleological intentionality clearly serves a certain function within Hegel’s overall investigation of spirit’s activity. Insofar as practical intelligence understands itself as efficacious towards its own activity, it manifests its first-personal authority by determining itself as end-pursuing—something that can be overlooked if one solely focuses on the *Philosophy of Right* or the *Phenomenology*.³⁷

Thirdly, from the perspective of the causalist interpretation of Hegel’s theory of action another problem occurs: that an agent ‘wants to build a house’ (subjective spirit) seems to express the same inner state of affairs as an agent’s ‘willing property’ (objective spirit)—only the latter description is more general. Moreover, if the deed is executed, it seems to refer to a single external event to which several descriptions apply, such as ‘building a house’, ‘acquiring property’, and even several chemical descriptions such as the mortar’s hardening, etc. So which description of that event is the right one and what justifies calling it an action at all? The post-Davidsonian tradition of action theory attempts to solve this problem by demanding that in

order to talk of an ‘action’ there has to be at least *some* intentional description among the potentially infinite variety of descriptions (Brandom 2013; Davidson 2001).

Within Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, there is no such problem for two reasons. The first reason is that distinguishing between ‘action’ and ‘event’ in this manner rests on the underlying assumption that what we refer to under *all* descriptions is a naturally caused event. However, to take this perspective is to consider that to which several descriptions apply as externally caused—which is the characteristic of nature. If we follow Hegel, however, we cannot hope for clarification of something that belongs to spirit as long as we regard it as part of nature in its basic sense. The moment we enter the entire philosophy of spirit, spirit aims at thinking *itself* as being both finitely and infinitely determined and at apprehending this distinction as a difference *within* itself. Spirit builds on nature, not as an underlying, neutrally describable world of mechanically caused events to which spirit is added on top, but rather as a constant drive to apprehend the finite moments *within* spirit.

The second reason is that following Hegel’s argumentative path—as we have reconstructed it—requires us to reconsider our conceptual framework in coming to terms with the rational human activity as such, which is ours. The systematic context of each particular problem and distinction within the philosophy of spirit has to be taken seriously. Given that both, ‘wanting a house’ and ‘willing property’ serve distinct roles within the overall argument of spirit’s coming to terms with human activity as such, this should not be treated as the question of how different *descriptions* apply to one and the same underlying, neutral event. If a concrete example should help us in coming to terms with our rational practical activity then what has been ‘wanting a house’ from the psychological-normative perspective is *better* understood as ‘willing property’ in its legal normativity. If all we had to reflect our rational activity were the categories of subjective spirit, we would not be able to fully apprehend ourselves in these categories as self-determining. For these two reasons, it is a categorical mistake to think the natural determinacy of events as being in fundamental competition with our intentional determinacy of action.³⁸

However, large parts of modern action theory approach intentional action as the sort of inner process that I named ‘subjective action’. Thus it might seem as if the externality of subjective spirit remains untouched and continues to follow its own laws—as in nature—and we would have to explain how the peaceful coexistence between the inner, mental act and the outer event is possible.³⁹ But according to Hegel, ‘externality’ is a mere limit concept (*Grenzbegriff*) for the finite activity of subjective spirit pursuing ends. By using the categories of subjective spirit we simply cannot determine whether externality indeed corresponds to my inner processes or not—and in fact, we do not need to as the product of subjective action is ‘enjoyment’. Only the fully fledged intentional action as *Absicht* in objective spirit allows us to conceive of the world in which it takes place as rationally objective and

as capable of absorbing the products of objective action—which is why an exclusively psychological perspective is at odds with Hegel’s use of the term *Absicht*. The end-pursuing intentionality of the *Psychology* is logically different from the law-realising intentionality of the *Philosophy of Right*, just as the normativity of social norms in the *Psychology* is logically different from the socio-moral normativity in the context of ‘right’. This distinction is not only lost if one consciously ignores the moral context in which Hegel discusses his notion of *Absicht* (Quante 2004, 104f.). It is also violated if the notion of ‘right’—that employs the genus/species universality—is explained in terms of a ‘practical norm’ for which the universality of allness is distinctive (Brandom 2013, 80f.).

When we distinguish between subjective and objective action—as suggested here—we are not committing our interpretation of Hegel’s theory of action to the claim that objective action was a composite of an inner action and a corresponding outer event in the world subject to natural laws. Rather, we should conceive of both as part of the argumentative development of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit in which various forms of normativity are to be found. To acknowledge the philosophical context of spirit in which Hegel embeds his investigation of rational, human intentionality as such is crucial for both expressivist and causalist readings. Whereas the latter fails to grasp the fundamental difference between a philosophy of spirit and a philosophy of nature, the former does not sufficiently differentiate between the various types of spirit’s inherently social character. A discussion of the *Psychology* can help to face these challenges insofar as it forces us to explain how the various parts of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit are systematically linked and what drives their development.⁴⁰

NOTES

1. For a criticism of this reading, see Alznauer 2012/13 and Houlgate 2010.
2. Yeomans 2012 defends a largely expressivist interpretation, however, with an agent-causal turn (203, 215).
3. Some exceptions are Winfield 2013, Buterin 2009, Ikäheimo 2004, Peperzak 1991 and 2001, and Horstmann 1979.
4. The ‘primitive sign of wanting is *trying to get*’ (Anscombe 1963, §36, 68). Interestingly enough, she already distinguishes this kind of wanting from a ‘prick of desire’ (ibid.).
5. I borrow this term from Korsgaard’s investigation into human action as autonomous and efficacious (ch. 5). However, being efficacious in the sense of causing changes in the world is to be distinguished from being efficacious towards *oneself*. It is not entirely clear whether Korsgaard distinguishes these two senses when she writes ‘an agent is *efficacious* when she succeeds in bringing about whatever state of affairs she intended to bring about through her action’ (82). If I am right, then Hegel’s argument within the *Psychology* does not rely on there being a judgement about the (un)successful *result* of my teleological activity.
6. The EPM is quoted according to the Inwood edition (2007), the translation for *Trieb*, however, is thoroughly altered from ‘urge’ (Inwood) to ‘drive’.

7. The description Hegel gives for his philosophy of right in PR §2 holds for spirit in general: 'it must observe the proper [*eigenen*] immanent development of the thing [*Sache*] itself.' (Quoted according to the Knox/Houlgate translation 2008).
8. The *Science of Logic* lays the foundation for this approach (cf. Herrmann-Sinai 2016).
9. Hegel insists on the fact that theoretical and practical intelligence are not to be distinguished as being passive on the one hand and active on the other. Rather, both ought to be considered as active *qua* intelligence and hence as 'drive'. Passivity was the mark of consciousness (EPM §444).
10. Thus, Hegel's original use of 'action' is 'portentous' in the way Davidson points out (Davidson 2001, FN 2). There is a wider philosophical use of 'action' meaning 'anything that an agent does intentionally' (ibid.). It is this wider use according to which I am referring to the topic of the *Psychology* as 'subjective action'.
11. Hegel further describes desire as 'destroying' and 'not formative' (*bildend*) (EPM §§428 and 428 A), and because it is not formative, its product is not persistent.
12. According to Hegel, however, self-consciousness can grasp the identity of its two meanings insofar as it is capable of understanding *that* they can be understood as united under the wider notion of a 'universal self-consciousness' (EPM §436). But—again—this kind of universality only is an '*appearance* of the substantial' (ibid.). It remains a consciousness of something distinct from itself—the forms of spirit as family and state for example—which themselves are not consciousness and thus not the topic of the *Phenomenology*.
13. 'I calculate that, all things considered, I should do *B*, follow the principle of continence and decide all out to do *B*. I observe that doing *A1* is a means, arrive at an action, and do *A1*. As I have done *A1*, I ask what to do, considering all things now present. I calculate that, all in all, I should do *B*, follow the principle of continence and decide all out to do *B*. I realize that this requires doing *A2*, arrive at an action, and do *A2*. No *one* intention [based on desire—SHS] is the ground of my doing *A1* and my doing *A2*, but one underlies my doing *A1*, another my doing *A2*. But then I am not doing *B*.' (Rödl 2007, 32). Lavin (2012) shows the regress also comes up the other way around when we try to understand action as a compositum of a number of causally dependent elements, the last one of which would be some sort of 'basic' action.
14. Anscombe explains the two directions by two perspectives on a shopping list—one from the person who does the shopping and for whom this is an instruction what to do, another one from a detective following this person, documenting the items he is putting in the basket. (Anscombe 1963, §32)
15. Cf. Buterin 2009 for the general unity of theoretical and practical intelligence and also Inwood 2007, 462.
16. Cf. Houlgate 2006, 247: 'Finally, Hegel argues, intelligence takes the form of thought in which conceiving, judging and reasoning are explicitly understood both to be our own activities and to disclose fully the intelligible, rational character of the world.'
17. Cf. EPM §473, which begins with the passage: 'The practical *ought* is a *real* judgement' as well as EPM §469 A where Hegel explicitly refers to the universality of reflection or allness.
18. Although the distinction between four kinds of universality might sound unfamiliar to modern ears, we can see some of these distinctions have been stressed throughout the twentieth century, such as the distinction between formal universality of judgements modelled along the constraints of mathematical set theory on the one hand and judgements about biological species, as stressed by Michael Thompson, or human practices as in the pragmatist tradition on the other.

19. The addition of EPM §472 differentiates between three levels of content that practical feeling can have. First, the rather superficial level of pleasant and unpleasant, secondly, more determinate feelings such as joy, anger, pain, and, thirdly, feelings whose content is determined by thinking, such as moral, ethical, or religious feelings (cf. LPS §§471ff.) What is relevant, though, is not that there are three distinguishable layers (some of which can only fully be understood in objective spirit or absolute spirit), but what these three layers have in common—namely formally comparing a striving activity with an externality, an objectivity, or actuality. Peperzak 1991 gives a detailed analysis of practical feeling throughout the various writings of Hegel on subjective spirit.
20. ‘The pleasant and unpleasant already constitute a judgment, a comparison of the condition in which I immediately exist with the determination that is inner, an “ought to be”.’ (LPS §473, 256).
21. This context is decisive, as it draws a line to animal’s drives, drives that are not spirit and cannot be dealt with in a philosophy of spirit (see PR §10 A for the pre-rationality of children and §11 A for animal drives). Here I disagree with Winfield (2013, 213): ‘The capacity of choice requires no discursive intelligence. Feeling, intuition, and imagination are sufficient for mind to present itself with the options of impulses and implementation from which to select. For this reason, both dumb animals and prelinguistic children can choose, provided they have enough intelligence and bodily control to imagine their options and decide which to follow.’
22. ‘Here the past is a merely *relative* past,—it resides only in the *comparison of immediate* intuition with what we now have in representation.’ (EPM §450 A)
23. Hegel seems to agree with Kant on the fact that the subjectively free will (*Willkür*) understands itself as independent from natural law, but not yet as law giving. They both disagree, however, as to how to understand the independence. Hegel is emphasising that this is not simply a negative notion to natural causality, but already contains an active part played by subjective spirit that concludes in a self-actualisation. Subjective spirit is ‘practical’ in determining itself independently from one drive or another, but not in being completely independent from drives *as such* as Kant suggested (cf. Ferrarin 2004, 332; Peperzak 1991, 394; Westphal 1993, 245; Yeomans 2013, 42). This is still something different than to say reason is practical in giving itself the moral law. But for Hegel, the latter difference is only a difference between grades of freedom as self-determination.
24. Cf. Winfield 2010, 118 and PR §15. Houlgate (2005, 184 and 2010, 156ff.) and Dudley (2002, 34) both point out the limitation of *Willkür* by something given. Yet the way, in which drives are given is distinct from the way in which desires are given. Thus, it is true that *Willkür* is dependent and heteronomous, but it is still more developed than reacting to desires. Only within freedom of choice are we able to understand the mind as active in the first place.
25. The parallels to Aristoteles’ notion of *eudaimonia* as the highest good are not accidental and have been stressed by others (Williams 2007, 39ff.). Also, Hegel seems to be very much in agreement with the worry against Prescriptivism that drives such accounts as Anscombe’s.
26. Ackrill is arguing against Anthony Kenny’s reading of Aristotle’s notion of *eudaimonia* as the ‘highest good’, which serves as an end dominating all other ends (Kenny 1965/66).
27. For a detailed analysis and comparison with the *Encyclopaedia*, see Peperzak 2001, ch. 3.
28. *Willkür* ignores this systematic connection and can only contingently prefer one drive to others. A singular drive that dominates all others is ‘passion’ (EPM §475 R). When one is preferred over all other drives, *Willkür* takes a part for

the whole. The other mistake is to simply dominate drives by the understanding. But understanding can only operate with principles that are abstract and thus not developed out of spirit's activity, which is drive.

29. My understanding of 'teleological action' thus differs from Christopher Yeomans (2012), who reads teleologically structured thought into the *Philosophy of Right*. According to my reading, the representation of ends is decisive for subjective spirit, whereas the objectivity of right in objective spirit cannot be captured by merely end-pursuing intentionality. Yeomans also reads the 'system of drives' as a subjective system of drives within an agent's character (175, 177; further developed in Yeomans 2013). But 'character' is still a notion of subjective spirit (EPM §§474 R, 482 R) and thus does not capture the sense of a system that constitutes the objectivity of right and moral agency. Spirit itself changes by stepping from subjective to objective spirit and so does the ground of its self-determination.
30. In the tenth book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle refers to this luck by mentioning Priamos, whose life ends in the turmoil of the Trojan War.
31. In this analysis of *Willkür* I agree with Yeomans (2012), who bases his arguments on Hegel's summary of the *Psychology* in the introduction to PR (§§5–7). 'In the terms of the logic of reflection, this is to view the conditions as presupposed in but not posited by the process of self-determining agency.' (169)
32. In PR §26 A, Hegel distinguishes between subjective and objective will and equally between subjective and objective action. Here, Hegel calls bad actions 'merely subjective.' This does not mean that all subjective actions are bad *per se*, but it means that we cannot judge acts of *Willkür* to be morally good or bad, nor can we withdraw to our subjective perspective as soon as we are acting properly as in the context of objective spirit (cf. PR §132 R). Goodness and badness of an action can only be judged within the right sort of universality. There is nothing morally good or bad in my eating a banana (Inwood 2007, 525).
33. Sometimes, it is claimed to be vice versa: the fact that others are judging what I have done explains the normativity. But in fact, it is the normativity of right that explains why the judgement of others is constitutive.
34. Alfredo Ferrarin's otherwise highly illuminative investigation into practical spirit does not always distinguish between objective and subjective spirit with respect to the different kinds of norms (Ferrarin 2004, 330).
35. 'Equally important, objective spirit is the realm of intersubjectivity. Subjective spirit is the treatment of the individual "I." Objective spirit treats the "We," a no less essential phase in spirit's self-actualization.' (deVries 1988, 52)
36. Robert Brandom talks about two 'loci of authority' (2013, 79), and what constitutes their unity is not entirely made clear. Their unity ultimately depends either on the deed as 'what I do under all descriptions' (69) or it completely rests on mutual recognition: 'The content is what is both acknowledged by the agent and attributed by the community: the product of a process of reciprocal specific recognition.' (74/75) Whereas the first strategy would make Brandom liable to the same objections as the theories relying on a natural event in order to explain intentional action, the second strategy puts all the burden on the 'process of recognition' and thus gives up the first-personal perspective for the social one.
37. An exception here is Dean Moyer (2011), who stresses another form of the first personal perspective, the notion of 'conscience' that Hegel develops in the transition from 'morality' to 'ethical life'. Although Moyer wants to identify 'conscience' with the general perspective of an agent engaged in practical reasoning and applying a 'set of capacities' (14), I would like to keep a distinction between these two ways of investigating the first personal point of view. Whereas the first personal perspective developed in the *Psychology* is merely formal or subjective,

- ‘conscience’ is the internalisation of moral laws and rational, ethical standards—something the *Psychology* cannot fully express. Although ‘conscience’ expresses a more sophisticated form of the first person as self-determining and autonomous, it is fair to say that without the analysis of the *Psychology* about the internal determination of practical spirit, we would hardly be able to understand the internalisation of moral laws by an agent as investigated in objective spirit.
38. Hence, action and deed within objective spirit should not be read as the distinction between the intentional and the naturally caused bit of my action (Quante 2004, ch. 4). Hegel’s full answer to the problem of the compatibility of our freedom and natural causality cannot be discussed here.
 39. And it might seem plausible to separate the question as to whether what I am doing intentionally is moral or not from its action-theoretical core.
 40. I wish to thank Mark Alznauer, Sean Bray, Elisa Magri, David Merrill, István Zárdai, and Lucia Ziglioli for carefully reading versions of this paper.

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9 Practical Mind and Free Will

Hegel's Gradual Development of Will

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Hegel's theory of free will, as he unfolds it in the introduction of the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* as well as in the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia* at the end of the *Philosophy of Subjective Mind*,² has received little consideration to date. This lack of attention, however, is by no means warranted, as one of the very few examples of a stage theory of will can be found in Hegel's chapter *Practical Mind*. This theory implicitly carries out a gradation of freedom and will be elaborated on in the following. Yet particularly the latter immediately seems unusual in that 'degrees of freedom' in today's use of language instantly refers to statistical mechanics, although it has been forgotten that the meaning of this term did not emerge in this field until the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to this—so, still in the days of Hegel—it had been used in a more juridical context. For example, the Prussian Civil Code, which Hegel was very familiar with (cf. Hočevár 1972), states under §14: 'The degree of accountability as regards both the indirect and direct consequences of an action is dependent on the degree of freedom of the acting person.'³ But whether freedom actually exhibits different degrees or instead is existent or not (and in what manner such degrees can be determined) are by no means trivial questions. Unfortunately, these questions have received only marginal attention in the debates on free will over the past 15 years, inasmuch as the mainstream debates merely navigate within a bipolar spectrum of answers: either there is such thing as freedom of will or there isn't—*tertium non datur*. In this respect, Hegel's theory on freedom of will can also be read as an interesting perspective for contemporary debates, which can then better conform with the gradations of freedom implicitly undertaken in current juridical texts (which is, for example, evident in the term 'diminished responsibility') than the bipolar approaches can.

That is why the systematic placement of free will shall first be determined on the basis of the *Philosophy of the Subjective Mind* in the following, which will reveal that, as a whole, this philosophy is to be interpreted as a stage theory of mind and as the progress of liberation of such mind. Subsequently, the individual stages of will shall be examined with regard to the question of gradation of freedom. A final step shall then again focus on

the question as to what extent Hegel's theory of will can be made beneficial for the current discussions on free will.

1 THE SYSTEMATIC LOCATION OF FREE WILL

It has already been mentioned that free will in the form of 'free mind' shapes the keystone of the *Philosophy of the Subjective Mind*, i.e., the result of how the meaning of the term subjective mind has shifted and in the direction of which all partial stages will ultimately develop. That is why it is wise to take a closer look at Hegel's notion of mind, as well as the particular designation and purpose of the subjective mind, in order to illustrate what is at the core of the development that ends in free will. This is achieved by analysing two quotations, the first of which defines the notion of mind, the second, by contrast, culminating in the finite mind.

The first quotation is the main text from §384 in the *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*:

Revelation, taken to mean the revelation of the *abstract* Idea, is an unmediated transition to Nature which *comes* to be. As Mind is free, its manifestation is to *set forth* Nature as *its* world; but because it is reflection, it, in thus setting forth its world, at the same time *presupposes* the world as a nature independently existing. In the intellectual sphere to reveal is thus to create a world as its being—a being in which the mind procures the *affirmation* and *truth* of its freedom. (EPM §384)⁴

If one begins the analysis at the end of the quotation, it becomes clear that mind is thought of as a process, as a 'creation' of nature 'as its being' or, as is stated before, 'to *set forth* Nature as *its* world'. The incorporation of nature in this manner, i.e., transferring nature into the 'world of the mind', at the same time juxtaposes nature as something independent with the mind. The mind then uses this independent entity as a basis to create within itself a quasi second nature. It is exactly this capacity of the mind being able to create nature within itself that constitutes its freedom,⁵ which *in itself* is always a given, but which the mind must develop *for itself* in that process so that it can recognise itself as free. The mind does not give itself freedom during this process because of the fact that freedom is a potential given, but because the mind provides itself with the '*affirmation* and *truth* of its freedom' in such a way that the mind reveals itself step by step in the course of this process.

At the same time, the entire complexity of Hegelian thought lies within this complicated notion of mind or, as Hegel would put it, of the matter itself (*die Sache selbst*); if the mind were not in itself free, it could not give itself its entire freedom and would have to be bound to the necessity of nature in which freedom does not exist. The mind must, therefore, already possess the potential to be free from the beginning, so that it can concretely develop

such freedom from within itself. From the other vantage point, the concrete formations of freedom (intelligence, will, right, state, etc.) cannot already be a direct given, as they would present a mere postulation until freedom is shown on the basis of these formations themselves. Therefore, this process is nothing other than a step-by-step depiction of various concrete formations of freedom of the mind which, however, evolve from one another in a staggered and systematic manner (the concept of state, for example, requires developed individuals); or, when viewed from the end of the process, evolve from one another and vice versa, and, when viewed from the beginning, are derived from one another step by step. Within this systematic step-by-step depiction of the various formations of the mind, the latter correspondingly also shows its various forms of freedom that it creates within itself in continuously higher steps with broader implications.

The second quotation, which defines the finite mind, is therefore also to be considered against this background:

The several steps of this activity, on each of which, with their semblance of being, it is the function of the finite mind to linger, and through which it has to pass, are steps in its liberation. (EPM §386)

According to this passage, the steps in the process of the mind are to be considered 'steps in its liberation' which the mind must pass through on the path to its goal, its complete freedom. Within this process, the steps not only present themselves as intermediate stages on this path, but also determine the systematised moments and/or concrete formations of the mind (soul, consciousness, mind, to name only the main moments of the subjective mind). With every step, the mind thus moves closer and closer towards its goal of liberation and/or moves further and further away from the natural qualities of the soul that constitute the beginning of this process. In this respect, the entire developmental process of the mind according to Hegel can be understood as the progress of its freedom in which each step is consequently imparted with a certain degree of that freedom. In short, freedom is, therefore, only a potential given for the mind while it passes through various steps and thus through degrees of freedom as it develops this potential.

However, if we restrict ourselves to the subjective mind in this case, these individual formations of the mind constitute various capacities of the individual mind, which are always similarly present in every living human being. After all, it would be absurd if one wanted to deem the step of consciousness obsolete once the higher step of intelligence had been reached. From a theoretical standpoint, intelligence, which internally processes objects (for example, imagination, language, or thought), is nonetheless granted a higher degree of freedom than consciousness and self-consciousness, which deal with outside objects. This means that various capacities with different degrees of freedom are always present in the living individual, although,

roughly speaking, the present degree of freedom is measured according to the respective capability that is predominant at a given moment.

If one examines the individual developmental steps of the subjective mind, then *Anthropology* begins with the soul as the 'substance of the mind', which in the beginning exhibits natural qualities. Without drawing up the entire manner in which the soul unfolds at this point of our argument, it is, however, decisive that the mind begins to develop from its simultaneous immersion in nature, inasmuch as the mind as a soul possesses qualities that stem from natural conditions. Thus the beginning of the liberation process of the *in itself* free mind begins with total lack of freedom, as the soul 'takes part in the general planetary life' (EPM §392) and exhibits specific qualities by means of that life. By contrast, the end of this unfolding of the subjective mind is the highest form of freedom that the subject can attain as an individual and that is free will. Free will, as will be shown in greater detail further on, creates its content completely from within itself and consequently emerges free in the highest sense from a given natural influence. The various steps between these two poles cannot be addressed individually here. A rough outline must suffice; in *Anthropology*, the soul develops a relationship to its body and conversely becomes embodied, for example by means of gestures. Subsequently, as the *I* it externalises out of itself the content of its embodiment in the form of an objective world, the relationship of which is then developed into a unity in the steps of consciousness, self-consciousness and reason (*Phenomenology*). This unity distinguishes the mind, which from then on, as intelligence, forms the given content of its intuition as representation and strips that content by means of re-forming that which is given until that content within the thought process presents itself as arising entirely from the mind. This is the rough sketch of development to the point at which will as practical mind develops. It shall be outlined in as much detail as possible in the following.

2 THE STEPS OF WILL

Before we can begin to present the individual steps of will, we must first establish Hegel's notion of will as it quasi represents the principle of the entire *Practical Mind*. Similarly to the manner in which the notion of mind presented above shows the entire development of mind, practical mind also comprises such a principle that substantiates all forms of will and can at the same time be found in all its forms in different guises. In this respect, it is necessary to once more briefly address *Theoretical Mind*, i.e., the development of intelligence.

In the context of intuition, intelligence assumes a given content, which is first internalised in the area of representation as an image and then refined to thought via the steps taken by the imagination and memory (in this context, 'refine' means transforming the given characteristic of the content into

a characteristic of intelligence). For example, a symbol is more bound to a given content than a sign (e.g., an eagle or a lion are appropriate symbols for strength, whereas a butterfly is not). For the most part, a sign is not bound to any given content, in that an apple for instance can be both the sign for the Beatles's record label as well as for a widely known manufacturer in the IT industry, even though an apple has nothing to do with a record label or a computer. The relationship between the symbol and the sign thus provides a good example of what Hegel means when he says that the mind gradually generates the characteristics of the content from within itself and/or liberates itself from the external circumstances of that content. This course of development that intelligence undergoes culminates in thought, in which it takes the form of 'understanding' because when a conclusion is made, the content of the inference entirely originates from intelligence; therefore, intelligence generates the content purely from within itself at this stage.

Intelligence has now carried out such liberation only within itself, it knows that the content was created from itself and that this content, within intelligence, possesses objectivity. This content that was created from within intelligence is still juxtaposed with the given content of the intuition:

[S]ince intelligence is free and has coincided with itself, it is to be distinguished from its immediacy. It is implicitly the immediacy and is distinguished from this immediacy as free [intelligence], and consequently the immediacy is other for it. So it is this, it suspends this difference of immediacy from itself, and it produces immediacy through its activity, so that immediacy is something posited by it, but at the same time it possesses the mode of immediacy. (LPS 249/VPG 240)

The fact that intelligence from within itself creates content that is given in the same immediate manner as the content of intuition constitutes the basic principle of what Hegel defines as free will. Will, therefore, shapes actuality according to the requirements of intelligence and in doing so creates something given which is not only valid within intelligence but is just as valid in actuality because 'as will, the mind steps into actuality' (EPM §469).

Yet at the same time, this addresses the fundamental topic or the fundamental contradiction of will that pervades every form of will: the juxtaposition of developed intelligence and a given immediacy which, by means of the various forms of creating intelligence within itself, is superseded into actuality. This is the fundamental principle of will which it demonstrates in various forms. Yet, in addition, this fundamental principle also demonstrates that, according to what was stated above, will possesses a greater degree of freedom than intelligence, inasmuch as will is not juxtaposed with that which is given, but instead creates a circumstance that corresponds to the requirements of intelligence. The manner in which this takes place will now be illustrated in detail by investigating the individual stages of development of the practical mind.

2.1 Practical Feeling

Hegel calls the first and immediate form in which this actual circumstance of the requirements of intelligence is encountered ‘practical feeling’. With this term, he initially means nothing other than that higher-minded and/or reasonable content, such as right, morality, ethical life, and religion, is present in the sphere of feeling. To this day, it is still quite common to speak of someone having a ‘healthy sense of justice’ or ‘a good heart’, which means that someone has an immediate—i.e., without having to think about it—sense of what is right and good and/or immediately does that which is right and good.

A heart that is pure and correctly ordered in its feelings (for the heart must be educated to do this), feels instinctively, so it appears, what is right in an immediate way. Since I myself am just, I do what I find in my heart. (LPS 252/VPG 245)

What is important here is Hegel’s reference to the fact that such a heart must be ‘educated’ (*gebildet*) because this demonstrates that practical feeling is not a natural disposition, but that developed reason also emerges in the sphere of feeling. Hegel thereby opposes a premature division of reason, with thought on the one side and feeling on the other, because for him it is very important to note ‘that in the human being there is only *one* reason, in feeling, volition, and thought’ (EPM §471 R).

The fact that practical feeling now forms the beginning of the development of practical mind is connected to the form of feeling, which is immediately given in the same manner as intuition in the theoretical mind and/or in the development of intelligence. Even practical feeling exists as a given, although unlike intuition, its content is created by intelligence, by the mind. Right or morality are subject matters which are not naturally given, nor can they be perceived by the senses. According to Hegel, they are purely mental/intellectual creations that are produced by human thought. Yet they are therefore not only bound to thought, but they also express themselves in the form of feeling. In this form they merely appear to have developed naturally or instinctively.

The degree of freedom of practical feeling must be determined in two directions. In the direction of intelligence, the degree must be set higher as it is the first form in which the created content of intelligence was created in the actuality that is and/or reaches an immediate determinate being (*Dasein*), as Hegel would say. In the scope of practical feeling, a given actuality is no longer juxtaposed with that which intelligence creates, but these creations themselves are an actuality that is shaped according to the requirements of intelligence. That is why they also have a higher degree of freedom. As regards the development of the practical mind, the degree of freedom must still be viewed as undeveloped inasmuch as the actualisation of the

content of intelligence at this point is still bound to that which is merely immediately given. In comparison to the higher steps of practical mind, the form of practical feeling thus emerges as yet almost completely unfree; this form merely constitutes the beginning of a development, the goal of which is free will. As a side note, this corresponds quite closely to our day-to-day practice when assigning responsibility; if someone takes action based on a feeling and/or (as we now say) based on a gut feeling in a situation that does not allow sufficient time for due consideration, this person will not be held responsible to the same extent for the possibly unfavorable consequences of their actions as they would be in a situation in which the creation of good reasons would have been possible by means of extensive consideration.

To provide more clarification on the further development of practical feeling, both moments (the developed content of intelligence and that which is actually given) in the case of a sense of justice or the good heart constitute an immediate unit. Against the background of this immediate unit, they can, however, also separate in the case where the state of the subject does not correspond with its inner determination; so, for example, one's own inner determination may be set to justice, although one experiences injustice. In such cases, practical feeling is disrupted, which Hegel characterises as the feeling of what is unpleasant. Consequently, the consonance of these two moments is perceived as pleasant. However, this consonance does not constitute a step back into the unity of the level of immediate practical feeling as it makes sense only as regards the possibility of these moments separating based on a comparison of inner determination and a given state. Thus, practical feeling ingrains that which ought to be, which aims to bring these two moments together in unity.

As regards the degree of freedom, two things can now be stated. On the one hand, the feelings of what is pleasant and unpleasant are freer in the one direction in comparison to the immediate practical feeling. They are freer as they do not exclude the state of the subject compared with its internal determination, but take it into consideration in the sense that a good heart follows its determination irrespective of whether doing so corresponds to its state (pleasant feeling) or not (unpleasant feeling). Therefore, the feelings of what is pleasant and unpleasant go one step further in this direction; they are, on the other hand, still faced with the form of that which is merely a given, which means that only a state corresponding to that which ought to be exists—or in fact does not. A change in the direction of that which ought to be cannot yet be considered at the step of practical feeling, but will be addressed at the next step, namely, impulses (*Triebe*).

2.2 Impulses and Choice

The principle of the practical mind, i.e., the notion of will, was determined above in that developed intelligence is no longer merely juxtaposed with a given immediacy, but that the determinations of intelligence assert

themselves in this immediacy and/or take shape in actuality. In practical feeling, this took the form of a sense of justice or a good heart, for instance, as well as the manner in which the feeling of what is pleasant demonstrated the conformity of the internal determination and the external given state. However, these forms are actually not befitting of the will that is active in that will distinguishes itself by shaping the internal determinations in the exterior, by being the first to put forth such conformity, which means that conformity does not merely exist. Thus practical feeling is a borderline form with regard to being categorised in the form of will as it, on the one hand, belongs to the area of the principle of will due to its basic determination, and on the other, is not yet will in the actual sense based on its quasi passive nature.

Regarding the latter, will comes to be when said conformity not only immediately exists in feeling, but rather when it is also brought forth, when a subject has an *impulse* or *inclination* that create conformity:

What I am is supposed to be something brought about by me. Spirit must know what it is, and it knows this only when it has posited itself as such. In this ‘ought to be’ that spirit is for itself, it is implied that feeling passes over to impulse so that the will is for itself. Accordingly, the conformity of the inner determination and the immediate existence should be posited by the will—impulse, inclination and passion’. (LPS 256/VPG 251; transl. mod.)

The quasi ‘passive’ determination of that which ought to be, which already exists in the ‘feeling of what is pleasant or unpleasant’, now becomes within the ‘impulse’ the ‘active’ and practical ought, according to which the ‘practical mind’ now finds its impulse on its second step to align the singularity that is with its determinations or, in passion, immerse itself into one of its determinations and center its entire being around those determinations.

Such centering, or the satisfaction of the impulse set by means of actualising the determination of that which ought to be, is *enjoyment*, in which conformity that was actively brought forth is expressed:

When I attain what I have willed, I have enjoyment. The known, which is determined as true, is brought about, and I am satisfied—both the cause and I are satisfied. It would be folly if a human being were supposed to receive no satisfaction, no enjoyment from what he accomplishes. I have made my existence conform to the inner determination, my impulse. In life the human being has to see to it that he enjoys himself, that he brings forth a true end and takes pleasure in what he has done’. (LPS 258/VPG 254; transl. mod.).

In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is worth shortly mentioning to what extent the ‘impulse’ in the ‘practical mind’ differs from a ‘desire’ (*Begierde*)

of the 'self-consciousness', as is demonstrated in the second part of the *Philosophy of Subjective Mind*—the *Phenomenology* (EPM §§426ff.). Whereas in the case of 'desire' the object always remains external and conflicting, which as such must be destroyed when satisfied, 'desire' in the 'practical mind' expresses the possibility that the actualisation of a reasonable purpose can just as much take on the form of an 'impulse' and that such actualisation is accompanied with satisfaction and enjoyment. However, such reasonable purposes cannot yet play a role in 'self-consciousness' and/or 'desire' as such purposes require the theoretical process of intelligence.⁶ Neither can the impulse at the step of the practical mind be confused with bodily desiring, which is dealt with as the practical side of 'self-feeling'⁷ in the first part of *Philosophy of the Subjective Mind*—the *Anthropology*—as, at this bodily level, the purpose is only to unfold as forms of self-feeling the feeling of disruption within desiring and the reestablished wholeness within satisfaction, although it must be stated that desiring ultimately constitutes subconscious bodily demands which find expression in a specific practical self-feeling and by no means constitute determinations of intelligence as is the case at the level of the practical mind. However, the differentiation between these three levels of desiring, desire and impulse therefore means that convergences between these levels can arise. Hunger, by contrast, is conceivable at all three levels; first as the bodily feeling of being torn/conflicted within desiring, then as a striving within desire that is aimed at an object and focussed on consuming, and lastly the impulse to establish the reasonable purpose of self-preservation. As the example of hunger shows, the same content can have very different meanings depending on the mind's level of development.

The fact that the degree of freedom also changes with these different meanings at the three levels of the *Philosophy of the Subjective Mind* is clear, inasmuch as desiring is still completely immersed in the body and desire at the level of self-consciousness is still completely entangled in the opposition of *I* and the external object, which is decisive for the standpoint of the consciousness, whereas impulse at the level of the practical mind follows the determination of intelligence. The fact that impulse and enjoyment also exhibit a higher degree of freedom compared to practical feeling was already hinted at above, in that practical feeling presents itself as a mere given and thus depends on whether a state grants conformity or not. In contrast, impulse overcomes this dependency by focusing on the *active* formation of conformity which then presents itself in enjoyment.

But back to the systematic development of this second step of the practical mind. If we again look at enjoyment, which the mind feels when an impulse or inclination is satisfied, then the content of such satisfaction may itself be reasonable due to the internal nature of intelligence, although this is realised only with respect to the particular content the impulse is focused on, and satisfaction is merely that of a particular impulse. Due to this particularity or specificity of content, the 'practical mind' now exhibits

a variety of particular impulses and their respective satisfaction. Where will is now opposed by a variety of impulses and particular possibilities of realisation, it is henceforth a *reflecting will*. If 'practical mind' were first to express itself completely in impulse and as such stood in opposition to an immediacy—to which said practical mind set its realisation and in that realisation achieved satisfaction—practical mind as 'reflecting will' would then no longer be immediately immersed in impulse. In fact, it would, as regards the variety of particular impulses and their realisations, possess a new immediacy in which the 'practical mind' could actualise itself only by choosing, as *choice*, one of these particular impulses and the realisation thereof. As Hegel explains, the particularity of an impulse is that it 'now sees it as its own, because it closes with it and thus gives itself specific individuality and actuality. It is now on the standpoint of *choosing* between inclinations, and is option or *choice*' (EPM §477). At first, choice has no other content than to choose from the variety of impulses, but for this it lacks a general criterion—in a purely subjective and incidental manner—it merely chooses from particular impulses. And each decision that choice makes leads to the satisfaction only of a particular impulse which necessarily involves the disregard of other impulses and inclinations. The idea of a universal satisfaction of impulses however constitutes the next step of practical mind: *happiness*.

Within day-to-day understanding it is generally viewed that choice, meaning the possibility to very openly choose between different options, is the actual form of freedom, but this is clearly rejected by Hegel:

It is said that will is free because it can *choose*. The reasonable freedom, will in and for itself, does not choose, but also possesses necessity. . . . I want because I want, says choice with the pure abstraction of volition. The content is that which I do not have to choose. I could also want something else. (VR1821/22 50; translated by Sarah Nort)

Thus the reason why choice decides to choose one or the other option ultimately remains completely undefined and contingent. However, this undefined freedom is at the same time opposed by the dependency on given eligible options, although—as was stated—each choice in its decision *for* an option is simultaneously also forced to decide *against all other* options. Therefore, the freedom of choice cannot yet be the highest form of freedom in a Hegelian sense. In relation to the level of impulses and inclinations, it must, however, be determined that choice exhibits a higher degree of freedom than those impulses and inclinations as they are only immersed in one option and as such are immediately opposed by all others. In contrast, choice stands in opposition to the entirety of impulses from which it can choose freely even if, by way of this choice, it can only achieve one particular satisfaction at a time, thus precluding others.

2.3 Happiness

The idea of happiness, whose goal is the universal satisfaction of impulses, attempts to solve this contradiction that lies within choice of only being able to achieve satisfaction through non-satisfaction of other impulses. Happiness in relation to given impulses thereby not only pursues a particular, subjective purpose, as is the case with choice, but seeks a universal purpose, namely that of all-round satisfaction. Such all-round satisfaction however still remains bound to particular impulses, inasmuch as it can only be achieved by means of the satisfaction of impulses and inclinations, even if they must subordinate themselves to the universal purpose of happiness.

In this idea, which reflection and comparison have educed, of an universal satisfaction, the impulses, so far as their particularity goes, are reduced to a mere *negative*; and it is held that in part they are to be sacrificed to each other for the behoof that aim, partly sacrificed to that aim directly, either altogether or in part. Their mutual limitation, on one hand, proceeds from a mixture of qualitative and quantitative considerations: on the other hand, as happiness has its sole *affirmative* contents in the springs of action, it is on them that the decision turns, and it is the subjective feeling and good pleasure which must have the casting vote as to where happiness is to be placed. (EPM §479)

Even if happiness pursues a universal purpose compared to choice, it is lacking where it is dependent on particular impulses. This is because, on the one hand, the particular impulses are subordinated to the actualisation of this universal idea and/or are 'sacrificed to that aim . . . either altogether or in part'; on the other hand, the determination, as regards content, of this idea is dependent on the concrete formations on the basis of these particular impulses and inclinations, which is why the determination of what in each case is to be understood as happiness falls under the category of the 'subjective feeling and good pleasure'. In this respect, choice once again emerges on this step, albeit in a higher form⁸, and does so in relation to the determinations of that which actually characterises happiness in each case.

Happiness requires the satisfaction that is universal, but it is at the same time a universal that is yet rooted in particulars and has no other content but the particular. Here the arbitrary will dominates: 'To me that is no enjoyment, others may make of it what they wish.' (LPS 263/VPG 261)

In that the idea of happiness receives its concrete content by referring to the satisfaction of impulses and inclinations, it is ultimately up to choice how each individual determines and/or concretely shapes the idea for themselves. Happiness thereby remains behind a universality, which can similarly claim validity for all, and can only be achieved at the next step of the 'free mind'.

As for the degree of freedom that happiness exhibits, it can be stated in the direction of the step of choice that happiness in fact pursues a universal purpose and is therefore less bound to given impulses and inclinations than the choice that is solely geared towards subjective purposes. Or in other words, choice in its choosing is dependent on the existence of options and does not possess an innate determination as regards content in the sense of criteria or reasons etc. Happiness, by contrast, pursues the idea of universal satisfaction of impulses and chooses impulses and inclinations according to that criterion. Although the problem of choice in turn arises at the higher level of happiness, inasmuch as it does not constitute a criterion that encompasses all subjects equally as is the case at the level of the free mind, the degree of freedom as regards the individual subject must also be set at a higher level than is the case with choice due to the higher level of this problem.

2.4 The Free Mind

Since the third edition of the *Encyclopaedia*, the free mind has constituted the third step of *Psychology* and thus the last and conclusive step of *Philosophy of the Subjective Mind*. If happiness (as discussed) still stands in relation to the given immediacy of various impulses and inclinations that are created according to the universal idea of happiness, this relation to a given immediacy, which composed the basic principle of practical mind, supersedes itself in the free mind and becomes pure self-determination of will according to the requirement of intelligence and/or reason. It is not until now that will is liberated from a dependency on given impulses, inclinations, etc., inasmuch as it determines its content solely from within itself and places such content in actuality. Exactly herein lies the unity of theoretical and practical mind, of intelligence and will, where the mind has freed itself from its natural dependency and can now actualise its own content. It is only in this manner that will is truly free.

Actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical mind: a *free will*, which *realises its own freedom of will*, now that the formalism, fortuitousness, and contractedness of the practical content up to this point have been superseded. By superseding the adjustments of mean therein contained, the will is the *immediate individuality* self-instituted,—an individuality, however, also purified of all that interferes with its *universalism*, i. e. with freedom itself. This *universalism* the will has, as its object and aim, only so far as it *thinks* itself, knows this its concept, and the *will* as free *intelligence*. (EPM §481)

As free will merely pursues the content of reason, it can nonetheless still be ascribed as will of an individual subject to the subjective mind; its content, however, as reasonable content, is objective and applicable to all subjects

equally, which thus leads beyond the sphere of the subjective mind into the area of the objective mind in which free will manifests the actualisation of its content. Therefore the steps of the objective mind, i.e., right, morality, ethical life, are nothing other than manifestation of the activity of free will, which Hegel demonstrates explicitly in the categorisation of objective mind in the *Encyclopaedia*.

The free will is[:] A. itself at first *immediate*, and hence as a *single being*—the *person*: the *existence* which the person gives to its liberty is *property*. The *Right* as right (law) is *formal, abstract right*. B. When the free will is reflected into self, so as to have its existence inside it, and to be thus at the same time characterized as a *particular*, it is the right of the *subjective* will, *morality* of the individual conscience. C. When the free will is the *substantial* will, made actual in the subject and conformable to its concept and rendered a totality of necessity,—it is the ethics of actual life in family, civil society, and state. (EPM §487)

At this point, the objective mind's individual steps, into which the mind as free will that is liberated from natural immediacy can place its own content (a quasi second nature) cannot be discussed in detail.

Instead, the degrees of freedom, which the will has reached as free will, should again be addressed here. In that free will has overcome all that binds it to a natural given, all dependency on anything opposing it, and draws its content objectively from within itself, its degree of freedom should be set higher than that of happiness. However, no higher subjective freedom of will is conceivable beyond free will; therefore, the gradation reaches an end at this point—but only as regards the individual subject; objective freedom unfolds in the forms of objective mind, which have, however, always required free will.

3 GRADATIONS OF FREEDOM

The significance that is attached to such a theory of gradation as regards freedom of will shall now again be brought into focus. If one compares Hegel's steps of will with the Kantian idea of freedom and even more closely with his differentiation of various forms of imperative, at first glance there appears an interesting overlap because that which Kant determines as 'problematic hypothetical imperative' can again be found at the step of 'impulses' and 'choice' (because they pursue a possible purpose), the 'assertive hypothetical imperative' would correspond to the step of 'happiness' (because they pursue an actual purpose) and the 'categorical imperative' could again be found in 'free mind' as it seeks an objective purpose.⁹ However, according to Kant, only the will that pursues the categorical imperative can be considered a free will, whereas the orientation around the other two imperative

forms necessarily leads to heteronomy. Although Hegel would agree with Kant, on the one hand, in that only will as 'free mind' in the fullest sense could be characterised as free and all other forms would comprise moments of heteronomy, he would, on the other, not completely deny the latter forms a moment of freedom, but would slowly gradate them from one another as shown above.

The difference between both concepts is also interesting when one places freedom and responsibility in relation to one another. It seems understood that a person cannot be held responsible for an action that they were forced to undertake in comparison to how such responsibility is assigned without reservation when a self-determined and free action is undertaken. However, for Kant a free action of this kind exists only when will orientates itself around the demand of the categorical imperative, which is problematic in that almost all day-to-day action lacks such orientation and consequently cannot be responsible action. In this case, a gradual concept has the clear advantage that, by means of the various degrees of freedom, it can also determine the various levels of responsibility and thus also brings us much closer to our day-to-day understanding of responsibility than is the case in the Kantian notion of free will.

But there is also an additional advantage in the gradual notion of freedom. If one follows Adriaan Peperzak's interpretation of the Hegelian theory of will as an example of 'fundamental ethics', then the Hegelian approach not only integrates feeling and impulses in a rational-ethical perspective, but, beyond that, presents a concept that integrates the various main ethical concepts instead of excluding them. According to Peperzak, 'practical feeling' corresponds to the requirements of *hedonism*, 'impulse and choice' to *utilitarianism*, 'happiness' to *eudaimonia* and finally 'free mind' to Kantian *formalism*, whereby these approaches are attributed a systematic step-by-step positioning (cf. Peperzak 1991). With these concepts, Hegel, however, correspondingly also integrates their underlying concepts of freedom, which is why freedom of choice cannot simply be denied its validity, even though it cannot be acknowledged as the highest or even only form of freedom due to its restrictions.

4 CONCLUSION

In order to once more focus on the debates of recent years surrounding the freedom of human will, which were in particular initiated by the relevant findings of cognitive neuroscience, it was already mentioned in the introduction that the philosophical position within this debate has for the most part taken place within a bipolar spectrum of claiming that freedom exists or does not exist, whereas a gradation of degrees of freedom remains a desideratum in this debate.¹⁰ This is all the more surprising since—as already mentioned—it is a matter of course in a juridical context to work

with a reduced self-determination of action, which is evident in the term 'diminished responsibility'. Comparably, just to name another area, it is undisputed in pedagogical contexts that children of different age groups cannot be assigned the same responsibility for actions, which—not only in reference to Kohlberg's theory of stages of moral development (cf. Kohlberg 1976)—is hardly surprising. However, what is rather surprising is that the philosophical discourse surrounding the freedom of will in no way satisfies the demands of these phenomena and/or practices where they claim that a person is either completely or not at all free.

This outcome is very likely to be less than satisfactory for some readers and will prompt questions as to Hegel's relevance in current debates. A substantive reply to such questions would however require a text of equivalent length in that answers would have to be developed at various levels. Yet I will nonetheless conclude with several aspects of such reply. The most obvious answer would refer to the fact that there is not merely one type of freedom whose existence one could question, but that there are several gradated forms that would each have to be addressed individually. A second aspect would focus on factors that are in opposition to freedom in current debates; these factors are by no means homogeneous, but range from natural determinism to natural causality to neural processes. In this context, one would first have to broach Hegel's notion of mind and, in doing so, demonstrate that, for example, the reference to a self-contained natural causality is based on a notion of nature that is reduced to its physicalism and, at the very latest, collapses with the phenomenon of the organism, as was already outlined by Kant.¹¹ For Hegel, the alternative of 'freedom vs. natural causality' would thus correspondingly be to seize the problem in a completely narrowed and reduced manner. A third aspect of the question is connected to Hegel's notion of mind, which is usually reduced to subjective mental phenomena in current debates, whereas mind, according to Hegel, encompasses right, morality, state, history, art, religion, and philosophy; this first and foremost allows the scope of the problem surrounding freedom of mind to become apparent. The awkward attempts to explain religiousness, for example, as a neural phenomenon shows how grotesque some positions appear against the background of a broader concept of mind. In conclusion, a fourth aspect emerges from those preceding it, referring to the fact that the questions surrounding freedom of will are currently located in the limited area of a philosophy of mind, even though the prior aspects clearly show that, according to Hegel, a substantive discussion of the problem requires a systematic link between the various philosophical discourses. Substantive clarification of the questions surrounding freedom could thus be achieved only within the perspective of a system of philosophical sciences in which the various isolated current discourses can be related to one another. The fact that such perspective is far more complicated in our present day than it was in the days of Hegel is certainly undeniable—however, this does not raise doubts as to whether such perspective is warranted. In fact, it merely

shows that simplified questions by no means do the subject justice. At this point, we are reminded of the lasting benefits of a study of Hegel's philosophy and its gradual theory of will.

NOTES

1. Many thanks to Sarah Nort for the judicious translation of the German manuscript.
2. Cf. to the different versions of the development of free will according to Hegel: Stederoth 2001, 395ff.
3. *Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preussischen Staaten*. Berlin 1794, first part, third title, §14; quote translated by Sarah Nort.
4. The EPM is quoted according to Wallace's translation (2008).
5. In his 1825 lecture on the *Philosophy of Subjective Mind*, Hegel demonstrates this connection in greater detail: 'That which is natural is not free. Freedom means that I am not dependent on that which is other, other being the boundary where I end, that is where I am finite, unfree. However, freedom is that where I refer to that which is other but negate it; in doing so I am in tune with myself, am free. The essence of the mind is freedom, the identity of the mind with itself, . . . freedom is to apply this itself to oneself, to be identical with oneself in being that which is other. To differentiate oneself, to provide oneself with object for someone else, is its manifestation. The content is freedom itself, the notion itself, or it is exactly this manifesting, which immediately constitutes a diminishing of being that which is other in externalness, which remains internal.' (VSG 1, 197ff.; translated by Sarah Nort)
6. Hegel clearly illustrates this difference in his 1825 lecture on the *Philosophy of Subjective Mind*: 'The practical mind as such does not relate to an objectivity, this is the side of consciousness and, provided that they are impulses and inclinations, the side of self-consciousness; therefore these side belongs to self-consciousness and cannot come into consideration here.' (VSG 1, 538; translated by Sarah Nort)
7. Cf. in this respect: Stederoth 2001, 218ff.
8. Here the author suggests a differentiation of the two notions of choice to the effect that the first pertains to 'pure choice', but that in the field of happiness it relates to a 'particular choice' because pure choice lacks any cause that characterises an option ahead of another. However, in the field of happiness the subjective choice determines the criteria of a universal satisfaction of impulses, even if, when viewed from a higher vantage point, the various formations of the idea of happiness in turn are subject to a pure choice as there is no criteria to decide which concrete formations of happiness are relevant in different individuals.— Cf. in this respect: Stederoth 2001, 391.
9. Cf. G B40ff.
10. The author shall attempt to meet this desideratum in Stederoth 2015.
11. Cf. CJ B289ff.

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10 Freedom for Free

Hegel on Cognition, Willing, Free Mind, and the Methodological Cost of Finite Freedom

Sebastian Stein

What role does freedom play in cognition and willing? For Kant and the post-Kantian idealists, this question is intimately connected with general metaphysics. Whether one thinks that the cognising and willing subject is free depends on one's most profound metaphysical commitments, reaching all the way down to naturalist, physicalist, dualist, or spiritualist convictions about the nature of reality as such.

For Fichte and Hegel, such convictions are inevitable, and they accordingly argue that even philosophers who think that the ultimate nature of reality cannot be known inadvertently describe ultimate reality as whatever they base their claims about the impossibility of knowledge about ultimate reality on.¹ Whatever defines the perspective from which philosophical talk about reality as such is critiqued, e.g., 'experience' (Hume 2008, 1.15/15), or the subject-object relationship² (CPR A42/B59f.), inadvertently takes ultimate reality's place.

Just as there is no escape from committing to a notion of ultimate reality, so Fichte and Hegel argue, there is no escape from the relationship between individual freedom and reality. The reality of freedom depends on the freedom of reality: If reality as such is determined, then so are the individuals it incorporates. If reality itself is only *potentially* all-determined (ibid.)—and thus also potentially *not* all-determined—then so are the individuals. Only if reality itself is fully self-determining can the individuals be so, too.³

With this in mind, Fichte and Hegel respond to Spinozism's alleged self-contradiction⁴ and undermining of general (and the corresponding) individual freedom when they base their accounts of individual freedom on conceptions of a free reality. Whereas Fichte calls this reality the universal, or absolute, *I* (Fichte 1986, 19ff.), Hegel champions the notion of '*Geist*', arguing that it expresses its freedom in individual cognition, willing and finally, free-minded practices. He thereby continues a line of argument handed down from his idealist predecessors Kant and Fichte. They suggested that freedom is 'self-determination (to self)' and avoids arbitrary willfulness on the one hand and merely assumed, necessary objectivity on the other. In this form, it lies at the heart of the notions of theory (theoretical reason, cognition) and praxis (practical reason, willing). Like Hegel, both

Kant and Fichte insist that spontaneous subjects actively contribute to the process of cognising reality and freely define reality when they will. The cognising subject *discovers* reality; the willing subject *posits* it.

However, if cognition and willing define the relationship between subject and reality in such fundamentally different ways, how can the same individual be theoretically *and* practically rational, i.e., how is it possible to cognise and act *at the same time*? And yet, this must be the case, for unless one has cognised when one is acting, one acts blindly, and unless the subject is active in the process of cognition, it is but a determined receptacle for sensual impressions and thus no (spontaneous, self-determining) subject at all.

This worry leads to the further question of whether the desired unifying account of rationality (and thus freedom) differs from cognition and willing or whether one of the two should accommodate the other: should cognition be explained in terms of willing, willing be explained in terms of cognition, or is there a third category to unite the two?⁵ For the early Fichte,⁶ cognition is a subcategory of willing: unlike cognition, willing as a fundamental, reality-positing act does not assume a subject-independent notion of objectivity.⁷ Instead, it explains all reality (objectivity) with reference to subjectivity. This includes the world within which just *finite* willing (done by ‘empirical consciousnesses’) takes place. However, placing willing first makes objectivity dependent on subjectivity, undermines the notion of objectivity’s non-subjective status, and subsequently sabotages subjectivity’s claim to being objectively real. To avoid this, Hegel proposes his category of ‘free mind’ as a third option. It suggests that neither cognition (theory) nor individual willing (praxis) is logically prior but that both always already imply each other and that the defining elements of both, i.e., the identity and the difference of subject and object, are logically *simultaneous*.⁸

This reading of Hegel contradicts the findings of other commentators. For example, in a recent article on the relationship between theory and praxis in the work of Fichte and Hegel, Damion Buterin suggests that Hegel’s account of the freedom of finite, minded individuals repeats Fichte’s privileging of praxis over theory in the sense that ‘our theoretical cognitions, and the elaboration of the subjective conditions thereof, require the motivational drive which morality supplies’ (Buterin 2009, 28). For Buterin, cognition is itself an *act* because it is always already morally—and thus practically—informed, whereas willing is free of cognition. Against this reading, I shall argue that, unlike the category of willing, Hegel’s category of ‘free mind’ avoids the vice of unilaterally prioritising either the identity or the difference of subject and object over the respective other.

The overall argument will proceed in two steps. First, I shall describe Hegel’s categories of cognition and willing followed by an analysis of the category of ‘free mind’ as their logical simultaneity. In the second step, I shall contrast this reading with Buterin’s claim that Hegel follows Fichte in prioritising praxis over theory. The contribution will close with the observation that, although Hegel’s description of ‘free mind’ avoids certain

problems of his idealist predecessors' accounts of finite agency, it can do so only because Hegel relies on a different philosophical method than they do. From Hegel's *speculative* perspective, Kant's and Fichte's *reflective* accounts of finite freedom⁹ pay an unwarranted conceptual price when they refuse to let go of their reflection-based prioritisation of either cognition (subject-object-difference) or willing (subject-object-identity).

COGNITION, WILLING, AND FREE MIND AS FORMS OF *GEIST*

Hegel's category of 'free mind' can be best introduced by considering its positioning within the architecture of his system.¹⁰ Most crucially, Hegel deviates from the view championed by his idealist predecessors when he refuses to frame his discussion of finite freedom in terms of a conscious subject that absolutely opposes, i.e., fundamentally differs from, a consciousness-independent, objective reality. Instead, he undermines the fundamental character of this subject-object-opposition when he situates his analysis in the *Encyclopaedia*'s section of *Psychology* that is concerned with the explication of the overarching category of '*Geist*'¹¹ (EPM¹² §440). This means that for Hegel, both the minded subject and objective reality are different elements of the same general reality, viz. *Geist* (EPM §443).¹³ So when a category in the *Psychology* describes how a minded individual relates to a seemingly non-minded world, it is truly *Geist* as minded subject that relates to *Geist* as non-minded object. The *Psychology*'s categories therefore represent attempts to render *Geist*'s self-reference explicit (ibid.), i.e., how *Geist*'s always already obtaining unity of subject and object¹⁴ plays out in three different ways. These define the categories of *cognition* (*der theoretische Geist*), *willing* (*der praktische Geist*) and *free mind* (*der freie Geist*). Since the first two provide the latter's constituents, they shall be discussed first.

Hegel on Cognition

The *Psychology* begins with the category of cognition (EPM §445). It suggests that *Geist* in the form of a presupposed objectivity is encountered by *Geist* in the form of a minded subject that tries to identify with this object by acquiring knowledge about it.¹⁵ The object of investigation logically exists *before* the subject encounters it, i.e., the object is logically prior to the subject, is therefore subject-independent,¹⁶ and represents the standard that the subject's mind has to live up to.¹⁷ Hegel refers to this logical primacy when he claims that the cognising subject's content is particular (e.g. EPM §447 R)—and thus fallible¹⁸ in comparison to the universal object (GPR, W 7, note to §4, 49; Houlgate 1995, 860, 863).¹⁹

However, although the cognising subject's attempt to identify with an object that is independent of the subject's own particularities (by having intuitions, forming representations, thinking etc.)²⁰ seems doomed to failure

as the object differs from the subject by definition, cognition *also* implies that the subject *does* manage to successfully identify with the object.²¹ The cognising subject does know. So while cognition has knowledge²² (and thus subject-object-identity) both as a goal and as silent assumption, it prioritises the knowledge-opposed subject-object difference when it suggests that the two are *first* different and *then* become identified in the cognitive process—with the cause of the successful identification remaining unexplained. For example, when I (correctly) cognise that there are 13 people in the lecture hall that I am standing in, there must be an identity between my subjective, mental representation of the hall and the hall itself *although* the hall is part of an objective reality that is defined as being different from my mind. Cognition's prioritisation of difference thus prevents an explanation of how knowledge is *actual*: If the object is first and is assumed to differ from the subject, how do subject and object coincide, i.e. how does the subject know the object, where does their identity come from? If the world is different from my mind *by definition*, how can I mentally represent it? And yet, cognition has to imply that this identity always already obtains, for otherwise all cognition would be unsuccessful, result in ignorance, and not be cognition as discovery of the truth, at all.

So if cognition must imply knowledge and knowledge is only actual if subject and object are always already identical but cognition prioritises the difference of subject and object, then cognition falls short of adequately articulating its own presuppositions. To Hegel, it is this failure to explicate the always already implied simultaneity of the difference and identity of subject and object (i.e., *Geist* as it truly is) that renders cognition an inadequate description of freedom (EPM §§445ff.).

This even applies to the highest level of cognition, where the subject thinks about the object in terms of correct, necessary syllogisms (EPM §468) and thus actively maps the object in its mind. While this kind of thinking is still thinking about a presupposed object, it also conveys that the object is posited *as it truly* is within the subject's mind *by* the subject and so marks the transition into willing.

Hegel on Willing

Cognition's prioritisation of difference is therefore left behind once the subjective aspect of *Geist* *entirely* posits, i.e., brings into existence, the objective reality of *Geist* (EPM §§467–468). This defines what Hegel calls the category of praxis, i.e., 'practical reason' or 'the will':

Intelligence, which as theoretical appropriates the immediate determinacy [i.e. objectivity], is, now that it has completed taking possession [of objectivity], in its own property; . . . When intelligence is aware of itself as what determines the content, which is not only determined as being but is also intelligence's own content, it is will. (EPM §468)²³

As in cognition, so willing's subject and object are always already situated within the overarching identity of *Geist*. But now, there is no presupposed, subject-independent, objective context (e.g., an objective, subject-independent world) within which the subject's willing takes place.²⁴ No objectivity (the subject-external world, the contents of willing, the conceived and realised purposes of action) is subject-independent or universal.²⁵ Instead, the *subject* is universal and functions as the standard for objectivity when the willing subjectivity independently from anything but itself chooses whatever objectivity it sees fit to realise.²⁶

For Hegel, this means that willing goes further than cognition in emphasising subject-object identity: by implying that objectivity originates in the subject, willing prioritises the elements' identity over their difference. So whereas cognition only *implies* the subject-object-identity and thus knowledge, willing explicitly defines it as point of departure. Where cognition logically proceeds from universal object to particular subject and thus from their difference towards their identity, willing goes from universal subject to particular object and thus from their identity to their difference.

According to Hegel, this also points to willing's fundamental shortcoming. Since willing prioritises the elements' identity, it fails to explain the origins of the subject-object difference that it ends up with. Unless that difference is always already there, its emergence is *ex nihilo*, i.e., out of the undifferentiated identity that willing begins with, and thus unexplained. If it did not imply that difference existed from the beginning, so Hegel, willing could not be the positing of anything determined (EL §7). Instead, it would be just subjectivity and so the willing of no objectivity, content or purpose. It would be the willing of nothing, and thus not willing at all (PR §5).²⁷

Whereas cognition has to always already imply subject-object identity and thus knowledge, willing has to always already imply subject-object difference to explain how the subject can will anything in the first place. However, willing fails to explicate this difference from the (logical) beginning because it starts with identity and posits difference *afterwards*. Willing's failure to explicate the logical *simultaneity* of identity and difference mirrors cognition's failure to explicate the simultaneity of difference and identity and so both are open to the charge of not articulating what they must imply.

This illustrates the following, general problem: the explicit beginning with and thus prioritisation of, either subject-object identity (willing) or difference (cognition) provokes the charge of not having explained what one puts second as it entails that the prioritised element is unexplained until the second element is introduced. This gives rise to questions such as 'How can the subject cognise something that differs from it?' and 'Where does the content of willing come from?' So when willing begins with subject-object identity, it is not clear what this identity is unless it is defined as 'not-(subject-object)-difference'. This, however, implies that difference is first and identity second since identity is defined with reference to something

(viz., difference) that must be there already, if it is to help explain what identity is. This, however, triggers the need for an explanation of difference as ‘non-identity’, which in turn means identity must be first etc. Hegel tries to solve this problem by arguing that both identity and difference have to be assumed *and* explained with reference to the respective other so that both must be logically posited first and second, *at the same logical time*.²⁸ Identity is thus (non-)difference *while* difference is (non-)identity.²⁹

Neither willing nor cognition articulate this simultaneity, as they fail to let identity and difference see logically eye to eye when they derive one from the other, i.e., when they place one logically first. Neither in willing nor in cognition are subject and object ever both explicitly universal, i.e., independent (different) of the respective other, *and* identical with it at the same logical time (EPM §§481ff.). Instead of articulating difference *with* identity, both cognition and willing juxtapose the elements’ identity and difference in a sequence. When willing inverts cognition’s logical prioritisation of subject-object difference over-identity, it turns cognition’s shortcoming on the head instead of solving it.

***Willkür* and Happiness**

In an attempt to remedy at least the prioritisation problem of willing, one might distinguish between two kinds of willing. One kind admits *any* particular purpose as willing’s objectivity, the other aims at a set of thoughtfully balanced, systematic and thus more universal purposes, i.e., happiness. Whereas the first describes only wilfulness void of any subject-external criterion, the second seems more rational because more thought goes into the choice of the purposes and thus the creation of the object. Hegel makes this distinction when he argues that ‘willing as such’ or ‘*Willkür*’ (EPM §477) is defined by the particular nature of the feelings- and drives-derived content. *Willkür*’s subject chooses to do what it happens to desire and what its drives compel it to do, e.g., drinking, eating, warming up, socialising etc. The subject eats, loves, pursues career goals etc. because it feels like it or is driven to do so by something that differs from its own subjectivity *as* subjectivity: the drives, feelings, etc. have the quality of objectivity, whereas the deciding faculty is subjective.

In contrast, the subject in pursuit of happiness places its feelings, desires, etc. within a coherent, hierarchical system, aiming to realise long-term, overall goals (EPM §§479–480).³⁰ While this pursuit includes a larger control of feelings and desires than their immediate and wanton satisfaction, the object of happiness-oriented *Willkür* is still just the subject’s particular, *own* happiness and the chosen goal is still defined by whatever combination of particular long- and short-term purposes the agent’s particular feelings and drives happen to motivate (EPM §479).³¹ Also, the end of happiness remains particular as it depends on the choosing subject.

Hegel on the Free Mind

This changes only with the category of ‘free mind’ (EPM §481, PR §§21ff.). Here, the self-determining subject wills truly universal, properly objective, subject-independent purposes.³² Now, the purposes that represent the willed content are not the particular objectivity of *Willkür* but the universal, objectivity of cognition and so free mind is a form of cognition (PR §24). However, unlike cognition, free mind *also* incorporates the notion that the objectivity is conceived and realised by the subject. This makes it *also* a form of willing.³³

In free mind, the independence of *Willkür*’s subject that functions as a standard for objectivity is matched by an equally independent, universal objectivity. Like cognition’s objectivity, so the objectivity in free mind has the status of being a standard for the cognising subject.³⁴ While this objectivity is created by the subject—as in *Willkür*—the objectivity *also* serves as a subject-independent orientation point for the subject—like in cognition. Free mind’s subject is objectivity-creating *and simultaneously*, the objectivity is subject-orienting. The object is independent of the subject *although* it is the subject that through its passions, feelings, drives, thoughts, representations, intuitions etc. posits it. The same feelings and drives that were particular in *Willkür* and the search for happiness are now directed at universal purposes (PR §19 R): whereas the subject of *Willkür* was passionate about the satisfaction of particular desires, feelings or achieving overall happiness, the subject of free mind is passionate³⁵ about realising the truth.³⁶

Being a free minded individual thus means to be a subject that devises and realises purposes that are informed by one’s cognitive activity of thinking, and which are universally, and thus subject-independently, valid.³⁷ The free minded subject chooses *those* ends that correspond to its own being as rational chooser and so it chooses to do what it itself always already is. The subject *is* the end it chooses but it has to choose to be it. This does not render the choice (and thus the difference between subject and object) illusory because a subject’s choosing what it always already objectively is, *is* what free mind consists in (EL §21).

FREE MIND AS UNITY OF COGNITION AND WILLKÜR

As a description of freedom, so Hegel argues, free mind overcomes the aforementioned deficiencies of cognition and willing. When these differentiate between the elements’ identity and difference and either prioritise identity or difference, they cause an asymmetry between universal subject and particular object (*Willkür*) or universal object and particular subject (cognition). This renders them incapable of explicating the *simultaneity* of identity and difference, i.e., that subject and object are independently valid, and that in relating to the respective other, they relate to themselves³⁸ (subject and object are identical). In contrast, free mind does express this thought. Here,

the self-determining subject is explicitly *self-determining* since it is identical with the object and *at the same logical time*, the subject chooses freely since it commits to something that is independent from it, so that the universality of the object orientates its choice: the equal independence of subject and object constitutes their identity.³⁹

So within free mind, the subject-object relation is one of knowledge (identity)⁴⁰ and of creation and orientation (difference): the subject-independent, universal object is what the subject realises, the universal subject is object-independent when it freely chooses the object.⁴¹ *At the same logical time*, the willing subject knows the object, i.e., the cognised object is known by the subject, and so the two elements are identical. So free mind articulates the elements' identity that cognition silently implies and that willing takes as explicit point of departure. *Simultaneously*, it expresses the elements' difference that cognition begins with and that willing must imply.

Hegel accordingly identifies three senses in which free mind represents the freedom of ultimate reality, i.e. *Geist*⁴²: *Geist* as free mind is a) actively self-determining as it contains the universal subjective dimension, b) free from indeterminacy because it contains universal objectivity, c) independent of anything other than itself (PR §22). Since the universal subjective and objective elements are explicitly identical—there is actual knowledge—neither the subject nor the object depends on anything other than what it truly is when it relates to the respective other (PR §§23ff.). To Hegel, free mind thus articulates the desired notion of freedom as 'self-determination (to self)': the independent subject actively relates to itself as independent object.

This also renders transparent the very difference-accommodating identity of independent subject and independent object that defines how the notion of general reality that grounds the *Psychology*, i.e., *Geist*, always already is. In free mind, both subject and object are recognisable as universal *Geist*'s elements since they participate in *Geist*'s independence (PR §§25–26). When *Geist* as free mind simultaneously articulates the identity and difference of the elements that define the categories of theory and praxis, it also shows that the two cannot be separated: when willing begins with subject-object identity, i.e., knowledge, it presupposes successful cognition because knowledge is the product of cognition. The willing subject knows what to posit because it has always already cognised. For example, when I decide to go (successfully) swimming, I have formed a representation of me and swimming and my plan of doing so. I know what swimming is, how to do it and that I can do it. Similarly, when cognition begins with the difference of subject and object, it presupposes willing as an explanation of the subject-object difference. The cognising subject relates to a cognised object because subjectivity has always already posited them as such.⁴³

Cognition and willing can thus be described as forms of the respective other: Cognition is an activity because the cognising subject differentiates itself from objectivity and represents it within itself by actively forming contentful intuitions, representations, memories etc. about it (see Houlgate

1995, 863). At the same time, willing is cognition because the willing subject strives for positing the right and thus subject-independent, kind of objectivity.⁴⁴

Buterin on Hegel: The Self-Contradiction of the Primacy of Praxis

Not all commentators agree that the category of 'free mind' is designed to describe the logical simultaneity of willing and cognising. For example, Damion Buterin suggests in his article 'Knowledge, Freedom and Willing: Hegel on Subjective Spirit', (Buterin 2009) that Hegel follows Fichte in arguing that praxis trumps theory so that willing is logically first and cognition second (Buterin 2009, 27).⁴⁵ For Buterin's Hegel, this means that epistemological engagement with the world can only be explained in light of practical moral commitments and interests, in other words, willing. There is only cognition because subject and world have been differentiated in an act of decision and the subject then wants to know the object in a specifically motivated way. Knowing is a subset of willing.

However, from Hegel's perspective of free mind, this description of freedom suffers from an essential shortcoming: it lacks cognition's universal objectivity. Since willing makes the object dependent on subjectivity, it entails that the subject-positing objectivity is merely particular: the world is *only* what subjectivity happens to posit it as and consequently the subject's intuitions, representations etc. would be objectivity-independent and thus merely subjective. So, if subjectivity⁴⁶ were to cognise the world *after* positing it, it could only cognise *itself* as object and thus as a particular and thus *not* universal, subjectivity-independent, objectivity. Not only could such a subject learn only about itself,⁴⁷ it would also lack objective status itself. Consequently, there would be no criterion to distinguish knowledge from opinion.

In contrast, Hegel's category of free mind renders explicit that even willing's particular objectivity is in truth universal objectivity and that cognition's particular subject is willing's universal subject: willing must imply difference and thus equal independence of subject and object, while cognition must imply their identity. So from free mind's perspective, a kind of willing that *entirely* precedes cognition is impossible because the very 'subject-object' difference that willing must assume but does not explicate is provided by cognition.⁴⁸ A knowledge-less and thus ignorant, yet supposedly willing subject could not be willing at all as it would fail to posit *any* purpose. Since there would be no independent objectivity within the subject, there would be nothing to decide on and externally posit.⁴⁹ Unless the universal subject of willing is always already different from the object, it not only fails to know what it is doing but it does not know what to do.⁵⁰ Placing willing first thus amounts to self-contradictorily claiming that the universal and thus subject-independent objectivity that willing always already implies, does not exist.

The claim that willing—along with its particular objectivity—is prior to cognition and thus cognition-independent not only deprives the cognised objectivity of its universal status but also denies *Willkür*'s participation in objectivity, thereby rendering the 'willing-first'-view unable to resolve the following contradiction: To be able to cognise and thus identify with objectivity, the subject must will, i.e., posit objectivity out of itself. However, to be able to will, the subject must have cognised and thus have identified itself with an objectivity that always already differs from it.⁵¹

FREE MIND, COGNITION, AND RECOGNITION

The simultaneity of universal and thus independent subject and object within free mind also undermines Buterin's further claim that, according to Hegel, practices of recognition⁵² function as a condition for the possibility of the same epistemological selfhood that cognition relies on. This amounts to the claim that there are epistemic subjects only because there is a social universe that recognises them as such:

[I]f no individual person is a free self-consciousness in isolation from another person, and if the give-and-take of mutual recognition is practically motivated, then our epistemic assertions about the world are conditioned by the communal settings that circumscribe who we are. (Buterin 2009, 33)⁵³

From Hegel's perspective, this reading confuses the relationship between willing, cognition, free mind, and the practices of recognition that form part of objective *Geist*. For Hegel, objective *Geist* is the articulation of free mind (PR §33), which is not *based* on practices of recognition but *enables* them. Free mind always already implies successful cognition and rational willing (PR §4 A) so that recognition as a person, moral subject, and participant in ethical life⁵⁴ is possible only because one is always already a cognising and willing subject.⁵⁵

If cognition unilaterally depended on *recognition*, and recognition were prior to cognition, recognition would not imply cognition: recognising someone would have to take place without the person having been cognised by the recognisers, which would be self-contradictory.⁵⁶ Buterin's claim that free minded practices of recognition condition cognition falsely denies that cognition contained *within* free mind and that recognition can be logically prioritised over cognition.⁵⁷

Speculation and Reflection

This problem of whether to prioritise subject-object-identity or difference and Hegel's rejection of any notion of prioritisation of one over the other

in his category of free mind points to a methodological difference between Hegel, his idealist predecessors, and Buterin's reading. As opposed to what Hegel calls Kant's and Fichte's *reflective* notions of theory and praxis that prioritise either the identity (willing) or the difference (cognition) of subject and object before reflectively 'adding' the respective other,⁵⁸ Hegel's category of free mind is supposed to be *speculative*: it is designed to express the notion that the elements' identity and difference are logically *simultaneous*.⁵⁹

In free mind, subject and object are both different and thus independent from each other. The subject is the object-positing, active subject of willing; the object is the subject-orienting, sought object of cognition. *At the same logical time*—and thus speculatively—they are also identical: The subject knows the object, the object is known by the subject.⁶⁰ The speculative identity of the identity and difference of subject and object is the simultaneity of 'subject is independent' and 'object is independent', i.e., subject and object are different, *and* of 'subject is object' (identity). The elements' speculative identity (PR §§21ff.) logically *precedes* their reflective difference *and* their reflective identity—their reflective knowledge and mutual independence—*without* obliterating or competing with them on the same logical level.⁶¹ It claims that identity and difference are themselves an *articulation of* and situated *within* speculative identity.

According to Hegel, Kant and Fichte must reject this notion on methodological grounds⁶² as they conceive of thinking as the relating of representations, categories, entities, etc. in terms of identity, difference or contradiction but not in terms of two or three of these categories *simultaneously* (VGP III 375, 390 and SL⁶³ 354ff.).⁶⁴ Reflectively, identity, and difference cannot be identified; they cannot be thought to be reflectively identical, without (their) difference being lost.⁶⁵ When Kant and Fichte choose to fundamentally differentiate them and thus commit to the method of reflection, so Hegel argues, they end up with their juxtaposition, having to prioritise one over the other instead of articulating their always already obtaining mutual implication. Hence Buterin's suggestion that Hegel follows Fichte in prioritising praxis over theory can also be rejected with reference to Hegel's speculative method that opposes the absolute prioritisation of *any* logical element, be it subject, object, their identity, their difference, theory, or praxis.

CONCLUSION

Hegel's category of free mind represents his solution to the riddle of how theoretical and practical reason can be united within the same category. This makes it also the most developed categorial description of what Hegel considers to be the finite form of infinite—and thus truly free—reality *as such*, namely, *Geist*. The category of free mind describes how this overarching reality manifests its own truly infinite (self-referring) freedom in the form of finite and thus objectivity-confronting individuals (*Geist* as subject) that

know *and* act: they pursue *those* subject-independent ends (*Geist* as object) that correspond to their knowledge (subject-object-identity) of what is true.

Free mind's logical simultaneity of equally (identity) independent (difference) subject and object is implied but not articulated by the categories of cognition and willing and by reflective accounts such as Kant's and Fichte's that insist on horizontally differentiating subject-object-identity with-difference. Unlike them, free mind does not incur the cost of sacrificing the logical priority of cognition or willing, subject-object-identity or-difference. Instead, it requires letting go of the reflective need for such prioritisation whilst speculatively acknowledging the equal importance of all elements involved. According to Hegel, only speculative philosophy can establish that choice and the truthfulness of choice differ only because they are always already the same.⁶⁶

NOTES

1. See Hegel's remark regarding empiricism: 'The fundamental illusion in scientific empiricism is always that it uses [metaphysical] categories . . . and it goes on to draw conclusions, guided by categories of this sort. . . . It does all this without knowing that it thereby itself contains a metaphysics and is engaged in it, and that it is using those categories and their connections in a totally uncritical and unconscious manner.' (EL §38 R—quoted according to the Geraets/Suchting/Harris edition 1991) And regarding Kant: 'In any dualistic system, but in the Kantian system particularly, its fundamental defect reveals itself through the inconsistency of uniting what, a moment earlier, was declared to be independent, and therefore incompatible. Just as, a moment before, what is united was declared to be what is genuine, so now it is said that both moments (whose subsisting-on-their-own was denied by [asserting] that their unification is their truth) have truth and actuality only by being separate-and this, therefore, is what is genuine instead. What is lacking in a philosophizing of this kind is the simple consciousness that, in this very to-ing and fro-ing, each of the simple determinations is declared to be unsatisfactory; and the defect consists in the simple incapacity to bring two thoughts together-and in respect of form there are only two thoughts present.' (EL §60 R)
2. Regarding the potentially inconsistent consequences for Kant's notion of objectivity, see de Boer 2014.
3. As will be shown, Hegel argues that only his conception of free reality (*Geist*) entails that the agents (actually) *are* free as opposed to only being *possibly* free.
4. On Hegel's reading, Spinoza's notion of the absolute, i.e., God/nature/substance, is logically prioritised over its determinations (*modi*) and therefore lacks determinacy proper. See e.g. VPR II 499.
5. While there already exist excellent studies on the categories of theory and praxis in Hegel's *Science of Logic* (Winfield 2013) and in the *Encyclopaedia's* subjective *Geist* (Houlgate 1995), I shall explicitly focus on the *logical structure* of these categories to argue that unlike Kant and Fichte, Hegel is primarily concerned with the freedom of *Geist*, i.e. the freedom of reality as such, rather than with 'our', finite freedom. Still, 'our' freedom turns out to be the indispensable articulation of *Geist*, i.e., it is how *Geist* freely expresses itself.
6. '[The fundamental principle of all human knowing] must express this *Thathandlung* [deed-action] which is not part of the empirical determination of our

consciousness, and cannot form part of it, but which is the foundation of [all] consciousness and makes it possible in the first place' (Fichte 1997, 11; my translation).

7. This is Fichte talking about the universal subject ('universal *I*') and its relationship to objectivity, not about the empirical *I*, e.g., 'me' as particular individual. Insofar as this comprises Fichte's most fundamental notion of general reality, one might call the subject-object relationship that is being described in terms of cognition or willing the early Fichte's notion of 'God'. It is ultimately responsible for all natural, logical and spiritual laws, e.g. that there is water, that it boils at 100 degree Celsius and that $2+2=4$. I owe this idea to an exchange with Michael J. Inwood.
8. I thus aim to analyse the *logical structure* of what Stephen Houlgate calls the 'unity of theoretical and practical spirit' (Houlgate 1995, 859).
9. In one sense, the notion of 'finite freedom' is a contradiction in terms as for Hegel, freedom is by definition infinite in the sense of being self-referential. I shall therefore argue that Hegel's account of finite freedom implies that its finitude (i.e., 'our' freedom) is but an element of the overarching, true freedom that refers to itself by referring to something (apparently) else. At times, Hegel refers to the universal dimension of *Geist* as 'thought' (PR §21 and Houlgate 1995, 860).
10. Regarding the general benefits of a systematic approach to Hegel, see Brooks 2007.
11. This is sometimes translated as 'spirit' or 'mind'. Throughout the text, '*Geist*' is used for the overarching category that incorporates cognition, willing and free mind ('*der freie Geist*'). 'Free mind' is used instead of 'free *Geist*' to stress the finite character as 'mind' is frequently associated with a finite individual's inner life. 'Spirit' is avoided due to its religious connotations that for Hegel are subordinated to its philosophical (i.e., conceptual) meaning. 'Free mind' is the least finite of the finite forms of *Geist* that in truth is infinite. Strictly speaking, free mind is therefore itself (truly) infinite but it is the (truly) infinite that articulates itself as finite.
12. The EPM is quoted according to the Inwood edition (2007).
13. Hegel talks about cognition and praxis as forms of *logical reality* in the *Science of Logic's* '*Begriffslogik*'. The ontological unity of theory and praxis he there describes parallels the categories of subjective *Geist*. (See, e.g., Winfield 2013).
14. Whereas *Geist* articulates itself in the form of cognising and willing, i.e., free-minded finite human subjects, their existence does not condition *Geist*. Instead, they (and whatever is objectively, i.e., actually, rational) are as appearance of *Geist*.
15. See Winfield (2013, 418): '[Theory] presumes that objectivity accords with conceptual determinacy'. Cognition therefore does not describe how a finite subject cognises but how infinite *Geist* manifests itself in form of a cognising, objectivity-presupposing subject.
16. Since this independence is situated *within Geist's* overarching subject-object identity, it does not go 'all the way down'.
17. E.g., I presuppose that there is a world with a race track in it before I can learn about it. Stephen Houlgate describes this as the subject's commitment 'to the idea that what it understands . . . there to be, is in fact what there is' (Houlgate 1995, 868). This subject-object constellation can be read to have *realist* connotations insofar as the object is something that the subject finds. However, since both subject and object are truly forms of *Geist*, and *Geist* is both subject *and* object, the realism is confined to the interior of *Geist*.
18. 'The cognising subject lets reality be, cognises it as what it subject-independently is.' (Houlgate 1995, 860)
19. In truth, *Geist* is its own standard as both subject and object are but forms of *Geist*. Regarding the general relationship between Logic, Nature and *Geist*, see Ziglioli 2016.

20. Inwood calls this the ‘formality’ of cognition, i.e., that the subject differs from the cognised content (Inwood 2007, 517). Since the object is the standard of truth for the subject, the source of cognitive error lies with whatever the subject brings to the process of cognition, e.g., cognitive and sense-based biases, unwarranted presuppositions, false beliefs etc.
21. In the context of pure logic, Winfield describes this thus: ‘For [truth as identity between concept and objectivity] to be possible, theorizing must presume that objectivity contains conceptual determinations. Otherwise, analysis will be fruitless and theory without practice will be a vain endeavour.’ (Winfield 2013, 415)
22. According to Hegel, neither Kant nor Fichte were able to conceptualise knowledge in this sense as they consistently kept subject and object separated from each other. (This is only partially true of Hegel’s reading of Fichte according to which Fichte is a subjective idealist who posits the overarching identity of the subjectivity as absolute condition of the difference between subject and object). (PR §6 R)
23. For an enlightening analysis of the will’s three moments, see Vieweg 2012, 67ff.
24. To Hegel, thinking of willing as subjective activity within a presupposed, objective world is to remain at the level of the will’s ‘appearance’ or ‘consciousness’ (PR §§8, 11). In contrast, the philosophical, i.e., *Geist*-based, notion of willing (how *Geist* as willing is ‘in an for itself’ (ibid.)) describes that *Geist* as willing subjectivity decides that there is a finite individual that differs from the external world and other individuals and then decides that this *I* has a purely indeterminate dimension (EL §5) that differs from the drives- and feelings-based purposes (EL §§6, 8) that it realises in an external world (EL §§8, 13). So objectivity-positing subjectivity (i.e. *Geist* as willing) is all there is according to the category of willing (EPM §440). One might call this ‘pure’ or ‘divine’ willing insofar as there is nothing this willing presupposes or conceptually depends on. (I owe this understanding to an exchange with Michael Inwood.)
25. *Geist* as willing subjectivity decides that there is an individual, finite *I* that differs from the external world and from other individuals and then decides that this *I* has a purely indeterminate dimension (EL §5) that differs from the drives- and feelings-based purposes (EL §§6, 8) that it realises in an external world (EL §§8, 13). In the context of pure logic, Winfield describes this as ‘[v]alid concepts comprise the end that practice seeks to realize’ (Winfield 2013, 418).
26. Willing can be read to relate the constructivist notion that all objectivity originates in the subject. However, this seeming constructivism takes place within the constructing (subject) and non-constructed (object) reality of *Geist* and is therefore not constructivist ‘all the way down’. For a discussion of this in terms of character (object) and self (subject), see Yeomans 2015, 203ff.
27. According to the philosophical account of willing, all objectivity is subject-positing. See, e.g., PR §8.
28. ‘It is the will in and for itself which is *truly infinite*, because its object is itself and so is not for it an ‘other’ or a limitation; on the contrary, in its object this will has simply turned back into itself.’ (PR §22)
29. See e.g. EL §7. For a clear and insightful exposition of the role that contradiction plays in Hegel’s thought, see e.g. Bordinon 2012.
30. This need not be egoistical but can include other-regarding purposes. Still, the pursuit of these purposes ultimately serves the particular happiness of the subject.
31. This might include abstract, long-term goals such as saving to buy a house or devising a complicated insurance fraud scheme for purposes of revenge, all decided with a view to their compatibility with one’s other arbitrary motives and ends: ‘[W]hat my happiness amounts to depends on what urges I already happen to have’ (Inwood 2007, 526).

32. Houlgate (1995, 869) describes this as the willed objectivity's universal status.
33. Houlgate (1995, 859) calls this the 'indissoluble unity of the theoretical and the practical'.
34. Winfield calls this the 'unity of concept and objectivity that is just as much subjective as objective' (Winfield 2013, 419) and describes it thus: 'The theorizing would be objective and not confront an opposing given objectivity, whereas the objectivity would comprise the same process of determination that the thinking of it involves' (Winfield 2013, 420).
35. And therefore not passionate in the sense of 'suffering'. Since subject and object are identical, there is nothing 'external' to suffer from (PR §22).
36. Whereas passion is always a form of *Geist* (PR §11) albeit not in the form of *Geist* but of nature, it is more so in free mind than in *Willkür*. The pursuit of universal purposes includes the satisfaction of immediate needs, e.g., one still needs to dress, drink, eat, etc. to engage in moral deliberation or participating in family life, civil society or the state. However, the free minded individual eats and drinks to be a rational citizen, not just to avoid hunger or to quench thirst. See, e.g.: 'I might want a banana for a dietary reason, even perhaps for a moral, or a religious reason. I might have submitted my want to a dietary, moral, or religious test before giving way to it' (Inwood 2007, 532).
37. From the non-ideal perspective, this does not mean that the subject must consciously or reflexively know what it is doing or that what it is doing is supremely rational. One might just have an intuition or a feeling that a certain universal purpose is worthwhile pursuing. Still, the free-minded subject does what is universally valid and thereby expresses *Geist*'s freedom, i.e., its self-identity. For a discussion of the unity of willing and cognition that also treats the concepts of action, deed, purpose and intention, see Herrmann-Sinai 2016.
38. Pippin calls this 'actual and experienced identification with one's deeds and practices and social roles' (Pippin 2008, 6). One might add that these roles must be universally and objectively (in the subject-independent sense) valid to qualify.
39. 'Only in freedom of this kind [i.e. free mind] is the will with itself without qualification, because then it is related to nothing except itself and so is released from every relation of dependence on anything else' (PR §23).
40. This makes the subject-object identity of free mind an instance of what Robert Stern calls 'material truth' (Stern 2009, 78).
41. See Houlgate: 'In fact, the fully developed human spirit will be the explicit unity of theoretical and practical activity: the will which knows itself as will, understands all that it means to be will, and wills . . . what it understands willing to entail' (Houlgate 1995, 860).
42. For a finitude-emphasising interpretation of this notion, see Pippin 2008, 127ff.
43. E.g. I can know that there are 13 people in the lecture hall because I am differentiated from the external world, from other individuals and their number has been posited as my epistemic goal. Similarly, I can throw a frisbee because I have cognised what throwing a frisbee means and what it means for me to throw it. Or I want to know how many people there are in the room because the room and I are different and I want to form a representation about its content.
44. This may happen consciously or unconsciously: I might think that I just want to quench my thirst or pursue my happiness but in virtue of being a rational being, I always pursue what is universally valid. Differences also occur in the extent to which this pursuit of rational ends is realised by a given, particular individual.
45. '[My] aim is to highlight the role of the will in Hegel's depiction of our cognitive capacities, the relevance of which concerns the way we imbue our experiences with meaning through the purposes we assign ourselves' (Buterin 2009, 27).
46. Kant calls this 'reason' and Fichte the 'absolute (rather than 'the empirical') *I*' (e.g., Fichte 1997, 30) whereas Hegel prefers '*Geist*' to indicate that the object-limited subject is but one aspect of the same overarching entity. Kant and Fichte

maintain that reason and universal *I* must manifest in form of finite subjects that are limited by an encountered (cognition) or posited world (willing). Kant's theoretical reason describes that a finite subject encounters a world, Fichte's universal *I* means that a finite subject epistemologically confronts a self-positing object, i.e., itself in form of objectivity. Kant's (infinite) reason and Fichte's infinite, universal *I* can thus only manifest in *finite* and never explicitly infinite form. The primacy of the practical and universal *I* over the theoretical and universal *I* that Fichte frequently alludes to (e.g., Fichte 2005a, 8, 9) means that the universal *I* must take the form of a subjectivity that actively posits its own negation as object, thereby limits itself, and then confronts this object in the activity of cognition. The empirical *Is*, i.e. finite, empirical subjects, are temporally-spatially conditioned instances of the always infinite *and yet finite* universal *I* (e.g., Fichte 2005, 203).

47. This is problematic because the universality, i.e., objective validity of Fichte's absolute *I* and the products of its positing cannot simply be assumed but has to be justified by showing that the absolute *I*'s universality is itself objective, i.e., *is* objectivity. Whereas both Kant and Fichte emphasise the necessarily finite nature of the infinite with even Fichte's universal *I* always being limited by objectivity, Hegel places finitude as a necessary element within true, i.e. finitude- and infinity-combining, infinity. Fichte's universal *I* wills first and cognises second because it first posits the object and then relates to it as its own limit (e.g., Fichte 1997, 26ff.).
48. Similarly, cognition must imply willing's subject-object identity. Cognition does not explicate this identity since it prioritises difference over identity, thereby rendering the subject's knowledge particular.
49. This seems to be what Fichte argues in the *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1804. Although he distinguishes between universal and empirical subject (*I*) (Fichte 1986, 5) with the former having universal, i.e., non-particular, quality *by definition*, he considers the posited objectivity to be subject-dependent. The object could accordingly be otherwise and lacks universality, i.e., subject-independence, proper. Whereas Fichte wants to avoid this consequence, he does not explain how the object could possibly be subject-positing and subject-independent *at the same logical time* and ultimately seems to prefer the primacy of the positing subjectivity over the object.
50. Although the known objectivity of *Willkür* is not cognition's explicitly universal objectivity but only *implicitly* universal (and thus particular) objectivity, it is the same objectivity as in cognition, nevertheless.
51. See also Fichte 2005a, 7. Hegel's solution: Cognising implies positing objectivity, willing implies living up to a standard, so to will and to cognise means to always already participate in independent subject-independent object-identity, i.e., true knowledge (*Geist*). Cf. 'The mind has 'knowledge' (*Wissen*) of itself; the knowledge is 'boundless' in that it does not come up against any barrier in its exploration of itself; it 'embraces . . . all objectivity' in the sense that all the objectivity that concerns it, namely the objectivity of the mind itself, is immanent in it (Inwood 2007, 453).
52. For Hegel, recognition is part of the categorical determinations that assume an absolute difference between subject and world, i.e. consciousness-based views. This is obsolete at the level of *Geist* (i.e., the *Psychology*). The 'social dimension' (Deligiorgi 2012) of Hegel's notion of freedom becomes obvious when free mind is articulated as objective *Geist*. Arguably, this also applies to Kant, for whom the social dimension of freedom as described in the *Metaphysics of Morals* is complementary to and based on the morality-based freedom described in the *Groundworks*.
53. Also: 'But rather than simply subordinate the rules of knowledge to morality, Fichte intimates that only a subject that is conscious of itself as authorising

- moral norms can be conscious of itself as authorising conceptual norms' (Buterin 2009, 28).
54. For an insightful discussion of how freedom in ethical life's civil society spells out, see: Merrill 2014. This manifests itself in the individual mind as what Houlgate calls the subject's 'feeling at home' (Houlgate 1995, 877) in rational society.
 55. Cf. 'There cannot be a human being who is aware of and aims at freedom alone, but does not aim at anything more specific and does not belong in any social context' (Inwood 2007, 542).
 56. Whereas it seems *psychologically* plausible to argue that cognitive ability requires recognition by others, Hegel thinks recognition's prioritisation over cognition is *conceptually* problematic. Hegel's initial solution to this problem is 'universal self-consciousness' (EPM §436). Another way to put it: If my cognising consciousness depends on others' consciousnesses, what do theirs depend on?
 57. Buterin claims: Freedom includes (recognition & cognition). Whereas recognition enables cognition's (self-)conscious subjectivity, this subjectivity is needed to enable recognition, i.e. the recognising subjects must be conscious subjects. Both elements are thus related in virtue of an identity despite their difference. That this always already implies a plurality of individuals is due to the unity of the three logical dimensions of universality, particularity and individuality in *Geist* (as a form of the logical concept's idea). See e.g. Martin 2012, 624. Also: 'Hegel is an opponent of "methodological individualism".' (Pippin 2008, 4)
 58. Already Hegel's notions of theory and praxis are speculative because they situate the elements' reflective prioritisation within the speculative identity of *Geist*.
 59. For a general discussion contrasting speculation with understanding, see Wood 1990, 1ff. and Stein 2014.
 60. To Hegel, free mind is thus the standard to which all human beings consciously or unconsciously aspire to live up to.
 61. The preceding of the speculative identity that *encompasses* reflective identity and reflective difference is thus of a different kind than the horizontal preceding that reflective identity does in willing or that reflective difference does in cognition. Ultimately, both reflective difference and identity *are* speculative identity albeit in the form of reflection.
 62. See, e.g., VGP III 390.
 63. The SL is quoted according to di Giovanni's translation (2010).
 64. Hegel thinks that Fichte's thought is more speculative than Kant's but ultimately insufficiently so (e.g., VGP III 388, 414).
 65. According to Hegel, this would merely repeat Spinoza's difference-abolishing determinism (i.e., all-encompassing reflective identity/objectivity) on a higher level.
 66. See e.g. Koch 2014, 177. For a critique of this reading, see Pippin 2008, 10ff.

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Part IV

The Challenge of Hegel's Philosophical Psychology

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11 Cognitive Psychology, Intelligence, and the Realisation of the Concept in Hegel's Systematic Epistemology

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1 INTRODUCTION

Hegel's comprehensive, systematic, highly original philosophy remains an enormous expository and critical challenge. One strategy has been to compartmentalise Hegel's views, by treating the main sections of Hegel's philosophical *Encyclopaedia* as a series of mutually separable philosophical tracts, each of which poses considerable challenges. This pronounced tendency obscures both Hegel's division of philosophical tasks and their equally important interconnections. The scope, character and relations amongst various aspects of Hegel's philosophy have been further obscured by tendencies to dismiss the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* as an immature first work, to regard the *Science of Logic* as the master premiss from which all else is to follow, and either to neglect Hegel's epistemology or to assume he avowed intellectual intuitionism. The present chapter counters these tendencies by examining some illuminating links between Hegel's *Science of Logic*, his philosophical *Psychology* and his *Philosophy of Nature*. So doing shows how Hegel preserved and augmented Kant's insightful cognitive psychology whilst dispensing with Transcendental Idealism. Four key features of Hegel's account of *Intelligenz* are: 1) Human cognition is active, and forges genuine cognitive relations to objects which exist and have their own characteristics, regardless of what we may think, believe or say about them; 2) The *Denkbestimmungen* ('determinations of thought' or: 'thought-structures') which structure and thus characterise worldly objects and events can only be grasped by intelligence (not merely by consciousness); 3) Intelligence obtains genuine objectivity by correctly identifying characteristics of a known object; 4) Central to our intelligent comprehension of *Denkbestimmungen* is natural science. These four points underscore the importance of Hegel's adoption of one use of the verb '*realisieren*' from Tetens *via* Kant, according to which to 'realise' a concept is to demonstrate that an extant object corresponding to it can be located and identified by us (Westphal 2015b, §2.3). These findings show that Hegel's *Logic* is mutually interdependent with *Naturphilosophie*, with natural science and with cognitive psychology, especially with cognitive judgement. Recently published

transcripts of Hegel's Berlin lectures on *Logic* and on *Philosophy of Spirit* further corroborate Hegel's realism in epistemology.¹

2 IS HEGEL A SUBJECTIVE IDEALIST?

I begin with a statement from Hegel's Introduction to the *Encyclopaedia Logic*:

Because it is equally the case that in reflection the truthful nature [of the object] shines forth (*zum Vorschein kommt*), and because this thinking is *my* activity, the truthful nature of the object is equally well the *product* of *my* spirit, indeed qua thinking subject; it is mine according to my simple universality, as the 'I' that simply *is at home with itself*,—or according to my *freedom*. (EL² §23)

Statements like this often have led commentators to ascribe some more or less standard form of subjective idealism to Hegel, according to which the world is mind-dependent, both for its existence and its characteristics. If in Hegel's view the world may not depend for its existence or characteristics upon individual human minds, nor even all human minds, this is only because the world depends for its existence and characteristics on Hegel's candidate for the ultimate mind of all minds, *Geist*.

Subjectivist interpretations of Hegel's idealism comport with a long line of commentary that places Hegel's philosophy in the ranks of historicist relativism (e.g., Haym 1927, 375f.; Meinecke 1936, 451f.), a movement inaugurated by Herder.³ Even the broad movement of historicist relativism is a species of a broader movement which may be called 'interpretationism'. The key idea of interpretationism is concisely formulated by Thelma Lavine:

The distinguishing feature of interpretationism, from the German Enlightenment through American pragmatism to mid-twentieth century *Wissenssoziologie* is an affirmation of the activity of mind as a constituent element in the object of knowledge. Common to all of these philosophical movements . . . is the epistemological principle that mind does not apprehend an object which is given to it in completed form, but that through its activity of providing an interpretation or conferring meaning or imposing structure, mind in some measure constitutes or 'creates' the object known. (Lavine 1949/50, 526)

Traditionally, Hegel has been thought to advocate the interpretationist 'epistemological principle' Lavine here identifies. Classifying Hegel's views in this way stems, in part, from neglecting the fact that 'idealism' is a broad label for a host of distinct views, many of which are epistemic rather than ontological (Rescher 1992), whilst only some ontological forms of idealism are subjective (Gersh and Moran 2006). This wide range of 'idealisms'

suggests that subjectivist interpretation of Hegel's idealism rest on the fallacy of neglected alternatives.

I have argued in detail that ascribing any kind of subjective idealism to Hegel is profoundly mistaken (Westphal 1989, 140–145). Hegel argued in line with later-day pragmatic realists, such as Peirce, Dewey, Clarence I. Lewis (1956), and more recently Frederick L. Will, by contending that empirical knowledge must be interpretive in order to *reconstruct*, not to create or (somehow) to 'complete' (as Lavine indicates) the object known (Westphal 2009a, 2015a–c). Indeed, one of Hegel's key insights in epistemology is that cognitive activity on our part is consistent with realism about the objects of human knowledge, where 'realism' in epistemology is the conjoint ontological and epistemic thesis that

- 1) Some things exist and have at least some characteristics unto themselves, regardless of what we say, think or believe about them. (Realism)
- 2) We can know at least something about some such things. (Cognitivism)

Hegel was the first to respond to the sceptical threat of historicist relativism by acknowledging some very fundamental social and historical dimensions of human knowledge, whilst also arguing that the social and historical dimensions of human knowledge are cognitive *enabling conditions*, necessary for our knowing anything at all. Since the social and historical dimensions of human knowledge concern our cognitive skills and abilities, including our capacities to assess and to justify by reasons and reasoning, recognising these dimensions requires recognising that human cognition is active. Hegel accordingly argued that an active model of human cognition is consistent with realism about the objects of human knowledge.

One key to properly understand Hegel's idealism is his clarificatory remark on his special use of this term, added to the second edition of the *Science of Logic*. There he indicates that to be 'ideal' is to be dependent on something—anything—else (WdL I/1 142–143). Thus causal relations, or rather: causal interrelations, show that their relata are 'ideal' because they are interdependent for their existence and characteristics. Causal dependence upon human minds is, in Hegel's ontology, only a subspecies of causal dependence, although (apart from theory of action) not a central ontological instance of such dependence. Hence Hegel's idealism is a form of ontological holism that is, as intended, consistent with realism about the objects of human knowledge. Hegel's ontological holism is moderate, because he contends that the whole and its members are mutually interdependent for their existence and characteristics. Hegel is thus *the* original pragmatic realist (Westphal 2013b, 2015a–c).

One striking feature of Hegel's account of 'intelligence' in his analysis of 'theoretical spirit' (within his *Psychology*) is his stress on the key feature of human knowledge just noted: human intelligence is cognitively active;

only through its cognitive activity can any human subject know the genuine features, the ‘true nature’, of any object known.⁴ Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia* is a concise syllabus, to be explicated and elaborated in lectures. Hegel’s key epistemological theme, that intelligence forges genuine, veridical cognitive links between worldly objects or events and human knowers, is even plainer in his lectures. In his lectures Hegel identifies Herder as one of his epistemological opponents, because Herder inferred, fallaciously, from the active character of human knowledge, and especially from the creative character of human linguistic usage, to the sceptical conclusion that we cannot know things as they are.

3 CORROBORATIONS FROM HEGEL’S LECTURES ON LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY

The passage quoted above (§2) from Hegel’s *Encyclopaedia Logic* (§23) is a test case for any realist interpretation of Hegel’s epistemology. To appreciate its significance requires putting these issues into their systematic and historical context, which Hegel does in the adjacent sections (EL §§22–25). The central problem underlying the debate between realism and irrealism is that of reconciling a realist correspondence conception of truth with a complex philosophy of mind (cf. Will 1997, 1–19). Hegel was the first philosopher to recognise this crucial problem, and the first to solve it. Hegel expressed both of these points whilst lecturing on the Introduction (§22) to the *Encyclopaedia*:

What results from reflection is a product of our thinking. On the other hand, we view the universal, the laws [of nature], as the opposite of something merely subjective and in them [we know] what is essential, truthful, and objective about things. Mere attention does not suffice to experience the truth of things, rather it requires our subjective activity, which reforms the immediately given. At first glance this seems perverse and to go against the aim of knowing. But one can just as well say that it has been the conviction of all ages, that the substantial is first reached through reflection’s reworking of the immediate. The business of philosophy consists only in expressly recalling to consciousness what has always been held concerning thought. (EL §22 A)

The reason why the confidence of earlier times in our powers of reflection needs to be recalled is that in recent times—that is, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, though also again in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries—severe doubts were raised about the fitness of the ‘products of reflection’, that is, about our conceptions and language, for grasping the nature of things themselves. Within the rationalist tradition, the paradigm source of these doubts was Kant’s Transcendental Idealism (EL §28 A, cf.

§62 R), with its key distinction between how things are in themselves and how they necessarily appear to us due to our forms of intuition, though Hegel recognised that Kant's assessment of the complexity of our cognitive abilities had been exceeded and exacerbated by Herder's socio-historical linguistic account of human thought; the twentieth century was not the first to see epistemological realism threatened by a holistic, social theory of language.⁵ Pre-critical philosophers, Hegel noted (EL §28), faced no such problem, and neither did nor do working natural scientists (PdG ¶74, GW 9, 54.8–9). Against Kant, Hegel insisted that the correspondence conception of truth is crucial (WdL II 25–26; cf. Westphal 1989, 111–114). The task of Hegel's epistemology is to reconcile a realist epistemology, including a correspondence conception of the nature of truth, with a very complex social and historical philosophy of mind and theory of knowledge.⁶

The corrective to subjective idealist interpretations of Hegel already appears in EL §§24, 25, where Hegel distinguishes between 'subjective' and 'objective' thoughts, where the latter are actual structures of worldly things and events. In his published remark to §24 Hegel states:

since thought seeks to form a *concept* of things, this concept . . . cannot consist in determinations and relations that are alien and external to the things. (EL §24 R)

Note that it's only possible for the 'determinations and relationships' we specify to *be* 'alien and external to the things' *if* those things have their own characteristics unto themselves, regardless of what we say, think, or believe about them. This is realism, in the sense specified above (§2).

Whilst clearly suggested in his published remarks, the key issue here is most clearly identified in Hegel's lectures on *Logic* (1831), where, commenting upon EL §25, Hegel states:

furthermore we have the prejudice (*Vorurteil*), that through thought we learn what is the truth of things (*was das Wahre der Sache ist*). The first way to philosophise was this innocent one . . . which never thought about the opposition (*Gegensatz*) of thought to objectivity; . . . The second position is the relation, according to which thought and object are regarded as distinct from each other, so that one does not reach the thing through thought; instead one either takes the object as it is, without thinking, the subject must simply consider the object. . . . The *third* [approach] is the *return* to the first, though with the consciousness that thought in general or the subject is of course immediately connected with the object, that the subject is not without knowledge of the object, and that its knowledge of the object is true. (VL 657–681)

Hegel here limns the three 'Attitudes of Thought toward Objectivity' detailed next in the conceptual preliminaries of the *Encyclopaedia Logic*

(§§19–83): those of pre-modern metaphysics, modern empiricism, Kant's critical philosophy, and Jacobi's—though also Schelling's—intuitionism. Important here are two points. First, Hegel's announced aim is to restore our philosophical confidence in the pre-modern presumption that through thought we can and do know the true nature of things.⁷ For example, in his lectures on theoretical spirit (1827–28), Hegel emphasised the following:

That which is truthful, the truthful, the eternal is only for thoughts; comprehending thought is thinking in its totality, thought in its total determinateness. But even when I thus take being and thinking in their true sense, the phrase 'unity of being and thinking' expresses them as if they were not distinct. However, thinking judges, it distinguishes itself, and thinking is at first true thinking only through this process of distinguishing itself and concluding together with itself. The true sense of the phrase, thinking is the thing itself (*Sache*), is something completely ancient, it's nothing eccentric, paradoxical or mad. . . . Reason just is the achieved consciousness of what truthfully is. (VPG 228.247–258, cf. 154.794–842)

Hegel can hardly state his ontological realism—and the typical misunderstanding of it—more plainly than this. His closing statement about reason accords entirely with his account of reason observing nature in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Ferrini 2009b). The centrality of these issues, which Hegel identifies as 'the interest of our times', to Hegel's philosophical agenda shows how central is epistemology to Hegel's philosophy. Here Hegel expressly distinguishes between thought and its objects of knowledge by *rejecting* any subjectivist assimilation of the objects of our knowledge to our thoughts about them, and does so by stressing the cognitive activities involved in distinguishing ourselves from our objects of knowledge, and in cognitive judgement. These cognitive activities are further examined below (§§4, 5.2, 5.3).

There is much more of interest about these two key issues in Hegel's 1831 lectures on *Logic* (VL), which make this central point: Hegel's *Logic* concerns 'objective thoughts' or *Denkbestimmungen* that are actual structures of worldly phenomena. Hegel expressly uses the term '*Denkbestimmung*' in order to avoid any misleading subjectivist connotations of the phrase 'objective thought' (EL §24 A). For this reason, Hegel's *Logic* only discusses *en passant* the deep and complex issues involving epistemology and philosophical psychology that concern whether or how we human beings are able to think in ways which enable us to comprehend the *Denkbestimmungen* that structure the world we inhabit and investigate. Hegel's treatment of these issues appears where it belongs, in his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, and in particular, in his account of 'theoretical spirit', which includes his analysis of 'intelligence'.

Before turning to these materials, note their exegetical advantage. Before Hegel explicates his philosophical psychology, he considers himself already to have shown—through a phenomenology of spirit (EPM §§413–439)⁸—that we can and do have conceptually articulated knowledge of worldly phenomena (EPM §§438–439). Hegel's division of his exposition into a 'phenomenology of spirit' and a philosophical 'psychology' wisely exploits a distinction like Kant's between an 'objective' and a 'subjective' deduction. Like Kant, Hegel first shows *that* we are capable of knowing the world, and only then addresses the issue of *how* we are capable of such knowledge. In this way, Hegel avoids a profound confusion pervading epistemology from Descartes to the present day, of trying first to understand how we have knowledge, only then to conclude that we can't have any after all. Because he takes himself to have settled favourably the question whether we can know the world, Hegel can adopt a largely descriptive approach to philosophical psychology (EPM §442 R⁹). This allows Hegel to develop his philosophical psychology directly, without encumbering it with complex epistemic analyses or arguments. This allows us to see much more plainly just what views about human knowledge and about cognitive psychology Hegel espouses. The remainder highlights some revealing remarks about human knowledge and intelligence from Hegel's *Lectures on Philosophy of Spirit* from Berlin 1827–28 (VPG). Though these passages must be extracted from their lecture context, I hope to explicate them sufficiently for present purposes.

3.1

Hegel begins his discussion of *Psychology* by remarking, quite in line with the views rehearsed above, that:

Spirit is essentially infinite, since the opposition is sublated, it no longer has a limit in the object, it knows the object as rational. (VPG 178.626–628)

Spirit knows the object as rational because rationality structures both the object and us as subjects; more specifically, rationality structures our intelligent thinking. The world of objects and events has a rational structure (consisting in *Denkbestimmungen*), which we can comprehend rationally, insofar as we are intelligent:

Reason is the unity of subject and object; such one-sidedness as 'only subject, only object' is not true. Instead the truth is that the pure subject, the inwardly subjective, thought, this inwardness, the being with itself of intelligence, *is*, intrinsically, the most objective. Intelligence as reason goes to the world, in order to posit as subjective what initially

is external. Spirit trusts itself to be capable of knowing this. (VPG 221.80–86;¹⁰ cf. 178.628–639)

Much of Hegel's account of human intelligence and its psychological preconditions is taken up describing, in ways which cannot be summarised here (see deVries 1988), how intuition (EPM §§446–450)—which incorporates and transforms sensation and feeling—and representation (EPM §§451–464)—which incorporates and transforms recollection (*Erinnerung*), imagery, imagination, psychological association and memory (*Gedächtnis*)—function together to enable us to identify and to name universal features of things which recur in our experience. All of these capacities and abilities, and their active exercise, are required to enable us to think: they enable us to *be* intelligent (EPM §§465–468).¹¹ We exercise and exhibit our intelligence first and foremost by identifying (if approximately) universal features of things, including the natural kinds and species to which things around us belong (EPM §467).

If indeed, as quoted above, 'the truthful nature of the object is equally well the *product of my spirit*' (EL §23), the remark just quoted cautions us to pay attention—as subjectivist interpretations of Hegel's idealism do not—to Hegel's inclusion of the phrase 'equally well' (*ebensosehr*) in this statement:

in reflection the truthful nature [of the object] shines forth (*zum Vorschein kommt*), and because this thinking is *my* activity, the truthful nature of the object is equally well (*ebensosehr*) the *product of my spirit*, indeed qua thinking subject. (EL §23)

To say that 'the truthful nature of the object' is '*equally well* the product of my spirit' is also to say, the truthful nature of the object is not only, not merely, not solely the product of my spirit. '[S]uch one-sidedness as "only subject, only object" is not true', certainly not according to Hegel (VPG 221.80–81)! What our thinking contributes to producing the true nature of the object is considered below (§§4, 6). First, it is important to follow out Hegel's stress on the objectivity of our properly informed thinking and the realism this involves.

As Hegel stresses, especially in his lectures, we must 'posit' what is initially external as internal. Hegel elaborates:

That objectivity is within intelligence at all, is [contained] in the intuition, that whatever is immediately given I also posit within myself. The other side is that intelligence itself posits itself as the objective; in this way intelligence is in memory in a mechanical manner. . . . The position of memory is this moment, that the unity of the subject and object is not only in itself in intelligence, but also this unity is posited within intelligence, such that this externality obtains. Thus within intelligence exists

that which is also [*sic*] something external, objectivity is not divorced from it, but rather is identical with it. (VPG 222.104–105)

Thought contains the determination, that *what I think*, is *the thing itself* (*Sache*), *what is in it*, *what it is—to do this I must reflect on it* (*darüber nachdenken*). The thing itself comes to me first through thought, and now, so far as it is thought, noumen, is it the thing itself. The other [i.e., what is not thought but is only appearance] is only existence, opinion, nothing objective; first in thought does it have its objectivity, thus thought is objective. (VPG 224.164–170)¹²

As we shall see further below, if the ‘true nature’ of the thing itself is ‘equally well’ the product of my spirit, what I produce is truly the nature of the thing itself only insofar as *the thing* is inherently and dynamically structured unto itself by *its* fundamental characteristics (*Denkbestimmungen*). If we produce the true nature of the object, we do so only by investing ourselves in our conceptually articulated comprehension *of it*. Intelligence achieves objectivity by identifying the specific features of the known object. This is epistemological realism, as specified above (§2).

3.2

Hegel pointedly contrasts his confidence in our powers of cognition with Herder’s (1784–1791, 1799) linguistically based scepticism:

Herder makes many declamations of this kind, that philosophising is a coining and combining of words, by which one believes to have the thing itself (*Sache*) by using words in this way, although this movement through words is merely a deception, in which we falsely believe that in this way we have the thing itself before us. (VPG 219.2–32)¹³

Herder’s stressing the (alleged) subjectivism of our linguistic categories is one version of a common concern about our systems of classification, Hegel contends:

The universal is nothing other than what is contained in the object. The universal is only in the subject, and it has been asked, whether genera are in nature or are only in the subject. . . . However, the universal is the truthful in objects. ‘To provide marks, differentia, in a definition’, one says, ‘is necessary though only for the subject’. However, the mark by which one kind of species is distinct from another kind must be an essential mark, which is the root of its other characteristics. (VPG 230.308–318; cf. PdG ¶246, GW 9, 140.14–31)

Whether or how Hegel can prove that things have such essential differentia, and that we can identify them correctly, is a much larger, crucial issue

to which I return below (§6). What matters now is identifying his view, which is that there are natural kinds with essential differentia, and that we can identify them in and through their instances (cf. Düsing 1987). Intelligence obtains genuine objectivity by correctly identifying characteristics of a known object. This is fundamentally an anti-sceptical, realist contention.

This point is corroborated by recalling that Hegel's German term, rendered as 'essence', is '*Wesen*', which unlike its English counterpart, though like the Latin *essentia*, connotes *beings* with whatever characteristics they have. It is vital not to import the Anglophone Cartesian notion of abstract, uninstantiated essences into our (mis-)reading of Hegel's writings.

3.3

This realism is underscored by Hegel's repeated, emphatic stress on the role of our experiential intake in our developing and specifying genuine thoughts of the kind just indicated:

Thinking applying itself to this stuff as it comes to it from without is what we call thinking cognition, when thinking as such transforms a stuff into thoughts. However we do not have to consider thinking as applying itself; instead [we consider it] as its form, generally speaking, as explicating itself, determining itself, particularising itself, positing particularity, judging and thus concluding with itself. However, . . . thinking cognition is initially applying thinking and its form to its stuff at hand. Thus the course of cognition is this, that we begin with intuition, perception and we make these perceptions into something universal, we transform this particular, this individual into the universal. (VPG 229.284–295)¹⁴

Part of why Hegel insists that we 'transform' the particulars we sense, intuit and perceive into 'the universal' is that he denies that universals as such exist; universals only exist in their particular manifestations or instances (EPN §246 A). Universals *qua* universal exist, on Hegel's view, only insofar as we identify and articulate them correctly. In EL §23 Hegel stresses our production of the true nature of the object, yet his further remarks stress that this production is only one *aspect* of the cognitive process, the proper complement to which involves our investing ourselves in the objects themselves as we come to know them, as we come to identify and correctly articulate *their* features, whereby alone we cognitively internalise the stuff we gather in and through our experience *of them*.

The brief remarks about this process quoted and summarised here may sound like standard empiricist doctrine, though Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* develops a very sophisticated cognitive psychology.¹⁵ Because empiricism remains the default presumption within Anglophone philosophy, it is important to note that Hegel's dissent from empiricism, like Kant's, is marked by

his appreciation of the key shortcoming of concept empiricism. In principle, Hume's copy theory of ideas and three laws of psychological association can account only for determinate concepts, classifications of particular features of particular things or events, as fine-grained as one can perceptually distinguish. However, Hume recognised that we also have, use and understand merely determinable concepts such as those of 'time', 'space', 'identity', 'thing' or 'word'. For these, only Hume's imagination can provide, but for these capacities of our imagination Hume can provide *no* empiricist account (Westphal 2013a). Hegel's strictly internal critique of Hume's concept empiricism focuses upon these determinable concepts (Westphal 1998, 2000, 2002/03), in which he justifies (without appeal to transcendental idealism, nor to any similar view) Kant's view that periods of time or regions of space we can demarcate *ad libitum*, though only because we possess and can properly use *a priori* concepts of 'time', 'period of time', 'space' and 'spatial region'. These fundamental shortcomings of concept empiricism undermine later versions as well (Turnbull 1959; Westphal 2015b), and reinforce Hegel's reasons for developing a new approach to philosophical psychology, to retain and support Kant's transcendental analysis of judgement and action whilst dispensing with transcendental idealism.

3.4

Here it is important to note Hegel's account of what is required to identify and correctly articulate the universal features of things. The central cases of the relevant kinds of universals are, in Hegel's view, laws of nature, and in particular, laws of force, which we can only identify through natural science. Regarding laws of nature, in his 1830 lectures on *Logic* Hegel states the following about essence and appearance:

Once the world is brought to the system of laws it is known in its determinateness. These laws do not stand behind it, as if appearances were lawless. Instead, the law is there in the appearance. The form [sc. of law] contains connection to itself, though it also contains being externally dispersed (*Außereinandersein*). Thus the form is present twice over, in finite things the external form is distinguished, yet that externality in the motion of the planets is identical with the law. To know the world of appearance as a system of its laws is important, though it is not yet comprehension (VL 153.584–593)

The 'system of laws' Hegel mentions here are natural-scientific laws. Hegel's statement that 'the form of law is present twice over' underscores the realism involved in Hegel's account of *Denkbestimmungen* as objective thoughts—as objective structures of and in natural phenomena—and our intelligent grasp of them in our observationally and experimentally, i.e. our natural-scientifically informed thinking.¹⁶ The centrality of natural-scientific

experiment and investigation in Hegel's account of concepts and cognition shows that Hegel's aim to reestablish the ancient confidence in our human powers of rational cognition, that we can indeed know the world through reason, is no reactionary (and epistemologically hopeless) return to any form of pre-scientific reflection, nor any form of pre-Critical metaphysics.

For now we postpone considering Hegel's remarks here about genuine comprehension (see below, §4.6). First it is important to stress that Hegel seeks to replace arm-chair reflection with reflection upon the results of natural science, because only through natural-scientific research can we correctly identify the laws of nature:

One must show through experiments what the force is; the content the appearance has is also the content the force has; conversely, one derives the appearance from the force, that is, one has constructed (*eingerichtet*) the force according to the appearance: . . . If one considers electricity in particular circumstances that concern its expression, one thus removes the accidental and seizes on what is essential, which is the simple: I reduce [the force] to its simple determination. Especially Newton introduced the determination of reflection, force, into the exploration of nature, although the determinateness, the appearance, alone is the content. (VL 155.644–659)

Among much else, Hegel here states directly that only through natural-scientific examination can and do we distinguish between the accidental and the constitutive features of natural phenomena. This is why natural science is so fundamental to identifying genuine *Denkbestimmungen*, in part because one of the most important *Denkbestimmungen* is force (WdL I/1 11).¹⁷

To support this important thesis, Hegel argues here along lines already established in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*,¹⁸ that force just *is* its manifestations:

force is just this, to sublimate one-sidedness; it is only force by expressing itself. Each side [*sc.*, force and expression] is itself this whole, the force itself is that which expresses itself, and the expression is thus already posited as this mediation, simply to have its connection to its other. (VL 155.638–643)

Only because force constitutively exists in and through its manifestations, only because force constitutively consists in relations among things and events, can forces and the laws which structure them be correctly identified and known. Only this knowledge enables us to distinguish in any particular case between what is constitutive and what is merely accidental in any natural phenomenon. Hegel's stress on natural science in this connection shows clearly that his view of our cognitive investment in knowing the things around us—the proper complement to EL §23—is no obscure,

metaphorical transmigration of our souls into nature. Rather, our cognitive investment in knowing the things around us *is* our investigating physical objects and events by using the methods, techniques and resources of the natural sciences.¹⁹ Although the natural sciences do not suffice for philosophical comprehension (VL 153.584–593), they are on Hegel's view basic necessary conditions for genuine comprehension (Westphal 2008, 2015c).

3.5

Hegel's thesis that forces constitutively exist in and through their manifestations is the key to his response to Herder (1787), who drew sceptical conclusions from the supposed distinction between forces and their manifestations. This is central both to Hegel's analysis of 'Force and Understanding' in the 1807 *Phenomenology* (PdG ¶¶137–141, GW 9, 85.9–87.37), and in both terminology in analytical detail also to his 1831 lectures on these same issues (VL 155.66–685; re: EL §136 R). In a phrase that recalls a key theme from 'Force and Understanding', Hegel stresses the crucial cognitive insight gained through systematically integrating various forces and kinds of forces through experiment and observation-driven natural scientific theory. The centrality of natural science in Hegel's account of our development of genuine concepts and cognition shows that, not Hegel, but rather too many of his expositors have suffered from a romantic disdain for natural science—much to the detriment of the understanding, reception, and reputation of Hegel's philosophy.

3.6

Considering these features of Hegel's account of force and of laws of nature enables us to characterise briefly an important feature of Hegel's account of genuine comprehension and the 'concrete' universals it involves. Hegel's view that forces are constitutively manifest in their expressions, and that their expressions consist in causal processes and interactions amongst things and events, entails that particulars and the universals which characterise them, and conversely, universals and the particulars which instantiate them, are thoroughly, 'concretely' integrated. Hegel states this point concisely in his 1831 Lectures on *Logic*:

The individual and the universal are so inseparable from each other; this is just the nature of the concrete, the individual as such, just as the universal as such, are nothing true, but rather empty abstractions. (VL 15.401–404)

This concrete integration of universals and their particular instantiations concerns objective thoughts, *Denkbestimmungen*; it involves Hegel's neo-Aristotelian response to Kant's excessively abstract universals.

Yet we have already seen (§3.3) that Hegel thinks that universals only exist in their universal *form* insofar as they are correctly identified and articulated conceptually by us. Hegel's 1827/28 lectures on theoretical spirit develop this point in connection with Hegel's account of thought. Here he states:

The further relation, determinateness, is such that with it falls away the opposition that is present between immediacy, externality and inwardness, which is not only an opposition of immediacy, what is given, and of inwardness, of being by oneself, but is equally well a distinction between individuality and universality. Intelligence is the simple being by oneself of universality, which is such that, as what is opposed to the universal, to what in general is, has the determination of individuality, of manifoldness in general, of the particular. This opposition has sublated itself, and thus is intelligence determined essentially as thought. Intelligence, the simple being by itself and externality, this is the opposition; however, since intelligence within itself is this sensuous manner of externality, the difference from it, in the form of the universal against the individual, has fallen away. Insofar as difference in general is still present at hand, this difference in general is the individual; insofar as this difference has sublated itself, intelligence is a concrete universal that has posited the individual, particular within itself. Intelligence as the unity of both is the comprehending grasp over the other, the unity of the previously diverse. (VPG 223.139–159)

The concrete universal central to Hegel's ontology and epistemology thus consists in our conceptually articulated, comprehensive grasp of extant individuals in view of the universal properties and natural laws which constitute, structure and also alter them, recognised expressly in their thorough mutual interdependence, through which these universal kinds and laws are expressly articulated in their universal form, and are recognised in their specific instances, which include their specific interrelations.

The specific contribution Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* makes to this genuine comprehension is to re-analyse the basic terms, conceptions, principles, laws, and findings developed in the natural sciences, so that we can articulate, recognise, and thus appreciate the ways in which the fundamental terms, concepts, and principles in scientific theories are interdefined by their contrasts (their 'opposition', Hegel says) in ways which essentially prefigure the particular character of whatever natural laws they are used to formulate (Westphal 2008). If 'the truthful nature of the object is equally well the *product of my spirit*' (EL §23), this is because theoretical spirit comprehends and expresses the truthful nature of known objects in their express and genuinely universal form, in cognitive connection with its instances. This central text for subjectivist interpretations of Hegel's idealism thus in fact expresses Hegel's epistemological realism!

4 INTELLIGENCE AND OBJECTIVITY

Richard Winfield (2007/08, 2010, 79–81) rightly notes that Hegel ascribes our awareness and grasp of objectivity, not to consciousness as such, but specifically to intelligence. This point can be reinforced by two brief observations, which further develop these interim conclusions.

4.1

Hegel held a ‘sensationist’ account of sensations.²⁰ According to sensationism (about sensations), the mere fact that objects in our environs cause our sensations does not explain how our sensations either represent or refer to their supposed objects. Explaining how sensations acquire a representational function (both referential and informative) within human perception is the central task of sensationist theories. Sensationist theories of perception generally adopted the sensory atomism common to Modern theories of perception. A second key problem recognised by sophisticated sensationist theories is to explain what unites any plurality of sensations into *a* percept of any *one* object. This issue arises within each sensory modality, and also across our sensory modalities. This issue arises synchronically within any momentary perception of an object, and it arises diachronically as a problem of integrating successive percepts of the same object. These two sets of issues also arise at two levels. One is purely sensory, and concerns the generation of sensory appearances to each of us out of a plethora of sensations. A second level is intellectual, and concerns how we recognise the various bits of sensory information we receive through perception to be bits of information about one and the same object.²¹

The important point here is Hegel’s contention, following Kant, that sensations are integrated into percepts *and* acquire their objective purport, in the form of at least putative singular cognitive reference, only insofar as they are integrated, synthesised, in ways guided and effected by the intellect (EPM §§448 A, 449–450; VPG 190.90–102). Accordingly, Hegel stresses that feelings (*Gefühle*) only exhibit both their subjective and their objective aspects through their role in theoretical spirit (EPM §446 and §446 A), and that theoretical spirit has direct cognitive reference to individual objects via sensory intuition (EPM §445 A). In his Berlin lectures on theoretical spirit, Hegel expressly states that sensations provide the stuff, the content or matter, of sensory intuitions, both inner and outer (VPG 190.28–37, 191.70–77), and they provide the basic content for feelings (VPG 191.90–95). Nowhere in this crucial connection does Hegel describe intuition as intellectual intuition, much less espouse any such view. On the contrary, his discussion confirms and elaborates his remark, that intuition is directed solely towards perceptible particulars (above, §§4.2, 4.3).²² In brief, sensations and feelings only acquire objective reference by being incorporated into sensory intuitions via acts of intelligent synthesis, and only thus become

candidates for conversion into self-ascribed representations. Self-ascription is the cardinal cognitive advance achieved by representations, according to Hegel (EPM §451). Thus both self-conscious awareness of and cognitive reference to perceptible particulars are, on Hegel's view, as Winfield rightly stresses, effected by intelligence, not merely by consciousness. Thus on Hegel's account, intelligence is fundamental to objectivity, in these two crucial regards.

4.2

Awareness of and cognitive reference to spatio-temporal objects and events is, however, only a necessary, though not a sufficient condition for discerning what is objective within the objects and events which appear to us.²³ To discern what is objective in spatio-temporal objects and events requires, as we have seen, exacting natural-scientific observations and experiments (above, §§3.4, 3.6). Such natural-scientific investigations, including their results and the assessment of these results, are quintessentially *intelligent* activities. Thus intelligence is crucial for achieving this kind and degree of objectivity, as Hegel stressed in his Berlin lectures on *Logic* and on *Philosophy of Spirit*, and in 'Reason' in the 1807 *Phenomenology* (Ferrini 2009b). This, too, confirms and reinforces Winfield's central contention that according to Hegel, objectivity is achieved only by intelligence, and not merely by consciousness.

This point also underscores how important are natural science and Hegel's *Philosophy of Nature* to understanding Hegel's idealism, because natural science discovers both natural kinds and genuine causal laws. These causal laws formulate causal interrelations amongst spatio-temporal objects and events. Among these causal interrelations are those which generate the existence and characteristics of spatio-temporal objects and events, and also bring about their alterations and eventual disintegration. The causal generation and corruption of things and events shows, Hegel argues, that spatio-temporal things and events are ideal, precisely because they are interdependent, and so are not ontologically self-sufficient. All of this holds about the natural world as such, regardless of human minds and whatever we may or may not be aware of (Westphal 1989, 140–145).

4.3

Devotees of Hegel's *Logic* will rightly insist that Hegel also espouses yet a third kind of objectivity, one central to the *Logic*, consisting in logical identification and analysis of the fundamental *Denkbestimmungen* as worldly structures, along with the basic cognitive principles, *etc.*, required for us to identify, analyse and ultimately comprehend these *Denkbestimmungen*. This third level of objectivity, too, is solely the prerogative of intelligence. In some sense, this third level of objectivity is philosophically fundamental in Hegel's philosophy, and is (purportedly) more basic than the natural-scientific objectivity just mentioned (§4.2).

Yet Hegel's lectures clearly show that this third level of objectivity is much more closely connected with and based upon natural-scientific objectivity than is typically recognised. The passage quoted earlier (VPG 229.284–295; above, §3.3) closely associates Hegel's own philosophical activity, his way of considering *Denkbestimmungen*, with the identification and articulation of *Denkbestimmungen* through the cognitive processes whereby we 'begin with intuition, perception and we make these perceptions into something universal, we transform this particular, this individual into the universal'. Hegel's own philosophical activity, he says there, consists in considering these same materials, these same universals, in a different way:

we do not have to consider thinking as applying itself; instead [we consider it] as its form, generally speaking, as explicating itself, determining itself, particularising itself, positing particularity, judging and thus concluding with itself.

Certainly Hegel's philosophical re-analysis of the *Denkbestimmungen* discovered by natural science provides a cognitively distinctive vantage point on them (above §§3.4, 3.6). Important here are three points:

- 1) Hegel's philosophical vantage-point can only (though not solely) be developed on the basis of the results of natural science;
- 2) Hegel's philosophical vantage-point fundamentally involves a distinctive reconsideration of those very same natural-scientific results;
- 3) Hegel's philosophical vantage point centrally includes a distinctive reconsideration of those very same cognitive processes and involved in common-sense and natural-scientific knowledge.

It should not be surprising that Hegel associates his own logical methods, insights and results so closely with natural science and its inquiries and results: Hegel's study of gravitational theory played a central role in the development of his 'dialectic', from a merely destructive set of sceptical tropes into a constructive set of philosophical principles based upon gravity exhibiting the essential interrelatedness of physical bodies.²⁴ More generally, as Harris notes,

the Baconian applied science of this world is the solid foundation upon which Hegel's ladder of *spiritual* experience rests. (Harris 1997, vol. 2, 355)

If this is surprising, that is due to expositors and critics failing to identify Hegel's intimate involvement with and use of contemporaneous natural science already in the 1807 *Phenomenology*, in both 'The Certainty and Truth of Reason' and in 'Observing Reason' (Ferrini 2009a, 2009b).

Whilst Hegel's *Logic* surely has an important kind of philosophical priority over his *Philosophy of Nature*, I submit that this priority has not been correctly identified in the literature, precisely because the close links

between Hegel's *Logic* and *Philosophy of Nature* have been disregarded, in part because of a persisting tendency to assimilate Hegel's philosophical procedure to the old deductivist model of *scientia*, according to which one begins with *a priori* rational principles (traditionally, self-evident ones), and systematically deduces from them various more specific corollaries.²⁵ This has been the standard view of the relation between Hegel's *Logic* and *Realphilosophie*. Yet Hegel's solution to the Dilemma of the Criterion puts paid to the deductivist model of rational justification in all its forms; Hegel's epistemology replaces it with a very sophisticated transcendental-pragmatic, fallibilist account of rational justification (Westphal 2009a, 2013b, 2015a–c), one which both allows for and requires much closer connections between Hegel's *Logic* and his *Realphilosophie*, including his *Philosophy of Nature* (Ferrini 2012; Westphal 2008, §3). These close connections between Hegel's *Logic*, *Philosophy of Nature*, and his sophisticated epistemology underscore how important and how central are both epistemological realism and cognitive psychology to Hegel's philosophy as a whole.²⁶

5 CONCLUSIONS

Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* is indeed a lecture compendium, outlining his topics for his no doubt beleaguered students. Fortunately, some good transcripts have survived, which help to show that, and how, Hegel preserved and augmented Kant's insightful cognitive psychology whilst dispensing with transcendental idealism, including, centrally, the four features of Hegel's account of *Intelligenz* noted in the Introduction (§1). The strictly 'top down' model of explication and justification drove Kant's transcendental idealism to the very end. The important links between Kant's and Hegel's views, however, lie instead in Hegel's recognition that Kant's transcendental idealism can be refuted strictly internally, and that so doing reveals how Kant's insightful account of rational judgement (both cognitive and moral) and his transcendental method of analysis and proof can be disentangled from transcendental idealism (Westphal 2009b, 2015a–c). So doing also requires reconstructing Kant's cognitive psychology. This Hegel does in his philosophy of subjective spirit, including his account of *Intelligenz*. Attending to both the structure and the details of Hegel's cognitive psychology is important, both for its intrinsic interest, and for correcting long-standing misconceptions of Hegel's comprehensive and challenging philosophy.²⁷

NOTES

1. The importance of Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* is highlighted by Stern 2013; cf. Hoy 2014. The present analysis supplements these salutary findings. Many important features of Hegel's views and their systematic character, together with the interpretive issues they raise, are examined by Ferrini 2012.
2. Except where noted, translations are mine.

3. Herder aspired to an ultimate universalism which he called 'humanity'. The critical issue is whether his universalist aspirations are consistent with his critique of Kant and his sceptical philosophy of language. Like Hegel, I don't think Herder's views are consistent on this crucial issue; see below, §4.2.
4. Cf. EL §§20, 21; VL 9.207–209, 10.237–239, 11.275–276, 14.363–367, 16.426–444, 16.445–451; VPG 178.626–639, 226.214–231. Hegel's recently published lectures (VPG, VL) are cited by page.line numbers. Only the page on which the cited passage begins is indicated, because the ending line number univocally indicates the close of the relevant passage.
5. On Herder's thought and its impact on his contemporaries, see Beiser 1987, ch. 5. For concise discussion of Herder's linguistic metacritique and its importance to Hegel, see Surber 2013.
6. Hegel's philosophy of mind (or: 'philosophy of subjective spirit') is broadly (not reductively) naturalistic. His main source is not Descartes, but Aristotle (see deVries 1988; Ferrarin 2001, ch. 8).
7. Also see, e.g., EL §§5, 21 R, 24 A; VPG 227.235–242; VL 15.412–417.
8. This section of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia* has very different aims within a very different context than his 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Assimilating the latter to the former results from and further compounds confusion; on the context and aims of the latter, see Westphal 1989a and 2009a.
9. 'Likewise, if the activities of spirit are considered only as expressions or powers in general, in view of their usefulness, that is, as purposive for any other interest of the intellect or of the mind, then no *final end* (*Endzweck*) is at issue. This final end can only be the concept itself and the activity of the concept can only have itself for its end, to sublimate the form of immediacy or of subjectivity, to reach and grasp itself, to liberate itself for its own sake. Only in this way are the various so-called capacities of spirit to be considered as stages in this liberation. Only this counts as the rational way of considering [sic] spirit and its diverse activities.' (EPM §442 R)
10. Burkhard Tuschling (VPG, ix–xxxviii, §VI) calls attention to this passage in his Introduction.
11. deVries 2013 provides a good conspectus of Hegel's cognitive psychology; its philosophical significance is underscored by Eason 2007–08, deVries 1988, Stern 2013, and the other contributions to the present volume.
12. Note that Hegel uses the terms 'noumen' and 'thing itself', not the Kantian terms 'noumenon' or 'thing in itself'. In so doing, Hegel stresses his rejection of Kant's transcendental idealist view that we cannot know things as they really are, but merely as they appear to us.
13. Linguistically based scepticism of this kind remains widespread.
14. Hegel's contrast between the genesis of cognition and his own consideration of thinking as self-developing through its self-particularisation, etc., is as important as his clear indication of their very close relation. This passage corroborates my contention that Hegel's *Logic* and his *Philosophy of Nature* are much more thoroughly integrated than is commonly recognised (Westphal 2008, §§2.7, 3; see below, §6.3).
15. See deVries 1988, and 2013; Eason 2007; Halbig 2002; Hespe and Tuschling 1991; Westphal 2006; Winfield 2007, and 2010; Stern 2013.
16. The fundamental role of scientific experiments in Hegel's philosophy of nature is established by Renault 2001, 155–57; also see Moretto 2004. The fundamental role of natural science within Hegel's 1807 *Phenomenology* is established by Ferrini 2009b.
17. See Westphal 1989a, ch. 10; 2008; 2015c.
18. PdG ¶141, GW 9, 87.24–25; see Westphal 2008, §2.6; 2014a; 2015c.

19. Although I stress the role of natural science in discovering the intelligible structure of nature, I do not discount the passages in which Hegel stresses the 'otherness' of nature to spirit; on Hegel's view this 'otherness' cannot, however, make nature unknowable.
20. See deVries 1988, ch. 11; Westphal 1998, §6.5. DeVries does not use the term 'sensationalism', though this is precisely the account of sensations that results from Hegel's combination of 'symbolist' and 'representationalist' theories of thought, which deVries explicates. Also see Wolff 1992, 35–f., 47–49, 51, 58, 62, 95, 143–147, 164, 168, 174–f., 177, who distinguishes 'preintentional' and 'intentional' sensations within Hegel's analysis.
21. These issues are central to Hegel's analysis of 'Perception' in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ch. 2; see Westphal 1998.
22. These passages are partially quoted by Franks 2005, 377–379, who claims they undermine my interpretation. To the contrary, Franks fundamentally misunderstands Hegel's view; for specifics, see Westphal 2007/08, §5.
23. Objects and events 'appearing' to us must not be understood as anything qualified by subjective forms of intuition, *à la* Kant's forms of intuition which (he contends) *are* space and time. Hegel expressly warns against this misinterpretation of his position: 'However when we have said that the intuited receives the form of the spatial and the temporal from the *intuiting spirit*, this statement may not be understood to mean that space and time are *only subjective* forms. Kant wanted to make space and time out to be such forms. However things are in truth *themselves* spatial and temporal; that double form of externality is not done to them one-sidedly by our intuition.' (EPM §448 A)
24. Ferrini 1999; cp. *De Orbitis Planetarum* (PD 295, GW 5, 247.29).
25. The important question, How did Aristotle's flexible, broadly Euclidean model of *epistēmē* or to the Latins '*scientia*', become the infallibilist, deductivist Cartesian-empiricist model, is answered precisely by Boulter 2011 and developed further in Westphal 2016.
26. In Westphal 2014a I argue that Hegel's transcendental-pragmatic epistemology provides a much more adequate basis for understanding natural science than is found amongst Modern philosophers (including Kant) and the empiricist tradition up through the twenty-first century.
27. This contribution further develops Westphal 2007/08. I again thank Richard Winfield for kindly inviting me to examine Hegel's account of *Intelligenz*, and am grateful to the editors for kindly including this version in the present volume. I dedicate my contribution to Philip Grier, whom I first met at Northwestern University in 1977. In Grier 2013, he argues that the 'traditional' or rather the standard, narrow, largely Cartesian mind-body problem is fundamentally ill-conceived. My own effort in this regard—on Hegel's behalf—appears in Westphal 2014b.

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12 Hegel's Account of the Presence of Space and Time in Sensation, Intuition, and the World

A Sellarsian View

Willem A. deVries

INTRODUCTION: SOME CONTEXT

Space, time, sensation, and intuition in Hegel are complicated, more so than in Kant, and for good reason. Hegel rejected Kant's transcendental idealism: besides the *subjective* reality Kant attributed to space and time, Hegel also attributed to them a truly *objective* reality. For Hegel, space and time qualify finite things as they really are. Moreover, space and time, in Hegel's view, have two different modes of subjective presence. These distinctive modes of subjective presence can be illuminated by comparing Hegel's and Wilfrid Sellars's strikingly similar arguments against transcendental idealism.

Tying space and time to the issues of sensation and intuition makes explicit a concern for both the phenomenology (in the post-1900 sense) and the epistemology of space and time, as well as their metaphysical status. That the *phenomenology* or *presence in experience* of space and time is a distinct issue from the *epistemology* of space and time is not always observed in the literature.

Hegel confronted a complex set of positions with regard to space and time. Descartes' identification of space and matter seems to have been put out of play, but still open were

- The Newtonian conception that space and time are infinite objective (non-mind-dependent) entities in their own rights, independent of the objects that occupy them;
- The exoteric Leibnizian conception that space and time are derivative (but objective) existences, dependent on relations among independent objects, and incapable of existence without such independent objects;¹ and
- The Kantian conception that space and time are subjective forms of intuition that represent nothing with regard to things as they are in themselves, though they are objective and constitutive structures of phenomenal reality.

These are recognisably the alternatives Kant puts forth in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' of the first *Critique* (CPR A23/B37–38), though these positions do not exhaust the possibilities. For instance, according to one interpretation, Kant thought that Berkeley correctly took space to be subjective, but made the mistake of thinking that it was an attribute of *empirical* intuition (Janiak 2012). This helps explain why Berkeley thought we must face an extra explanatory burden with regard to the third dimension.

The general outline of Kant's motivations for his position is fairly clear. The conflict between the conceptions of space and time in Leibniz and Newton could not be easily resolved. Kant believed that any view of space and time as objective leads to antinomies, whereas the subjectivity of space and time is a key move in resolving those antinomies. The epistemology of space and time plays a central role in Kant's final view: He needs to be able to account for the apriority of our knowledge of space (which he takes as having been made explicit in Euclidean geometry) and time (much less clearly associated in some way with arithmetic). Kant's view is, therefore, developed with an eye on both the metaphysics and the epistemology of space and time.

Kant's solution is to distinguish between receptivity and spontaneity, intuition and conception, and then to treat space and time as the forms of human receptivity. Because space and time are both formal and dependent on the particularities of human nature, we can explain why our knowledge of them is apriori. Kant can thus treat space and time as Newtonianly absolute without substantivising them. Kant thought his treatment of space and time was a new approach that resolved the standing problems he had inherited. The price for this was the acceptance of transcendental idealism and the rejection of the idea that we could ever know things as they are in themselves, a price Kant was eager to pay.

HEGEL CONTRA TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

When Hegel considers space and time, he begins his exposition with a bow to Kant's treatment, but it is also clear that whatever truth is to be found in the Kantian view, transcendental idealism will not survive, for Hegel is convinced that transcendental idealism is just another name for subjective idealism, and that is anathema.

The nature of space has given rise to many theories. I shall only make mention of the *Kantian* determination of it as a *form of sensuous intuition* like time. It is now generally accepted that space must be regarded as a merely subjective element of the representative faculty. If we disregard the determinations of the Kantian Notion and subjective idealism in this theory, we are left with the correct determination of space as a simple form, i.e., an *abstraction*, the form of immediate *externality*. (EPN² §254 R)

Hegel's rejection of Kant's view, however, does not entail rejecting the Kantian doctrine that space and time are forms of intuition. Hegel grants the truth of that Kantian doctrine, but rejects the claim that they are *only* forms of intuition. Tied as it is to transcendental idealism, Hegel refuses to accept the fundamental dualism between the objective and the subjective that he attributes to Kant.³

Time, like space, is a *pure form of sensibility or intuition*; it is the insensible factor in sensibility. Like space however, time does not involve the difference between objectivity and a distinct subjective consciousness. If these determinations were to be applied to space and time, the first would be abstract objectivity, and the second abstract subjectivity. (EPN §258 R)

In other words, space and time are indifferent to the subject/object divide; they are forms of intuition, but also and equally forms of finite things, real things, not merely phenomenal things. The both/and-solution is rejected by Kant for at least two reasons: it doesn't seem compatible with his explanation of the apriority of our knowledge of space and time, and it would still engender the antinomies he thought his transcendental idealism resolves.

In Kantian terms, then, Hegel revives transcendental realism. Hegel is not bothered by the contradictions or antinomies that, according to Kant, follow on a transcendental realist treatment of space and time. Hegel welcomes and generalises the idea that concepts generate antinomies; it is just such antinomies that generate higher or better concepts. For Kant, 'dialectic' is a bad thing, at best an exposure of falsehood, but not a path to truth; for Hegel, it is the lifeblood of the world and the only road to truth.

THE OBJECTIVE REALITY OF SPACE AND TIME

Hegel agrees with Kant that space and time are forms, but we have to be clear on what that means for Hegel. They are *not* forms in the sense of empty molds into which some material can be poured. That is a version of a Newton's substantivising conception of space and time that Hegel rejects. For Hegel, space is an *abstract, universal, ideal* form, in particular, the abstract universality of self-externality (EPN §254). Time is the negativity, the self-sublation of the indifferent self-externality of space (EPN §§257–258). Matter and material objects are not prior existences that (somehow) come to inhabit space and time; space and time are the enabling conditions of material objects. To be a material object is to be located in space and time, to possess spatial and temporal characteristics.

While Hegel thinks space and time are forms of natural things, he also thinks they are forms of our intuitive capacities. One challenge to his view, therefore, is to question how two such disparate contents could have the

same form. After all, doesn't Hegel insist that form and content (or form and matter) should be tuned to each other, each kind of content matched to its appropriate form and vice versa? Material, that is, *finite and self-external* objects in space and time are the content of nature. But *finite and self-external* intentional objects are the content of intuition, so it is only to be expected that nature and intuition would share forms as well. Here the fact that space and time as forms are *abstract* is surely important. An abstract form, let's say, the Sicilian Defence in chess, can be realised in any number of media: the traditional wood or plastic pieces moved on the traditional 8x8 board, pixels on a computer screen, written notation in correspondence between the players, etc. Despite the material differences, there is a clear sense to the claim of sameness across these realisations.

What this reflection does call upon us to do is to distinguish between *matter* and *content*. I understand *matter* as it appears in the form/matter pair along Aristotelian lines, whereas *content* in the form/content pair as an essentially *semantic* concept, entwined with notions of meaning or significance. For instance, a feeling may be *enmattered* or *embodied* in a grimace or gesture, while its *content* is tied to its significance in the spiritual life of the subject.⁴ The *material* of experience is sensory; its *content* is spiritual. Space and time are the forms of finite, immediate self-externality. Space and time are the forms of material objects, which are finite, immediate, and self-external. In experience, when the *content* of spirit is self-external materiality, space and time recur as forms of the sensory manifold.

That space and time are abstract forms seems to be incompatible with any substantivalist interpretation of space and time themselves.

To ask whether space by itself is real, or whether it is only a property of things, is to ask one of the most well-worn of all metaphysical questions. If one says that it is something inherently substantial, then it must resemble a box, which, even if there is nothing in it, is still something subsisting within itself. Space is absolutely yielding and utterly devoid of opposition however; and if something is real, it is necessary that it should be incompatible with something else. (EPN §254 A)

Time does not resemble a container in which everything is as it were borne away and swallowed up in the flow of a stream. Time is merely this abstraction of destroying. Things are in time because they are finite; they do not pass away because they are in time, but are themselves that which is temporal. Temporality is their objective determination. (EPN §258 A)

To develop a full interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of space and time here would take us too far afield into Hegel's relation to Newton and mechanical physics. It is worth noting, however, that Hegel seems to take the truths of geometry to be conceptual truths that unpack assumptions made at the beginning of the inquiry,⁵ so he does not explain the apriority

of mathematical knowledge by reference to the special role of intuition in the constitution of mathematics. It is the unfolding of a specific form of self-externality that applies universally to finite things. For instance, he argues explicitly (EPN §256 R) that the definition of a straight line as the shortest distance between two points, which Kant regarded as synthetic apriori, is analytic. The addition (*Zusatz*) asserts that

[i]f certain determinations are given, it is the task of the science of geometry to discover what other determinations follow from them, the main thing being that that which is given, and that which follows, should constitute a single developed totality. The central propositions of geometry are those in which a whole is postulated, and expressed in its determinate elements. (EPN §256 A)

However intriguing Hegel's view of objective space and time, his treatment of their subjective presence in experience is particularly complex, a complexity that seems to be thoroughly justified by the facts. The complexity of Hegel's treatment results from his distinguishing several different levels of sensibility and the corresponding requirement that space and time inform those levels in different ways.

THE SUBJECTIVE REALITIES OF SPACE AND TIME

Idealism and naturalism are usually taken to be at odds. Yet Hegel is an idealist, and it is equally clear that he is also a naturalist in at least the following sense: He does not accept as fundamental any dualism that treats mind or spirit as a separable thing capable of existence independently of material nature. Indeed, he clearly treats mind/spirit as developing in seed, as it were, throughout the dialectical development of nature. There is, of course, a sense in which the Idea is prior to nature, but there is no less important a sense in which spirit develops from and within nature. Thus spirit develops in space and time. Neither geographical nor historical characteristics are foreign to spirit, which, furthermore, also exists in the finite individuality of the human organism at very particular places and times. The symmetry is significant: while spirit is present in space and time, space and time are also present in spirit. They are present in ways as complex as the structure of spirit itself.

Space and Time in Intuition

Jumping from space and time in nature to space and time in intuition, Hegel accepts the Kantian dictum that space and time are forms of intuition. Arguably he cannot mean just the same thing by this assertion, for Kant believed that space and time are *only* forms of intuition, that space and time could

not also be properties or relations among things as they are independently of our cognitive faculties.

Intuition is the first subdivision of theoretical spirit. Thus, in intuition spirit adopts a generally passive attitude towards its objects, seeking to *find* itself, that is, to find *reason* in the object. At its lowest level, theoretical spirit is *immediate* and *objective* cognition, pervaded, however, with the (not yet fully explicit) certainty of and awareness of itself as spirit. It still *appears* to be self-external, like consciousness, related to something *outside* it that is merely *given*, that is to say, *found*. The dialectic of intuition is the overcoming of this appearance.⁶

In more common language, what is really at issue? In Kant, it seems clear that 'intuition' (*Anschauung*) is pretty much equivalent to what English language speakers call 'perception', by which, via uptake of their sensible qualities, we identify objects in space and time and acquire beliefs about them. Not all the properties and relations of perceptible objects are themselves perceptible. Hegel uses *Anschauung* in a broader sense that need not be tied to specifically *sensible* qualities. Whenever we respond to a situation by immediately taking in a complex totality and being able to judge its truth, we are intuiting.

True intuition is full of spirit however, and apprehends the *genuine substance* of the general object. A talented historian for example, when describing circumstances and events, has before him a lively intuition of them as a *whole*, whereas a person with no talent for the presentation of history overlooks the substance of it and gets no further than the details. (PSS III §449 A)

So we can say that, as in Kant, intuition involves the conceptual unification of a manifold—in the first instance a sensory manifold, and later, higher-level complex manifolds. What we do not yet thematise in intuition is the conceptual activity in the mental act. Conceptualisation is always present in intuition, and thus intuitions always operate in the logical space of reasons, but they *appear* to do so without the explicit mediation of reason or our rational capacities.

The three stages or 'moments' of intuition are (1) sensation or feeling, (2) attention, and (3) intuition proper. It is in the second moment, attention, that space and time enter the picture. (We will come back to the issues in sensation and feeling, which also connect with earlier moments of the dialectics of nature and subjective spirit.) The stage of attention has, itself, two moments, one of which is attention (properly so-called), in which some subset of the welter of sensory states found within a subjective spirit emerges as a focal point of the cognitive and cognitive/practical activity of spirit. This emergence within spirit of a specific focus is a necessary condition of the taking up (*Auffassen*) of an object. It yields a preliminary cognitive relation. It is not knowledge (*Erkenntnis*), says Hegel, but he does call it '*Kenntnis*'.⁷

I suggest we make sense of Hegel's view here by thinking of intuitions as 'takings as'. They are not apprehensions that purport to be of a mere 'this' (as might be the case in sense certainty); they have conceptual content, which not only provides internal unity to a manifold of sensory material, but also ties that manifold to other manifolds via relations of sameness and difference, thus providing the universal element.

The sensations/feelings that emerge as a focal point of spirit's further cognitive activity have, according to Hegel, the determination of being both objective and subjective. It is subjective, for one thing, because the sensations are states of the subject, describable as such in their own right, and for another, because attention is subject, if only in part, to the will.⁸ But what one is paying attention to is not itself the attention; there is an *object* of attention. Emerging within subjectivity as a locus of attention, the sensations and feelings are distinguished from and made external to their own original being. They become, therefore, self-external, which is made manifest by the adoption of spatio-temporal form. The focus of attention must be determinately distinguished from spirit, even if it is itself something internal to spirit.

What occurs on account of intuition is therefore simply the changing of the form of *internality* into that of *externality*. . . . Two observations have to be made in respect of the significance of this externality however; *firstly*, since what is spiritual or rational constitutes the objects' *own* nature, what is sensed assumes the form of a *self-externality* in that it becomes an object external to the *internality of spirit*. *Secondly*, we have to note that since this transformation of what is sensed proceeds from *spirit as such*, what is sensed is endowed with a *spiritual*, that is to say with an *abstract* externality, and so acquires the same universality as that which can pertain *immediately* to what is external, a *universality* which is still entirely *formal* and *devoid of content*. In this abstract externality however, the form of the Notion itself falls apart (cf. [EPN] §§254–259). By means of intuition therefore, sensations are posited spatially and temporally. (PSS III §448 A)

Intuition thus takes the sensory state to be something self-external—not necessarily external in the spatial sense, though obviously many sensory states are referred to points in space—but in the sense of not being mere expressions of spirit, even though, in a different sense, that is what they are. Even mental states are formally self-external in being temporal, not wholly themselves in any moment. To reiterate:

If we have said that what is sensed derives the form of what is spatial and temporal from the *intuiting spirit* however, this statement must not be taken to mean that space and time are *only subjective* forms, which is what *Kant* wanted to make of them. The truth is that the things in *themselves* are spatial and temporal, this dual form of extrinsicality not being

onesidedly imparted to them by our intuition, but in origin already communicated to them by the implicit, infinite spirit, by the eternally creative Idea. Our intuiting spirit therefore bestows upon the determinations of sensation the honour of endowing them with the abstract form of space and time and so assimilating as well as making proper general objects of them. (PSS III §448 A)

What exactly does this projection of sensation into space and time amount to? Hegel warns us that space and time

are extremely primitive and superficial determinations, forms, therefore, which are of very little significance to things, and through the forfeiting of which, if this were in any way possible, they would therefore lose very little. *Cognitive* thinking does not halt at these forms, but apprehends things in their Notion, which contains space and time as sublated within it. (ibid.)

This is not difficult to make sense of: if one knows only the spatio-temporal properties of things, their *where* and *when*, but nothing else, one knows very little indeed. Absent knowledge of something's sensible qualities, its causal, teleological, and social properties, one has only the barest grasp of a thing, a *something there and then*. Yet the sensible, causal, teleological, and social properties of things absolutely require a spatio-temporal locus and cannot be described without reference to space and time.

However 'primitive and superficial' space and time might be as determinations of things, we cannot be so dismissive when it comes to our cognition of them. It is difficult to dismiss geometry as 'primitive and superficial'; it was an admittedly early but glorious achievement of the human spirit. It was only after Hegel's career that the development of non-Euclidean geometries became known and it could no longer be taken for granted that Euclid's geometry described physical space. Today, the question of the fundamental nature of space and time is clearly recognised to be difficult and still open as physics develops.

Our *conception* of space and time has undergone significant change in the past 400 years. Hegel's claims concerning space, time, and our cognition of them allow the accommodation of modern developments, I believe, for he tells us that space and time are abstract forms, and abstract forms themselves can be organised in genera and species. The subjective space and time into which objects of intuition are projected might be in some perfectly reasonable sense *the same form* as the objective physical space inhabited by things, even if there are specific differences between them.

But puzzles arise as we think these things through. Intuition has conceptual content: what we can intuit depends on the concepts we can bring to bear upon the sensory manifold. If we externalise the sensory manifold in intuition, referring (to use Kant's locution) the sensory to spatio-temporal

locations and relations, do the changes in our conceptions of space and time somehow appear in our intuitive experience itself? It is implausible to claim that *experienced* space changes as our *conception* of space changes. Our *conception* of space and time is open to indefinitely great refinement and specification under the influence of increasingly sophisticated empirical investigation of physical nature, but our *experience* of space and time will be limited by the structure of our sensory capacities, whatever conceptions we have available to synthesise sensory input.

Some of the ideas that Wilfrid Sellars developed in his treatment of Kant can help resolve some of these puzzles. Sellars suggests that Kant's notion of intuition harbors confusions because Kant did not develop 'the idea of the manifold of sense as characterized by analogical counterparts of the perceptible qualities and relations of physical things and events' (Sellars 1967, ch. I, ¶78, 30). The idea of counterpart qualities and relations helps us understand how *the same form* could be found in both nature and the experiences of subjective spirits. What might be more important in the long run is that it also helps us understand that we can represent space and time both sensorily and conceptually. For most of human history, these were assumed to go together: the space presented to us immediately in experience is the same space that we conceptualize in our thoughts and theories. But we now see that the sameness here need only be formal and abstract. The *sensory representation* of space and time may be the occasion of our original conception of space and time, but under the pressure of both empirical and conceptual sophistication, our final and adequate *conception* of space and time might have only a generic similarity to its sensory counterpart.

From a different perspective: Kant treats our *concepts* of space and time as if they are simply derived from—*given* by—our sensory capacities, a kind of *endogenous given* (see Redding 2007). Sellars points out that our conception of space and time is no more a simple given, fixed once and for all by something non-conceptual, than is any other concept. While we do begin to develop our concepts of space and time based on the structural organisation of the sensory manifold as captured in our initial and rudimentary concepts, every concept, as such, is open to dialectical refinement. Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that the best description of the structural organisation of the sensory manifold itself will turn out to be specifically identical with the best description of the structural organisation of nature, even if we can count on their generic sameness.

For both Kant and Sellars, intuition produces states in which we grasp the unity of complex manifolds immediately. In the first instance, these manifolds are sensuous manifolds, but the educated or *gebildete* human can grasp complex, many-layered manifolds. Intuitions are, therefore, an exercise of our conceptual or rational capacities, but it is not, of course the end of the story. Hegel admonishes us that

[m]ere intuition has to be *superseded* however, the necessity of this lying in intelligence conforming with its Notion as *cognition*. Intuition,

however, is not yet *cognitive* knowledge, since *as such* it has not yet attained to the *immanent development* of the substance of the general object, but rather confines itself to apprehending the *unexplicated* substance, which is still enclosed within the *secondary essentiality* of what is *external* and *contingent*. Intuition is therefore only the *initiation* of cognition. (PSS III §449 A)

The apparent immediacy of intuition is possible only within a context in which the implicit activity of recollection and conceptualisation has become explicit in representation and thought.

Space and Time in Sensation and Feeling

My quick handwave to the culmination of intuition presupposes that Hegel has a robust conception of sensation and sensory states, so now it is time to make that case. First, of course, is that in order to understand Hegel's conception of sensibility, we cannot confine ourselves to the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. Sensibility is a function (indeed, the distinguishing feature) of the animal organism and receives extensive treatment in the *Philosophy of Nature*.

In the animal the self is for the self, and the immediate consequence of this is that the *differentia specifica* or absolute distinguishing feature of the animal, is the completely universal element of its subjectivity, the determination of *sensation*. (EPN §351 A)

Second, whereas Kant has been the background against which we've understood Hegel's text so far, it is Aristotle who most significantly informs Hegel's thought about sensation—especially the idea that there is an identity of form shared between the sensation and the object sensed.

Hegel's attempt to explain the very nature of sensation is fascinating but obscure. I have elsewhere discussed it at some length (deVries 1988). In brief, there are certain determinations of the animal organism that manage to be present in the animal simultaneously as generic and as specific, by which means those determinations are not only present *in* the animal, but *to* the animal as well. These determinations are tied to certain organs, the sense organs and nerve fibers of the animal.

However intriguing Hegel's attempt to explain the nature of sentience, the focus here is on the presence of space and time in experience. Although Hegel 'officially' introduces space and time into subjective spirit only at the level of intuition, space and time clearly must be present in more primitive levels of experience.⁹ It is not difficult to see why. Animals orient themselves in a spatio-temporal environment; they find food, shelter, and mates, often evade predators, and they have some sense of the boundaries between themselves and the world around them. All of this involves their sensory interaction with the world. Higher animals must, therefore, have at least a sense of where they

are and where the things they need are, and they can figure out trajectories between moving objects, whereby time enters their ‘calculations’.

The dialectic tends to move from the less to the more determinate, and this must be the case with regard to the presence of space and time in experience. In intuition humans confront the world via a determinate, even if abstract, form of sensibility, one that enables them to *measure* space and time and recognise in them the highly determinate forms of geometry and chronometry. The forms in which space and time are available to animals, we have to think, are less determinate: near and far, big and small, just happened and sometime back, mere directionality—these are the kinds of relations available to an animal. They are tied closely to the practical process of irritability.

Sellars’s suggestion that our sensory states exhibit counterpart properties and relations that enable them to be proxies for objects, properties, and events in our environment can help us understand how it is that space and time can be present both in the world and in our experience. The various sensory systems of an animal contribute to an ideal counterpart construction (in the common sense) of it in its environment.

The animal organism is the microcosm, the centre of nature which has become for itself. Within it, the whole of inorganic nature has recapitulated itself and is idealized. (EPN §352 A)

These counterparts are present in both animal and human, and their peculiarities can account for the shape of differing phenomenologies in organisms with differing sensory structures (e.g., the infamous worry about what it’s like to be a bat) or sensory disabilities. What distinguishes human intuition from animal sensation and irritability is precisely the presence in intuition of *conceptual structure*, the presence of abstract structure as such for the organism, which enables human intuition to ‘apprehend the genuine substance’ of objects.

This brings us to an important question in the interpretation of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*: How do space and time figure into the *Encyclopaedia Phenomenology*? Hegel says:

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit* . . . I have determined the general object of sensuous consciousness as spatial and temporal singularity, *here* and *now*. Strictly speaking this belongs to intuition. At this juncture the object is to be taken, in the first instance, only in accordance with the relationship it has with consciousness, that is to say, as *external* to it. It is not yet to be determined as in itself external or as being self-external. (PSS III §418)

This seems to demand a significant revision of at least the ‘Sense Certainty’ chapter, and it’s hard to see how to make sense of ‘Perception’ and ‘Understanding’ without reference to space and time.

Hegel drops the important hint in the passage I just quoted. What is present to consciousness in the *Phenomenology* is an object that is conceived of as *external*, but not yet *self-external*. The difference is principally that an object that is external but not self-external is an object that is self-contained, complete in itself, different from and independent of the subject. The subject-object distinction is taken to be absolute here, so absolute that either one, subject or object, is supposed to be entirely separable from the other. The *Encyclopaedia Phenomenology* is the story of the overcoming or sublation of this supposedly absolute distinction. Only once this distinction is overcome does it become clear that the objects we relate to cognitively are not only external but self-external—that is, not self-contained and determinate entirely in their right, but essentially bound up in contexts, situations, and relations to other objects and to the subjects that cognise them. Only then are they suited to be posited in space and time, the forms of self-externality.

In a more Kantian mode, one might think of it like this: Kant took there to be two basic determinants of the objects of knowledge: sensible form and categorial form. These are independent of each other, but both are simple givens. The forms of sensibility are determined by the contingencies that make human beings what they are, whereas categorial form is determined by the universal nature of judgement. For Hegel, however, these forms are neither fully independent of each other nor simple givens. Springing from a common root, subject and object, sensible and conceptual form, are mutually dependent. In the subject/object dialectic, therefore, there can be stages at which the object is distinguished from the subject and therefore external to it, without that object yet being conceived of as determinately self-external and enmeshed in a metric space and time. The logic of *objecthood in general* is distinguishable from the more determinate logic of *spatio-temporal objecthood*; a transcendental deduction does not depend on the specific details of a metric space and time. Objects in their full generality are immediacies that unify abstract and general properties in particular ways and are both distinguishable from each other while necessarily connected via robust subjunctives. Spatio-temporality is a specific form of objects. The *Encyclopaedia Phenomenology* is the dialectic of objecthood in general.

Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* has long been an unjustly neglected part of Hegel's system. This regrettable situation is beginning to change.¹⁰ There is a wealth of interesting material in this text that cannot be discussed here, e.g., the distinction between sensation and feeling. I leave the reader with the thought that Hegel made significant strides towards an understanding of the mind over the work of his predecessors at the very least because he took our continuity with other biological entities seriously. Of course, this immediately rules out Cartesian dualism. More significantly, it paves the way to requiring evidence for any claimed distinction between humans and animals, paving the path towards Darwin, who finally gave us the framework that put us on the proper path to understanding our relationship to

the animal kingdom. What I have called Hegel's naturalistic 'moment' is the source of a great deal of the richness in his treatment of spirit.¹¹

NOTES

1. We now know that Leibniz's esoteric doctrine, as opposed to his exoteric doctrine, taught that space and time were *phenomena bene fundata*.
2. The EPN is quoted according to Petry's translation (1970).
3. See Sally Segdwick (2012) for a good discussion of Hegel's rejection of transcendental idealism.
4. I believe Hegel observes this distinction, but I won't argue that here.
5. 'In so far as it is not a philosophical science, geometry may *assume* the universal determinations of space as its object, and it is not to be demanded of it that it should deduce the necessity of the three dimensions of space' (EPN §255 R; my emphasis).
6. '[T]he *sole* purpose of the activity of spirit is to sublimate the apparent *self-externality* of the implicitly rational object, and so refute even the apparency of the general object's being external to *spirit*' (PSS III §447 A).
7. My urge is to translate this as 'acquaintance', which is probably the most natural translation. Among English-speaking philosophers, 'acquaintance' has become closely tied to its use by Bertrand Russell as a technical term whose supposed role is the ultimate and certain foundation of our knowledge. That is *not* what Hegel has in mind here. Petry (PSS III 1978) tries to evade this association in his translation by talking of 'information', but that doesn't seem quite right to me either. Wallace/Miller (EPM 1971) simply ignores the distinction between '*Erkenntnis*' and '*Kenntnis*', translating both as 'knowledge', though adding in that '*Kenntnis*' is 'only superficial, not systematic'. Inwood (EPM 2007) contrasts 'cognizance' to 'cognition' to capture Hegel's terminology (EPM §448 A).
8. See EPM §448 A (according to Inwood 2007): '[A]ttention is something dependent on my willfulness (*Willkür*), therefore, that I am only attentive when I will to be so.'
9. This point is connected in complex ways to the distinction I made above between the phenomenology and epistemology of space and time. Space and time seem to be phenomenologically present to higher animals, arguably in ways not unlike its phenomenological presence in human experience, although ultimately this is an empirical question. But the epistemology will have some significant differences.
10. For instance, Stern 2013 and, of course, this volume.
11. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Bonn Summer School on Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit. My thanks to Markus Gabriel. The editors of this volume, Susanne Herrmann-Sinai and Lucia Ziglioli, gave me very helpful comments as well, for which I am grateful.

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13 Conceptualism, Non-Conceptualism, and the Method of Hegel's *Psychology*

Luca Corti

1 INTRODUCTION

In the past few decades, there has been a revival of interest in Hegel, thanks largely to a number of scholars who claim that he can provide conceptual resources for answering, (dis)solving, or overcoming some interesting problems concerning philosophy of mind, the nature of our conceptual activity, and the anatomy of knowledge. One of the main questions that helped bring Hegelian ideas back to center stage concerns the nature of perceptual experience. More specifically, it concerns how conceptual components inform our perceptions: is the content of our perception fully conceptual? Are there perceptual intentional states that do not involve concepts? And do humans enjoy such states? The debate surrounding these questions has come to be known as the quarrel between conceptualists and non-conceptualists. Robert Hanna, prominent voice in the debate, sums it up as follows:

In a nutshell, non-conceptualism says that our cognitive access to the targets of our intentionality is neither always nor necessarily mediated by concepts, and furthermore that our cognitive access to the targets of our intentionality is sometimes wholly *unmediated* by concepts; and conceptualism says that our cognitive access to the targets of our intentionality is always and necessarily mediated by concepts. Here, then, is the fundamental philosophical issue: can we and do we sometimes cognitively encounter things directly and pre-discursively (non-conceptualism), or must we always cognitively encounter them only within the framework of discursive rationality (conceptualism)? (Hanna 2011, 325f.)

Many arguments have been put forth on both sides of this debate; they involve general topics such as the anatomy of animal experience, the fine-grained character of human experience, the nature of perceptual illusion, the possibility of intentionality, etc.¹ Many of these arguments are not related primarily to either Hegel's view or Classical German Philosophy. However, one strand in the controversy takes place on the turf of German Idealism: scholars have appealed both to Hegel and Kant to clarify their positions

and put forth new arguments. This has generated a parallel debate that is more historically oriented but still deeply connected with the more general controversy.

The debate has in fact focused on Kant much more than on Hegel.² The latter is often brought on stage with a well-known role, sometimes even stereotyped: namely, the champion of conceptualism. This is perhaps due to the influence of a famous group of Hegelian interpreters, deeply influenced by Wilfrid Sellars.³ Among them, John McDowell has famously focused on the topic of perceptual experience, and has defended his position as 'Hegelian, at least in spirit' (McDowell 2002, 269). His particularly influential reading of Hegel finds him a theorist of the full-blown conceptual character of experience. McDowell's approach to Hegel, however, appears to be quite selective. It follows a notorious interpretative path that leads to Hegel through Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and, to present date, has been mainly founded upon just a few of Hegel's early writings, especially *Faith and Knowledge* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Hegel, however, seems to develop interesting views relevant to the topic of conceptualism also in later texts, such as the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. There Hegel deals extensively with a wide range of topics, many of which (like 'sensation', 'intuition', 'language' etc.) are at stake in the current debate.

Looking more closely at these texts is important for at least two reasons. First, they have been widely neglected in the secondary literature. Second, most scholars who *have* addressed the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* in the last decades seem to agree on a reading of Hegel that shares many important views with the non-conceptualists. Hegel has been understood in this context as developing a theory of mind that includes components of experience that are prior to (and independent of) any conceptualisation. Such readings of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* seem to challenge the standard McDowellian picture of Hegel as a champion of conceptualism.⁴ Yet at the same time, those readings have not deeply affected the reputation of Hegel that McDowell defended in his writings. It might therefore be fruitful to inquire into Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, and especially his *Psychology*, guided by the question: was Hegel a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist?

In order to answer this question, however, it is necessary to take a few steps back and introduce some preliminary considerations concerning Hegel's 'method'. As we shall try to show, different ways of understanding the nature of Hegel's argument can *significantly* change the kind of answer we take him to be giving to the problem of non-conceptual content. To put it crudely: different understandings of Hegel's method lead to different (and opposed) readings of his thought, enabling the interpreter to see him as either a conceptualist or a non-conceptualist.

Therefore, in what follows, we shall address the question of conceptualism in the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* by proceeding through three steps: 1) First, we are going to sketch the context, outlining what seems to be the background of several conceptualist readings of Hegel. Starting from

Sellars and his interpretation of Kant, we shall move quickly to McDowell's reading of Kant and Hegel. This general overview will allow us to see how the problem of 'conceptualism' came to be 'translated'—to use a Sellarsian metaphor—into the idiom of German Idealism. 2) Next, we shall turn to the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* and try to address the question of Hegel's 'method': what kind of philosophical argument is Hegel developing in this part of his system? How is spirit's progression to be understood? This is a crucial point. We shall distinguish between *two* possible approaches to Hegel's procedure, labeling them 'descriptive' and 'reconstructive'. We shall then present the general features and deficiencies of each, referring to contemporary readings of Hegel in order to illustrate them. 3) Finally, after having outlined the two different ways of reading Hegel's argument, we will illuminate his answer to the problem of perceptual experience and conceptualism.

2 SELLARS'S KANT AND MCDOWELL'S HEGEL

A good gateway for understanding how the problem of conceptualism came to be central for reading Kant and Hegel is the philosophy of Wilfrid Sellars, who laid out a view of conceptual activity and perceptual experience that has been highly influential on the recent history of philosophy. Sellars also paved the way for reading Kant in light of some of the core questions in today's debate. For Sellars, in fact, 'the history of philosophy is the *lingua franca* which makes communication between philosophers . . . possible' (Sellars 1992, 1), and Kant, on many occasions, plays this role as Sellars's spokesman on the topics that are relevant for our purposes.⁵ Moreover, many Sellarsian views and interpretative claims on Kant are shared by McDowell and other conceptualists.

2.1 Sellars's Kant

Sellars was a systematic thinker, and his views about language, concepts, and knowledge are closely tied together.⁶ According to Sellars himself, his thought was informed by many important lessons learned from Kant.⁷ Among them, Kant's view on the relationship between sensibility and understanding was certainly determinant. For one of the core questions within Sellars's system is how to conceive of the relationship between a conceptual (intentional) component of our perceptual experience, which is defined in normative-linguistic terms, and a receptive component, which seems to be causally tied to the world. It is in light of this central issue in Sellars's philosophy that Kant comes primarily into the picture. Sellars claims to be drawing from Kant a central view for his account of perception. It is a sharp division *within* the realm of receptivity. Sellars notoriously identifies two subdomains: 1) a class of non-conceptual representations, which he calls

sense impressions or sensations and 2) a class of conceptual components that he calls *intuitions*.⁸ To put it simply, sensations are non-cognitive states causally linked to the external world; intuitions, on the other hand, are conceptual. As Sellars says:

Not only are sense impressions not the primary objects of knowledge and perception but sense impressions are not cognitive themselves, they are not *knowings*, sense impressions are neither corrigible nor incorrigible, because they don't make any, as Kant pointed out, claims concerning what is the case. Sense impressions are not cognitive, they are not knowings, they are neither corrigible nor incorrigible, because they don't make any truth claim at all. (Sellars 1969–1989, 255f.)

In order to locate the relevant distinction in Kant, Sellars refers to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In particular, he interprets Kant's *Empfindungen* as non-conceptual sensory states that can be easily assimilated to Sellars's *sense impressions*. Intuitions, on the other hand, would for both Sellars's and his Kant also be conceptually shaped components of experience (see Sellars 1992, ch. I–II; 2002a, 269ff.; 2002b, 41, 475).⁹

In order to argue for the *conceptuality* of Kantian intuition, Sellars famously refers to a paragraph in the *Critique* that would later become very popular among conceptualists (CPR A79/B105). In that passage Kant writes that, 'the same function which gives unity to various representations in a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition'. According to Sellars, this means

Kant tells us, in effect, that intuitions of manifolds contain the very categories which can be found in the general concepts which we apply to these intuitions . . . It is essential to see that intuition is a species of *thought*, for any sense-datum like approach makes essential features of Kant's theory of knowledge unintelligible. . . . Although the content of *sensations* does not contain the categories, the content of *intuitions* (of manifold) does. (Sellars 2002a, 406)¹⁰

Here we shall not discuss how Sellars depicts the relation between sensations and intuitions, which changed over time.¹¹ It is sufficient to recognise the basic outline of his interpretation of Kant's account of experience. Sellars understands Kantian *intuitions* as conceptually shaped sensory states.¹² But at the same time, Sellars retains a role for a non-conceptual component of experience (*sensations*)—even if the latter is shaped in a very peculiar non-cognitive and non-linguistic way. Keeping *sensations* in the picture allows Sellars to avoid what he perceives as the wrong path of idealism, 'from Hegel's *Phenomenology* to nineteenth-century idealism' (Sellars 1992, 16).¹³

2.2 McDowell's Hegel

Despite his different philosophical attitude, John McDowell endorses many views about concepts and experience that we could broadly call 'Sellarsian'. McDowell's approach to Kant is also in many ways influenced by Sellars. However, he differs from Sellars in that both his own views of perceptual experience and his reading of Kant are fully conceptualist. According to McDowell, the content of our experience is conceptual 'all the way down,' and it is of the very same nature as the content of our judgements. He entirely rejects Sellars's notion of *pure receptivity*, denying that non-conceptual representations play any role in experience: 'by my lights that is simply a mistake on Sellars's part' (McDowell 2004, 245).¹⁴ Regarding the interpretation of Kant, McDowell dismisses again the idea of non-cognitive states like sense impressions or *Empfindungen*, but he deeply agrees with Sellars's reading of Kant's notion of *intuition*. For McDowell, intuitions are mental representations that are entirely conceptual, and in order to prove this, he repeatedly quotes the same Hegelian passage quoted by Sellars, CPR A79/B105. This could be understood as McDowell's favorite passage,¹⁵ and his gloss sometimes sounds like a paraphrase of Sellars's.

In the so called *Metaphysical deduction of the categories* . . . Kant writes (A79/B104–105): 'The same functions which gives unity to the various representation *in a judgement* also gives unity to the various representations *in an intuition* . . .'. Kant is here claiming, in effect, that intuitions—cases of sensory consciousness of objects—have logical structures, and they are the same as logical structures possessed by judgements. (McDowell 2009a, 94)

The Sellars-McDowell thesis on the conceptual character of intuitions has been challenged by non-conceptualist scholars along several different lines.¹⁶ McDowell does articulate some possible responses, but we shall not consider them here.¹⁷

There is, however, a line of argument in McDowell's reading of Kant that seems particularly interesting for our purposes. McDowell resists the idea of conceiving the conceptual activity involved in the notion of 'synthesis' as an *active combination* of elements that are *per se* non-conceptual. Indeed, he goes so far as to criticise Kant for 'overstatement'. At the beginning of the *Deduction*, McDowell says, Kant provides a guiding principle to his thought when he states that 'all combination, all representation of something as complex is an act of the understanding' (McDowell 2003, 82; see CPR B129f.). But this principle, according to McDowell, 'is an overstatement. It requires him, awkwardly, to contemplate exercises of freedom that are unconscious' (McDowell 2009a, 71). McDowell seems to believe that this 'overstatement' can be easily corrected without betraying the spirit of Kant's philosophy (see McDowell 2009a, 73f.; Sellars 1992, 4). What is important for us, however,

are the motives for this correction: one of the main reasons for deflating Kant's talk of 'activity' is to avoid a *particular picture of perceptual experience*. To use McDowell's own words: a picture 'in which intellectual activity can somehow make experiences of an objective world out of items that are in themselves less than that' (McDowell 2002, 273). This compositional picture is particularly relevant in what follows, for, as we shall see, some interpreters are inclined to attribute it to the later Hegel.

To be sure, McDowell does not charge either Kant or Hegel with this view. In order to understand Hegel's view about experience, one has to go through a different route, focusing on Kant's notion of the 'form' of intuition. More specifically, McDowell sees Kant as wavering on the issue of the 'givenness' of these forms and Hegel as radicalising Kant's conceptualism on this point.¹⁸ According to McDowell, 'the empiricist elements in Kant's own conception are not minimized, but reconceived' by Hegel (McDowell 2002, 274). For McDowell, according to Hegel, the forms of our sensibility can no longer be seen as 'brute-fact features of our subjectivity' that make our access to the world 'subjective' and 'restricted', but rather lie within our conceptual capacities themselves and disclose the world to us in a genuinely objective way. McDowell thus proposes to 'domesticate' Hegelian rhetoric through his own well-known conception of the 'unboundedness of the conceptual' (McDowell 1994, 44).

We have moved very quickly, but, according to what we have outlined, it would not be incorrect to say that, in many respects, *McDowell's Hegel* does to *Sellars's Kant* what McDowell himself does to Sellars's philosophy of perception. Namely, McDowell rejects the idea of a non-conceptual component of experience—even in the form of non-cognitive *sense impressions*—and conceives the content of experience as falling entirely within the domain of conceptual activity. This makes both McDowell and his Hegel full-fledged conceptualists: they succeed, to use McDowell's terms, in 'incorporating receptivity within Reason' (McDowell 2009a, 64).

3 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SUBJECTIVE SPIRIT

According to McDowell's interpretation, Hegel thus appears to be the champion of conceptualism. This reading, as it has been articulated by McDowell to date, is based primarily on what he sees as the difficulties with Kant's *Transcendental Deduction*, and it relies mainly on *Faith and Knowledge* and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, ignoring the reflections on the topic contained in Hegel's later system.¹⁹ This might be consistent with McDowell's philosophical aim, but it is still interesting to broaden the scope and look at the question in a more systematic way, especially with respect to the later Hegel. In order to do so, one needs to ask: what is Hegel's later conception of the relationship between concepts and empirical content? And more specifically, what is the status of intuition and sensation within this relationship?

As we have said, in his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*, Hegel seems to address the multiplicity of human cognitive activities by systematically shaping the vocabulary of the debate. Hegel discusses the topic of what we can broadly call ‘sensible experience’ at various stages of his argument, addressing it in its different levels of complexity (*Empfindung*, *Gefühl*, *Sinnliches Bewußtsein*, *Anschauung*, *Wahrnehmung* etc.) in a context far removed from a Kantian ‘Transcendental Deduction’. Interestingly enough, when critics approach this part of the system, Hegel often turns out to be a non-McDowellian. Indeed, Hegel is frequently depicted as theorising the anatomy of the mind as including non-conceptual sensory states (i.e., sensations, intuitions, etc.) progressively shaped into states like thinking, or full-blown intelligence, through a process involving multiple steps. The *Anthropology*, in particular, is the site of Hegel’s development of a notion of *Empfindung* that bears many non-conceptual characters, but the *Psychology* has also been read as containing descriptions of non-conceptual contents.

Much could be said about these interpretations and the accounts of Hegel’s text that they offer. Here we shall focus only on a very general feature of them: namely, the kind of argument they take Hegel to be offering. For most interpretations of Hegel as a non-conceptualist seem to be based on particular assumptions concerning the *method* of his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*.

3.1 Description vs. Reconstruction: The Nature of Hegel’s Argument

There are many possible ways of reading Hegel’s text and conceiving Hegel’s ‘speculative’ argument. For our purposes, it is useful to distinguish between *two* different paradigms or general approaches to it: we shall call them the ‘descriptive’ and ‘reconstructive’ readings. Each relies on specific textual evidence and attributes to Hegel a peculiar philosophical procedure. We will sketch the two readings by their general traits, and therefore, our illustration of them will not aim to coincide with any actual interpretations that circulate today. The two models might therefore appear somewhat artificial, but this is not necessarily a disadvantage. One might consider them as ‘ideal types’, in the sense that they exemplify some paradigmatic general assumptions that underlie many current readings but are not always made explicit by their proponents. Thus, while it may be impossible to boil down all current interpretations to either ‘descriptive’ or ‘reconstructive’, we think the distinction worthwhile for mapping the territory of possible approaches to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (and in particular to the *Psychology*).²⁰

3.2 Descriptivism

The ‘descriptive’ way of approaching Hegel’s text is fairly common among commentators. Hegel is often seen as offering some sort of linear progressive

argument, whose steps can be thought of as the ‘description’ of the various activities or faculties of spirit. From this point of view, every section of Hegel’s text appears, in a very specific sense, as ‘autonomous’: it can be understood as describing a particular activity that 1) can be *understood independently* from the others described in the rest of the argument. When Hegel approaches the activity of sensing and its outcome (‘sensations’), for instance, this reading would consider him to describe a potentially autonomous content adequately *defined* in the corresponding sections. This does not mean that, in order to understand the function of a sensation, one does not need to locate it within a wider system or set of activities. But in the descriptive model there is a sense in which the content of *Empfindung*, as it appears in the corresponding section, is a component of experience that is *in principle* ‘separable’ from the other components described in the further steps of the argument.²¹

Furthermore, according to some descriptivist commentators, this content in some cases 2) can *de facto* occur as separated. That is to say: the activity (or set of activities) at stake in a particular section can sometimes enjoy an *actual* instantiation without the presence of ‘higher’ and more complex ‘faculties’ that will appear later in the argument. ‘Sensing’ and ‘intuiting’ are self-standing cognitive capacities in this sense: at least in some cases, they are seen as operating in isolation. Infants and fools, for instance, represent the paradigmatic cases of what Hegel calls ‘the *becoming independent* (*selbstständigwerden*) of the sentient soul, the *separation* (*Trennung*), from mediated, understanding *consciousness*’ (PSS II §406 A; transl. mod.).

The assumptions of *separability* and *instantiability* can affect the descriptive reading in many forms and can be differently applied to Hegel’s text. In many cases, separability and instantiability involve another important view. One could call it the 3) *additive* picture of our cognitive capacities. This idea maintains that, at each stage, the relevant capacity that is being analysed in the argument *adds on* in some way to the previous ones.

The ‘additive model’ can affect descriptivist readings of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* at different levels. If applied locally, namely to the single subsections, the result is a reading in which, at each stage of the argument, both the activity at stake and its contribution to perception pile up, so to speak, on top of previous ones, having a particular *function* in progressively shaping a given content. When the model is applied more *globally* (namely to the three main sections that articulate the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*—*Anthropology*, *Phenomenology* and *Psychology*), *additivity* results in a general picture of the mind composed by three different layers (anthropological, phenomenological, and psychological). The lower layer, called *soul*, can be understood in isolation from the higher ones, and is in a way independent from them. The higher layers simply add up to that level.²² Notably, the ‘appearance’ of new faculties can take many forms, depending on the interpreter: one can speak of ‘supervenience’ (see deVries 1988, 40ff.) or ‘emergence’ of consciousness (Greene 1972, 9). In other cases, one might see the new capacities as the result of some ‘genetic’ development: ‘We are

first feeling souls and then thinking: once only *feeling* souls, we have become accustomed to and capable of thinking and abstraction through repetition and practice' (Gabriel 2011, 57). In this way, the process can be seen either as committed to some chronological considerations or as largely *not* involving any kind of temporal sequence.²³ In any case, the passage from 'animal mental life' to the proper 'human mental life' happens thanks to the appearance of new capacities that accumulate on previous ones, and can be either acquired or produced within the process itself. This makes humans able to further elaborate the content given in sensation.

1) *Separability*, 2) *instantiability*, and 3) *additivity* are the basic components of the descriptivist approach. Starting from these assumptions, this view can result in a variety of very refined readings. According to the descriptivist, Hegel addresses the way in which our faculties *function* or *work* in elaborating a certain form of given content. 'The content or general object . . . appears to come to knowledge'—Hegel says—'*from without* as something *given*' (PSS III §442 A). Thus Hegel appears to describe various forms of cognitive activity exercised upon this 'given' material—or some content that has the form of 'immediacy' and is transformed into thought. Hegel commonly uses expressions like *verarbeiten*, *verknüpfen*, and *assimilieren* in order to describe this cognitive process in a metaphorical way (see also PSS III §445 A).²⁴ His system also seems to allow for this kind of interpretation, since he often writes as if he is explaining how things work in the mind, with different activities *adding on* to each other and, by the same token, *adding* new features to a certain content:

First we speak of intuition [*Anschauung*], then of representation [*Vorstellung*], insofar as it is directed to intuition; then we speak of the imagination [*Einbildungskraft*] as it is directed to the representing activity . . . Next we speak of memory [*Gedächtnis*], where this is directed to representation of images. What is present in representation is transformed by memory. (LPS 202–203/VP 182–183)

According to the descriptivist account, every step considered in the argument corresponds to a faculty or an activity that, so to speak, operates on the result of the previous one and further elaborates it. Thus, for instance, the content of an act of intuition (like intuiting a pink ice cube) would provide the material for the exercise of the next activity of spirit, whose outcome, in turn, will serve as the starting point for a further elaboration by a different activity. (To use an image: one could call this an 'assembly-line' model of spirit.)

Some instances of this paradigm of understanding Hegel seem to appear in Richard Winfield's reading, who describes the process of intelligence in the following terms: 'Intuitions become representations when the mind recollects them', then, in a further step, the image is 'the form intuition takes upon becoming produced and reproduced by mind' (Winfield 2010, 20).

Winfield's talk about different 'types of mental content that precede thought in the life of intelligence' (Winfield 2007, 60) also seems to point in the same direction, namely towards a reading based on the 'separability' thesis.²⁵ Another illustration of this way of thinking is in a recent article by Jere Surber, who explains this using a diagram that associates to every step in Hegel's argument a corresponding faculty, which would be 'described' by Hegel together with its products (Surber 2013, 200).

Many texts in the secondary literature that address Hegel's *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* give the impression that they are reading it according to this general picture.

The strongest evidence for this kind of interpretation could be found in a very famous passage not in the *Psychology* but at the very beginning of the *Encyclopedia Logic*. Here Hegel refers to what he calls the 'chronological order' involved in what appears as the process of cognition.

Chronologically speaking [der Zeit nach], consciousness produces for itself [sich macht] representations of objects prior to generating concepts of them. What is more, only by passing through the process of representing [das Vorstellen] and by turning towards it, does thinking spirit progress to knowing by way of thinking [denkendes Erkennen] and to comprehending [Begreifen]. (EL²⁶ §1)²⁷

These and other similar passages have been interpreted as keys for reading the *Psychology*—together with some parts of the *Anthropology*—according to the description of our cognitive activities progressively working upon each other, reshaping a given content until reaching 'thought' (as successive operations that spirit exercises on a certain object, or *Gegenstand*). From this perspective, it is not difficult to see Hegel as theorising a component of experience prior to any linguistically articulated conceptualisation of it.




Figure 13.1 Surber's Diagram

Some scholars identified this element in *sensation*, for instance, but the same could be said with respect to *intuition* or *feeling* (deVries 1988, 54; Gabriel 2011, 40ff.; Houlgate 2006, 242f.; Winfield 2007, 63).²⁸

3.3 Problems with the Descriptive Approach

The first general concern with this descriptivist approach is tied to the fact that it seems to refer us back to what Hegel has criticised as an *aggregative* conception of *Geist*. In his attack on *empirical psychology*, Hegel notoriously argues against the very idea of *separation* of the so-called faculties (what he calls the various determinations of the activity of spirit). It is not difficult to find passages in which he explicitly rejects approaches that proceed by separating activities: here Hegel claims, ‘whatever is *distinguishable* in the activity of spirit is defined as an *independent determinateness*, and spirit is so treated as an ossified and mechanical *agglomeration*’ (PSS III §445 R; transl. mod.).²⁹ In *some* respects, the descriptivist model risks committing to an idea of ‘separation’ that shares a relevant character with the one underlying empirical psychology, criticised by Hegel himself.³⁰

The linear-descriptivist approach might moreover lead to an awkward multiplication of mental events and activities. By extending the idea that each section corresponds to a particular activity, the descriptivist reader appears convinced that Hegel’s picture of mind is populated by a large number of elements. A further question is raised by the fact that Hegel *repeats* many topics at different levels of his argument (feeling, for instance, appears three times, as part of the *soul* but also *consciousness* and *intelligence*). Must we see Hegel in this way ‘describing’ three episodes different in kind? How would the ‘descriptivist’ reading accommodate such apparent repetitions?

Yet another challenge related to the descriptive approach presents itself when we consider that the progressive operations carried out by the subjectivity on a certain content, starting from a lower level, are presumed able to generate *objectivity*, or *objective purport*. The problem here may be framed in different ways. Let’s assume we start from *sensation*, which Hegel often describes as a state that is non-cognitive, non-linguistic, and whose content is singular.³¹ We have seen that, according to some descriptivist approaches, sensation is a *separable* component of human experience, perhaps shared with other non-human animals. It can also possibly be processed through various stages, in order to achieve an intentional representation of an object.³² At this point, a major concern may be raised, which we already mentioned with regard to McDowell’s reading of Kant. To use McDowell’s formulation: how can an intellectual activity ‘make experiences of an objective world out of items that are in themselves less than that’ (McDowell 2002, 273)? Although Hegel talks about a subject that ‘creates’ (*erzeugt*) or ‘constructs’ the world, surely this way of looking at it could activate what McDowell calls ‘phobia of idealism’ (McDowell 1994, 39).³³

The descriptivist account for how Hegel conceives the relation between a non-epistemic, non-cognitive episode (*sensation*) and a conceptually shaped representation of the world, produced by a ‘spontaneous’ activity that acts on that content, seems hindered by many drawbacks.³⁴ There are many ways to spell out the descriptivist reading and therefore to reply to these problems. For us, it is sufficient to note that these questions arise insofar as all readings are more or less (locally or generally) committed to the *separability thesis*, as well as to other views about the relationship among faculties. If one rejects these assumptions, one might get a different take on Hegel’s argument—and avoid some of the difficulties sketched above.

3.4 Reconstructivism

A different way of looking at the argument presented by Hegel would consist in considering the single sections not primarily as *descriptions* of some sort of cognitive activity but as parts of a global *retrospective reconstruction* of the conditions for a cognitively contentful experience. In his lectures, Hegel himself seems to describe his procedure in these terms: near the end of the section devoted to *Theoretical Spirit*, he recapitulates ‘what we have previously seen’ as ‘reconstructing intuitions . . . as thoughts’ (LPS 240/VPG 228; trans. mod.). What does ‘reconstructing’ mean and how is it possible to conceive ‘intuitions as thoughts’?

Generally speaking, from the point of view of the reconstructivist, each form that spirit assumes in the process outlined in the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* can be seen as an attempt to make human experience intelligible by using different modes of activity. Each of the main paradigms considered (*soul, consciousness, intelligence*) would therefore be characterised by certain kinds of ‘mental’ episodes and corresponding contents, as well as by different conceptions of the self. In the course of the argument, Hegel would then *articulate* the conceptual implications of each model, showing that closer consideration reveals it to be insufficient. This would prompt progressive articulation of a more adequate cognitive structure. In the *Psychology*, for instance, where Hegel provides his most ‘constructive’ account of cognition—starting from *Anschauung* and proceeding through *Vorstellung* and *Denken*—he would explore the logical structure of activities, highlighting their insufficiencies in providing a fully deployed cognitive activity.³⁵

In some places Hegel defines his argument as a progressive ‘*Vergeistigung*’ and describes it as the process ‘whereby this material is spiritualized and its sensuousness sublated’ (PSS III §442 R). According to the reconstructivist approach, this sublation of sensuousness is *not* to be understood as some kind of elaboration of an empirical content that is initially ‘given’ in an intuition and then further elaborated by a string of faculties. It would be rather a progression in the *understanding* of the true nature of human cognition. The whole argument could thus be understood by what Hegel calls ‘a Notionally determinate and necessary transition of the one determination

of intelligent activity (a so called spiritual activity [*Vermögens des Geistes*]) into the other' (PSS III §445).³⁶

The process progresses through different stages which, as in the previous reading, are not always easy to follow and have to be considered in closer detail. Nevertheless, conceiving Hegel's argument in these terms—i.e., stressing the *Geist*'s knowledge of itself, in its *conceptual retrospective* articulation, instead of highlighting the progressive *descriptive import* related to the single faculties—changes both our understanding of Hegel's theory of cognition and the tensions found in Hegel's text.

Firstly, over the course of Hegel's argument, it may happen that some structures are self-contradictory and do not allow (*per se*, as they are 'described' in the corresponding section) *any* separation or instantiation. Secondly, since the reconstructivist reads each stage of Hegel's retrospective reconstruction as providing a more adequate and conceptually inclusive account of what precedes, she might claim that the appearance of a new activity changes the *very nature* of the previous ones. The reconstructivist is therefore strongly compelled to deny the *separability thesis*: the very *definition* of the content at stake at each stage is not adequate if one restricts oneself to what Hegel says in the corresponding section. The various faculties we encounter along Hegel's reconstruction are indeed notionally *distinguishable* in a retrospective process through which spirit articulates its own understanding of cognition. It is only at the end that we discover their true form (and so the true form of experience). 'The intelligence is the universal that specifies itself' (LPS 247/VP 246). In this process, intelligence has to 'attain the goal set for it by its notion', and only when that is attained is it 'that in truth which initially it merely *ought to be*, namely *cognition* [*Erkennen*]' (PSS III §445 A).

The reconstructivist approach could also be presented as a particular way of reading Hegel's discussion of 'form'. According to some of Hegel's passages, each cognitive capacity shapes its content in a characteristic *form*. The progression from one faculty (or activity) to another must be a progression relative only to the *form* (in some sense of this term) of that contribution. Such a progression must not, accordingly, alter the *content* of experience. It must, in Hegel's words, 'sublate the form of immediacy or subjectivity' (PSS III §442). Whereas the descriptivist sees the process presented by Hegel as a progressive cognitive enterprise, in which mind works on a particular 'given'—transforming it into thinking by freeing it from the form of immediacy—the reconstructivist conceives the process of intelligence as a progressive comprehension of the true *form* of experience and cognition. As Hegel states in a widely cited passage of the *Encyclopedia Logic*:

The human content of consciousness which is grounded in thought does not at first *appear in the form of thought*, but rather as feeling, intuition, representation, i.e. *forms* that must be distinguished from thought *as forms*. (EL §2)

Nevertheless, as Hegel famously emphasises: ‘Feeling, intuition, image, etc., are in this respect the *forms* of such content, a content which remains *one and the same*, whether it is felt, intuited, represented, willed.’ (EL §3) Only at the end of this path of self-knowledge is the content of intelligence fully understood (see LPS 236/VPG 226).

In this sense, to use a distinction that Hegel himself applies in his *Realphilosophie*, intuition might be ‘abstractable’ as a part of a whole, but it is not ‘extractable’ from it (SEL 223). Notionally ‘extracting’ intuitions from the rest of the argument would therefore provide us with a concept of ‘intuition’ impossible to think of as actual. The same could be said for sensation, which Hegel *inter alia* explicitly defines as ‘the contradiction’ (PSS I, 125).³⁷ Hegel’s treatment of sensation and intuition thus could be considered complete only at the end of Hegel’s argument. If the capacity for intuiting, in itself, is something that Hegel considers affected by strong insufficiencies, then intuiting, in his ‘concrete’ form, should be understood only in a context in which a subject is able to exercise other capacities, like deploying symbols, using language, and having thoughts. This capacity, in turn, affects *the very nature* of intuition, whose content thus acquires a different ‘form’: the true content of intuition seems eventually to be conceptually shaped.

At a more general level, this reconstructivist way of talking about ‘form’ appears, among other things, to be aligned with Hegel’s appreciation of the relationship between different ‘souls’ in Aristotle. As Alfredo Ferrarin notices, an important feature of Aristotle’s theory of mind that Hegel subscribes to is precisely his refusal of the *separability thesis*. Hegel praises Aristotle for not splitting the human soul in three different parts but rather attributing to the rational soul the function of the lower levels. Ferrarin contends that according to Hegel

[t]he meaning of the consecution of the three souls, or the shapes, is that the first is the ‘truly universal’ . . . , in that the vegetative soul is potentially or ideally contained in the sensitive soul the way a predicate inheres in a subject (VGP 204). In this fashion, each form becomes matter for the superior form. Aristotle has rightly considered spirit as ‘a series of successive determinations’ (VGP 199); his great insight is that the different souls are not to be conceived as independent but as ideal moments, as forms of a functional unity. (Ferrarin 2001, 249f.)³⁸

This leads us to a more general consideration regarding the difference between a ‘reconstructivist’ and a ‘descriptivist’ approach: by deflating the separability thesis, the reconstructivist appears inclined to water down the peculiar self-standing status that the descriptivist attributes, for instance, to the anthropological sections presenting ‘soul’ (and to the components of experience associated with that form of subjectivity). In this sense, one should not imagine Hegel as trying to shed light on an independent layer of our mental anatomy. More generally, the reconstructivist denies a picture of

the mind as constituted by multiple layers that would correspond to the different sections of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (see Bourgeois 1994).

Lastly, it is worth highlighting some difficulties the reconstructivist has to face. In relation to Hegel's text, she must take into account all the passages in which Hegel does seem to characterise the operations of cognitive faculties as *separable* (not only in children and animals but also in phenomena like madness, for examples, or animal magnetism—see PSS II §§403ff.). Furthermore, there are passages that seem to suggest that Hegel conceives of cognition in a very descriptivist, compositional way. Hegel claims, for example:

So far there is a stuff, a matter, set before thought, which thought works on, we say that thought is applied to this material, i.e. the particular is subjected [*unterworfen*]. Thought in its applying itself to this stuff that appears external to it is what we call thinking knowledge—when thought as such transforms a matter into thought. (LPS 240/VPG 229)

Just as the descriptivist may have a response to the issues arising from the 'separability' thesis, the reconstructivist may have an account for how to accommodate these passages.³⁹ Moreover, the reconstructivist approach has yet to provide a precise distinction between what Hegel considers the deficiencies of each mode of activity, on the one hand, and the coherent aspects that must be preserved through the text, on the other. Nonetheless, as we have seen, the project of defining a more detailed Hegelian picture of the mind based on a 'reconstructivist' reading seems at least as consistent and plausible as the 'descriptivist' approach.

4 CONCEPTUALISM OR NON-CONCEPTUALISM?

We can now return to our initial question. As I have tried to show, in order to understand Hegel's view of perceptual experience and the conceptual activity involved in it, it is necessary to understand the nature of his argument. In his important book about Hegel's theory of mind, Willem deVries attributes several elements typical of a non-conceptualist position to Hegel. Stephen Houlgate also attributes a strain of thought which is non-conceptualist to Hegel.⁴⁰ According to Houlgate, Hegel is a conceptualist in the sense that experience always confronts us with conceptual content, but the conceptual character of this content is the result of a 'work' on non-conceptual, sensuous content: 'our understanding works on the non-conceptual deliverances of sensibility' in order to produce experience (Houlgate 2006, 252).

This point of view, as has been shown, seems in various ways committed to a descriptivist reading of Hegel's method in his *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit*. As we have shown, such a reading might run the risk of inconsistencies, some of which are conceptual, others related to the criticism Hegel himself raises against *empirical psychology* (see PSS I §379).

On the other hand, if we change perspectives and move to a reconstructivist approach, we see that what we were considering as ‘non-conceptual contents’ are not independent products of some faculties, but *partial ways* of understanding a particular content, which eventually, turns out to be *always already* conceptual. For in a reconstructive argument one comes to understand the actual form of experience only at the end of the progression. Evidence for this conceptualist and reconstructive account could be found in the *Introduction* of Hegel’s *Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit*:

Experience means more than mere sensible grasping or mere perception: it already includes a universality within itself. If something *is supposed to count as experience*, there must be a law, something universal, and not merely a particular perception. (LPS 62/VP 8–9)

If one assumes the reconstructivist point of view, Hegel’s account of perceptual experience seems to allow a kind of conceptualism. To state it in Hegel’s own terms: ‘in order to experience, one must provide [*mitbringen*] thoughts and reason’ (LPS 63). From this point of view, experience itself turns out to be permeated by thinking rather than acquiring conceptual form through an external thinking operation (conscious or unconscious). As Hegel himself says of man: ‘logic is the supernatural element that permeates all his natural behavior, his ways of sensing, intuiting, desiring, his needs and impulses; and it thereby makes them into something truly human’ (SL 12).⁴¹

In conclusion: it seems that the choice between non-conceptualism and conceptualism in Hegel’s *Psychology* might largely depend on a prior interpretation of the kind of argument we take Hegel to be offering. Readings of Hegel’s theory of perception that attribute a role to non-conceptual components seem to rest on some kind of (what I called) ‘descriptivist’ understanding of his method. On the other hand, a ‘reconstructivist’ approach to Hegel’s *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* seems to support a conceptualist reading of Hegel’s understanding of perception. Both interpretative views seem to have problems and are open to criticism, depending on which textual evidence we focus on. Both seem to provide a different overall picture of the mind and its activities. Still, I hope to have shown that devoting closer attention to alternative ways of understanding Hegel’s procedure reveals interesting perspectives on both Hegel’s understanding of perceptual experience and his *Psychology* and *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* more generally.

NOTES

1. For an overview, see Crane 1992, Gendler and Hawthorne 2006, Bermúdez and Cahen 2012, York 2003, Brewer 2005, Byrne 2005, Peacocke 2001.
2. Many of the contributions that gave rise to the controversy are collected in Heidemann 2013. See also Hanna 2013a and 2013b, Bauer 2012, Land 2011, Tolley 2013, Wenzel 2005, Gomes 2013.

3. Scholars like Robert Brandom, Robert Pippin, John McDowell, and Terry Pinkard have developed some Sellarsian views into some influential (conceptualist) interpretations of Hegel. Their positions are of course to be differentiated (see Corti 2014). Although he reads Hegel in a different, mostly non-Sellarsian way, Hanna as well labels Hegel's position as 'super-conceptualism' (Hanna 2013b).
4. Among the few articles that refer to the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* in order to highlight the difference between Hegel and McDowell there is Houlgate 2006 and Houlgate *in this volume*. DeVries (1988) holds some relevant non-conceptualist views about Hegel. See also Forman 2010 and deVries 2013.
5. Drawing inspiration from the sage of Königsberg, Sellars put forth his *Variations on Kantian Themes*, in which, by using a Kantian vocabulary, he shaped some fundamental views about perception and how the mind relates to the world. For an analysis of some Kantian themes in Sellars, see Haag 2012 and Corti 2014. For the disagreement between Sellars and his Kant, see Sellars 1992, 18ff. and 1969–1989, 201–202. DeVries (2005, 18) highlights both the originality and peculiarity of Sellars's interpretations of classical texts: 'Sellars often wrote essays on historical figures and movements in philosophy because they provided a convenient foil by which he could put forward his own views.'
6. Sellars's theory of perceptual experience is part of a larger and detailed whole that is behind the scope of this contribution. A pivotal role in his theoretical construction is played by his views about semantic meaningfulness and conceptual activity. See Sellars 1980, 142, and Sellars 1979, 78; 1969, 506; 1975a, 306; and 1991, 34ff. For an overview on Sellars's conceptual role semantics, see O'Shea 2007, and deVries 2005.
7. Sellars claims that, in putting forward his functional theory of concepts, 'the influence of Kant was to play a decisive role' (Sellars 1975b, 285).
8. Primarily this view is offered in Sellars 1992, 2002a, and 2002b.
9. Sellars notoriously claims that Kant does not always maintain this distinction between sensation and intuition consistently. McDowell criticises this view of Kant's 'sensations' by relying on CPR A320/B376f. (McDowell 2009a, 110). For a criticism of this conception of 'unstructured sensations inherently lacking cognitive content', see Hanna 2013b, 4.
10. See also Sellars 1992, 4; Sellars 2002b, 73.
11. See Rosenberg 2007, 236ff. and 270ff. for an account of how Sellars conceives of it after Sellars 1992.
12. Accordingly, they can be thought of as analogous to linguistic expressions: 'Kant *does* think of an act of intuition as a demonstrative thought' (Sellars 2002a, 429), which has the form of a 'this-such'.
13. Sellars seems to think that, by denying a role for a causal component in one's picture of experience, one will end up theorising an unconstrained conceptual activity, which in some sense 'creates' the world. The latter seems to be, in the eye of Sellars, Hegel's position. Hegel, he says, had 'muddled the philosophical waters' (Sellars 1992, 29) with respect to the relation between the senses and understanding. Regarding Sellars's general appreciation of Hegelian thought, one can safely join Paul Redding in affirming that 'Sellars regarded Hegel as representing a path to be avoided' (Redding 2007, 26). See also Sellars 1980, 146.
14. See McDowell 2009a (16), where McDowell defines sensations as 'idle wheels'.
15. See McDowell 1998, n. 5 414; 2002, 276; 2003, 79; 2009a, 35, 94–96, 148; 2010, 28.
16. On the one hand, by appealing to textual evidence, focusing on text where Kant seems to hold the opposite view, such as CPR A89/B122 ('objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to the functions of the

understanding'). On the other hand, by looking closer at Kant's definition of intuition and stressing, for instance, that intuitions involve singularity and have therefore to be conceived of as *inherently* different from thought. See Heide-
mann 2013.

17. See above, footnote 8. As for McDowell's own view, the most up-to-date conception of perceptual experience, as far as I know, is to be found in McDowell 2009b, 243ff.
18. McDowell gives his detailed reading of the passage from Kant to Hegel in McDowell 2003, and 2009a. The problem concerning the 'givenness' of our forms of intuition could be seen as summarised in the following passage: 'Kant contrives to represent the combination of manifolds into the formal intuitions, space and time, as a case of the kind of unity that is not intelligible except in the context of the freedom of judgement. But he depicts the fact that it is space and time in particular that are the formal intuitions answering to the form of our sensibility as *a mere peculiarity of our sensibility*, not an attunement of it to the way things anyway are. The Aesthetics positively encourages us to the idea of differently formed sensibilities. . . . That leaves it look like *a sort of brute fact about us* . . . that what are unified into formal intuitions, in our case, are manifolds that are specifically spatial and temporal.' (McDowell 2003, 83; my emphasis). In general, this approach to Hegel through the *Transcendental Deduction* was framed by Robert Pippin (Pippin 1989). Pippin, however, sees a full-blown conceptualism already in Kant's *Deduction* (see Pippin 1989, 30).
19. Hegel is hardly quoted in McDowell's *Mind and World*. McDowell himself states: 'Hegel figures in my book only as an inspiring figure, largely off-stage' (McDowell 2000, 342). Also in the other essays there is only limited reference to Hegel's text.
20. In working out the basic features of the 'descriptive' and the 'reconstructive' approach, one must keep in mind that both readings can be present to various degrees. On the other hand, the readings that circulate in the debate often combine elements from both of our models (how consistently will not be questioned here). In the next paragraph, we shall see how closely our two approaches relate to the answers we get from Hegel regarding the issue of conceptualism.
21. It is worth stressing that separability here means separability *in principle*. The descriptivist can still deny a *de facto* separability, rejecting that something like a human sensation can occur *without* higher activities being in play. What is relevant for us is that, also in the case in which sensation is seen as occurring only with *all* other capacities (maybe simultaneously), the descriptivist says that the *cognitive content* of an *Empfindung* can be consistently understood in *isolation* from any consideration regarding the following stage.
22. Many interpreters have seen 'soul' *per se* as the name for a distinctive *set of activities* and functions that are 'separable', in particular as the Hegelian description for *the unconscious*. Although more differentiation would be necessary, see for instance Mills 1996 and 2000, Christensen 1968, and Severino 1983. In a different way, Klaus Brinkmann seems to confer to the notion of the *soul* a substantial autonomous import: 'The soul according to Hegel represents the pre-conscious, or, in any case, the pre-thematic life which is potentially capable of intelligent self-articulation' (Brinkmann 1998, 9).
23. Some interpreters are clear on this issue. Alfredo Ferrarin (2001, 287), for instance, writes: 'the *Psychology* should not be read as a chronological or temporal development'. Murray Greene (1972, 124) also claims: 'the speculative development of *Subjective Spirit* is not a genesis in time but in notion'. Other interpreters are not equally clear. A different story must be told about Terry Pinkard's view of 'self-conscious life as something that emerges out of our

- natural bodily involvement with the world' (Pinkard 2009, 83). See also Pinkard 2012, 30.
24. For the historical background of this metaphor, see Ferrarin 2001, 222, and Illetterati 1995.
 25. In some other passages Winfield seems to correct the picture by saying that 'what transforms feeling into sensation is not a modification of the mental manifold' (Winfield 2007, 59). However, his talk of psyche as 'preceding' intelligence often seems to foster the idea of two different sets of separable activities. See for instance the description of mind's activity as 'starting from sensation of its immediate givenness, distinguishing this from mind's own intuiting by paying attention and apprehending the intuited object as something in space and time' (Winfield 2007, 61f.).
 26. The *Encyclopedia Logic* (EL) is quoted here according to the Brinkmann and Dahlstrom edition (2010).
 27. See also Hegel's *Fragment on the Philosophy of Spirit*: 'All cognition derives subjectively from perceptions and observations, and the cognition of appearances is not only of the utmost importance, but completely indispensable.' (PSS I 97).
 28. Once again, by holding this view one does not need to deny that in order to enjoy experience of objects we have to be capable of exercising all sets of cognitive activities.
 29. This approach, Hegel says, 'involves treating spirit as nothing but an aggregation, and considering their relationship as an external and contingent relation' (PSS III §445 R; the same point is made in LPS 203/VPG 9, 183).
 30. To be sure, the descriptivist reader will of course have something to say about the *internal necessity* of the argument he attributes to Hegel, thus differentiating himself from the empirical psychologist *strictu sensu*. But does the appeal to 'necessity' suffice, in order not to fall into a view according to which there are different activities, various in kind, each performing a *completely* independent task? According to that view—to quote Hegel's critical remark—'the soul appears as the external connection of all these *diverse types* of powers and activities' (LPS 63/VPG 9f.; my emphasis).
 31. See deVries 1988, 54 but also Ferrarin 2001, Greene 1972, and Wolff 1992. We cannot go into a more detailed analysis of sensation here.
 32. See, for instance, Houlgate 2006, 244, 251. Houlgate provides one of the most refined and accurate accounts of Hegel's views on perceptual experience. Here, it shall not be discussed in its entirety. It is important, however, to notice that a) Houlgate confers a certain autonomy and 'separability' to the single sections of Hegel's text (although only *in principle*, whereas *de facto* all activities are *always* performed together) and b) he stresses Hegel's vocabulary of 'activity', seeing thought as operating—although instantly, in the very moment of the occurring perceptual act—on a non-conceptual element. He contends, for instance, that according to Hegel 'thought, as consciousness, actively conferring objectivity on sensory content that otherwise lacks it' (Houlgate, *in this volume*). These features of his reading are shared with what we called a 'descriptivist' approach.
 33. In his exchange with McDowell, Houlgate seems to be aware of the problem. His way of securing *genuine* objectivity to an initially non-objective content—without falling into some form of 'subjective idealism'—appears to involve at least two strains. First, he contends that all elaboration of the non-intentional content happens in the *very same moment* of perceiving (there is just *one* perceptual act, in which all activities occur at once). This, however, does not seem to alter the 'constructed' nature of that content. What does then grant that the construction is not only a *mere* 'construction'? In a more promising line of argument, Houlgate refers to Hegel's idea of thought (see Houlgate, *in this volume*),

which should secure the genuine objective character of what we perceptually perceive. 'To put it simply, thought knows a priori *that* there is and, in its basic structure, *what* there is.' Therefore, Houlgate adds: 'our conceiving of what we see as an object, and as an object that *is there*, is justified by *thought's* knowing that there are objects (and how such objects are structured).' A discussion of this strategy is outside the scope of our contribution. For another explanation of the genesis of objectivity out of non-objective content in Hegel, see Gabriel (2011, 55): 'The self-feeling soul alienating that which it feels (itself) from itself so as to engender, through this splitting, an other to which it refers.'

34. Another question arises about how experience, so conceived, can function as a *justification* for our judgement about the world. At this point, however, some possible responses are open, see Houlgate 2006, 250 or Pinkard 2012, 24ff.
35. To conceive of our experience only in terms of *Anschauung*—as it is described by Hegel—would mean not having the conceptual resources to understand the actual (Hegel would say 'concrete') content of our experience.
36. Hegel stresses the *necessity* condition frequently (LPS 9/VPG 9; PSS III §442).
37. Therefore, according to the reconstructivist, sensation as such—as it is described in the *Anthropology*—is *not* instantiable as part of human mental life. A different story must be told for sensations as it appears in the *Naturphilosophie*. Pinkard (2012, 29) is one of the few commentators who draws a distinction between the two occurrences, denying that Hegel theorises a common cognitive element, called 'sensation' that humans share with animals. Hegel does not claim 'the idea that in our seeing something blue, we are having the same qualitative sensation that the color-sighted animal is having'. The same is in Bourgeois 1994. Hegel sometimes describes the whole argument of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* as aiming at solving of the contradiction implicit in his notion of 'sensation'. See for instance: 'The soul is this immediacy, where the contradiction is not [yet] posited. The second [moment] is always the positing of the contradiction, the difference in relation. The aim is to solve the problem of 'Consciousness'. This is spirit, the resolved contradiction, the contradiction as reconciled.' (LPS 169) This might be evidence for *not* considering the sections on soul and consciousness as having *per se* a strong descriptive import.
38. On this point, see also Chiereghin (2011, 26).
39. For example, by looking closer at the idea of 'anticipation' that Hegel deploys in the *Anthropology*, or possibly to the different meanings of *sensation* that appear throughout Hegel's system.
40. For Houlgate, however, Hegel *also* holds some views that are typical of conceptualism (Houlgate 2006, 252 and *in this volume*, 63/64).
41. The *Science of Logic* (SL) is quoted according to di Giovanni's translation (2010).

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14 Freud, Hegel, and the Mind, and Philosophy as Retrieval

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PREAMBLE

Freud's debt to German Idealism, though recognised, is discounted against his founding conception of psychoanalysis as a science. Psychoanalysis's wartime transplantation to the English-speaking world coincided with the rise of analytic philosophy, the rejection of idealism and the resurgence of empiricism. When Hegel's philosophy of mind is explicitly drawn upon by commentators on psychoanalysis, the occlusion of idealist traits in psychoanalysis' Anglophone reception is compounded when key ideas are lost in translation or misinterpreted. Notably, Hegel's developmental account of mind is read as a causal one, adduced in support of Freud's claims of psychoanalytic discoveries in this field, from similarities and resonances between them. This misinterprets Hegel's philosophy of mind (including, where it is considered at all, his own *Psychology*) as a psychology of individual development and consequently provides no support to Freud's theory.

Also notorious are difficulties with Hegel's term *Geist*. I follow accepted usage in referring to Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*'s third section as the *Philosophy of Spirit* (EPM). Parenthetically, we should note that within the second section of the *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit* (itself constituting the first part of EPM), the role of the *Phenomenology* is to deal with conscious mind only—in contrast to the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* (PS) which deals with the much broader notion of 'Spirit'. Overall, to avoid the awkwardness of speaking in English of the mind in the general sense of 'spirit' I prefer to use 'mind' to speak indifferently about the mind in general, and the minds of individual subjects (both following the dialectical progression seen in the EPM along a trajectory, starting with the *Anthropology*, *Phenomenology*, and *Psychology*). When the two senses—the individual mind and mind in general—are kept separate it is less disconcerting to talk of mind in general as 'Spirit'; for the latter I use from now on the designation 'Mind-as-Spirit' to preserve the link with individual mind. The trajectory of both is the self-realisation of mind's own concept actively brought into being, the subject of the *Psychology*. The mind's concept of itself progresses towards greater self-realisation by becoming more concrete and determined. Here ambiguity cannot be

avoided: the concept thus brought into being through self-realisation is both that of 'Mind-as-Spirit' and that informing individual mind.

This chapter takes two, complementary, philosophical approaches: first is a critique of the prevailing endorsement within philosophy of psychoanalysis of what I call the Freudian 'Developmental Theory', according to which the developing mind follows a maturational trajectory from a starting point in the thought of the infant. I shall argue that this view, while incoherent, is nonetheless held in place by implicit Hegelian structural commitments. Second is the constructive critical task of retrieval from psychoanalysis of governing ideas from German Idealism.² The work of retrieval offers a parallel with psychoanalytic work itself, yielding here a reinterpretation that psychoanalysis needs in order to understand itself correctly.³

INTRODUCTION

Psychoanalysis' indebtedness to German Idealism, as the master-theory of Romanticism, opens up a field of scholarship across the arts, humanities and social sciences. My own modest strategy here, which I call retrieval, has a modest aim: to view one small part of this field through a window provided by the work of Richard Wollheim (1923–2003).⁴ Wollheim, whose intellectual interests, contrary to the prevailing philosophical climate, included British Idealism, advances an analytic reconstruction of the psychoanalytic unconscious which can be re-presented as capturing what I shall call psychoanalysis' underlying 'Hegelian thesis'. This is not to maintain that Freud drew directly upon Hegel, still less that Hegel 'anticipated' Freud. Rather, I shall suggest that the Hegelian conception of the mind is, while implicit, structural for psychoanalysis. This is not novel in general terms, but Hegel's contribution to psychoanalysis is largely taken to be the development of consciousness and subjecthood in the Jena *Phenomenology of Spirit* whereas the *Encyclopaedia's Psychology* with its account of active mind is little considered.⁵

First however I critique, and reject, a psychoanalytic view of the mind, to which Wollheim himself subscribed, along with other Anglophone philosophers sympathetic to psychoanalysis. I discuss this under the title of the psychoanalytic Developmental Theory.⁶ Originating with Freud himself, it continues, dogmatically, as a reference point notwithstanding later developments within psychoanalysis which draw no theoretical support from it. According to it the mind as Freudian 'ego' develops its subjecthood along a trajectory from an origin that is infantile, primitive and archaic. These terms will be interrogated in what follows, but ultimately Freud's equation of them is stipulative. On this view adult mental pathology is the re-emergence of (or the lapsing, as what Freud calls 'regression', into) early infantile stages of this developmental trajectory. Later psychoanalysts (Caper 1998) have rejected the regressive explanation of pathology, but remain committed to the Freudian equation of infantile, primitive and archaic.

I argue that the Developmental Theory, while untenable, remains fixed in the psychoanalytic corpus by its claim to empirical status. This unwarranted claim evades challenge because of an unreflective allegiance to the inheritance from German Idealism of an ideology, albeit one 'in the descriptive sense'.⁷ Abandoning the Developmental Theory allows idealism's real contribution to psychoanalysis to be explored.

1 THE 'DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY': TWO THESES OF MENTAL DEVELOPMENT

Freud was ambitious to present psychoanalysis as conforming to the methods of modern science in which he was trained. As Frank Kermode has argued, his intellectual moves in this direction were understandable within the form of explanation canonical for the period (Kermode 1985). Despite later philosophical critique of his scientific claims Freud's developmental theorising resists dismissal from the psychoanalytic corpus.⁸ Explanatory references to early mind as primitive, archaic, regressive and infantile abound in psychoanalysis and these concepts also permeate the theoretical vocabulary and presuppositions of analytic philosophers writing on psychoanalysis.⁹ The following is representative: Jonathan Lear tells us that Freud's great discovery was of 'an archaic level of mental functioning . . . so alien as to be unrecognisable' to the subject (Lear 1990, 6). This unrecognisability comes about because of a bodily presentation of thoughts; taking Freud's example from 'On Negation' Lear asks, how something physical like vomiting could count as 'thinking' anything (Lear 1990, 7). The answer is that vomiting (for instance) is a 'primitive mental activity' which is inchoate and 'pre-interpreted' and as such is situated at the beginning of a developmental trajectory: 'It is as though the archaic "thinking" is an early stage of a developmental process en route toward expression in terms of concepts and judgements' (Lear 1990).¹⁰

The Developmental Theory persists, I suggest, because of its function. However precarious its credentials as a psychoanalytic empirical thesis (as we shall shortly see them to be), it provides a façade of scientificity fronting a second (decidedly unempirical) thesis owed to German Idealism. This latter, which I dub the Hegelian thesis, is tacit both in being occluded by the scientific self-presentation of psychoanalysis and as an expression of the ideology of German Idealism; in consequence of which it is, practically speaking, ineradicable from psychoanalysis. The Developmental Theory itself is thus an amalgam of two distinct theses keeping each other in place despite the inadequacies of each. The empirical thesis rests on Freud's important causal insights: that the mind of the individual follows a developmental trajectory and that adult mental pathology can arise as a disorder of development. However, Freud further claims (though contemporary psychoanalysis does not) that adult pathology displays the characteristics of earlier developmental 'infantile' stages. The ill adult's mental states are infantile in character,

because they are re-occurrences of a type of mental state the disposition for which is laid down in infancy, a mode of production of mental states which Freud calls regression. The pathological is thus designated by Freud as regressive, and identified with recurrence of the infantile type in the mind of the adult (Freud 1923, 36). The more plausible claim, then, is that there can be occurrence of thoughts, the disposition to form which was acquired early in life, as certain phobias or beliefs might be acquired, and fail to be modified by experience. But to think of the occurrence of such thoughts as evidence of developmental arrest, or maturational failure, of cognitive and affective abilities, presupposes that there is a trajectory of maturation along which the mind has failed to progress, or has become arrested or away from which it has diverged.

This cannot establish the empirical thesis that there is a maturational trajectory in the first place, for two reasons (at least). The first is that, as above, it is circular; the idea of a trajectory is presupposed in the ideas of development, maturation, and their arrest; the evidence psychoanalysis adduces cannot establish a trajectory because it inherits this circularity. Second, while Hegel gives elaborate content to the idea that the mind follows a developmental trajectory, and while (as I shall claim) this does indeed provide psychoanalysis with its correct concept of development, the idea that the mind is the sort of thing that develops in the way claimed for it by Freud, is implausible to the point of incoherence. I deal with these points in turn.

First, in adult psychoanalytic work, patients' own reports of dreams and descriptions of symptoms provide the data for ascribing mental states which are deemed pathological, whereas for young children and infants their play and behaviour provide the basis on which thoughts are attributed to them (Klein 1961), in a characterisation of infantile mentality based on features from adult mental life already judged to be infantile in character (whether as possessing 'zonal' developmental characteristics of orality, anality, and pre-genitality, or as having the wish-fulfilling character attributed equally to dreams, infants, and adult patients' neurotic symptoms). Thus the empirical thesis's individuation criteria for attributing thoughts to infants and young children derive from a theory of the mental that is erected on the premise of adult mental pathology's resemblance to infantile states; states of mind attributed to children on the basis of their behaviour and talk are already psychoanalytically interpreted as having the 'infantile' characteristics supposedly discerned in adult pathology. Mental states are not primitive and archaic because they are the sorts of states infants are observed to have; they are described in such terms on the basis of theory-laden observation of adults' mental states and interpretively attributed to infants. The empirical question of the nature of young children's mental states cannot then be answered independently of how the Developmental Theory says they are. The supposed developmental trajectory joining infantile and adult states invokes two sets of data points which are not conceptually independent of each other, since the states of mind attributed to infants and young children

are already conceptualised as the precursors of adult psychopathology, and adult pathological states are conceptualised as regressive and infantile.

This suggests dismissing Freud's Developmental Theory as unfalsifiable by clinical observation; observation confirms the claim of a developmental trajectory, because it presupposes it, inviting Popper's charge that psychoanalytic theory is self-confirming (Popper 1972, 33–65).¹¹ Nevertheless, it might be argued that psychoanalysis can be redeemed, since the data for claims about children's development and adult pathology are indeed observations, and the problem is that faced by any genuine empirical theory; since its observations are, always, theory-laden, ascription of mental states based on those observations will require validation by independent theoretical means. However, observations in psychoanalytic work are necessarily refracted through the lens of theoretical interpretation which itself excludes any independent way to confirm the posited trajectory from primitive infantile mind to adult mentality. Here the Developmental Theory compares unfavourably with attachment theory, an empirical developmental psychology whose psychoanalytically oriented operationalised constructs do offer a source of semi-independent evidence for some psychoanalytic claims about mental development (Bowlby 1979).¹²

In fact, the Developmental Theory is beyond saving anyway, being incoherent in its supposition that the mind is the sort of thing that could develop in the causal way Freud assumes it does. Here, Freud's pursuit of intellectual and particularly scientific legitimacy implicates other characterisations of the starting point of the mind's development, which are both unconfirmable by observation and rest upon multiple, if fertile, equivocations centred on the notion of primitivity in different domains.¹³ Freud asserts repeatedly (Freud 1916, 1923, 1925) that the infantile mind is archaic and primitive. It is also 'corporeal'; Freud, as 'biologist of the mind', gives the Romantic conception of the mind a scientific makeover by endowing it with a biological basis, neatly (and ambiguously) labelled the 'bodily ego'.¹⁴ Ontogenetically early mind supposedly arises out of a matrix of bodily urges. These appear in the mind as instincts to think which the mind employs, says Freud, the 'language of the oldest—the oral—instinctual impulses,' a vocabulary in which bodily urges represent themselves in corporeal terms (Freud 1925, 237). In the same biologicistic vein, Freud glosses his own version of the 'myth of the primitive' of early mind on the lines of an 'embryology'.¹⁵ The undifferentiatedness of early embryonic development supplies a biological sense of primitivity as ontogenetic earliness in the individual, and Haeckelian recapitulationism equates this with primitivity as phylogenetic earliness in the developmental history of mankind. Finally, the equation of the socio-culturally primitive with the archaic in Romanticism allows Freud all of the following: the infantile is the corporeal, the corporeal is the (ontogenetically) primitive, the (phylogenetically) primitive is the archaic, and so, the infantile is the archaic. All these equivalences were part of the currency of Romantic thought which provides the out-dated, if contextually

intelligible, basis of Freud's claims about mental archaicism. But their deft compression by Freud into one thesis about mind and its origins should not disguise the fact that they all rest on equivocations between the terms involved. The nature of the infant's mind cannot be established in this way.

Nevertheless, evading much-needed critique, the Developmental Theory slides between these different equivalences, supplying psychoanalytic vocabulary with a lexicon of epithets invoking the archaic and the primitive. What continues to hold this web of psychoanalytic lore in place and allows it to masquerade as a 'theory' is the prior idea that the mind develops along a predetermined trajectory whose point of origin is undifferentiated with respect to the projected end-point. When psychoanalysis contributes its own explanation of pathology as regressive back down the trajectory to the origins of mind in infancy it exploits an identity borrowed, *vide infra*, from Hegelian thought, between the mind of the infant and the mind in its infancy. From this identity it follows that they have the same properties. The mind in its infancy is infantile, whereas the infant's mind at the outset of its (individual) developmental path is undifferentiated, primitive, and archaic.¹⁶

In retrieving the Hegelian thesis from this appropriation by psychoanalysis, I shall be arguing for retaining the concept of the archaic under a different interpretation. In particular I shall suggest that, understood in Hegelian terms, the archaic has another connotation than that bestowed on it by Freud, one which psychoanalysis should take into account.

2 THE PLACE OF HEGEL

The Hegelian thesis, as I am calling it, is the more visible part of a ramified idealist ideology within psychoanalysis, an infrastructure of ideas and conceptual commitments that runs throughout. The Hegelian thesis itself loosely assembles a set of claims about the mental deriving from certain central tenets of idealism. One is the idea that, as the philosopher William Hart puts it, that 'the mind is an artefact of its understanding of itself' (Hart 1992, 232). The idealist conception of mind as self-making was incorporated into psychoanalytic theory as part of the constellation of ideas with which German Idealism articulated the aspirations and convictions of Romanticism. Noting this historical influence, my aim is to diagnose the conceptual error of a misappropriation of idealist thought into the Developmental Theory. What I am calling the Hegelian thesis in psychoanalysis is not therefore to be attributed directly, or solely, to Hegel. Nevertheless, to elucidate it my focus will be solely on Hegel, specifically on the conception of development to be discerned in his *Psychology*. For Hegel, the mind comes into being as it develops in a dialectical progression through which its concept comes to be realised.

Hegel in fact means different things by 'development'; in tacit reference to Schelling's Philosophy of Identity, between some of them he simply asserts identity.¹⁷ Thus developmental progression is, indifferently, that of

the mind of the individual subject and that of the impersonal Mind as Spirit. Individual psychological development thus has the same trajectory as Mind as Spirit towards self-consciousness and reason. Both are ontological progressions, comings-into-being towards the end of a complete self-realisation of their concept.¹⁸ If it had occurred to him Freud might have thought that the identity Hegel assumes between the development of individual mind and Mind as Spirit would provide a ready-made legitimating premise to the Developmental Theory's empirical theory of infant mental development. Not within Hegel's *Psychology*, however. Hegel himself opposed empirical psychology as being based on the 'untruth' of the appearances of mind always on the move through the stages thrown up as the dialectical progression proceeds. Hegel, to return to a contrast drawn earlier, is concerned with the infancy of the mind but not with the mind of the (empirical) infant.

How then should we understand Hegel on the realisation of the dialectical progression in mental development, both in the individual mind, and in Mind as Spirit? In particular, how should we take Hegel's insistence that the mind is self-sufficient for its own coming-into-being? In the *Psychology* all resources for the activity of mind-making, for change and ascent, are to be found within the mind. This is, after all, an implausible claim given the stark facts of human physical and emotional dependence. Hegel will regard these facts as appearances in the mind, but it must be firmly borne in mind that, transplanted outside of idealism, the idea of self-sufficiency of mind cannot be maintained in any straightforward way. Within Hegel's system, the self-sufficiency claim can be understood in Aristotelian terms. The mind at the beginning of its trajectory of development is not what it will come to be, but its final cause is contained or prefigured in the beginning, as formal cause or, for Hegel, the concept. The coming into being of the mind in development realises the mind's concept into what it will become. This is one way to gloss Hegel's terminology of the 'germ'. The 'germ' is the condition of possibility of the end, into which is compressed all that is needed for, and makes possible, the eventual end: the metaphor of the germ condenses formal and final (as well as material and efficient) causes. In the *Encyclopaedia* the dialectical progression through the appearances of mind *en route* to self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology*, and to intelligent mind in the *Psychology*, is the analytical unrolling or mapping-out of Mind-as-Spirit's formal cause.¹⁹

The *Psychology*, though it follows the *Phenomenology*, is not additional or adjunctive to it. It describes the same onward movement towards self-consciousness but as the development of intelligence and reason, the *termini* of subjective mind. Progress is seen from a theoretical perspective on mind's activity, not on what appears to the mind; the *Psychology* works out a catalogue of the mind's activity-types: the faculties brought into play and thereby into existence, in obedience to the requirement that the mind contains within itself what will ground and make possible the next dialectical step in its self-realisation. Every developmental stage is an onward shift of the dialectical movement, controlling and containing its progress, towards a

more integrating and over-arching conception of itself and its capacities. In this way the mind is always working to make itself according to its concept.

3 WISH-FULFILLING THOUGHT

Freud's seminal insight is that wish-fulfilling thought is fundamental to the mind. It is integrated into philosophy of mind as a form of imagining, by Wollheim's philosophical explanation of unconscious thought which, I said, has a fundamentally Hegelian structure. To show this however will require a critical reevaluation of Wollheim's argument to deal with a circularity in his explanation of the role of imagination.

In 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning' (Freud 1911) Freud contrasts two types of thought: reality-oriented thought that represents the way the world is, and 'pleasure-oriented' thought that represents the way the subject would like the world, or some part of it, to be. The first is cognitive, the second is wishful; Freud says that the pleasure-ego can do nothing but wish.²⁰ Reality principle governed thought is oriented to the world; its representational activities are rational and action-producing. Pleasure principle governed thought is oriented to instinctual satisfaction; instinctually produced wishes self-misrepresent themselves as realised through a mechanism which Freud hypothesised as the 'hallucination' of their content and which gives the subject a temporary respite from instinctual demand. Mental life is under constitutive tension between these two modes of thought, in respect of their form and of the ends they serve. To reduce this tension, wish-fulfilling thought is indirectly presented to consciousness; dreams, symptoms, slips and actions all betray unconscious wishes through some disguised representation of their fulfilment. Wish-fulfilling unconscious thought *is* unconscious imagining, imagining which is kept unavailable to consciousness.²¹

Wish-fulfilling thought is however directly observable in the representational activity of the imagination in daydreaming; such imagining represents, or mis-represents what is wished for in such a way or under such a guise that it is felt as real. It also has real consequences in the mind; daydreaming is accompanied with appropriate feelings, of pleasure, satisfaction, or relief from anxiety. Whereas Freud himself uses both *Phantasie* and *Einbildung* as general terms for imagination (as translated by Strachey) indifferently as to whether the imagining is conscious or unconscious, as above, he held that thought under the pleasure principle is intrinsically wish-fulfilling while insisting on unconscious thought's radically different character as omnipotently wish-fulfilling; what is imagined is taken to be real (this is the force of 'hallucinatory'). The question then arises of how a form of thought, conscious or unconscious, can be wish-fulfilling in this way without the subject succumbing to delusion and becoming incapable of satisfying her real wants and needs. Freud's answer is simply that the reality principle supervenes over the pleasure principle in a 'momentous step'. Nevertheless if wish-fulfilling

thought is to contribute to the ordinary working of the mind rather than disrupt it mental regulation must have a dual capability. There must be a mechanism, some capability of the mind, which both allows unconscious imagining to run freely without disabling the possibility of action and can also integrate imagining into conscious reality-oriented thought.

Wollheim addresses this in his explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. In ordinary usage, imagining is the mental activity of entertaining thoughts of, and representing as real what is, or may be, contrary to fact. In daydreaming, content and phenomenology together betoken the occurrence of temporary satisfaction of wishes.²² Wishfully imagining a danger successfully circumvented yields a temporary gain of relief from anxiety; in such daydreaming, wish-fulfilling thought is fully circumscribed by considerations of reality. Conscious imagining is a mental activity carried out in a regulated way which permits the subject to suspend considerations of truth within the duration and scope of the imagining and to represent as real what is contrary-to-fact. Nevertheless such imaginings do not lead to action. They remain truth-sensitive in tracking contradiction between what is wishfully held to be true and what is, outside of the scope of the imagining, held to be false.

Everyday imagining of this sort is therefore a mental activity that is regulated; we may say that it is carried out under a concept of the imagination. A subject must possess the concept (whether explicit or implicit) in order to be able to imagine in this way without acting on her imaginings.²³ However, the effectiveness of a regulating concept of this sort is variable: it may be intentionally abrogated (when 'let's pretend' is abandoned) or unintentionally attenuated by emotions such as anxiety (when imagined fears become real). When regulation of conscious imagining fails, the concept of imagination lapses in ways that are temporary and contingent.

However, contingency cannot explain the role that psychoanalysis allots to unconscious imagining as constitutively part of the mind's activity. Systematicity, Wollheim suggests, is secured by a recalibration of all mental activity in which the concept of the imagination is rendered inoperative, and sensitivity to contradiction is lost. This recalibration is effected by what Wollheim calls the 'archaic theory of the mind' (Wollheim 1979, 56f.; Wollheim 1984, 90f., 142ff.).²⁴ The archaic theory of the mind is a theory in the sense that, when it dominates in the mind, the mind systematically conforms its activity to a conception of itself as omnipotent in bringing about what it thinks. This is not however an all-or-nothing change: the theory is one whose penetrance of mental life is global but varies in intensity along a continuum.²⁵ In ordinary psychology the influence of the archaic theory is minimal, manifesting as over-optimism or unrealistic enthusiasm. Under increasing degrees of its influence mental life may be tinged, skewed, or colonised by its mode of construing thought as efficacious in realising its content. The degrees of wish-fulfilling thought are thus explained within psychoanalysis as wishful imagining under different degrees of control by, or penetrance of the mind by this omnipotence-asserting mode of thought,

against the counterbalance of reality. But why is this mode of functioning 'archaic'? Wollheim tells us that:

the [archaic] 'theory' intermediately proposes for the mental—that is to say, both for the mind and for its phenomena—a conceptualisation in corporeal terms. The infant or primitive man—or, *we must add, regressive man*—is led by the theory he embraces to think of his thoughts as some part of his body or, again, of his thinking as a particular piece of bodily functioning, and this conceptualisation provides us with an explanation of such a person's belief in the omnipotence of thoughts. For, as he comes to attach, *in accordance with developmental norms*, an exaggerated efficacy to this part of the body or that particular piece of bodily functioning, so he will correspondingly overvalue the psychic phenomena he has equated with them. (Wollheim 1979, 57; my italics)

Wollheim here explains Freud's hypothesis of the belief in the omnipotence of thought in terms of the regression to an infantile, primitive, mode of thought where the 'developmental norm' is a corporeal vocabulary for the mental. In conformity with the Freudian equivalences given earlier, Wollheim explains the archaic theory as archaic because it imposes a regression on the mind to an infantile or a primitive mode of functioning, in line with the Developmental Theory.

However, we cannot accept this explanation of the unconscious mind as imagining under the archaic theory once we notice the antinomy produced by the Developmental Theory. Unequivocally implied here is a return to, or a resurgence of, a developmentally earlier form of thought. The antinomy arises because (once again) the nature of that developmentally earlier form of thought is explained, and only explained, in terms of a developmentally later one. The explanation presupposes a concept of imagination as wish-fulfilling thought regulated with reference to norms that belong to a later stage on the cognitive trajectory implicit in the Developmental Theory than those governing infantile wish-fulfilling thought. The explanation of unconscious, wish-fulfilling thought is given as imagining under the archaic theory of the mind in which imaginings are taken as real experiences. 'Adherence to developmental norms' of the infantile mind obliges considerations of reality, with the norms of truth and falsity, to drop out. The imagination released from the constraint of regulation is thus re-configured, as primitive, corporeal, infantile and 'regressive'. To avoid circularity in the explanation we are owed an account of what this infantile form of the imagination is, which is independent of the form of thought that it will develop into and from which it has retreated.

4 HEGELIAN FREUD RETRIEVED?

Uncritically retained by Wollheim, the Developmental Theory not only produces an antinomy undermining his analysis, it also suppresses a different

interpretation of archaicism. Here the idealism informing his thought about psychoanalysis, very likely owed to the early work on Bradley (Wollheim 1969a), brings him nearer to Hegel than his allegiance to Freud has allowed him to notice. Freud, explaining that objective, reality-oriented thought arises when wish-fulfilment's immediate but spurious satisfaction provokes the mind to cope with frustration by producing the reality principle, writes:

the *psychical apparatus* had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the external world and to exert itself to alter them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was presented in the mind was no longer that which was agreeable but what was real. . . . This setting-up of the *reality principle* proved a momentous step. (Freud 1911, 219; first italics my emphasis)²⁶

Bradley voices a very similar idea three decades before (Bradley 1893) when he writes that consciousness comes about when the conflict between the subject's apprehension of the object as satisfying and as frustrating is resolved and the subject comes to see itself in relation to the object: 'We can feel the problem that pressed hard upon the struggling mind and understand how the result has partly solved it.' The defining doctrine of the British idealists was the Hegelian thesis of self-realising mind in the creation of the subject by itself: 'the self (or ego or subject) of the (rational) agent is a self which is always in the making . . . being continuously realised in every course of action and every activity of the (rational) agent' (Milne 1962, 29).

Any psychology's account of the way the mind works depends on the way mind is conceptualised. If psychoanalysis' conceptualisation is Hegelian we should look for a notion of archaicism within a Hegelian notion of development. I propose that we view the developmental progression from Freud's 'hallucinatory' wish-fulfilment to conceptually regulated fantasising, and the supervention of the 'archaic theory', as development towards freedom as Hegel sees it. The argument is owed to a suggestion from Susanne Herrmann-Sinai, that hallucinatory wish-fulfilling thought is a limitation of the subject in Hegelian terms, in being im-mediate.²⁷ In a footnote to the 'Two Principles' paper Freud notes:

It will rightly be objected that an organisation which was a slave to the pleasure principle and neglected the reality of the external world could not maintain itself alive for the shortest time, so that it could not have come into existence at all. (Freud 1911, 220 FN)

From Freud's biological perspective, hallucination provides the limit case where freedom is terminally restricted through failure to survive, whereas the developmental move to the reality principle increases freedom in making life possible.

If daydreaming is imagining under the reality principle, mediated by the regulating concept of the imagination, then imagining under a concept is a dialectical advance towards freedom, in being a mediated form of thought in place of the immediacy of a hallucinatory state. However, whereas Freud's hypothesised transition to imagining under the reality principle might, as suggested, be construed as an increase in freedom, it does not yet conform to the dialectical structure of development since it is not motivated dialectically by the limitation of the subject's wish-fulfilling imagining. Nothing internal to the concept of immediate wish-fulfilment requires or impels a dialectical advance through its negation to regulation by reality; on Freud's account it is the absence of satisfaction by the external world that does this.²⁸ Equally, conceptually regulated imagining contains nothing dialectically oppositional to connect it back to hallucinatory imagination as its own negation. Mediatedness by conceptual thought would not yield by negation to the immediacy of hallucination; rather it would lead to the unregulation of thought. So far, the two forms of imagining appear as Humean independent existences unconnected by the dialectical opposition of mutual negation.

What does impel the onward dialectical development of mind here? We must look again at what might connect these two radically different forms of mental functioning occurring under Freud's different and opposed two principles. For onward dialectical progression to be possible they must to be connected together as two forms of imagining, and as two different forms of thought, they can only be thought of as imagining under the concept of imagining; in Hegelian terms, already thought as two sides of a unitary concept.²⁹ Conceptual progression in the dialectic requires a conception of the imagination that makes regulated imagining a rational advance on hallucinatory imagining. To make this advance from hallucination to reality-oriented imagining, the mind 'had to decide' (or to 'struggle') to produce by its own *Aufhebung* a concept of imagining under which both forms, immediate wish-fulfilment and mediated regulated imagining are seen for what they are by mind's intelligence.³⁰

Here we have the onward development of the activity of mind realising its concept in the mediated activity of imagining, and grasped as such by its intelligence.³¹ For Hegel in the *Psychology* this is part of the dialectical progression towards the full self-realisation of the mind's concept of itself. Every onward movement of the dialectical progression is internally motivated by what is already there, in the concepts that the mind thinks into being. This is so both for the individual concepts of mind's activities such as imagination, and for the concept the mind has of itself. This concept, embracing the mind in all its activities, is aptly designated 'the mind's image of itself', Wollheim's alternative name for the archaic theory.³² This provides a different gloss on 'archaic', retrieving the Hegelian undercurrent in Wollheim's explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. The change which comes over ordinary regulated imagining under the sway of the archaic theory, in which (it will

be recalled) the mind sees itself as omnipotently bringing about what is wished, is no longer to be seen as 'regressive' and unrealistic.

In the *Psychology* mind is bringing itself into being through its own activity; to be self-making is to be *causa sui*. Thus, the *Psychology* shows us omnipotent mind realising its own concept of itself in forward development. Wish-fulfilling thought, both unmediated and hallucinatory, and mediated as in daydreaming, are then determinate forms of omnipotent thinking; put another way, omnipotence in an unrealistic, hallucinatory mode of thought is one of the 'determinations' of the determinable concept of imagining that realises itself in the onward dialectical development of self-determination, by individual mind and at the same time under the overarching concept that is Mind-as-Spirit.

Further, omnipotence in self-creation can also become part of objective mind's development. Mediation by a concept of creativity would regulate imagining towards creating the objectively new, by speculating, hypothesising, conjecturing, or wondering as forms of imagining. Such development would be towards freedom through the increase in mediation by objective, shared rules guiding imagining. This re-interprets Freud's enunciation of psychoanalysis's goal as the freedom of self-knowledge, 'Where id was, ego shall be'. As interpreted under the Developmental Theory, the goal of psychoanalysis is cure when self-understanding liberates the patient from the shackles of instinctual life and from imprisonment within neurosis. Freedom, the ego's coming into being, is indeed brought about by self-understanding, seeing omnipotent thoughts for what they are. For Freud, what are seen are the instinct-driven wishes that press for satisfaction. The psychological defences, attempting to deliver this satisfaction obliquely and avoid renunciation of instinctual gratification, generate neurotic symptoms and mental un-freedom from within the mind itself. Freud, to borrow a familiar (if over-simple) distinction, envisages freedom as freedom 'from'. Freud himself, and subsequent psychoanalytic thinkers have come to see psychoanalysis' goal as more nearly freedom 'to': the freedom to think and to create. On the Hegelian interpretation I propose, the self-knowledge that makes this possible is the increase in mediatedness achieved through dialectical progression. This makes it non-accidental that the freedom to think and create are the achievements which are the aims of contemporary psychoanalysis; they are built-in to psychoanalysis' conception of the mind.

What now is the place of archaicism in this account? The idea of an 'archaic mind' antedates Freud, who first uses it in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud 1900).³³ 'Archaic' comes from the Greek *ἀρχή* whose cognate terms carry meanings of antiquity, genesis and first principles.³⁴ One meaning is 'belonging to an earlier period', a usage corresponding to German Romanticism's preoccupation with ancient Greece (*Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology* 1996, 48). The classicist Armand D'Angour argues that Greece's Archaic period should be seen, not as precursor to the changes ushered in by the Classical period which followed, but as 'container' of the

latter's origins and principles.³⁵ The Archaic was a period harbouring the conditions for the development of literacy and music, and much else new, in the Classical period.

The idea that the archaic is a container and holds within it both the origins and beginnings of what unfolds from it and what controls and guides that unfolding, recalls the Hegelian metaphor of the 'germ', and suggests a place for the archaic within a Hegelian philosophical psychology.³⁶ The mind's archaic theory of itself is then its 'first principle'; the ruling concept that extends back to a beginning that legitimates it and at the same time impels its onward development. This is more than mind's image of itself as omnipotently self-making; it is the concept of itself as archaic in containing the end, and the means, of its development towards freedom. If we take the psychoanalytic unconscious to be mental activity under a self-concept that is archaic in this sense, then unconscious mind itself comes into being in the course of mind's development.

5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

I have advanced two claims about psychoanalysis' Hegelian underpinnings: that the Hegelian thesis of mind as self-making is fundamental in Freud's conception of the mind and that the psychoanalytic conception of archaicism should be radically reread as a Hegelian one of mind's overarching self-concept. This is not to return to idealism but to rescue psychoanalysis' idealist conception of the mind from the specious scientism of the Developmental Theory. Nor is this to deny the empirical fact of mental development, as the growth of the ability to think, feel and interact with other human beings, or that those abilities causally depend on a trajectory of neuropsychological and socio-environmental change.³⁷

The themes in this chapter are preliminaries to further investigation of Hegel's *Psychology*. In proposing this connection of psychoanalysis with Hegelian thought I do not presume to do so with what Hegel himself wrote in the *Psychology* and my account rapidly parts company with the Hegelian progression of the faculties of *Theoretical Mind*. Neither is my identification of idealist themes in psychoanalysis based on Freud scholarship; I undertake neither the demonstration of intellectual influence on psychoanalysis' origins nor the historical reconstruction of its intellectual preoccupations.³⁸ Mine is not a work of scholarship but an enquiry into connections.

Nor however am I simply reversing Freud's 'biologisation' of German Idealism, rendering superfluous my reworking of Wollheim's explanation of the psychoanalytic unconscious. Reinstating the idealist thesis of self-making active mind elucidates contemporary psychoanalytic understanding of the mind. In my two claims I am attempting a retrieval of Hegelian thought in that of Freud, through that of Wollheim. In retrieval, intended as something like psychoanalytic interpretation, I have read Wollheim against himself to uncover what his idealist sensibility uncovers, not only

in the thesis of archaic mind immanent in Freud's theory but also in the work it does in later psychoanalytic thought. On my interpretation unconscious mind is an achievement of the mind's progress towards freedom and, in seeing its progress as development in the Hegelian sense, we see freedom to be that of a mediated, thought omnipotence. Psychoanalysis, as I have indicated, shares this ideal norm of self-realisation of the mind towards its goal of freedom. What however distinguishes psychoanalysis as a psychology is its understanding of mental pathology as mind's activity turned on itself in a mode of failure which, at worst, amounts to its own self-destruction.³⁹

It might then be seen as an omission that I have not dealt directly either with what Hegel himself says about pathology of the mind (in what he says about madness in the *Anthropology*) or with what other writers have found in Hegel's writing that might bear on this. In the *Psychology* in particular, the metaphor of the 'pit' or 'mine' of intelligence storing and supplying images to the imagination has been seen as the forerunner of the psychoanalytic unconscious.⁴⁰ Hegel's thought here (if it does support such claims) does not contribute to my argument. A fuller characterisation of the imagination in German Idealism is undoubtedly needed for my account, but it is not to be found in Hegel's *Psychology*.

More important is the question of how we are to view minds that are still in the making if the mind only fully becomes itself at the completion of development. Unless it is supposed that each individual's mind achieves the entire trajectory prescribed for Mind-as-Spirit, are we to see minds which do not progress fully as defective? This would be to reintroduce the Developmental Theory's mistaken projection of the dialectical progression onto a temporal developmental sequence of the individual mind.⁴¹ According to the Hegelian notion of archaicism I propose, the individual mind as exemplar of Mind-as-Spirit contains its self-realisation *in potentia*. It is in this way that contemporary psychoanalytic thought now understands mind, as a 'permanent possibility' for the ongoing activity of self-making and self-healing.

NOTES

1. Thanks are due to Richard Gipps, Hans-Johann Glock, Michael Lacewing, and the editors.
2. I borrow Wollheim's own term in 'Criticism as Retrieval' (Wollheim 1980) for the critic's reconstruction of the artist's creative activity.
3. 'Psychoanalysis' covers many theories; I use the term to refer to Freud's own theory and its Kleinian development.
4. Wollheim wrote on Freud but never systematically on later, Kleinian, theory. He did not engage with issues of psychoanalytic technique nor consequently with the clinically based theories being developed by the post-Kleinians (including his analyst Leslie Sohn), probably understanding these from his own analytic experience. Psychoanalytic observation is almost entirely clinical; scholarly commentators come intellectually equipped as clinicians or as academics, and are rarely informed, like Wollheim, by experience.

5. My focus is on Hegel's conception of the mind's activity (in his *Psychology*), hence I do not engage with Ricoeur's comparison of Freud with Hegel (in the Jena *Phenomenology*) on the development of consciousness as a dialectic between teleology and archaeology (Ricoeur 1970, 459ff.).
6. I distinguish 'Developmental Theory' from defensible psychoanalytic theses about mind's development, e.g., attachment theory and the theory of individual character formation (Harcourt 2012).
7. Geuss allows this neutral sense of 'ideology' (Geuss 1981, 4ff.); the usual 'pejorative' one also applies, when idealism's influence on psychoanalytic thought is imperfectly grasped by proponents of psychoanalysis.
8. Philosophical critics include Wittgenstein 1966, Popper 1972, and Grünbaum 1984. For recent reevaluation, see Lacey 2013a, 2013b.
9. These ideas are institutionalised in philosophical writing (Cavell 1996; Gardner 1993; Lear 1990), though often now discarded by psychoanalysts (Vivona 2006).
10. Lear avoids endorsing a version of the Developmental Theory but (in a Hegelian vein) continues: 'insofar as there is a natural developmental thrust by which the mind moves from archaic to more sophisticated formulations, the mind must be striving to understand its own activities' (Lear 1990, 8). Nevertheless, talk of infantile primitive mind persists unexamined in his and other philosophers' writing (Cavell 1996; Gardner 1993).
11. Popper objected that psychoanalysis was a 'pseudoscience'; since observations could always be interpreted to fit the theory it was self-confirming, hence unfalsifiable.
12. The Developmental Theory, while strongly criticised within contemporary psychoanalysis, is not a straw man to my argument; it persists as a source of distortion.
13. There is a fallacy of equivocation; 'primitive' is not univocal but denotes priority in a domain. Logical, conceptual, or ontological primitivity has the technical meaning of 'not further analysable'. In ontology it acquires the connotation of undifferentiatedness. However, being undifferentiated in one developmental sequence can only be identified with undifferentiatedness in another developmental sequence if the sequences can be mapped. Since it is an empirical question whether empirically established developmental sequences are isomorphic it is fallacious to equate the (putative) developmental history of mankind and the (actual) empirical developmental history of individuals. This assumes isomorphism, on no grounds.
14. The phrase is Sulloway's (Sulloway 1979).
15. Freud researched in neuro-embryology.
16. Freud is unlikely to be following Leibniz's Law (which states the indiscernibility of identicals), more likely being influenced by Schelling's system of identity affirming 'the indifference of nature and spirit, of subject and object', these and other such contrasts being already united in the Absolute (Inwood 1995, 800).
17. See note 15. Hegel borrows from Schelling (Cerf 1977), despite disagreeing with his philosophy.
18. Both, notoriously, follow, mirror, or instantiate the onward progress of Absolute Mind, God's own coming to self-consciousness through the parallel journey of mankind.
19. For Hegel, the dialectical movement from Being to its Negation and, through the process of *Aufhebung*, to Sublation (which over-arches of both these) takes the concept's self-realisation forward. We might see this progression as the mind's being efficacious towards itself, a non-mechanical sense of 'efficient cause', with the 'material cause' being mind's active nature. Thanks to Lucia Ziglioli here.
20. Analytic philosophical objection to Freud's references to 'principles' of mental functioning and to phrases such as 'the pleasure ego can do nothing but

wish' as instances of the homunculus fallacy disregards the context of Freud's writing. German thought, infused with Idealist assumptions, and German turns of phrase owed to idealism, are lost to view in the Anglophone reception of psychoanalysis.

21. The idea of unconscious thought is now largely accepted. For arguments in support of psychoanalysis own, further, claim that thoughts and thinking can be kept unavailable to consciousness by mechanisms of psychical defence, see, e.g., Gardner 1991.
22. Wollheim puts this as 'desire satisfied'; the term 'desire' is avoided here since it is not part of active mind (the topic of the *Psychology*; see the editors' preface to this volume); it is drive (*Trieb*) that belongs to active mind.
23. Wollheim is alluding to Davidson: having beliefs being only possible for a creature with the concept of belief (Davidson 1975). But the analytic point belongs to Hegel.
24. Freud's patient the Ratman called this 'the omnipotence of thoughts' (Freud 1909, 233–235).
25. Argued in Wollheim (1969b).
26. See note 19. Freud is perhaps also targeting idealist indifference to the reality of dependence (see Section 2).
27. Personal communication. In pursuing this I leave aside Hegel's own conception of the imagination in the *Psychology* as it is unlikely that psychoanalysis owes anything directly to it. In his treatment of the imagination Hegel attempts to broker a connection between association on the one hand, and Kant's distinction between the productive and reproductive imagination on the other. These are then shoehorned into the progression of Intelligence, through the faculties, leading towards cognition as the goal of Theoretical Mind.
28. While regulation introduces reality by situating the thinking subject as one among others, thus subject to law, this is a move towards objective mind which cannot yet be made; one might think of Freud's reality principle as either anticipating, or more likely compressing the development of subjective and objective mind.
29. This point due to Susanne Herrmann-Sinai.
30. Immanent in Wollheim's reference to Davidson (Wollheim 1982).
31. For Hegel it is intelligence as active self-consciousness that takes up ('comprehends') *Aufhebung*'s resolution of dialectical opposition. Understanding, which belongs only to consciousness, cannot itself grasp dialectical movement (thanks to Lucia Ziglioli for this clarification).
32. Wollheim describes the mind working according to its image of itself as corporeal and so, omnipotent, covering the same ground as his thesis of the 'archaic theory' (Wollheim 1969b).
33. Freud (1900) cites two authors using the term: Havelock Ellis (Chapter I.E) and Nietzsche (Chapter VII.B), without references.
34. ἀρχή has several meanings: 'very old', 'beginning' and 'rule', possibly reflecting separate roots (Lidell and Scott 1998). D'Angour comments on the ancient 'pun' of ἀρχή as beginning and as rule; the uses may be connected through the legitimation that origins give to rulers (see Geuss 1999).
35. D'Angour 2003.—'Container' here refers to the psychoanalytic thesis that in learning to think the subject's inchoate thoughts are contained by another's mind and rendered back to her in thinkable form; 'containment' here suggests idealist associations.
36. The idea of archaicism ramifies throughout nineteenth-century German Romanticism: see Ffytche 2012, 97–213.
37. Nor am I aligning myself with writers drawing on Hegel (e.g. Benjamin 1988) to fortify a relational intersubjective psychoanalysis, or with Lacan and his Kojévian borrowings.

38. See Gardner's exploration of the roots of the psychoanalytic unconscious in post-Kantian idealism (Gardner 2012).
39. Key psychoanalytic writers are Bion (1962), and Rosenfeld (1971); this work is notoriously hard for the lay reader to follow however.
40. Psychoanalysis' idealist ideology generates 'consilience' with German philosophers, who supposedly anticipate psychoanalysis; on the present view, they contribute to producing it.
41. The difficulty of saying anything about states of mind at a point dialectically prior to their being thought under their determining concept introduces the problem of un-thought mind, much discussed philosophically (e.g. Conant 1991) and by psychoanalysts (e.g. Bollas 1987; Vivona 2006).

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